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ABSTRACT 
 
The extant literature concerning the Law of Islamic Finance (LIF) is dominated by illustrations of 
Islamic financial contracts and critiques of the way in which the sharia has been circumvented. 
Much less emphasis has been placed on understanding the regulatory and financial 
environment in which the LIF is formed and practiced. This thesis considers the challenges in 
formulating and implementing a modern, transnational LIF in the conventional financial and legal 
environment and offers solutions to these problems. It demonstrates the way in which the 
classical sharia is transformed by these challenges into a LIF, a hybrid law resulting from 
pluralistic legal interaction and financial competition. In assessing the manner and impact of 
implementing the LIF in the United Kingdom, the thesis considers the interaction of the sharia 
with English law, UK financial services law and international regulatory standards. Comparative 
law methodology, with a particular emphasis upon legal pluralism and legal transplants, are 
employed. 
 
The sharia, a relatively stateless law, is the inspiration behind Islamic financial contracts.  
Dominated by transnational corporate interests, Islamic financial ijtihād represents the strategy 
to adapt conventional financial contracts to sharia criteria.  The results are hybrid structures that 
conform to Islamic legal theory but which generate municipal legal challenges in practice, as 
well as sharia-compliance risks. Such structures have been integrated in English law with the 
creation of tax exemptions and novel regulatory classifications that treat these structures as 
loan arrangements and debt-based instruments. Furthermore, Islamic financial transactions are 
subject to UK financial services regulation, which itself incorporates European Union financial 
directives and Basel Capital Adequacy Standards.  Finally, Islamic financial contracts, which are 
often governed by English law, face challenges in English courts concerning parties’ choice of 
the sharia as the proper law of their contract. Arbitration, on the other hand, offers parties the 
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autonomy to choose the sharia as the substantive law of their contract and to have it enforced 
under English law. 
 
The wide range of challenges in articulating and implementing a LIF demonstrate the hybrid 
nature of the law, resulting from pluralistic legal interaction in modern financial markets. This 
pivotal insight may encourage scholars and practitioners to revise their conception of the LIF 
and, by extension, their view of the industry and its financial practices. In sum, the LIF is a 
modern, transnational law that derives its inspiration from the classical Islamic tradition of 
commerce but which has been innovated in ways that distinguish it as an emergent law in its 
own right.     
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AAOIFI: Auditing and Accounting Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
AB: Advising Bank 
AFIB: Alternative Finance Investment Bond 
BCBS: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS: Bank for International Settlements 
CAR: Capital Adequacy Requirement 
CE: Common Era 
CDO: Collateralised Debt Obligation 
CIS: Collective Investment Schemes 
DCR: Displaced Commercial Risk 
DGS: Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
DIFC: Dubai International Financial Centre 
EC: European Council 
EEA: European Economic Area 
ESUA: Exchange in Satisfaction and User Agreements 
EU: European Union 
FSA: Financial Services Authority 
FSCS: Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
FSMA: Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council 
HMRC: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
HPP: Home Purchase Plan 
IAB: International Accounting Board 
IAH: Investment Account Holders 
IB: Issuing Bank  
IBB: Islamic Bank of Britain 
ICC: International Chamber of Commerce 
ICTA: Income and Corporations Tax Act 
IDB: Islamic Development Bank 
IDR: Issuer Default Rating 
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IFI: Islamic Financial Institution 
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards 
IFSB: Islamic Financial Services Board 
IFSL: International Financial Services London 
IIC: Islamic Investment Company 
IIFM: International Islamic Financial Market 
IILM: International Islamic Liquidity Management Centre 
IIRA: International Islamic Ratings Agency 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
INCOTERMS: International Commercial Terms 
IOSCO: International Organization of Securities Commissions 
LIBOR: London Interbank Overnight Rate 
LIF: Law of Islamic Finance 
LMC: Liquidity Management Centre 
LSE: London Stock Exchange 
MENA: Middle East and North Africa 
MLIF: Municipal Law of Islamic Finance 
NS&I: National Savings & Investments 
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference 
PLS: Profit- and loss-sharing 
PRA: Prudential Regulatory Authority 
PSIA: Profit-sharing and investment account 
RAO: Regulated Activities Order 
SDLT: Stamp Duty Land Tax 
SG: Symphony Gems 
SPL: Sanghi Polyesters Ltd. 
SPV: Special Purpose Vehicle 
SSB: Sharia Supervisory Board 
TCF: Treating Customers Fairly 
TID: The Investment Dar Company 
TII: The International Investor 
TNC: Transnational Corporation 
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UAE: United Arab Emirates 
UK: United Kingdom 
UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
US: United States 
VAT: Value Added Tax 
WTO: World Trade Organisation 
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Note: The transliteration of Arabic words into the Roman script has been undertaken according 
to the Library of Congress transliteration standard.  For the sake of simplicity, most singular 
Arabic words have been given an English ‘s’ to denote the plural form.  Words such as sukuk, 
however, which are often used in modern financial markets, are used in the plural.  Finally, 
Arabic words which, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, have been borrowed into the 
English language have not been transliterated or italicised.  Such words include the sharia, 
Hadith, Sunna and others. 
ARABIC-ENGLISH GLOSSARY 
 
‘Ādat at-tujjār:  practice of the merchant/trader 
‘Adhāb:  punishment, chastisement 
‘Ahd:   obligation, covenant, treaty, agreement 
‘Aqd:   contract, covenant 
‘Amal:   labour; action, performance 
Amānah:  trust, faithfulness 
‘Ariyah:  loan 
Arkān (pl.):  component(s), pillar(s) (of a contract) 
Aṣḥāb al-hadith: people of the Hadith (traditions); term associated with the Mālikīs 
‘Ayn:   a corporeal matter, substance 
 
Bāṭil:    void (legal) 
Batīn:    inner meaning or interpretation 
Bay‘ :    sale 
Bay‘ al-dayn:   sale of debt 
Bay‘  ghā’ib:   contract of sale for an absent thing or object 
Bay‘ al-‘īnah:   double sale used to circumvent the prohibition of lending with interest 
Bay‘ al-wafā’: a contract in which the owner of property (house or land) sells it, with the 
condition that that he will repurchase the property for a larger sum than 
the original price.   
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Bid‘a: innovation 
 
Dalīl:    sign, indication 
Ḍarūrah:   necessity, need 
Dayn:    obligation, debt; also expresses the idea of “claim” or right 
Dhimmah:   capacity, personal responsibility or obligation 
Fā’ida:   interest; growth 
Faqīh (sg.) /Fuqahā’ (pl.): Expert in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
Farḍ:    obligatory 
Fāsid:    defective (legal) 
Faskh:   rescission of a contractual bond 
Fatwa:   legal opinion 
Fiqh:    Islamic jurisprudence 
Fiţra:    the native ability to know of God’s existence 
Furū:  branches of jurisprudence; whereas the uṣūl al-fiqh indicates the roots of 
the law 
 
Gharar:   excessive risk/speculation 
 
Hadith:   narration of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad 
Ḥalāl:    lawful 
Ḥarām:   forbidden 
Ḥawālah:   transfer of debt 
Hibah:    gift 
Hijra:  the emigration of the Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina in 622 
CE 
Ḥīlah (sg.)/ḥiyal (pl.):  legal stratagem 
 
‘Ibādāt:    devotional worship (e.g. prayer, fasting) 
Ibāhah:   permissibility 
Ῑjāb:    offer 
Ijārah:    lease 
Ijārah wa-iqtinā’:  financial lease 
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Ijmā‘:    scholarly consensus 
Ijtihād:   independent reasoning  
Ikhtilāf:   disagreement, difference of opinion 
Ikhtiyār:   option, choice, preference  
‘Illah:  effective cause. The element utilised in establishing a connection 
between the holy sources, the Quran and Sunna, and a novel case 
requiring independent juristic reasoning (ijtihād). 
Irādah:   human will 
Isnād:    chain of authorities (of a Hadith) 
Istiḥsān:   juridical or personal preference 
Istiṣlaḥ:   public benefit (technical legal term) 
Istiṣnā‘:   contract of hire, manufacture 
 
Jahl:    want of knowledge; ignorance 
Jāhilīyah:   time of ignorance; pre-Islamic 
Ju‘ālah:   reward 
 
Kafālah:   guarantee 
Khultah:   mixed type of partnership 
Kitāb:    book 
Kitāb al-ḥiyal:   book of ḥiyal 
 
Madhhab/Madhāhib:  schools of law (Sunni schools of law: Shāfi‘i, Mālikī, Ḥanafī, and Ḥanbalī)  
Mafsadah:   evil 
Majlis:    (noun of place) indicating “a session” or “meeting, assembly” 
Makhraj (sg.)/Makhārij (pl.): exit(s); Ḥanafī term for ḥiyal 
Makrūh:   reprehensible  
Mal:    property 
Mandūb:   meritorious, recommended 
Manfa‘ah:   usufruct 
Maqāṣid al-sharia:  objectives of the sharia 
Maṣlaḥah:   public interest 
Maysir:   gambling 
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Mu’āmalāt:    transactions   
Mubāh:   permissible, licit 
Muḍārabah:   an investment partnership; also known as muqarāḍah and qirāḍ 
Muḍārib:   investment agent 
Mujtahid:   Islamic scholar who possesses the aptitude of performing ijtihād 
Mukhāṭarah:   legal stratagem (ḥīlah), commonly associated with bay‘ al-‘īnah 
Murābaḥah:   a sale with a mark-up (profit) 
Mushārakah:   contractual partnership; participation financing 
Mustaḥabb:   recommendable 
Muzāra‘ah:   agricultural partnership 
 
Naṣṣ:    a text whose presence in the Quran or Hadith must be demonstrated 
Nīyah:    intention 
 
Qabūl:   acceptance (contractual relation) 
Qādī:    Islamic law judge 
Qard ḥasan:   loan, a charitable loan (without interest) 
Qaṣd:    human intention 
Qirād:    sleeping partnership, also known as muḍārabah and muqarāḍah 
Qiyās:  analogical reasoning (one of the four sources of Islamic law according to 
orthodox Sunni Islam) 
 
Rabb al-māl:   investor (a partner in the muḍārabah contract) 
Ra’y:    discretion (legal reasoning) 
Ribā:    usury 
Ribā al-faḍl:   ribā of excess 
Ribā al-nasī’ah:  ribā by delay 
Ribāwī:   ribā-based; illicit 
Riḍan:    the fact of being pleased or contented; approval 
Rukn (sg.):   component(s), pillar(s) (of a contract) 
 
Sabab:   cause 
Ṣadaqa:   voluntary contribution 
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Ṣadd al-dharā’i‘:  blocking the means (legal principle) 
Ṣakk (sg.)/Sukuk (pl.): cheque; Islamic bond, Islamic investment certificate 
 
Salam:   a forward sale (fungible commodity) 
Şaḥīḥ:    valid (legal) 
Shahādah:  witness; the declaration by which a believer professes her belief in the 
Islamic faith 
Sharia:   literally, the way; Islamic law 
Shirkah/Sharikah:  partnership 
Sharikat al-milk:  partnership based on joint ownership 
Sharikat al-wujūh:  credit partnership 
Shurūṭ:   legal formularies; also conditions or appendages to contracts 
Sukuk al-ijārah:  Islamic securitisation based on a lease 
Sunna:  the living tradition; the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad 
(holy source) 
Sūrah:  chapter or segment indicating the way in which the Quran has been 
organised 
 
Takāful:   Islamic insurance 
Takhayyur:   eclectic choice (legal) 
Talāq:    pronunciation of divorce (by the man) 
Talfīq:    patching (a legal technique used to derive a novel legal opinion) 
Taqlīd:  juristic conformity in the period after “gates of ijtihād” were said to have 
been closed 
Tashrī‘:  refers to modern statutory legislation which incorporates elements of the 
sharia 
Tawarruq:   sale and re-sale transaction used to generate cash/liquidity 
Thawāb:   merit; compensation offered where not required 
 
Ulema:   religious scholars 
‘Umlah:   commission 
Ummah:   community 
‘Urf:    custom 
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Uṣūl al-fiqh:   the principles of jurisprudence (methodology) 
 
Wakīl:    agent 
Wakālah:   agency; investment contract in which agent represents investor(s) 
Waqf:    charitable endowment 
Waṣf:    attribute 
 
Zakāh:   obligatory charitable contribution (Islamic law) 
Ẓāhir:    outward meaning of a word, language or event 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND: ISLAMIC FINANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The emergence of the modern Islamic financial industry is recent despite the fact that many of 
the financial transactions from which it takes its inspiration are of ancient heritage.  The 
revolutionary idea of reviving classical Islamic commercial law in the modern world was first put 
to practice at an Islamic financial project in Mit Ghamr, Egypt in the 1960s.  Thereafter, the first 
fully-fledged Islamic commercial bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, was established in 1975.1  Since 
then the industry’s upward trajectory has taken observers by surprise with annual rates of asset 
growth ranging between 10-15 per cent.  The global Islamic financial market, estimated at 
$951bn,2 is now active in more than 70 jurisdictions across the globe.3   
 
Islamic finance derives many of its principles and rules from classical Islamic commercial law.4  
Although the sharia (Islamic law) does not nor ever has provided the governing order of nation-
states throughout the Muslim world,5 the industry’s existence and future development depend, in 
                                               
1 Askari et al., “New Issues”  (2009), 5. 
2 International Financial Services London, "Islamic Finance 2010” (2010), 1. 
3 Askari et al., “New Issues”  (2009), 5. 
4 Following Nicholas HD Foster I use the term “classical” to denote the long period stretching from the first 
Quranic revelations in 623 A.D. until the early 19th century when Islamic law was displaced by Western-
based legal systems.  The term “medieval” has been avoided as it refers to a European periodisation. 
5 The sharia was the governing legal order of Islamic empires, kingdoms, and other polities in the pre-
modern era, prior to the creation of nation-states.  The modern period saw the almost total displacement 
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large part, on Muslim investors’ perception that its financial products and services are in keeping 
with the rules and religious spirit of the classical Islamic legal tradition.   
 
The fact that the United Kingdom (UK), the principal country on which this research is focused, 
now constitutes the tenth largest country in terms of the size of its Islamic assets, valued at 
$10.4 billion in 2008,6  is an indication of the transnational reach of the industry. In the UK, 
Islamic finance has benefitted from the City of London’s conventional financial prowess.  The 
UK now houses five Islamic financial institutions which offer sharia-compliant financial products 
and services and the City of London has established itself as the third largest market for Islamic 
finance after the Gulf Co-operation Council states (GCC) and Malaysia.7  Moreover, seventeen 
conventional banks have established windows to offer Islamic financial products and services.8  
 
Yet the history of Islamic finance in the UK is fairly recent.  In the early 1980s a number of 
Middle Eastern Islamic banks established subsidiaries in the UK which conducted wholesale 
operations.9 In 1982 the first retail Islamic financial operations were developed by the Jeddah-
based Al Baraka Investment Company, which bought Hargrave Securities (a licensed deposit-
                                                                                                                                                       
of the sharia as the governing legal order from the Muslim world. For an analysis of the transformation of 
the sharia see Foster, "Comparative Commercial Law” (2011).  One exception is Saudi Arabia in which 
the sharia is put forth as the law of the land.  We discuss this issue further in chapter four, s 4.2. 
6 Askari et al., “New Issues”, 7. 
7 International Financial Services London, "Islamic Finance 2010”, 1. 
8 The CityUK, "Islamic Finance” (2011). 
9 Wilson, "Islamic Banking” (2010), 212. 
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taker), and transformed it into an Islamic bank.10  Following Al Baraka’s exit from the Islamic 
housing market, the United Bank of Kuwait, which had previously focused on Islamic trade 
financing for Gulf clients, began to offer home ownership plans based on the murābaḥah (cost 
mark-up) contract.  These, however, incurred double stamp duty; in the first instance when the 
property was purchased by the bank and in the second when the property was sold to the client 
with a profit.11   
 
Following the UK government’s abolition of double stamp duty in the 2003 Finance Act, these 
transactions became more competitive with their conventional equivalents and ushered in new 
business activity.12  In 2003 HSBC launched its amānah current account and home financing 
products and in 2005 Lloyds TSB also introduced a range of Islamic retail banking products.13  
Not until 2004 did the Financial Services Authority (FSA) license the Islamic Bank of Britain, the 
first wholly sharia-compliant retail bank in the United Kingdom.14  Since then four other 
wholesale Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) have been authorized, including the European 
Islamic Investment Bank and, most recently, Gatehouse Bank.  Moreover, at least nine Islamic 
fund managers, one sharia-compliant hedge fund manager, a takaful insurance provider and a 
                                               
10 Ibid., 213. 
11 Ibid., 214-15. 
12 Ibid., 217-18. 
13 Ibid. 
14 NS&I, "Review” (2008), 8. 
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growing number of advisory firms in the legal, accountancy and consultancy professions are 
active in the UK.15   
 
Until recently the United Kingdom was the only country in the European Union to house stand-
alone Islamic financial institutions16 despite its small Muslim population relative to France’s 
seven million and Germany’s four million Muslims.17   
 
In large part, this is due to the City of London’s tradition of innovation and flexibility, its deep and 
highly liquid markets, and the fact that its exchanges are some of the most frequently used 
venues for listing and trading financial instruments globally.18 Furthermore, commercial 
transactions under English law are protected so as to facilitate free trade and to mitigate the 
application of rules that would obstruct business activity.19 The United Kingdom also maintains 
close linkages with Muslim states and their citizens as a result of its colonial history and 
subsequent immigration flows.20  
 
                                               
15 Treasury, “Development” (2008), 6. 
16  HMRC, "Stamp Duty: Response”  (2009), 3. 
17 In 2009 Germany licensed its first stand-alone Islamic bank, Kuveyt Türk Beteiligungsbank. See 
Parker, "Islamic Bank” (2010). In June 2011 Chaabi Bank Europe, a subsidiary of Banque Chaabi du 
Maroque, introduced the first Islamic retail products to the French market.  See Saillon, “Islamic Banking” 
(2011). 
18 Ainley et al., “Islamic Finance” (2007), 7. 
19 Goode, “Commercial Law”  ( 2010), 9. 
20 Nielsen, “Muslims”  (2004), 40-62. 
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Furthermore, London’s Western pre-eminence is underpinned by multinational participation in 
the market as evidenced by the fact that Deutsche Bank and Barclays Capital are now among 
the world’s top five issuers of sukuk (Islamic bond).21  Indeed, there are now 20 sukuk issues 
listed on the London Stock Exchange, with total funds of over $11 billion.  Only Dubai’s 
NASDAQ exceeds these figures worldwide.22  Further, money flows through the UK capital via 
the commodity murābaḥah – which are used as interbank short-term lending and syndicated 
loans – are higher than any other financial centre.23 Recently, however, other jurisdictions are 
have been catching up.  Luxembourg has worked to amend some of its tax provisions to 
facilitate its development as an Islamic financial hub24 and France, Germany and Ireland have 
begun to initiate tax changes to accommodate Islamic finance within their borders.25 
 
1.2  OBJECTIVE  
 
The objective of this thesis is to consider the challenges in formulating and implementing the 
modern, transnational Law of Islamic Finance (LIF) in conventional financial and legal 
architectures.  It examines the challenges of articulating the LIF from a global perspective since 
many Islamic financial transactions are cross-border, comprise multiple legal and normative 
systems, and rely on multiple municipal jurisdictions for their enforcement. Therefore, Islamic 
                                               
21 Furneaux et al., “Development” (2008/09), 45. 
22 Parker, "Islamic Finance” (2010).  
23 Oakley, "London Leads”  (2009), 4. 
24 Parker, "Islamic Finance” (2010). 
25 Masmoudi et al., "Islamic Finance” (2010). 
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financial transactions, although relying on a local jurisdiction for implementation, are necessarily 
global in terms of the wide array of factors that influence their composition. The implementation 
of the LIF, on the other hand, focuses almost exclusively on the United Kingdom; the 
implementation of the LIF requires a positive municipal legal system and international regulatory 
order for its effective functioning.  However, even the implementation of the LIF cannot easily be 
limited to a single jurisdiction.  Sometimes Islamic financial transactions depend upon multiple 
jurisdictions for their enforcement, as was the case recently when a default event surrounding a 
sukuk issuance was subject to both English and the United Arab Emirates law of Dubai.26  
 
Many subsidiary questions derive from the central research objective.  Two general questions 
are:  (1) whether and/or to what extent Islamic financial transactions constitute authentic sharia-
based transactions.  Sharia-based transactions are those that comply with classical sharia rules 
and evince the ethical and religious spirit of Islam.  On the other hand, sharia-compatible 
transactions comply with the letter of the law but do not necessarily comprise the law’s ethical 
and religious underpinnings.  (2) Whether a truly authentic mode of alternative finance is 
feasible in the UK, and in Western political economies, in general. This involves the analysis of 
the institutional arrangements that underlie the economy and political system of Western states; 
and whether these arrangements permit an alternative mode of finance to co-exist.   
 
                                               
26 See Salah, "Debt Crisis” (2010). The Nakheel sukuk was did not make it to court so that the the 
question of which law(s) governed the relevant contracts was not tested.    
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1.3  TERMINOLOGY 
 
The following terms are used in the following ways:  
‘Islamic law’ and the ‘sharia’: Literally translated, the sharia is the road to the watering place, the 
clear path to God.27  It originates from the primary source of Islamic law, the Quran, which, 
according to Muslims, is the word of God, revealed by the Prophet Muhammad; and the second 
revealed source of law, the Sunna, which are the sayings and doings of the Prophet 
Muhammad.  The sharia sets forth numerous comprehensive social obligations and ideals in all 
facets of life, which, at its greatest extent, encompasses a “totality of life-ways”28 amongst 
Muslims everywhere, and attached to these practical consequences and ultimate sanctions.29  
The fiqh refers to the body of law created by Muslim jurists and is thus distinguishable from the 
sharia.  In practice, however, the fiqh is often included under the umbrella term of “Islamic law”, 
and this practice will be followed herein.  The sharia encompasses Islamic commercial law, 
although classical jurists did not distinguish between commercial and other types of law.  
 
Second, “hybridities” or “hybrid” legal structures: these arise when a range of legal orders 
interact to create the structure. These legal orders can be located in, for example, state law, 
religious law or international financial standards in a particular historical context. In this respect 
hybrid legal structures can be understood as a type of legal pluralism, in that the resulting 
ordering is based upon a multiplicity of formal and informal, national and transnational legal 
                                               
27 Ballantyne, “Essays”  (2000), 33. 
28 Hodgson, “Venture”  (1961), 75. 
29 Ibid., 74. 
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sources. Hybrid legal structures are not easily distinguished from “mixed” legal systems.  For 
example, “mixed Law” scholarship does not dispute the legal pluralism of every existing legal 
system.  However, it places greater theoretical emphasis on understanding the interaction of 
established “families of law” classified according to their historical, geographical and ideological 
roots, whereas legal pluralism is concerned with all types of normative orderings.  Mixed law 
scholarship also makes initial assumptions concerning its categorisation of legal families as 
“pure” or “mixed”, etc.  Its objective is to locate the elements of legal interaction and try to 
understand how these elements affect the original legal family.30  
 
“Municipal Law”: is the law of a jurisdiction or area in which a legal system is operative, e.g. 
England and Wales, France and New York state.  Terms such as “national law” are defective, 
as they do not take account of the fact that many nation states such as the UK and the US are 
divided into various jurisdictions.31 
   
The Law of Islamic Finance (LIF): the LIF is the hybrid law of modern Islamic financial 
transactions practiced worldwide, without specific reference to any particular jurisdiction. It 
embodies a wide variety of legal norms and systems including the sharia, municipal law, 
national law, regional law and international regulatory standards. For example, the LIF 
encompasses the localised versions of the LIF in places such as Malaysia, the UAE, Bahrain 
and the United Kingdom. 
                                               
30 See, for example, Örücü, "Mixed” (1996). 
31 Following NHD Foster. 
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A Municipal Law of Islamic Finance (MLIF): represents all legal aspects of Islamic finance in a 
specific jurisdiction including the sharia, municipal law, i.e. English law, national regulation (UK 
law), EU law and international financial standards.  
 
“English Law”: is the law of England and Wales. England and Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland are the three legal jurisdictions that comprise the United Kingdom.  Each jurisdiction 
has a separate judiciary and contains bodies of substantive and procedural law that are 
applicable only to that jurisdiction.32  Common law is the basis of the English and Welsh legal 
system.  Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland have developed constitutional codes for regional 
governance in the form of devolution statutes.  These statutes are: the Northern Ireland Act 
1998; the Government of Wales Act 2006; and the Scotland Act 1998.  As a result, these three 
countries have developed distinct legislative and executive institutions that are separate from 
the central government of the United Kingdom.  England has no ‘English Parliament’ or ‘English 
government’ that can be distinguished from the UK as a whole.33  The UK Parliament, as the 
supreme legislative body of the United Kingdom, is the sole body with power to enact statutes 
for England and/or Wales.34   
 
                                               
32 Feldman, “Principles”  (2009), 12. 
33 Ibid., 9-10. 
34 Ibid., 101. 
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“Finance Acts”: are so-called “money bills” which stipulate tax law in the United Kingdom.  
These Acts are the primary vehicle by which so-called alternative finance arrangements,35 the 
term used to refer to Islamic financial transactions, have been facilitated in the UK.  Many 
Islamic financial transactions – throughout the world – are governed by English law.   
 
“Financial Services Authority”: all financial services are regulated by a universal regulatory 
authority in the United Kingdom known as the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  The Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) is the primary legislation that gives the FSA 
authority to regulate all financial services.  The FSA’s regulatory and supervisorial authority is 
referred to as UK law because of its application in the whole of the United Kingdom.  
 
In the UK the LIF has been facilitated within English law and regulated according to UK financial 
services law.  However, these tiers of legal orders are subject to external legal and normative 
incursions. For instance, UK financial regulation must comply with European Union (EU) 
financial directives36 and the EU has been highly responsive to global financial standard-setting, 
particularly Basel capital adequacy standards.  
 
Now that the field of legal and regulatory interaction is clarified the following hypothesis is 
proposed: it is suggested that the challenges of articulating and implementing the sharia in 
modern financial markets are largely attributable to the application of the law in the complex 
                                               
35 This is the term used to facilitate Islamic financial transactions in UK Finance Acts. 
36 In chapter six the role of EU financial directives and international banking standards are examined.  
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modern financial and legal environment.  An examination of these challenges illustrates the way 
in which they transform the sharia into the LIF comprised of hybrid legal elements that, following 
Foster,37 represent an emergent legal system in its own right. The financial and legal 
environment is the primary factor in generating the LIF and its municipal variants (MLIFs). The 
LIF is a global law, comprised of multiple normative orders, and given municipal effect according 
to financial imperatives. It is a law that is inspired by classical legal theory and its history of 
commercial pragmatism. Yet it has been transformed in such a way that it diverges not only 
from the ethical and religious substance of classical traditions but also from traditional legal 
forms. The result is a law that has converged with the capitalist world economy but, as a result, 
has acquired a unique pluralistic and cultural identity. While the LIF has permitted the Islamic 
financial industry to achieve financial success, theorisers face the central challenge of retaining 
Islamic authenticity in the law in a highly innovative financial environment. This dilemma is 
increasingly expressed in terms of whether products and services can transcend the merely 
sharia-compliant (i.e. permissible, ‘ḥalāl’) threshold and become sharia-based (i.e. good, 
‘tayyib’).38   
 
1.4 SCHOLARLY CONTEXT 
 
The LIF constitutes a very recent field of inquiry amongst Islamic legal and economics scholars.  
It has generally been presented as a modern enigma, insofar as it combines the utilisation of 
                                               
37 See Foster, "Islamic Finance” (2007), 186-188. 
38 The classical scale of legal and ethical distinctions is examined in sections 2.2.1 and 3.4.  
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age-old classical Islamic law with the practices of modern financial markets.39  The industry’s 
ambitions to create an alternative to the conventional, interest-based financial system and to 
inject religion, ethics and morality into the substance and conduct of financial affairs strengthen 
this viewpoint. Thus, the industry’s success has rekindled hope that the sharia can again play 
an important role in the modern world.40  After its almost total displacement in the mid-19th 
century, its only viable role has been in the law of personal status, and even this has been 
transformed in function and form to resemble state law.41 Some writers have argued that Islamic 
finance represents the renewal of the sharia in the modern world, although this has proved to be 
a highly controversial idea.42 
 
As a consequence of these larger ramifications, the vast majority of research in the field is 
devoted to understanding this modern social, legal and economic phenomenon. This thesis 
does not distinguish itself from earlier works in this regard.  Yet it is designed to approach the 
problem in a different way, by placing emphasis on understanding the law within the regulatory 
and modern financial environment, rather than seeking answers based on a purely doctrinal 
legal analysis.  A contextual perspective incorporates the fact that commercial law is often 
forged in reaction and adaptation to dominant market forces, regulation and market events.   
 
                                               
39 Karasik et al., "Islamic Finance” (2007), 379. 
40 Vogel and Hayes, “Islamic Law” (1998), 3. 
41 Hallaq, “Sharia” (2009), 500.  Layish, "Secularisation” (1978), 272-73. Anderson, “Islamic Law” (1959), 
96. Anderson, “Reform”  (1976), 1-2. 
42 For example, Ray, “Renewal” (1995).  
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The principal contribution of this thesis lies in its analysis of the pluralistic legal interaction of 
sharia-compatible financial structures within the UK regulatory and financial services 
environment. This particular focus clarifies some of the conceptual and practical difficulties 
surrounding the development of an emergent LIF. Further, it provides insight into the way in 
which a municipal LIF develops within the institutional framework of specific jurisdictions. 
Therefore, the thesis clarifies many of the financial practices of the modern Islamic financial 
industry.  This may be important in that the industry’s practices have been controversial 
amongst many devout Muslims.  More generally, the thesis argues that the LIF constitutes a 
unique law in its own right and, as such, would benefit from novel approaches to the topic.  The 
LIF, in fact, may represent the most important part in the renewal of Islamic law in today’s world.  
 
To date, scholarly efforts aimed at understanding this complex dynamic have been very few and 
limited in scope.  For example, several articles treat the development in passing, sometimes 
sporadically, and occasionally by reference to a certain field of study, usually litigation.43  Others 
are concerned with charting the development of the industry in the UK.44  In general, authors’ 
objectives are circumscribed to narrow areas of study; they do not attempt to understand the 
application of modern Islamic financial law within the context of the nation-state’s financial 
services regulatory architecture.  The reasons for this are likely due to the fact that most 
scholars continue to associate the LIF with classical Islamic commercial law.  To the best of my 
                                               
43 See, e.g. Bälz, "Islamic Finance” (2007); Bälz, "Murabaha” (2004); Bälz, "Islamic Law” (2001); Junius, 
"Islamic Finance” (2007). 
44 Wilson, "Islamic Investment” (2010); Wilson, "Islamic Banking” (2010); Wilson, "Regulatory Challenges” 
(2010); Wilson, "Challenges and Opportunities” (2010). 
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knowledge, only one work has broken free from this constraint and treated the LIF as a law in its 
own right, comprised of multiple normative and legal systems, and requiring separate study for 
advancement.45  
 
Foster’s conception of an emergent legal system represents the first articulation of the LIF as an 
emerging legal system.  His work indicates that the industry’s attempt to reduce transaction 
costs and/or legal uncertainty have led to wide-ranging efforts to create standardised contracts, 
accounting guidelines and regulatory standards.  Further, international Islamic organisations 
charged with the task represent some of the “normative mechanisms” which are busy creating 
the LIF.  His analysis also considers the role of Western-based law firms in structuring Islamic 
financial transactions, creating standardised contracts and ensuring certainty by using English 
law as the governing law of contracts.  However, Foster’s objective is narrowly circumscribed to 
providing an outline of the emergent legal system.  He does not attempt to articulate the legal 
pluralistic processes – the interactive tiers of law in tandem with market forces – that effectively 
generate the LIF.46   
 
Another recent contribution is Balala (2011).47 Balala illustrates how sukuk can be integrated 
into the English common law legal framework. In fact, her work provides insights into the 
                                               
45 Foster, "Islamic Finance” (2007). 
46 I wish to acknowledge the assistance given by Nicholas Foster (one of my PhD supervisors) in helping 
me to clarify and develop my thinking with regard to this concept.  His perception that the LIF constitutes 
a separate and emerging legal system has provided the basis of this scholarship.   
47 Balala, “Theory and Practice” (2011). 
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commonalities between Islamic law and English common law that make this symbiosis 
profitable.  However, her principal argument is concerned with showing the fallacy of the 
sharia’s dominant interpretation which stresses a textual form over substance approach to the 
law.  Her work does not consider how the multiple tiers of law in addition to English law, i.e. UK 
financial services regulation, EU directives, etc., affect the English municipal legal environment.  
 
Similarly, DeLorenzo and McMillen illustrate the means and ways of assimilating Islamic 
financial structures into a Western-based legal system.48  However, their objective is not 
focused on understanding the challenges in articulating and implementing the LIF, rather on 
demonstrating the necessary legal provisions that must be adopted to facilitate Islamic financial 
transactions.  
 
A recent book by Aldohni is the first to address the challenges in implementing retail Islamic 
financial transactions in the UK regulatory and legal environment.49  His work principally focuses 
on the implementation of Islamic Home Purchase Plans50 and refrains from examining the 
challenges in the articulation of the LIF.  Therefore, his work is not an analysis of the way in 
which the classical sharia is transformed through these challenges.  As a result, his analysis 
does not conceptualise the LIF as the hybrid product of pluralistic legal interaction and 
competitive financial markets.   
                                               
48 See, e.g. DeLorenzo and McMillen, "Law” (2007); McMillen, "Sukuk”  (2006/2007). 
49 Aldohni, “Islamic Banking” (2011). 
50 Ibid., 162-70. 
41 
 
 
Legal analyses of the global phenomenon are often concerned with departures or deviations 
from the erroneously conceptualised classical legal tradition and the resultant economic 
inefficiencies of the contemporary industry.51  El-Gamal and Hamoudi are the most prominent 
authors representing this general line of argument. El-Gamal’s work shows great depth and 
understanding of how the industry practices sharia arbitrage, i.e. fulfilling the legal dictates of 
the sharia but evading the religious substance of its provisions.  Likewise, Hamoudi 
demonstrates an almost visceral disdain for the legal fictions which he claims characterise the 
industry. Strangely, neither author considers whether the classical commercial tradition was any 
different.  Nevertheless, both authors convincingly demonstrate that, in practice, Islamic finance 
pays much too little attention to the ethical and moral substance of the law.  These authors do 
not consider the challenges in the implementation of the law, and, as a result, are not concerned 
with the sharia’s pluralistic legal interaction within municipal legal systems. Nor do their 
analyses view the LIF as an emergent legal system. Their objectives have clear consequences 
for how they perceive the law that comprises the Islamic financial industry. 
 
Moreover, underlying El-Gamal’s and Hamoudi’s general premise is the intimation that Islam 
must rethink its prohibition of lending at interest for Islam to play a meaningful and authentic role 
                                               
51 See, e.g. Hamoudi, "Schizophrenia” (2006-2007), 611; Hamoudi, "Muezzin's Call” (2008); Hamoudi, 
"Social Justice” (2007), 112; Hamoudi, "Revolution” (2007-2008), 262; El-Gamal, "Interest” (2003-2004); 
El-Gamal, “Islamic Finance”  (2006). 
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in the modern economy.52 However, this suggestion is not feasible – nor has it ever been – 
amongst devout Muslims. It would require Muslims to turn their back on a prohibition that pre-
dates the rise of Islam.53  
 
A number of other authors54 have undertaken rigorous analyses of the LIF that offer insightful 
views on the modern law.  However, these works are not concerned with the interaction of 
market forces and multiple tiers of law. The line of reasoning in these works assumes that 
sharia scholars’ development of the law is the result of a strict ethical adherence to the uṣūl al-
fiqh (principles of jurisprudence).  Their work rarely problematises jurists’ legal rulings (fatwas).  
Their interpretation of the LIF is generally explained by jurists’ extraction of the law from the holy 
sources.  Our analysis of the LIF demonstrates that multiple tiers of legality and market forces 
are the principal normative mechanisms behind the LIF, which distinguishes it from classical 
jurisprudence.  
 
                                               
52For example, El-Gamal argues that ribā should be interpreted in terms of efficiency rather than 
exploitation.  He argues that Ibn Rushd perceived this underlying meaning long ago.  Such an 
interpretation would force jurists to rethink whether the absolute prohibition of interest is, in fact, contrary 
to the more limited meaning.  El-Gamal, "An Economic Explication” (2001). See supra note 26 for 
Hamoudi’s references to the prohibition of ribā. 
53 For a discussion of pre-Islamic ideas concerning usury, see Langholm, “Aristotelian Analysis”  (1984). 
54 See, e.g. Vogel and Hayes, “Islamic Law”; Kamali, “Commercial Law “ (2000); Ray, “Renewal” 
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The majority of the vast body of Islamic financial literature represents textbook-like introductions 
of the main financial developments in the field and the prevalent legal structures employed.55  
Most of the works in this genre are quite descriptive.  These works are not legal approaches to 
the LIF, although they do invariably outline the financial structures used in the industry.  Many of 
these works are very informative and thus contribute to the informational requirements of the 
industry, but they are not concerned with the interactive nature of the law nor its nature as an 
emergent legal system.  
 
A small number of insightful and thoroughly interdisciplinary analyses of the field shed light on 
the sociological, legal and economic importance of Islamic finance56 but in so doing 
underemphasise or fail to address the complex history and primary role of the law which 
undergirds Islamic financial transactions.  In particular, Warde offers one of the best all-around 
analyses of modern Islamic finance.  The great strength of his work is that it emphasises the 
importance of understanding the financial environment in which Islamic finance operates.  
Moreover, his general premise that the overriding influence of economic forces determines the 
trajectory of the industry accords with the results of this research.  Yet his work portrays a global 
industry in broad brushstrokes, so his analysis sometimes neglects the nuances and contextual 
                                               
55 Thomas and et al., “Structuring”  (2005); Visser, Islamic Finance (2007); Kettel, “Introduction”  (2008); 
Saw et al., “Introduction”  (2008); Saw et al. “Theory and Practice”  (2008); Ahmad, “Theory and Practice”  
(2010). El Diwany, “Islamic Banking”  (2010). 
56 Warde, “Islamic Finance”  (2000); Maurer, “Mutual Life”  (2005). Abdul-Rahman has produced an 
interesting work in which he tries to understand the modern role of money and its effects on Islamic 
finance.  Abdul-Rahman, “The Art”  (2010). 
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richness that a focused case study presents.  For example, Warde devotes a significant portion 
of his work to the analysis of the Islamic financial landscape and the emergence of IFIs in global 
financial markets.  Yet his book devotes only a small chapter to the role of global financial 
regulation, and then does so by generalising regulatory mandates as though they were not 
connected to municipal jurisdictions.57  
 
Maurer’s anthropological perspective of the industry helps us to understand the sociological 
importance of Islamic finance’s highly “entangled” social and economic practices.  Thus, his 
book helps to clarify the complex social meaning surrounding the emergence of Islamic finance.  
However, his work underplays the central importance of the sharia with respect to Muslims’ 
choice to believe and invest in Islamic financial products. 
 
1.5 GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
 
The approach to researching this thesis has been primarily literature-based.  The literature on 
classical Islamic law and Islamic legal theory consists primarily of secondary sources, but a few 
translated primary works were also used. It was felt that the predominance of secondary 
sources did not diminish the authority of the research, as its primary function was to create a 
general picture of the field of investigation.  Research connected to the municipal LIF – the case 
study of the UK’s localised facilitation of Islamic finance – employed government documents and 
                                               
57 See ch. 10 on regulatory issues. 
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miscellaneous communications originating from Islamic finance conferences as well as private, 
informal conversations. This general approach was conducive to the objective of researching 
the law’s articulation and the challenges of its implementation. For example, the interaction of 
the LIF with municipal, national and international legal systems required the use of government 
documents and non-governmental sources of information. The research also called for utilising 
a number of English court judgments that pertain to the enforcement of Islamic financial 
transactions.   
 
The formulation of the LIF and its implementation in the UK involve a study of the interaction 
between several legal systems.  It was necessary to use the comparative law methodology and, 
in particular, legal pluralism.  Various aspects of the thesis have also benefitted from work on 
legal transplants. 
 
1.5.1 COMPARATIVE LAW  
 
Comparative law compares and contrasts trends, similarities and dissimilarities of norms, 
institutions, cultures and entire legal systems.58  It “affords us a glimpse into the form and 
formation of legal institutions which develop in parallel, possibly in accordance with laws yet to 
be determined, and permits us to catch sight, through the differences in detail, of the grand 
                                               
58 Palmer, "Lerotholi”  (2005), 262-63. 
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similarities […]” as well as the mutual influence between legal systems.59 Furthermore, 
comparative legal tools help us to understand particular factors shaping legal growth and 
change. It helps us to understand better the nature of law and especially the nature of legal 
development.  This is often achieved by examining the historical relationships between legal 
systems.60    
 
Comparative law offers a number of methodologies that help to achieve these goals.  These 
include the historical, evolutionary, functional, statistical and empirical methods but could 
include any number of comparative legal techniques.61   
 
An important tool for understanding the implementation of the LIF in the UK concerns the 
concept of legal transplants.  The concept refers to the process of a rule relocating “from one 
country to another or from one people to another”.62 Once relocated, a legal transplant often 
develops within the host system just as a native rule or institution would.  Legal transplants 
generally fall into three categories, despite their wide variety of shapes and sizes: (1) when a 
people relocates to a foreign country where there is a much different civilisation, and brings its 
law with it; (2) when a people relocates to a foreign country where there is a similar civilisation 
but, nonetheless, brings its law with it; (3) and “when a people voluntarily accepts a large part of 
                                               
59 Zweigert and Koetz, “Comparative Law “ (1998), 3. 
60 Watson, “Transplants”  (1993), 7. See generally Twining’s categorisation in “Globalisation” (2000).  
61 Palmer, "Lerotholi” (2005), 263. 
62 Watson, “Transplants”  (1993), 21. 
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the system of another people or peoples”.63 The concept of legal transplants assists in 
conceptualising the process by which the LIF has been transmitted to the UK via immigration 
flows, historical ties and commercial relationships.  
 
The concept of legal pluralism advances this analysis significantly by providing a framework for 
understanding the transformation of the sharia in its interaction with multiple legal and normative 
orders in a single jurisdiction. Legal pluralism describes a situation in which two or more bodies 
of law coexist in the same social field.64 The concept originated from studies of hybrid legal 
systems created by European colonisation.  European countries superimposed their state-
based law on native legal systems, resulting in a situation in which different bodies of law were 
available for different population groups.65  
 
From the 1970s, the concept has been used to analyse non-colonised industrial states.  In this 
context it is used to examine relations between dominant and subordinate groups, such as 
ethnic, cultural and religious minorities, as well as unofficial normative orders66 in institutional 
                                               
63 Ibid., 29-30. 
64 Woodman, "Pluralism” (1999), 10. 
65 Merry, "Pluralism” (1988), 870. 
66 The boundary between normative orders that can and cannot be called law has not been decided and 
will not be attempted in this thesis.  The problem persists because of the great diversity amongst 
normative orders and the particular social fields in which they are present.  The normative orderings 
examined in this thesis are relatively uncontroversial in that Islamic law is generally accepted as ‘law’, and 
other legal systems are either state-based or globally accepted as normative standards, i.e. Basel Capital 
Adequacy Requirements (CARs).  
48 
 
and social networks.67 Contemporary views of legal pluralism see the interaction of highly 
complex normative orders in virtually every society and social field.  As a result, legal pluralism’s 
early focus on the effect that law had on society, and vice versa, has been redirected towards 
the interaction of highly complex official and unofficial normative orders in the same social 
field.68   
 
A useful tool in this regard is the concept of semi-autonomous spaces, which is a 
methodological tool used to describe the pluralistic ordering of complex societies.69  The 
concept provides the powerful insight that the “semiautonomous social field is one that can 
generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but that [...] is also vulnerable to rules and 
decisions, and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded”.70 The 
concept introduces a realistic conception of social fields that are not confined by impermeable 
boundaries and in which local, national, and global normative orders interact with each other 
simultaneously.  Crucially, cultures or social orders are never impervious or sealed-off from 
outside forces; instead they are dynamically evolving sub-systems which interact with other 
referents in highly complex ways;71 and which may come to mimic, resemble or define 
themselves in opposition to each other.   
 
                                               
67 Merry, "Pluralism” (1988), 872. 
68 Ibid., 873.   
69 The methodology is attributable to Moore, “Law”  (1978). 
70 Merry, "Pluralism” (1988), 878. 
71 Twining, “Globalisation”  (2000), 85. 
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Thus the concept of semi-autonomous spaces is an important tool in recognising the plurality of 
state law.  “State law legal pluralism” has been described as a type of legal pluralism in which 
multiple bodies of law within the state are branches of a much larger body of norms.72 State law 
“constitutes and is constituted by the normative orders of which it is composed”,73 whether these 
derive from customs, religion, religious law, corporations, institutions, associations or states.74 
Therefore, state law represents a plurality of legal norms, sometimes conflicting and otherwise 
fused in disparate networks of legalities.  This post-modern conception of the law, which 
differentiates it from positivist views that isolate state-based law as a separate field of study,75 
highlights the “multiple networks of legal orders” that intersect in dynamic, unstable76 and 
generative ways.  
 
The multiple tiers of law evidenced in our case study of the UK reflect this complex reality of 
interacting values, norms and legal systems.77  Hence, the sharia, English law, UK law, EU law, 
and international financial standards interact in ways that sometimes interfere with one 
another,78  or have unforeseen outcomes.  The result of this conception prevents the 
examination of a single normative or legal system in isolation from others without 
underestimating the complexity of the legal system in consideration.     
                                               
72 Woodman, "Pluralism” (1988) 10. 
73 Merry, "Pluralism” (1988), 883. 
74 Örücü, "Mixed” (1996), 342. 
75 Menski, “Comparative Law”  (2006), 55. 
76 Santos, "Law” (1987), 298. 
77 Santos, “Sense”  (1995), 270. 
78 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, a state’s facilitation of normative orders within its legal framework may create and 
give legitimacy to a plurality of normative orders. The facilitation of Islamic financial transactions 
within English law is a case in point.  This facilitation provides individuals with the freedom to 
realise their own financial objectives within a framework specified by municipal law. Similar to 
the legal facilities of the marriage, contracts, wills, companies and trusts, the government has 
enabled individuals’ private law-making;79 in this case, their ability to determine their legal 
relations with others in accordance with their religious beliefs.  The result of these facilitations, 
to varying degrees, creates and legitimates a “plurality of semi-autonomous realms” within the 
state.80  The state’s incorporation of these realms may give an illusion of a single ultimate 
source of authority, a unitary legal order,81 which does not necessarily apply.  
 
Legal pluralism represents a conceptual shift “away from the ideology of legal centralism” – the 
doctrine that holds all law is made by the state.82  It throws into question whether other semi-
autonomous legal and normative systems should be recognised and accommodated.  The 
marginalisation of pluralistic normative systems may undermine efforts to establish social 
harmony and impartial justice.83  Worldwide, normative pluralities are in the process of de- and 
re-territorialising social, legal and financial relations in former colonial empires.  This is evident 
                                               
79 Sugarman, "Law” (1983), 216. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Goldberg and Attwooll, "Legal Orders” (1996), 320. 
82 Merry, "Pluralism”, (1988), 889. 
83 Menski, “Comparative Law”  (2006), 64. 
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in the transmission of the LIF to the United Kingdom.  In this historical context the transmission 
and interaction of culturally diffuse norms has resulted in hybridities or hybrid legal structures.84   
 
However, recognising the plurality of normative and legal systems does not go far enough.  
Legal pluralist analyses are useful in their capacity to situate the interaction of pluralistic 
normative orderings in a particular historical context. This may assist policymakers and 
practitioners to accommodate non-state based legal systems in a manner that reflects the moral 
conditions of localised social life. By providing analyses of normative orderings in particular 
historical locations, legal pluralist analyses build a bridge to the social conditions in which legal 
norms and values are formed and expressed, and from whence their authority and legitimacy 
derive.85   
 
1.6   STRUCTURE 
 
The following discussion summarises the content and highlights the role of each individual 
chapter.  In particular, it illustrates the way in which each individual chapter contributes to 
answering the principal research objective.  Apart from this chapter the thesis consists of 3 
parts, formed of 9 substantive chapters and a conclusion.   
 
 
                                               
84 Geertz, “Local Knowledge”  (1983), 216. 
85 Cotterrell, “Law's Community”  (1995), 3. 
52 
 
1.6.1  COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE CLASSICAL SHARIA  
 
Part I consists of chapters two and three.  It provides a general outline of the sharia and 
classical Islamic commercial law, and some general trends in the classical practice of Islamic 
commerce.   
 
Chapter two concerns the sharia in general, its sources, its legal theory and the role of ijtihād    
(independent reasoning) in solving new legal problems.  It also contains a discussion of custom 
as an unofficial source of law.  Finally, the chapter discusses the important role of rationalising 
legal tools and legal stratagems (ḥiyal).   
 
Chapter three provides an analysis of Islamic commercial law.  The chapter examines the 
system of Islamic nominate contracts; the prohibitions of gharar (excessive uncertainty) and ribā 
(interest); and the way in which classical Islamic commerce was practiced, with particular 
emphases on the role of custom and on credit- and interest-based transactions.   
 
1.6.2  THE CHALLENGES OF FORMULATING A MODERN LAW OF ISLAMIC 
FINANCE 
 
Part II consists of chapters four and five.  It examines the challenges in formulating the LIF in 
modern financial and legal environments.  
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Chapter four provides a bridge from the previous chapters’ focus on classical Islamic law and 
commercial practice to the modern global economy.  It illustrates some of the economic 
challenges affecting the world economy and how Islamic financial theorisers have responded to 
these in their articulation of the LIF. It illustrates how the changing role of money has radically 
restructured social, legal and economic interaction.  It also considers the almost total 
displacement of the sharia in the modern era as well as subsequent social and legal efforts to 
revive a part of it via interest-free banking. Finally, the chapter examines the strategy of Islamic 
financial ijtihād in responding to these challenges.   
 
Chapter five highlights the strategies and tools employed in adapting classical contracts via 
Islamic financial ijtihād to modern financial markets by looking at its products, including the 
murābaḥah, tawarruq and sukuk issuance (Islamic bond).  The chapter examines the 
differences between conventional and Islamic products, the legal problems associated with 
these structures and their dependence on how the courts of a particular jurisdiction will enforce 
them. As a case study of the set of legal problems which can arise, an analysis is presented of 
the juristic ramifications of a recent statement issued by the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Finance (AAOIFI) on sukuk.86   
 
 
 
                                               
86 The highly respected Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
was established in 1991 to create standards on accounting, auditing, and governance.   
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1.6.3  THE CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING THE LAW OF ISLAMIC FINANCE  
 
Part III consists of chapters six, seven, eight and nine.  It examines the complex challenges in 
implementing the LIF. It demonstrates the complexity of facilitating and regulating Islamic 
finance in a modern legal and financial environment such as the United Kingdom. This part 
shows that the municipal LIF which results from this process is a hybrid legal order generated 
from the interaction of multiple legal elements and underlying market forces. 
 
Chapter six examines how and why the LIF has been facilitated legislatively within English law.  
The chapter shows the particular type of legislative accommodation given to the LIF, with a 
special emphasis upon the development of commercial and sovereign sukuk.  The challenges of 
creating an authentic sharia-based mode of finance are considered.   
 
Chapter seven looks at the rationale, the objectives and the tools with which UK regulators 
regulate IFIs. The chapter introduces the reader to the UK financial services regulatory 
environment, examines financial services regulation, EU financial regulation and international 
regulatory standards. The chapter shows that Islamic finance interacts with a complex set of 
regulatory norms and legal systems, and this interaction directly affects the types of financial 
structures the industry can competitively employ.  
 
Chapter eight examines the particular risks of Islamic financial intermediation and the FSA’s 
response to regulating IFIs, including sharia supervisory boards (SSBs).  The chapter illustrates 
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a number of ways in which the state’s regulatory norms may interfere with Islamic financial 
intermediation. A particularly important aspect covered by the chapter concerns the FSA’s 
approach toward regulating the law-making capacity of SSBs.    
 
Chapter nine illustrates the challenges incumbent upon contracting parties wishing to have their 
contract enforced according to the sharia in an English court. The chapter does this by 
addressing several important cases in which Islamic financial transactions were the focus of 
litigation.  Furthermore, the chapter investigates the role of arbitration as an alternative means 
of resolving Islamic financial disputes.   
 
Finally, the Conclusion addresses the thematic problems illustrated by the thesis and offers 
proposals for their resolution. It draws out the main implications for the further development of 
the LIF on the basis of these proposals. The importance of future research in building upon the 
the findings from this thesis is given consideration as is its general appeal. 
 
1.7  TECHNICAL MATTERS 
 
Dates used throughout the thesis correspond with the Gregorian calendar, although effort has 
been given to providing the Islamic calendar, where appropriate.  References to the “classical” 
period indicate the large time span beginning with the inception of Islam and continuing until the 
“modern” period in the 19th century.  
 
56 
 
The Library of Congress transliteration standard has been used to transliterate Arabic words 
and names into the Roman script.  Most Arabic words in the singular form have been given an 
English ‘s’ to denote the plural.  Words such as sukuk, however, which are often used in 
financial markets, are used exclusively in the plural.  Finally, Arabic words that have been 
borrowed into the English language by the Oxford English Dictionary have been used according 
to the way in which that publication stipulates usage.  Such words include the sharia, Hadith, 
Sunna, ulema and others. 
 
A simple referencing system has been used.  All case law references, statutes, EU legislation 
and conventions are located in the preface of the thesis. All books, articles, chapters, 
documents and websites can be found in the bibliography, located in the appendix. These latter 
references have not been classified according to genre so as to facilitate the reader in locating 
the relevant work. 
 
Finally, a considerable number of abbreviations have been used to simplify the language of the 
text.  Please refer to the list of abbreviations on page 5.   
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PART I: COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE CLASSICAL SHARIA 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE SHARIA: SOURCES, LEGAL THEORY, AND UNOFFICIAL 
SOURCES OF LAW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides the background to the discussion of chapter three in which classical 
Islamic commercial law is examined.  It contains a discussion of the sharia, its sources and legal 
theory, the role of custom, “rationalising legal principles” and legal stratagems known as ḥiyal.  It 
examines the historical development of the four formal sources of the sharia according to Sunni 
Islam and its ensuing legal theory.  It is argued that the sharia, despite its rigorous textual 
hermeneutic, is an adaptive, pragmatic and functional law that possesses a number of legal 
instruments, which enable jurists to adapt the law to changing needs and circumstances.   
These premises are demonstrated by examining the following topics in turn: the formal sources 
of the sharia; Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh); the role of custom and rationalising legal 
principles; and the role of ḥiyal.  
 
2.1  THE FORMAL SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW  
 
Four formal ‘sources’ underlie the body of Islamic jurisprudence.  These include the Holy Quran 
and the Sunna, which constitute the wellspring of Islamic jurisprudence.  The third and fourth 
sources are qiyās (analogical reasoning) and ijmā’ (scholarly consensus), which jurists used to 
develop the nascent law. 
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The Quran is the first and most sacred source of legal and moral guidance to the Muslim 
faithful. It contains revelations to the Prophet Muhammad, believed to have emanated directly 
from God.  These were embodied in permanent written form in the Quran shortly after the death 
of Muhammad in 632 CE. The Quran is concerned with a broad range of circumstances in the 
believer’s life, which extend from matters of prayer, ritual and belief to the family, transactions 
and/or commerce, criminal acts and much more.  Unlike secular legal systems the Quran does 
not differentiate between law and morality but sees the two as inextricably linked; in fact, one 
cannot possibly exist without the other.87   
 
It is generally accepted that Islamic law, envisioned as a system of rules and standards which 
impose order and sanction malfeasance, existed outside the sphere of religion, even during the 
Prophet’s lifetime.  As far as there were no religious or moral objections to specific transactions 
or modes of behaviour, Muslims remained largely indifferent to the more technical and purely 
legal aspects of the law.88  Muhammad may have only realised in the fifth year of the Hijra – 
after the migration to Medina – that his revelations also contained legal matter of significant 
import for the community.89  Indeed, it is generally agreed that the Quran itself contains 
                                               
87 Bergsträsser, "Anfänge” (1925), 78.  
88 Schacht, "Pre-Islamic” (1955), 35.  While Schacht argues that law did not exist in the technical meaning 
of the term, he omits the fact that pre-Islamic customary practices were, in essence, nothing other than 
law. 
89 Goitein, "Birth-Hour” (1960), 27. 
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relatively few technical legal verses that Muslim jurists were able to readily apply as the 
foundation for a growing body of Islamic law.90  
 
The early jurists of the Umayyad dynasty did not have a polished and ready “Islamic law” at their 
disposal from which legal rulings could be taken.  Foreign and pre-Islamic Arab customary 
practices constituted the raw material of the budding law which the religious specialists and 
caliphs of Islam shaped according to their discretion (ra’y) or “sound opinion”, as it was called, 
and with respect to the unique practices or customs of the jurisdiction in which the law was to be 
applied.91  In large part, the early law did not derive from the Quran.  Apart from areas of family 
law and inheritance, as well as cult and ritual, the norms taken from the Quran were 
reintroduced to the law during the second/eighth century.92  
 
Early jurists adhered to the ancient Sunna of their ancestors, and later to the ‘living tradition’ of 
their respective schools.93  The Sunna (pl. sunan), an ancient Arab concept, describes an 
                                               
90 Schacht, "Fiḳh." (2011).   
91 The raw material from which Islamic law originated was comprised of a wide range of foreign and pre-
Islamic borrowings including Mesopotamia, Judaism, Christianity, the Hellenistic and Roman civilisations, 
and.  See Schacht, "Foreign” (1950), and Schacht, "Babylonian” (1994).  For a critical examination of 
these influences as well as an assessment of Western-based research on the subject see Crone, 
“Roman”  (1987).  See also Vesey-Fitzgerald, “Alleged Debt” (1951). For an analysis of common legal 
institutions, language and stylistic patterns in Middle Eastern legal texts see Mallat, "From Islamic” (2003), 
704. 
92 Schacht, "Pre-Islamic” (1955), 41-42. 
93 Madhhab is conventionally translated as school or doctrine.   It usually refers to a jurist’s opinion 
concerning a particular case or to the opinion of an entire school.  See Melchert, "Formation” (2004). 
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exemplary mode of conduct that is meant for others to emulate.  Persons renowned for their 
charisma, rectitude and distinguished status in the pre-Islamic period were seen as the 
providers of Sunna or normative practices that should be followed.94  Adherence to traditional 
Sunna constituted the ethical, social and religious framework around which Arabian life revolved 
and found its meaning.95   
 
Much of the material comprising prophetic Hadith was derived from the ancient Sunna and ra’y.  
Prophetic Hadith were endowed with a legitimacy, however, that these sources of law did not 
possess.96  In fact, many of the Hadiths put into circulation were blatant fabrications.  They 
reflected the ideal wishes of the present and were projected back to the Prophet so as to endow 
them with authority.97  Jurists faced the difficulty of establishing the connection between a text 
and the Prophet.  The discovery of dubious personages or a defective chain of transmission 
(isnād) rendered Hadiths devoid of any legal effect.  Furthermore, Hadiths were scrutinised for 
their linguistic traits as well as their chain of transmission before they could be utilised as valid 
sources of legal reasoning.98 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Sunni Islam is composed of four doctrines or schools of law (pl. madhāhib) which bear the name of 
distinguished jurists associated with them: the Ḥanafī, Mālikī , Shafi’i and Ḥanbalī  schools. Other Islamic 
sects include the Shia, which are predominantly represented in today’s Iran and large parts of Iraq.  The 
Shia comprise three schools including the Zaydīs, the Twelvers (Jaafaris) and the Ismā‘īlīs. 
94 Hallaq, “Sharia” (2010), 40. 
95 Schacht, "Pre-Islamic” (1955), 34-35. 
96 Hallaq, “Sharia” (2010),  45. 
97 Goldziher, "Muhammedanisches”  (1888), 418. 
98 Hallaq, “Sharia” (2010),  92. 
62 
 
The uncertainty surrounding a Hadith’s origins led jurists to devise the requirement of multiple 
transmission or recurrence known as the principle of tawātur.   Islamic theology views the 
recurrent transmission of texts from multiple sources as a type of knowledge that is immediate, 
subconscious and innate.99  On the other hand, texts transmitted via channels fewer than that of 
tawātur are termed aḥad (solitary).  The vast majority of Hadith belong to this latter category, 
which Muslim theologians generally view as a source of probable knowledge.  The important 
point is that the large body of Islamic law – which largely derives from Hadith narratives – 
reflects a probable interpretation of God’s commands.100   
 
The epistemic importance of prophetic Hadith, the great authority and legitimacy that such 
narratives inspired, is probably the reason why the prophetic Sunna gradually eclipsed the 
authority of ancient Arab practices.  Prophetic Hadith were endowed with a unique legitimacy 
that allowed jurists to shed light on what the law was.101 Jurists eventually came to realise that 
the prophetic Sunna comprised an important aspect of Quranic hermeneutics; it gave them 
clues as to the meaning of the Quran with respect to a particular case. 102 It enabled the 
construction of a body of Islamic law known as fiqh.  
 
The great jurist and systematiser of the law, al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/820), is considered to be the 
originator of the theory of Sunna – the endowment of Sunnaic authority in the Prophet 
                                               
99 Ibid., 93. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 41. 
102 Ibid. 
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Muhammad - in classical Islamic law.103  Al-Shāfi‘ī considered ra’y to be an arbitrary form of 
reasoning that threatened to taint the holy texts with human judgment.104  His unerring 
insistence upon the sole authority of traditions originating directly from the Prophet, and his 
dismissal of ‘practice’ and ‘consensus’ as embodied in the living Sunna eventually established 
prophetic Hadith as the second exclusive source of law.105 The authoritative establishment of 
prophetic Hadith allowed religious scholars less freedom to exercise their juridical discretion 
(ra’y).  Al-Shāfi‘ī had achieved a means of conformity in the law that would help to preserve it 
from human meddling.106 The eventual triumph of Hadith over ra’y towards the middle of the 
third/ninth century saw the emergence of six “canonical” Hadith collections.   
   
Long before non-textual ra’y was outlawed, however, jurists had foreseen the great value of 
certain types of reasoning that were too important to discard.  In a long process that stretched 
from the middle of the second/eighth century and continued well into the next, the concept of 
ra’y underwent a largely semantic transformation that established several different categories of 
legal tools that derived from the same principle.  These were qiyās, ijtihād and istiḥsān. Qiyās 
signified a disciplined form of reasoning that was rooted in the holy texts, i.e. the Quran and 
Sunna.  Its primary typology is analogy although it also includes the a foriori argument in both of 
its forms, namely the a maiore ad minus and the a minore ad maius.107  The textual authority for 
                                               
103 Schacht, “Origins”  (1950), 77. 
104 Hallaq, “Sharia” (2010),  51.  See also Schacht, “Origins”  (1950), 20. 
105 Schacht, “Origins” (1950), 20.  
106 Hallaq, “Sharia” (2010),  49.     
107 Ibid., 50. 
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qiyās was found in prophetic Sunna and the practice of the Companions.108  Eventually, qiyās 
came to be accepted as the fourth formal source of law.   
 
Of the three categories ijtihād represented the most general type of reasoning.  Prior to the 
disapproval of ra’y it had been known as ijtihād al-ra’y.  Sometime in the 2nd/8th century the ra’y 
was dropped – it had become untenable - but the concept retained the same meaning, namely: 
“the total expenditure of effort in the search for an opinion as to any legal rule in such a manner 
that the individual senses (within himself) an inability to expend further effort”.109  
 
The third category, istiḥsān, represents a mode of reasoning that overrides strictly logical 
inferences derived from qiyās, which may present undue hardship.  A more reasonable, 
preferred solution may be chosen in its stead.  Therefore, istiḥsān appeals to a general sense of 
fairness, conscience and common sense.110  However, it lacked any textual authority and was 
the subject of much criticism.  Its usefulness clearly outweighed such criticism in the end, 
however, and consequently was adopted by the Ḥanafī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools, while Shāfi‘ī 
jurists rejected it altogether.111  The principle of istiḥsān was lent considerable weight by 
allowing the jurist to reject qiyās in favour of istiḥsān, in response to the flexibility it provided.112  
Citing Al-Shaybānī, Al-Sarakshi wrote that “[I]stihsan is the renunciation of analogy and the 
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adoption of what is more fitting for people.  Some say: istiḥsān seeks to introduce more lenience 
in laws in connection with difficulties encountered by the individual and the general public (viz., 
everyone).  Some say: it is to give wide latitude and to solicit comfort”.113 
 
Therefore, the strict textual adherence demanded by the proponents of prophetic Hadith was 
not complete and unconditional.  In fact, by the end of the third/ninth century jurists are reported 
to have arrived at a “great synthesis”, a methodological recognition that combined the different 
approaches to the law.114  
 
The third formal source of Islamic law is known as consensus (ijmā’). Consensus provided 
jurists with an all-important juristic tool for safeguarding the entire structure of the law, including 
the individual opinions (fatwas) of jurists that formed a body of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).115  It 
can be defined as “the agreement of the community as represented by its highly learned jurists 
living in a particular age or generation”.116  The concept establishes the epistemological 
certainty of any particular law based upon probable textual evidence and agreed upon by the 
mujtahids (the highest class of jurists).  In fact, once consensus was agreed on any particular 
point of law it became “an infallible expression of the divine law” and could not be cast aside by 
any future mujtahid.117 As a result, the law was divided into two spheres, namely that in which 
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unity prevails (mujmaʿ ʿalayh) and that in which there is disagreement (mukhtalaf fīh).  Within the 
sphere of disagreement diversity in the law is given free reign so that the schools of law and 
their body of doctrine can be justified as equally valid representations of the law.118  
 
Like all sources of law, with the exception of the Quran whose divine origins are grounded in a 
broad consensus that pre-dates the juristic notion of ijmā’, authority for ijmā’ as a source of law 
had to be found in the revealed texts.  While fatwas evince probable knowledge, the sources of 
law – which uphold the faith – must be absolutely certain. However, the Quran did not have a lot 
to offer in this regard.  Therefore, around the end of the third/ninth century a Hadith was 
promulgated that established, once and for all, that Muhammad’s community (umma) as a 
whole could never agree upon an error.119  Needless to say, the textual proof (Sunna) that 
legitimised consensus as a source of law had itself only recently attained certitude.120 
 
Consensus can only be established on the basis of revelation and with respect to a textual 
indicant (dalīl).  Importantly, consensus from the past must be assumed to have located the 
textual indicant whether or not the present generation has discovered it.121  Once consensus 
has been established it may act as a driver of further ijtihād.  As ijtihād yields new law, 
consensus can continue the process of law-making by enshrining the law to the realm of God.  
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Hence, consensus has been likened to the common law concept of stare decisis or doctrine of 
precedent, although its formulation does not take place in the courtroom.122   
 
The absolute certainty bestowed by consensus, coupled with the authority it derives from the 
revealed texts, endows consensus with a superior authority over the Sunna and the Quran.  
Essentially this means that whenever consensus has been established with respect to a 
particular matter, the textual evidence used to arrive at a consensus trumps any other conflicting 
evidence.  The reasoning behind this is circular.  Evidence set aside as a result of consensus is 
deemed irrelevant insofar as the community of Muslims would not have agreed on other 
evidential indications.123 
 
The development of the fiqh was gradual and marked by great debate and decisive theological 
developments.  A clearly delineated set of legal sources grew out of this process, as well as a 
number of legal tools used to provide flexibility.  In the following section the legal theory of 
Islamic law is examined. 
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2.2   THE THEORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 
 
The substantive body of Islamic jurisprudence known as fiqh was developed prior to the uṣūl al-
fiqh, the legal theory that is rooted in the four sources of Islamic law.124  Moreover, the fiqh that 
had developed by the end of the 2nd/8th century was not modified as a result of the genesis of 
the new legal methodology.  Rather the creation of the uṣūl al-fiqh seemed to mark a 
culmination in how the law should be developed but it also sought to endow the law with an 
ideal character.125  From around the middle of the fourth/tenth century, however, the uṣūl 
adopted a more prescriptive nature, while maintaining its normative and descriptive functions.126 
 
The theory of uṣūl al-fiqh required jurists to know which cases were subject to consensus so as 
not to work outside of existing school doctrine or the larger community of jurists.  Cases not 
subject to consensus – those having remained subject to disagreement (ikhtilāf) – or novel legal 
problems were subject to the theory.127  Qiyās was to provide the legal tool that was to elicit new 
law.  It comprised four elements: (1) the novel case requiring a legal solution; (2) the established 
rule, which can be found in the revealed texts or amongst those established by consensus; (3) 
the ratio legis (‘illah), also known as the “effective cause”, which can be found in both of the 
aforementioned cases; (4) the legal norm found in the established case, which, on the basis of 
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similarity between the two cases, can be transposed to the novel legal problem.128 
Consequently, the determination of the ‘illah became the jurist’s principal task.  Some ‘illahs 
were quite explicit and thus easily deciphered, while most could only be gleaned from inference 
and interpretation.129 
 
The uṣūl al-fiqh created a juristic modus operandi by which the Muslim jurist was to exercise his 
ijtihād.  In fact, the practice of ijtihād was seen as a divine communal obligation (farḍ kifāyah) 
that all jurists had to perform as a means of worship and belief in God.130  It was to proceed in 
the following manner: first, earlier legal opinions of renowned jurists were examined so as to 
determine whether a similar ruling already existed.  Second, when no precedent was available, 
other cases could be resorted to in which legal acts were of a different nature but essentially 
involved the same legal facts.  Third, when all else failed the jurist could consult the Quran, 
Sunna or ijmā’ to locate an ‘illah that is compatible with the new case (furūʿ).  This was 
accomplished with the aid of qiyās.131  
 
2.2.1  THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF ACTS 
 
The process of ijtihād highlights the probable nature of the jurist’s fatwa.  It is a central epistemic 
challenge that was solved by viewing the law bi-dimensionally: namely, via the (1) the forum 
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internum or religious conscience; and (2) the forum externum, which accepted the contingency 
of all legally valid decisions based on probable assertions concerning the facts of the case or 
the probability that the law had been extracted from the holy sources pursuant to God’s 
intentions.132  If probable assertions turn out to be false, the jurist’s error does not annul the 
legal validity and bindingness of his decision so long as sincere and diligent scrutiny of the 
revealed texts has been given.133  In the forum internum, however, the absolute veracity of one’s 
decisions in his relationship with God cannot be shirked; the eternal Law of God remains an 
absolute obligation for the individual concerned. The concept demonstrates the underlying 
epistemological scepticism of the jurists towards the fiqh.  However, this is necessary for a 
religious law, in which the absolute truth and validity of revelation is upheld, on one hand, and 
the fallibility of the jurists’ interpretation of those texts, comprises the other.134   
 
The Islamic judge, on the other hand, was forced to evaluate individual acts, dispositions and 
statements of human beings. The intentions and motives of human beings (the “invisible and 
interior” (bātin)) can only be deciphered from their acts and statements (the “apparent and 
exterior” (ẓāhir)).135  Only God knows the minds of His subjects and thus only He is in the 
position to punish them for their innermost convictions (which He shall do in the Hereafter).  
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Human judges are not in the position to judge as God would do.  The human judge must 
arbitrate according to the appearance which legal acts and dispositions produce. 136 Thus the 
legality of an act or disposition in the temporal world is emphasised in a textual materialism in 
which the form of the law takes on greater relevance.  This salient point re-surfaces in chapter 
four in connection with the jurisprudence of Islamic financial transactions, which evinces a 
formal adherence to the sharia but does not adhere to religious and ethical prerogatives.  The 
bi-dimensionality of the law may be a helpful clue in understanding some of the motives and 
justifications used to develop the LIF.   
 
Islamic law does not always attach legal consequences to relevant legal acts.  Rather it is often 
more concerned with laying down moral norms that distinguish between forbidden and allowed 
transactions.137  Accordingly, acts are classified according to whether their objects are spiritual 
or secular.  The performance of acts with secular objects, such as the performance of certain 
devotional acts, secures the release of the believer from the obligation of that act.  On the other 
hand, acts performed with a spiritual objective in mind secure a spiritual reward for the believer 
in the hereafter.138  
 
Some acts should be performed as the omission of such acts is prohibited.  These acts are 
either obligatory in the first degree (farḍ); this is the case when the rule is established in a clear 
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and conclusive text.  Other acts are wājib and thus obligatory in the second degree; these acts 
are established by probable knowledge.  The payment of zakāh, prayer five times daily, fasting 
and pilgrimage are obligatory acts of the latter category. A Muslim must perform both classes of 
obligatory acts.  She secures spiritual merit (thawāb) by performance and spiritual punishment 
(‘adhāb) by omission. Furthermore, some acts are beneficial and yet not required. These acts 
are supererogatory and commended (mandūb, mustaḥabb).  They include the creation of a 
religious or charitable endowment (waqf), ṣadaqah (charitable contribution), making gifts, 
attending to the sick, etc.  A further category of acts are forbidden and prohibited (ḥarām); these 
acts are regarded as abominable and condemned (makrūh).  A final category of acts are neither 
favoured nor prohibited but are regarded with indifference.  Such acts are mubāh (permissible) 
and include transactions of sale, pledge, lease and so forth.139 
 
2.2.2  THE TEXTUALISM OF THE UṢŪL AL-FIQH  
 
The uṣūl’s emphasis upon visually apparent material attributes endowed the law with a 
formalistic rationality, although it was an abstract formalism.  Islamic law is not concerned with 
the abstraction of general principles and systemic logic.140  Rather the sharia illustrates a 
casuistic approach to the law that eventually gave rise to an elaborate superstructure of rules; 
these too were developed and based on rulings, which, for their part, were derived from other 
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original rulings and the influx of new subject-matter.141  In the subsequent chapter an 
examination of the system of nominate contracts provides a clear example of how this approach 
affected the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence in the field of commercial law.  
 
The unrestricted use of analogical reasoning trends toward the creation of rules, originally 
restricted to a single description of acts, which are then extended to all acts of the same 
class.142  For example, because wine is prohibited in the Quran, all intoxicants are prohibited.  
Or less rational: a provision ensuring general cleanliness is extended into long ceremonies of 
ritual purification, and so forth.  Such an increasingly rigorous systematisation may preclude 
practical considerations of the law and limit society’s ability to function. It reflects a conscious 
effort to systematise the law or to produce a doctrine, which was free of all presuppositions (or 
any contextual considerations), Arab and non-Arab, and could be restricted to the observable 
characteristics of the revealed language, Arabic.143 
 
The necessity to return to the original texts in all matters of faith, society, religion and law in 
order to generate doctrine is an enduring and meaningful quality that is indicative of the 
development of the sharia and its unique religious and ethical spirit.  And yet the essentially 
static nature of this requirement betrays the greatest challenge to its continuing relevance as 
time evolves and society progresses.  Social necessities and opinion create the terms and 
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circumstances to which law must respond.  Indeed, even in those instances in which the law 
creates new sets of circumstances, human invention and nature tend to catch-up and 
overwhelm the law by finding any number of evasions, loopholes, or in the literal interpretation 
of the law, and so forth.  All of these responses to legal stimuli are a result of the natural 
progression of social and human development.  Legal rules are essentially static, and inherently 
indeterminate; they are created at a particular time and context, and effective only to the extent 
that their underlying norms are highly specific and can be applied to a particular set of factors.144   
 
The uṣūl al-fiqh came to fruition only after a body of Islamic jurisprudence had been developed.  
Yet legal theory played more than just a rhetorical and descriptive role.  It established a strict 
textual hermeneutic that, nonetheless, was not free from human error.  While its epistemological 
difficulties could be overcome, jurists’ subscription to the hermeneutic created a highly casuistic 
                                               
144 Black, “Rules”  (1997), 199.  By the beginning of the fourth century many modern scholars argued that 
the activity of ijtihād had ceased to take place; that, in fact, Muslim jurists had agreed to practice taqlīd or 
juristic conformity with the already established doctrines of the madhhab and the legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) 
that had developed until that time. For example, Joseph Schacht argued that jurists “felt that all essential 
questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled, and a consensus gradually established itself 
to the effect that from that time onwards no one might be deemed to have the necessary qualifications for 
independent reasoning in law, and that all future activity would have to be confined to the explanation, 
application and, at the most, interpretation of the doctrine as it had been laid down once and for all”. See 
Schacht, “Introduction “  (1964), 70-71. Known as the “closing of the gate of ijtihād”                                 
(in Arabic: insidād bāb al-ijtihād), taqlīd was to have demanded an unquestioning acceptance of the 
school doctrines.  The mujtahid or the jurist entitled to perform ijtihād was no longer said to exist.  
However, Hallaq convincingly demonstrates that jurists capable of exercising ijtihād existed at all times, in 
all centuries.  Moreover, ijtihād contributed to developing the positive law of school doctrine (fiqh) in the 
period of taqlīd.  For more see Hallaq, "the Gate” (1984). 
75 
 
law built upon the edifice of analogical reasoning.  The following section examines a further 
unofficial source of Islamic law, namely, custom. 
 
2.3   THE ROLE OF CUSTOM  
 
Custom has been defined as a form of life rooted in a people’s sense of propriety,145 and as a 
whole body of usages, practices or conventions, be they social, economic or other, which 
regulate social life from the grassroots level.146  These tend to be established practices, a usual 
way of doing things, and adherence to these folkways is an expression of membership to a 
particular community.  The more homogenous a society is, in terms of its racial, ethnic and 
cultural background, the stronger such a tendency is likely to be.147  Custom, unsurprisingly, is 
not one of the classically recognised sources of Islamic law; yet it is employed and called upon 
to such an extent that, in actuality, it is not only a major source of law, but an aspect of social life 
which the sharia has often left to its own devices.   
 
The refusal to recognise custom as a formal source is grounded in the doctrine of the spiritual 
essence of the sharia which is fundamentally opposed to human tampering with God’s law.  The 
juristic methodology sought to distance the law from the bedrock of customary practices which 
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had bequeathed to the new community the very foundations of the sharia.148 Paradoxically, 
however, it is the universal claim of Islam, its willingness to envelop and acquire the novel 
mosaic of customary practices that it met through siege and conversion, which enabled Islam to 
accept customs and imbue them with the Islamic spirit.149  It is this universal legitimising claim, 
on the one hand, and the divinely inspired doctrine, on the other, which have enabled Islam to 
straddle the sometimes uneasy chasm between theoretical ideals and the law applied. 
 
Yet it would simplify the relationship of customary practices to the sharia, and vice versa, by 
viewing their enmeshed relationship in discreet categories or institutionalised identities whose 
authority lies in their struggle with each other for legitimacy and identity.150  The authority and 
influence of the sharia extended to every domain of Muslim social and religious life.  It 
permeated all other conceptions of knowledge or practice so as to render their distinctiveness 
not only impracticable but without utility.151  Thus the demand for universality rendered Islamic 
all sorts of practices and these, in turn, reciprocated by allowing indigenous social practices to 
flourish within the broader confines of Islamic doctrine.  It is probably the inclusiveness of 
Islam’s universal values that accounts for the rapid spread of Islam amongst disparate local 
traditions.  In sum, drawing too fine a line between custom and theory, between the formal and 
informal, may distort the nature of Islam to the extent that its distinctiveness as a universalising 
religion is lost to the observer. 
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Substantial historical evidence underscores the controversy concerning custom’s role as a 
formal source of law in the classical period, and yet a de facto recognition of its importance is 
revealed in Muslim legal literature. Quasi-recognition of certain customs was made possible by 
resorting to other more legitimate legal tools such as istiḥsān or by linking these to ijmā’, both of 
which became a common means for assimilating popular custom into the law.  Likewise the 
principle of ḍarūrah (necessity) was utilised for the same purpose.152  
 
The introduction of Hadith collections in the latter part of the 9th century proved to be an 
essential means of incorporating age-old and recent customary practices into the sharia without 
diverging from the principles of the fiqh.  Because the Sunna is, in essence, the living custom or 
tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, customs originating elsewhere could be identified with the 
Sunna and accorded divine legitimacy.153  However, the incorporation of foreign elements was 
not limited to customary usages.  All sorts of ideals and common adages reflective of the then 
contemporary scholars’ wishes for the developing doctrine were projected back to the time of 
the Prophet and given religious legitimacy.154 For example, a common maxim often invoked to 
justify the use of “rationalising legal tools”155 reminded the followers that religion had been 
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bestowed upon the community, not to bring hardship but to ease their sufferings.  And thus 
Muhammad was to have expressed this adage to the Companions in his midst.156    
 
Some evidence of this incorporation exists in the fact that legal literature does not mention 
custom as a material source, i.e. its association with istiḥsān, as long as the redaction of the 
Hadith collections was taking place.  Once the standard Hadith collections had been finalised at 
the beginning of the 9th century, discussion of custom as a material source becomes frequent 
and was subsequently woven into the fabric of the law.157 This is particularly the case in 
commerce and trade, wherein jurists without qualm or hesitation invoked the domain of custom  
(‘urf) or the ‘practice of the merchant (‘ādat at-tujjār) in the formulation of contracts and in the 
settlement of disputes.  Indeed, large swathes of commercial conduct and the legality of its 
practical details are left untouched and unchartered due to the omnipresence of the inherently 
amorphous notion of custom.158 
 
Commercial customs were introduced into the law through the framework of dispositive law, i.e. 
via contract and stipulation by the parties.  Thus custom has the authority to determine the 
rights and duties of contracting parties when these have agreed stipulations to that extent.  
Even in the absence of such stipulations, scholars representing nearly all the madhabs voiced 
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support for the interpretation of contracts with a view to the customary practices prevalent in the 
area in which they were carried out.159 
 
With the passing of time and the increasing complexity of commercial exchange, custom has 
come to be recognised as a quasi-source of law, particularly within the Ḥanafī school.  The post-
classical period was witness to this transformation in the formulation of the Mejelle, whose 
authors compiled rulings on custom in ten articles.160  Following this break with the theory of 
classical jurisprudence, the gradual inculcation of custom as a formal source has been adopted 
by modern Muslim jurists who have attempted to legitimise their position through a revisionist 
view of the primary sources.161  
 
2.4   THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN CLASSICAL COMMERCIAL LAW 
 
The general consensus amongst early Western scholars of Islam, including Goldziher, 
Hurgronje, Bergsträsser, and Schacht, has been that a pattern of Islamic belief developed in 
which believers took little notice of the sharia with respect to the practical requirements and 
transactions of daily life (mu‘āmalāt); but in introverted fashion, placed great emphasis upon the 
uncompromising ideal doctrine,162  particularly in those areas of private law associated with the 
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institutions of the family, ritual and inheritance.  However, recent scholarship convincingly 
argues that jurists’ detailed treatises and other legal works elaborated the primary classical 
institutions of commerce, including partnerships (shirkah) such as the muḍārabah in surprising 
conformity with the way in which medieval commerce was practiced. 
   
Historical documents from the Cairo Geniza – a wealth of documentary material describing 
medieval civilisation of the Middle East from the 10th to the 16th centuries (the Fatimid and 
Ayyubid dynasties)163 underscore the assertion that, in fact, scholars paid frequent attention to 
the commercial practice of the late eighth century.  Their writings reflect a very detailed and 
elaborate discussion of commercial practices prevalent in the Near East in the medieval 
period.164  However, the historical record suffers from the almost “complete absence of any 
actual documents or records from the first few centuries of the Islamic era”.165  In particular, 
historical records of medieval trade and commerce prior to the tenth century are almost non-
existent or are yet to be discovered.166  Hence, Udovitch’s analysis hinges on documentary 
evidence that originates, at the earliest, from the 10th century.  And even these are hard to come 
by as Goitein notes that Geniza documents from the 10th century are comparatively few in 
number.167  The authoritative works of the schools of law in the earliest Islamic centuries cannot 
be viewed as historical records of actual economic and commercial transactions.  They may, in 
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fact, reflect an idealistic conception of the law.  However, classical legal literature dating from 
the 9th century has nonetheless provided valuable insights into the social and economic 
institutions of the classical Islamic world and in this regard has proved particularly illuminating in 
helping scholars piece together an otherwise poorly documented canvass of Muslim social 
life.168  
 
The jurisprudential emphasis on commercial practice is seen not only in the “eminently practical 
and functional” aspects of Ḥanafī commercial law, but also in their frequent writings in which 
scholars refer to the commercial imperatives of the “the custom of the merchants” or “the needs 
of the people”.169  Therefore, the earlier view that a rigid separation between doctrine and 
practice best described Islamic commercial law may not always have been the case. In fact, it 
seems that some of the more rigid aspects of doctrine were ameliorated by granting a wide 
berth to the role of custom in commercial transactions. 
 
Early Muslim legal literature underscores the supremacy of the concept of ‘custom’ in 
commercial exchange as a decisive feature of the laws of commerce.170 The prevalence of 
custom was not relegated or confined to the details of the law, but permeated the form and 
general character of the central institutions of commercial activity.171  With respect to an entire 
corpus of commercial practice, such as the all-important and ubiquitous use of weights and 
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measures, the means of transportation, the appointment of agents for the purchase and sale of 
commodities, even the semantic definition of descriptive terms when applied to certain 
commodities, the final arbiter of commerce is none other than custom. Thus it is the habitual 
practice of the merchants (‘ādat at-tujjār), the general manner of commerce (wajīh al-tijārah) or 
the usual practice of the people (al-muta‘ārif bayna al-nās) which busied the minds of jurists 
who clearly sought to enable Muslim entrepreneurs and merchants to succeed in meeting the 
material and subsistence concerns of the community.172  In many ways the commercial 
elaborations of the sharia reflect a diverse set of customary business practices – many derived 
from ancient foreign origins – in the medieval Middle East.    
 
However, a tension between doctrine and the actual practice of the law did exist.  It is evidenced 
in the use of contractual formulae, the shurūṭ, for formal, private transactions.  Islamic doctrine 
denied the validity of the use of written documents in a sharia court, despite an explicit ruling in 
the Quran at Sūra 2:282 which commanded: “When you contract a debt for a fixed term, record 
it in writing.  Let a scribe record it in writing between you […] Be not averse to writing down [the 
contract], whether [the amount] be small or great, with its term”.   Yet oral testimony provided 
the only form of formal proof inasmuch as the personal testimony of an upright Muslim was 
deemed much more worthy than a written document, which may have been falsified and/or have 
dubious origins. A private contract required at least two male witnesses, or two female 
witnesses for every male, and public documents required court-hired witnesses.173   
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The use of witnesses (shahādah in the wider sense) was not an Islamic invention, but was 
common throughout the pre-Islamic Near East.  In pre-Islamic Arabia the use of witnesses for 
giving evidence was almost certainly the most common form of proof, and ceremonies may 
have been performed for their reception.174  Therefore, it would seem that the institution of 
witnesses fulfilled an ancient practice prevalent in the pre-Islamic Near Eastern civilisation.  The 
legal invalidity of written documents at the sharia may simply highlight an aspect of the law 
which – despite the religious and ethical imprint of the shahādah – remained procedurally 
immune to the divine revelations. 
 
It can be concluded that customary practices played a very significant role in the Islamic law of 
commerce.  On the basis of Udovitch’s seminal research, it also seems likely that Ḥanafī legal 
doctrine comprised a wide range of customary business practices prevalent during the classical 
period.  In the modern world Islamic finance may, in fact, constitute a desire to reintroduce the 
customary practices of the classical Islamic commercial tradition.175  In the modern world jurists 
have appropriated conventional financial practices with the assistance of rationalising legal 
tools.  The particular approach to articulating the LIF will be examined in chapter four. In the 
next section some of the legal concepts and tools used to import customary practices, and to 
adapt and extend the law, more generally, are considered.  
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2.5   MAṢLAḤAH AND RATIONALISING LEGAL TOOLS  
 
This section focuses on the principle of maṣlaḥah (public interest) and the legal tools created to 
give it effect. Maṣlaḥah, referred to as istiṣlaḥ in technical legal terms, literally means a source 
of something beneficial or good.176 More generally, it refers to prohibiting or permitting a legal 
act or disposition on the basis of “public interest”.177   
 
Fatwas based on considerations of maṣlaḥah are found in some of the earliest legal writings 
from the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries.  However, the principle attained widespread acceptance 
only in the late 5th/11th century when the Shāfi‘ī  jurist al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) established that 
the “maṣlaḥah was God’s purpose (maqṣad, pl. maqāṣid) in revealing the divine law”.178  Al-
Ghazālī asserted that God’s revelation of divine law was designed to preserve the five essential 
elements of human welfare: namely, religion, life, intellect, offspring and property.  The 
protection of these essential elements or what averts harm from them is considered a 
maṣlaḥah; the endangerment of these elements constitutes its opposite, namely, mafsadah 
(evil).179 Maṣlaḥah is generally categorised according to three types: these are the ‘essentials’ 
(ḍarūrīyāt); the ‘complementary’ (hājīyat); and the ‘embellishments’ (taḥsīnīyāt).180   
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The use of maṣlaḥah as a means of effecting legal change was and still is controversial.  The 
controversy centres on whether or not the human intellect is able to discern maṣlaḥah without a 
concrete textual indication (dalīl) in the revealed sources.  Known technically as maṣlaḥah 
mursalah or unattested maṣlaḥah, this type of maṣlaḥah pertains to matters in which no textual 
authority can be located.  The challenge for jurists was and still is to devise legal strategies in 
which maṣlaḥah can be utilised in a legally valid manner. 181  
 
Amongst the eponymous founders of the madhhabs Al-Malik is the most outspoken supporter of 
maṣlaḥah as “a proof and basis of legislation (tashrī‘)”.182 Al-Malik held that not upholding 
maṣlaḥah when it is compatible with the objectives of the law or falls within the categories or 
genus of what God has expressly permitted would be to neglect God’s law. As such maṣlaḥah 
constitutes an integral norm of the sharia.183 The Ḥanbalīs adopted a similar position.184  On the 
other hand, the Ḥanafīs and Shāfi‘ī s held that maṣlaḥah constitutes a valid ground for 
legislation only in the presence of a textual indication as indicated in the ‘illah of a given text or 
in the general objectives of the revealed texts.  This requires the type of enquiry used in 
determining the ‘illah in qiyās and is thus designed to limit arbitrariness in the formulation of the 
law.185 Despite their different approaches to the principle, however, all four schools of law 
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agreed that an instance of maṣlaḥah, which did not conflict with the objectives of the revealed 
sources, should be upheld.186  
 
Rationalising legal tools such as istiḥsān, istiṣlāḥ and ṣadd al-dharā’i‘ (blocking the means) were 
created by the scholars to give effect to the general interest (maṣlaḥah) of the Muslim 
community.  Although each term is denoted differently, their varying nomenclature merely 
serves to identify their particular method but, in essence, they all are designed to promote 
maṣlaḥah.187  For example, ṣadd al-dharā’i‘, (literally: closing the gates to evil), prevents a lawful 
act from taking place that may eventually lead to an unlawful act.  Its ultimate objective is to 
establish maṣlaḥah.188   
 
Rationalising legal tools serve as an important vehicle in adapting and extending the law. In 
essence, they are designed to limit the damage and inconvenience of a formalist 
interpretation.189  They satisfy society’s desire for progress and improvement while, at the same 
time, not offending sacred or other authoritative instances disinclined towards change.190  They 
are constructed to conceal, or affect to conceal, the fact that a law has been altered, its letter 
remaining true, but its spirit wholly modified.  These and other mitigating effects were 
particularly necessary in the post-formative phase of jurisprudence in which jurists may have 
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operated under a regime of taqlīd (conformity), since they were charged with maintaining a 
genetic connection with the mujtahids of old.  It became necessary to invent new exceptions 
and classifications, to manipulate the wording and scope of legal injunctions to accommodate a 
changed reality and thereby erect a sort of ‘legal scaffolding’.191  
 
However, the pursuit of rationality in the interpretation of the sharia is at odds with the uṣūl al-
fiqh’s strict procedures for deriving legal rulings.  Yet the predominance of Ash‘arī textualism left 
unanswered the problem of how jurists were to know God’s law when a novel legal problem 
came to light and a scriptural indicant was not available.192 Rationalist legal tools provided an 
indispensable means of adapting and extending the law to new and changing circumstances 
where a strict adherence to the uṣūl al-fiqh would have stymied the applicability and relevance 
of the law as time and circumstances changed.  
 
Yet such tools possess the distinct disadvantage of creating a law lacking a guiding coherence 
expounded in logical deduction and which is subject to arbitrariness, subjectivity and legal 
uncertainty.193  Furthermore, when any novel problem can be decided by human reasoning, 
unaided by indicants located in the scriptural sources, the body of jurisprudence that is 
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attributable to revelation will consistently decrease over time.194  The resulting secularisation of 
the law is an unviable alternative for a religious law.195  The following section concerns the use 
of legal stratagems designed to circumvent the substance of the sharia. 
 
2.6   LEGAL STRATAGEMS (ḤIYAL)  
 
Islamic jurisprudence also makes use of legal stratagems known as ḥiyal, (sg. ḥīlah).  Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawzīyah (d. 751/1350) wrote that ḥiyal represent the subtle management of aspects 
of a legal transaction in ways for which they were not intended.196 However, for those who 
ascribed to these means, one could utilise ḥiyal to make lawful that which otherwise is unlawful; 
to create what the Ḥanafīs called “makhārij” (sg. makhraj) or ‘exits’.197 Ḥiyal represent an 
attempt by the jurists to ease the difficulties posed by scrupulous adherence to the sharia 
without having to trespass the divine laws on account of the exigencies of everyday life.   
 
Ḥiyal are devised to seek a compromise between theory and practice, between ideals and 
reality.198  Schacht made the largest-to-date contribution to contemporary understanding of 
makhārij with his translation of four published works dedicated to expounding these ‘ruses’, as 
he called them; these included those by Abū Bakr Aḥmad al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 874), Abū Ḥātim 
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Maḥmūd al-Ḳazwīnī (d. 440/1048-49) and Muhammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805).199  
Three of the works are by Ḥanafīs and the fourth by al-Ḳazwīnī, a Shāfi‘ī jurist.  Shaybānī was 
one of Abū Ḥanīfah’s most brilliant disciples.  His writings constitute some of the basic texts of 
Ḥanafī jurisprudence, which include the Kitāb al-Aṣl, al-Jāmi ‘al-kabīr and al-Jāmi ‘al-ṣaghīr – the 
so-called ‘ẓahir al-riwāya’, i.e. the authoritative and faultless transmission of Ḥanafī doctrine.  
The ẓahir al-riwāya contains the three major scholars of the Ḥanafī school: Abū Ḥanīfah 
(eponym of the school), Abū Yūsuf, and Shaybānī.200  It is therefore evident that the makhārij 
are an authoritative and illustrative feature of Ḥanafī jurisprudence, and not merely obscure 
works by less well-known authors whose views bore little impact.   
 
Ḥiyal were employed in nearly all facets of life.  They were not reserved for those areas of social 
transaction that, for the Western reader, are more closely associated with legal transactions. 
However, the chapters of the fiqh devoted to spiritual matters (‘ibādāt) comprise a much smaller 
proportion of ḥiyal,201 which probably indicates that the practice of ritual worship is more closely 
aligned with the ideals of the law.   
 
Hence the Ḥanafīs acquired a well-earned reputation for the systematic use of makhārij, 
although the Shāfi‘ī s were known to have utilised them as well.202  Abū Ḥanīfah is said to be the 
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founder of the genre despite the fact that he did not compose a treatise on the subject.  Many 
statements concerning ḥiyal in standard Ḥanafī texts are attributed to him.203   
 
A book of ḥiyal (kitāb al-ḥiyal) written by al-Shāfi‘ī  or one of his early disciples would have been 
unthinkable inasmuch as a lively polemic was directed by this school against the Ḥanafī works 
devoted to the subject.  The Shāfi‘ī experiment with ḥiyal seems to be more of an intellectual 
exercise of competition with the Ḥanafīs after the schools had consolidated their authority and 
legitimacy as a recognised madhhab. 204 In this regard, their devices are not as practically 
oriented as are the Ḥanafī ḥiyal. 
 
The Ḥanafīs’ recommendation of their use stretches far beyond a limited exercise.  Ḥanafīs 
encouraged the faithful to utilise them, even to avoid merely undesirable situations, since the 
law provides for these exits for those who seek them.  Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah confirmed this 
claim in his description of the Ḥanafī view regarding the sharia as a body of exits that envisioned 
the exigencies of human life.205  It is apparent, therefore, that the Ḥanafīs regarded the law in 
terms of its utility.  Makhārij were devised to help the faithful seek remedies for ‘oppressive’ or 
inconvenient situations that ‘prejudiced’ oneself.   
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The Mālikī or Medinese position on ḥiyal invoked the principle of ṣadd al-dharā’i‘’.  It has been 
described as the antithesis of ḥiyal in the sense that it seeks to block unlawful acts for 
presumably illegal purposes despite their otherwise lawful appearance.206  The principle became 
instrumental to later criticism of ḥiyal.   
 
A well-known example of ḥiyal is one of the oldest of its kind, the bay‘ al-inah or the double-
contract sale.  An object is sold on a deferred payment basis, but then bought back for a sum 
less than the original deferred price, payable on the spot.  This is, in essence, an interest-
bearing loan.  The transaction was so successful and widespread that Europeans of the Middle 
Ages adopted its use under the name of mohatra (from the Arabic, mukhāṭarah, meaning 
risk).207  Most jurists found the transaction impermissible but, interestingly, Muzanī notes that al-
Shāfi‘ī treated the sale as valid.208   This particular ḥiyal plays a very important role in many 
sales-based Islamic financial transactions. 
 
Therefore, the Ḥanafīs justified the incorporation of ḥiyal into their legal doctrine not as an 
attempt to circumvent the law but rather sought to utilise the law according to its underlying 
spirit, which provided for “exits”.  Ḥiyal were, by definition, legitimate, and were thus transmitted 
as a special genre of Ḥanafī doctrine.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Despite the strict hermeneutic which guides jurists in their ijtihād, Islamic jurisprudence contains 
a number of legal tools and methods to adapt and extend the law to changing needs and 
circumstances.  
 
The Quran is the first and most sacred source of Islamic jurisprudence.   However, the Quran 
contained little “strictly” legal material that early religious specialists could use to develop a body 
of Islamic law.  Therefore, they had recourse to their personal discretion (ra’y) and the ancient 
customary practices of the Arab Sunna.  Together these sources formed the raw material of the 
fledgling law.   
 
By the end of the 2nd/9th century the madhhabs increasingly recognised the superior authority of 
Hadiths that originated from the Prophet as opposed to the ancient Arab Sunna or established 
doctrines of the schools.  The eventual triumph of the authority of prophetic Sunna ushered in a 
much more systematic composition in the law.  A direct result was that human reasoning or ra’y 
– long used to create a body of Islamic jurisprudence – became viewed unfavourably in that it 
represented human tampering with God’s law.  By the middle of the 3rd/9th century prophetic 
Sunna became established as the second formal source of a growing body of Islamic 
jurisprudence.  In terms of the legal material that eventually found its way into the law, however, 
the Sunna became the most important source. 
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The theological and juristic debates that culminated in the victory of prophetic Sunna over 
ancient Arab Sunna and school doctrine gave rise to two further sources of law: ijmā’ and qiyās.  
These further sources not only consolidated the structure of the law (ijmā‘) but enabled it to 
grow through a process of inferential reasoning (qiyās).  With the theorisation of Islamic legal 
theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) finally in place the strict textual hermeneutic offered a normative and 
descriptive guide to the jurist in his interpretation of the law.   
 
While legal theory called for the review of the revealed sources in the event that a novel legal 
problem arose, in practice jurists’ practice of ijtihād had frequent recourse to other unofficial 
sources of law; amongst them custom was amongst the most important.   Particularly in the 
area of commercial and financial transactions the accommodation of customary business 
practices figured prominently in jurists’ legal writings.  Jurists also embraced the concept of 
maṣlaḥah and the rationalising legal tools that gave it effect. Together these tools enabled 
jurists to adapt and extend the law to new and changing circumstances.   
 
Finally, legal stratagems known as ḥiyal were created to circumvent the substance of sharia 
provisions while complying with the letter of the law.  In sum, the unofficial sources of law 
provided a counterweight to strict legal theory and facilitated the relevance and growth of the 
law as time and needs evolved.  The following chapter is concerned with Islamic commercial 
doctrine. 
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CHAPTER THREE: ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL DOCTRINE AND CLASSICAL 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter concerns classical Islamic commercial law.  It is asserted that Islamic commercial 
doctrine generally restricts contracting parties’ freedom to contract.  Yet various legal 
concessions offset the rigidities that would otherwise restrict commerce and trade.   
 
The chapter begins with an analysis of the theological conception of the Islamic contract and the 
resulting system of nominate contracts.   Second, the pivotal prohibitions of gharar and ribā are 
considered.  Finally, the Cairo Geniza records are analysed with regard to the rules and 
concepts developed herein.   
 
3.1   GOD’S COVENANT WITH MANKIND 
 
Classical Muslim thought is unanimous with respect to a human being’s native endowment, a 
God-implanted ability, to know with absolute certainty of God’s existence.   Known as fitra, this 
universal concept describes one’s ability to reason one’s way to an unshakeable knowledge of 
God and to its attendant obligations.  The pursuit of the knowledge of God ushers one into a 
covenantal encounter with Him.  To know God is to stand before Him as a presence before 
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whom one stands in a covenantal relationship.209  This relationship is enunciated in the seminal 
passage detailing the covenant: “And [remember] when your Lord brought forth from the 
Children of Adam, from their loins, their seed, and made them testify against themselves 
[saying]: Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes, verily.  We testify.  [This was] lest you should say 
at the Day of Resurrection: Lo! Of this we were unaware”.210   
 
The orthodox interpretation of divine revelation insists that all obligations to which human beings 
are subjected arise out of the covenantal encounter between God and mankind.  This 
relationship is vastly unequal as befitting the superiority of God vis-a-vis His subjects.  Thus, the 
passage is descriptive of two parties to the covenant: God, the Lord, who dictates the terms of 
the relationship, and mankind, an inferior, who submits to those terms.211 The covenant 
describes the rights and responsibilities of mankind and enunciates the consequences both of 
compliance and non-compliance.212 
 
The Muslim believer owes his obedience to God.  His faithfulness or loyalty (amānah) to his 
pledged word is made in His presence so that God is witness to the conclusion and binding 
nature of all contracts.  Several verses in the Quran highlight the divine importance of keeping 
one’s oaths and agreements.  For example: “Verily those who swear allegiance to thee, swear 
allegiance really to God, the hand of God is above their hands; so whoever breaks faith, to his 
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own hurt he breaks it, and to those who fulfil what they have pledged to God, he will one day 
give a mighty reward […]”.213 Likewise oft-cited verses that remind believers to hold tight to their 
pledge illustrate the general tenor of such commandments: “Ye who believe! Fulfil all 
obligations;”214 and “Fulfil the covenant of God when ye have entered into it and break not your 
oaths after ye have confirmed them”.215  From the primordial covenant the Islamic laws of 
contract were developed by jurists.  Thus, the sharia, not unlike the Western legal principle of 
pacta sunt servanda,216 underscores the sanctity of contract.  
 
However, the ever-present ethical concerns of Islamic law differ from the Western legal 
principle, as contracting parties are given the means to cancel unilaterally a validly concluded 
contract, if necessary.  Known as the option of rescission (faskh), they are designed to ensure 
that the agreement between the parties is real and not just apparent and that the parties are 
satisfied and committed to the fulfilment of their mutual obligations.217  Hence, the principal 
ethical aspiration embedded within the Islamic law of contracts seeks to extract the highest 
degree of certainty in the rights and obligations amongst the parties. The extinguishment of the 
option, either by agreement or forfeit, triggers the mechanism whereby the contract is endowed 
with binding legal force.218   
                                               
213 Quran 48:10. 
214Quran 5: 1. 
215Quran 16: 91. 
216 Ballantyne, " Shari'a” (1987), 12; Ballantyne, "Commercial” (1997), 228. 
217 Coulson, “Commercial Law”  (1984), 57-58. 
218 Ibid. 
97 
 
 
The option may only be attached to contracts which involve consideration and are to be legally 
binding.  Where these criteria do not exist, the option to rescind does not come into play.   
Straightforward contracts such as sale (bay‘) and hire (ijārah) fulfil these criteria, while valid but 
not binding contracts such as partnership (sharikah), agency (wakālah) and reward (ju‘ālah) are 
revocable by either party.219  The system of options is varied and complex and will not be 
pursued further here.  However, it is one of several features of Islamic commercial law that 
distinguish its underlying ethical impetus from the absolute binding nature of the Western 
maxim.  
 
3.2   THE ROLE OF INTENTION (QAṢD) 
 
Muslim scholars agree that human will alone (irādah) does not create rights and obligations, the 
central elements resulting from the conclusion of a contract.  While they agree that human 
intention (qaṣd) is responsible for triggering the commencement of the contractual process, the 
effects of the contract are produced immediately and irrespective of what the parties have 
agreed.  Thus the contract becomes a mere exchange of rules, wherein the role of human will 
(irādah) is curtailed dramatically.220   The will of the author of a contractual declaration has 
almost no place in the Islamic scheme of nominate contracts.  Chehata emphasises: “If the spirit 
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of the person making the declaration is to have in view the effects of the declaration, his will is in 
no way attached one way or another to the contents of the declaration.  This content, by which 
is meant the signification of the declaration, is realised by virtue of the law.  The will cannot by 
its own virtue create rights and obligations”.221   
 
Seen in this light, the contract in Islamic law is a cause (sabab) that flows from the sharia.  It 
produces effects (aḥkām) in terms of rights and obligations, equally foreseen by the law.222  
Most contemporary Muslim theorists perceive the element of intention (qaṣd) as a choice 
(ikhtiyār) at the moment of declaration, a primordial element in the formation of the contract.  
Thus, according to theology, freedom in contracting exists only at the level of the ikhtiyār. 
 
The emphasis placed upon the role of intention (nīyah), rather than will, has led to the willful 
underdevelopment of cause (sabab) as a juridical structure in Islamic law.223  In its stead jurists 
stress the important role that Islam places on the detailed nature of the rules concerning parties’ 
contractual consent, and most especially, concerning the subject matter of the legal act.  The 
richness of this legal matter, they argue, is sufficient to determine which legal acts should be 
cancelled.224 
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Consequently, the reduced role of intention in secular transactions (mu‘āmalāt) as opposed to 
the realm of worship (‘ibādāt) – where the importance of intention is undisputed – is evidenced 
in the differential treatment applied to the concept by the four schools of law.  Al-Shāfi‘i, writing 
in his famous al-Umm (the Mother), emphasised the appearance of validity of the contract which 
cannot be cancelled based on the suspicion or previous practices of the parties.  An unlawful 
intention is reprehensible (makrūh) but it does not cancel an agreement or disposition so long 
as it is not expressed.225  Likewise, the Ḥanafīs stressed the validity of a contract based upon its 
appearance despite circumstantial evidence indicating an act’s unlawfulness.226  The Ḥanbalīs 
and Mālikīs foresee a greater role for the will, however, and hence the immediate purpose or 
cause receives greater emphasis.  Therefore, Ḥanbalī and Mālikī jurists annul any agreements 
or dispositions whose authors’ intentions are suspected to be unlawful.227  As remarked in 
chapter two, the LIF has been profitably constructed to avail itself of this important concept.  The 
following section examines the system of Islamic nominate contracts. 
 
3.3  THE SYSTEM OF ISLAMIC NOMINATE CONTRACTS 
 
The term ‘ahd is used frequently throughout the Quran and seems at times to be a synonym of 
‘aqd (pl. ‘uqūd), although the latter is normally used to refer to bilateralism,228 or to a bilateral 
economic exchange between parties.  From the covenant or ‘ahd flow all other obligations, i.e. 
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commandments and rules, which God also demands of his slaves.  The Arabic word for 
contract, ‘aqd, is invoked only once in the Quran, in Sūra 5:1, cited above.  However, ‘aqd 
appears consistently in the classical works of Islamic law229 and is thus commonly used to 
denote the juridical operations concluded between parties.  In its more secular interpretation the 
Islamic contract is a legally recognised undertaking or juridical act, which is not necessarily used 
to denote an agreement. The term also describes unilateral juridical acts and dispositions by will 
(mortis causa) such as gifts, bequests, gratuitous loans, guarantees and so forth that do not 
require the consent of any other party.  Moreover, the system of contracts includes mere juristic 
acts that do not require consideration, such as the repudiation of marriage by the husband 
(talāq) and the manumission of a slave.230 
 
Jurists laid down no less than thirty specific nominate contracts, nearly all of which were 
modelled on the contract of sale.  In fact, some modern scholars of Islam view the contract of 
sale as a substitute for a general theory of contract, which itself is “probably too occidental and 
systematic an approach” to impose upon the Islamic body of law.231  In fact, the exceptions 
between the nominate contracts far outweigh the generalities amongst them.232   
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The jurist’s casuistic approach to the law was inclined to elicit subtle rules pertaining to specific 
contracts rather than formulating broad theories.233  In particular, qiyās was used to elicit 
additional contracts and the development of intricate rules pertaining to each commercial 
contract.  The resulting category of contract was subsequently authorised by Hadiths or other 
legal sources.234   
 
A scheme of nominate contracts emerged in which contracting parties could seek out a valid 
and effective nominate contract heading amongst an array of basic and exceptional contract 
types.  So for example, a contract of sale for agricultural commodities that had not yet been 
sown would be deemed null and void as it involved uncertainty as to the existence of the object 
of contract – comprising the central element of the prohibition of gharar.  However, parties could 
choose another contract heading such as the salam (forward purchase) in which the non-
existence of the commodity is permissible and proceed with the exchange.  Hence the rigid 
formality of the nominate contract system was minimised to a considerable extent.235 
 
Classical jurists generally categorised the system of contracts into four branches, based on a 
classification as to whether the exchange is of the corpus or the usufruct, and whether it is for a 
consideration or not.   These four contracts are often mentioned in the fiqh literature but, as 
seen, the contract of sale receives greatest emphasis as it tends to act as a hypothetical model 
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from which other contracts originate. The four classifications are: (1) bay‘, which denotes the 
transfer of the corpus for a consideration; (2) hibah (gift), the transfer of a corpus without 
consideration; (3) ijārah (lease, hire), the transfer of the usufruct for a consideration; and, finally, 
(4) ‘arīyah (loan), the transfer of the usufruct without consideration.236   
 
Despite their chief importance as foundational contracts, a much greater number of contracts 
constitute ‘exceptions’ to the basic scheme.  The ulema cite, as “standard practice”, that by strict 
analogy or qiyās with the relevant prototype contract, these exceptions would be invalid; in other 
words, their ‘illah would not correspond with the prototype contract.  This is the case with 
exceptional contracts such as istiṣnā‘ and salam that are examined below; it also applies to   
bay‘ al-wafā’ – a financing contract in which a house or land parcel is sold for a cash price with 
the condition that the seller can repurchase the house at a later date.  Agricultural tenancies and 
commercial ventures such as the muzāra‘ah, and, most importantly, for modern Islamic banking 
transactions, the muḍārabah, are all seen as exceptions to the relevant prototype contracts.237  
As a rule of thumb, all contracts for which a consideration as a fixed percentage of the profits is 
determined as a condition to the contract fall into this latter category.   
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Although such contracts did not meet the rigid standards of Islamic legal theory, classical jurists 
came to regard ‘exceptional’ contracts as “vital and integral parts of the total system”.238  In fact, 
these exceptions far outnumbered the foundational structures.239   
 
3.4  THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE GENERAL VALIDITY OF 
CONTRACTS 
 
The Islamic contract of sale contains three critical cornerstones or factors that apply to all other 
contracts.  These include the seller, the buyer, the form (ṣīghah) and the object of the 
contract.240  Jurists disagree whether it is necessary to combine all of these elements as a 
matter of principle.  In all contracts, however, jurists agree that the form of the contract must 
include an acceptance (qabūl) and corresponding offer (ījāb).241 Further, a sale is valid if its 
fundamental components (arkān) and ancillary attributes (waṣfs) are legal and are not 
connected to a third party.  Moreover, a valid sale must not contain options.  Properly 
concluded, a valid sale commences the immediate exchange of ownership of the object of sale 
and the price.  Therefore, a sale without options would transfer immediate ownership of the 
object of sale to the buyer and the price to the seller.242 
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The legal status of a contract is either valid or invalid as a result of the degree to which the 
cornerstones and conditions of the contract are satisfied.  A valid (ṣaḥīḥ) contract satisfies all of 
its conditions and cornerstones while an invalid (bāṭil) contract violates one or more of its 
conditions and cornerstones.  A sale is invalid if it is defective (fāsid).  However, the Ḥanafīs 
categorise contracts according to three criteria: namely, (1) valid (2) defective and (3) invalid.  
Therefore, they distinguish between contracts that are not valid, i.e. between those that are 
defective and those that are invalid.  A forbidden contract, although sinful, could be engaged in 
without invalidating the contract.  Thus Ḥanafīs differentiated between the fundamental 
components (arkān) of a contract, which invalidate it; and the prohibition of a general 
characteristic (waṣf) that only leads to it being defective.243 
 
However, the majority of jurists ruled that a prohibited contract is invalid and that whoever 
utilises such a contract has committed a sin.  Furthermore, the prohibition of a main component 
(rukn) of a contract “is equivalent to a prohibition of a general characteristic that is satisfied in 
that particular contract”.244 Any action, whether a fundamental component or a general 
characteristic, that disagrees with God’s commands, is both defective and invalid.245 
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With respect to the form of a contract, the law’s overriding concern is that the quality of riḍā, i.e. 
unconditional consent, is present between the parties.  Riḍā can assume many forms.246  With 
respect to contracts orally concluded, Muslim jurists regard the exchange of offer and 
acceptance not as an exchange of promises or even implied promises, but rather as 
performative utterances, that is, as oral statements that have legal effects.  In keeping with the 
sacrosanct nature of the utterance, both offer and acceptance are generally to be expressed in 
the past tense to indicate finality, rather than in the future tense, which is promissory (‘idah).247  
The past-tense expression of the dispositive utterance reflects the contracting parties’ 
establishment of immediate rights and obligations; so that the contract of sale is envisioned as 
an immediate transfer of counter-values.248  However, the Ḥanafīs allow the exchange of offer 
and acceptance in the present tense as it indicates immediate or future action in the Arabic 
language.249 An offer made in the present tense requires further clarification so that there is no 
uncertainty with respect to the way in which such language may be construed.250 
 
With respect to the object or effects of the contract, a series of overarching principles must be 
satisfied which imply that every category of acts or contracts has an end it itself.  Generally, the 
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objective must be morally attainable, and accord with other religious requirements, otherwise it 
is declared illicit (ḥarām).  In particular, the contract must be linked to the holy texts and the 
effects must necessarily conform to the principles of the sharia.  Any transgression of these 
effects or the creation of new ones which do not conform to sharia principles is unlawful.  For 
example, sale has been deemed permissible on the basis of supporting evidence from the 
Quran, the Sunna, and ijmā‘.251  The Quran is explicit on this matter: “But Allah has permitted 
trade”252 and “But let there be among you traffic and trade by mutual good will”.253  The second 
criterion pertains to the determination of what the religion of Islam forbids.  This list could 
comprise numerous illicit objects including the sale of alcohol, pork, ribā (usury), etc.254 
 
Furthermore, several necessary conditions are attached to the object of contract for it to be 
valid.  Most jurists agree that four principal requirements must be met:  First, the object of the 
sale must be in existence.  Thus the sale of a non-existent object or an object that may cease to 
exist is not permitted.  Exceptions to this general rule are made for the contracts of bay‘ al-
salam (a forward sale in which the price of a commodity is paid upfront) and istiṣnā‘ (the sale of 
a manufactured product/contract of hire, with payments made at varying stages).  Second, the 
object of sale must be owned and must be temporarily non-perishable, i.e. available for future 
use or consumption.  Third, the article of sale must be owned privately and be in the possession 
of the seller.  This stipulation prevents the sale of publicly owned lands, waters, wildlife and so 
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forth.  Finally, the object of sale must be deliverable upon conclusion of the sale.  Therefore, the 
sale of an undeliverable good may not be concluded.255  The existence of counter-values in a 
contract of sale is given further consideration below.  
 
3.5  APPENDING SHURŪṬ (CONDITIONS) TO CONTRACTS 
 
As discussed above free will has a limited scope in the formation of the Islamic contract.  Each 
nominate contract produces its own effects and the degree to which these may be modified or 
altered by appending special conditions (pl. shurūṭ; sg. sharṭ) illuminates the object of the 
present discussion.  Despite the theological limitations that have been discussed, the religious 
scholars (fuqahā’) concede that parties are free to contract as they see fit as long as they do not 
add new effects to the contract or contravene the criteria with respect to the essence or finality 
of the act as established above.256  Jurists perceive a danger in allowing parties to remove or, 
much less frequently, add effects to their contracts as these may create abuses which involve 
illicit profit or ribāwi (ribā-based) transactions.  An imbalance of benefits amongst contracting 
parties may ensue that undermines the essential reciprocity of exchange and the principles of 
equity and justice which underpin the law. Jurists legitimate this ruling with the well-known 
Hadith from the Bukhārī compendium in which the Prophet expressed his opinion of the subject 
in front of his wife Aisha: “What do they think of, those men who lay down conditions not to be 
found in the Book of God?  Any stipulation not to be found in the Book of God is null and void.  
                                               
255 Al-Zuhayli, “Transactions”  (2003), 15-16. 
256 Comair-Obeid, “Contracts”  (1996), 32. 
108 
 
Were there a hundred such conditions of this sort, the one rule of God will be more equitable 
and more sure”.257   
 
Of course, parties to a commercial transaction need to add stipulations or other conditions to a 
contract to fulfil commercial objectives.  Recall that some modern jurists perceived a margin of 
freedom for doing so only in the formation of the option (ikhtiyār).  At the moment of the option 
parties may choose different modalities with respect to the execution of the contract as long as 
these do not offend the essence of its structure.258  However, the positions of the schools of law 
with respect to these criteria differ as considered below.  
 
3.5.1  CONDITIONS AND THE FOUR SCHOOLS OF LAW 
 
Two general strands of thinking underlie the madhhab positions with respect to the appendage 
of ancillary conditions to an Islamic contract. The first is typified by the Ḥanafī position, which is 
almost identical in every point of detail to the Mālikī and Shāfi‘i viewpoint.  Ḥanafīs categorise 
shurūṭ into two classes: (1) clauses which are valid or ṣaḥīḥ; and (2) clauses which are null and 
void (bātil).  The following examines those conditions that do not conflict with the sharia.  First, 
clauses which confirm the effects of contracts already established in the fiqh do not occasion 
controversy as no additional obligation is imposed on either party.  An example would be for a 
seller to deliver a sale object to the buyer as this is an obligation that resides with the seller 
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whether explicitly mentioned or not. Second, Al-Kāsānī notes that clauses which establish 
effects that agree with the effects of acts to which they are attached, are also deemed valid.  
According to Ibn Qudāma, these are known as stipulations “connected with the legitimate 
interests of the parties”.  These include: a pledge; a security or bond in a sales transaction to 
secure payment;259 the determination of the period over which payment is to be made; and 
specification of the quality of services to be performed.  These stipulations are valid and 
binding.260  Finally, many clauses are deemed lawful due to their customary usage or practice.  
These tend to be services of little import that a purchaser may require of a seller when 
conducting a transaction.  This latter class of shurūṭ is seen as an exception and granted 
permissibility on the basis of istiḥsān.  Al-Kāsānī explains that “according to qiyās the clauses 
are not valid because they involve a supplementary advantage for one of the contracting 
parties.  They are null and void just like a clause by which the purchaser of some cloth required 
the seller to make him a shirt of it.  But such clauses have been accepted in practice; the qiyās 
has given ground in the face of such practice and these stipulations have been admitted by 
istiḥsān”.261  Notably, Shāfi‘is and Mālikīs admit the use of clauses that reflect customary 
commercial practice as a matter of principle. 
 
As noted above, Ḥanbalīs take a decidedly more liberal view of the role of human will in the 
contracting process.  (Unsurprisingly, Islamic finance often avails itself of the Ḥanbalī doctrine.)  
                                               
259 Ibid., 35-36. 
260 Coulson, “Commercial Law”  (1984), 51. 
261 Comair-Obeid, “Contracts”  (1996), 36. 
110 
 
Ḥanbalī liberalism extends beyond the sphere of the option even to the actual effects of the 
contract. Yet clauses and stipulations must not contravene general prohibitions or consensus 
(ijmā‘).  In fact, few new contracts are able to avoid this legal web.262 Still, the general sentiment 
is that parties are able to contract according to their requirements.  The influential Ḥanbalī jurist, 
Ibn Taymīyah, went so far as to state that “the parties decide as they wish the content of their 
juridical acts and determine the effects on the condition that these effects are not contrary to 
public order and morals”.263   
 
The Ḥanbalī madhhab adopted several areas of overlapping restrictions with other schools 
which bear mention because of Ḥanbalī doctrinal prominence in the LIF.  First, as is the case 
with the Ḥanafīs, Shāfi‘is and Mālikīs, a single contract may not comprise two agreements or 
stipulate a condition, the fulfilment of which is necessary to enact the other.  A famous dictum 
from the Prophet declared that “a loan coupled with a sale is not lawful”.264  This prohibition is 
ostensibly designed to avoid the uncertainty surrounding the apportionment of consideration or 
price.  Therefore, the sharia forbids the creation of two contracts for a single price.  This is a 
significant problem for Islamic financial transactions since they combine nominate contracts and 
wholly novel legal structures to achieve a single financial objective.  The solution has been to 
create ‘promise to purchase/sale’ undertakings, which enables individual contracts to be 
transacted separately.  This strategy is examined in detail in chapter five. 
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Second, a contract of sale may not impose two ancillary conditions imposing supplementary 
obligations upon the same contracting party.  So, for example, a buyer who purchased corn or 
wheat and required the seller to both grind and deliver the commodity to him would be unlawful.  
Finally, conditions may not be imposed that run counter to the juridical purpose of the act to 
which they are attached.265  For instance, a seller could not forbid a buyer from disposing of his 
property as he wishes and so forth.  While these rules place restrictions upon the contracting 
parties’ liberty to contract to some extent, particularly as seen in the modern sense of the 
concept, the Ḥanbalī position is nonetheless relatively unencumbered as compared to other 
madhhabs. 
 
The Ḥanbalī stance on contractual liberty is supported with textual evidence from the Quran 
which, as noted, includes exhortations to fulfil one’s contracts.  From these verses Ḥanbalīs 
deduce that every contract or condition which God has not declared ḥarām is licit in the absence 
of any divine textual references that speak otherwise.266  Hence, the Ḥanbalī position clearly 
views a larger role for human will in choosing the effects and conditions of contracts.  There is a 
presumption of permissibility (ibāhah) in transactions because ‘nothing in them is forbidden,’ as 
Ibn Taymīyah enunciated.  According to Ḥanbalī jurists, an attempt to declare something 
forbidden on merely speculative grounds, or to impose hardship or unnecessary rigidity upon 
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people, violates the spirit of tolerance and well-being that God wishes for His believers.267  The 
following Quranic verse is cited as proof: “God desires for you ease, He does not desire for you 
difficulty”.268  Every people and epoch develops customary manners of business practice for 
which it would impose hardship were people required to provide direct textual support (naṣṣ) 
from the Quran or Sunna to vindicate the legality of every commercial exchange.269  
 
3.6   GHARAR  
 
The complex regime of Islamic contracts is subject to additional rules that have wide-reaching 
effects.  The following examination begins with the prohibition of gharar. The prohibition of 
gharar (excessive risk, uncertainty, or speculation) is concerned with the issue of the existence 
of the counter-values at the time of contract; their qualities, quantities, ownership, and 
presence.270  Islamic law is averse to transactions which blindly award one person’s good 
fortune at the expense of another’s bad luck.  It is considered an unjust result for which the 
fuqahā’ sought to devise a systematic principle that required equality and fairness between the 
transacting parties in the formulation of contract.  A just profit should be the result of one’s 
labour, time and expenditure.271  
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Aleatory contracts, both pre-modern and contemporary, consist of financial products which 
seem to typify the probabilistic inequality which the jurists so vehemently opposed.  These 
contracts entail an uncertain outcome for one of the transacting parties whose benefit or loss 
from the transaction is impossible to predict.  Parties to an aleatory contract stipulate the 
possibility of gain or else they seek to insure themselves against loss as a result of some 
unforeseeable circumstance.  Yet gains and losses are not calculable beforehand as a result of 
this uncertainty.  Thus the element of uncertainty on which these contracts rest necessarily 
results in the benefit of one party at the expense of another’s loss.272  Nonetheless, 
jurisprudence ceded ground to the necessities of commerce in numerous instances, which 
resulted in a philosophical rendering of exceptions and qualifications to the general prohibition.  
These differed according to the jurist’s madhhab, and the context and time of his writing.   
 
The prohibition of gharar has widened in scope and detail over the centuries.  The Quran warns 
humans to take care with regard to their own folly and extravagance, which may interfere with 
the believers’ ritual and worship. Games of hazard or gambling (maysir) – a favourite pastime of 
pre-Islamic Arabs – are proscribed: “You who believe, intoxicants and gambling, idolatrous 
practices, and [(divining with) – a pagan Arab custom] arrows are repugnant acts – Satan’s 
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doing – shun them so that you may prosper”.273  These foundational verses do not specifically 
mention gharar but provide a general idea/principle that is subsequently broadened and 
elaborated in the Sunna.   
 
3.6.1  THE SALE OF A NON-EXISTENT OBJECT 
 
Ibn Ḥanbal, eponym of the Ḥanbalī madhhab, relates a well known tradition that typifies the 
attributes of the prohibition.  One should “not buy fish in the sea, for it is gharar”,274 i.e. because 
one does not know with certainty what one is buying.  Moreover, Ibn Māja’s recounting of the 
following Hadith continues to shape the concept of gharar, despite an acknowledged weak 
chain of transmission (isnād).  He recites, “The Prophet forbade sale of what is in the wombs, 
sale of the contents of the udders, sale of a slave when he has run away, … and [sale of the] 
‘stroke of the diver’ [ḍarbat al-ghā’is, sale in advance of the yield of a diver’s dive, whatever it 
was]”.275  The message of these Hadiths, according to Muslim scholars, is to protect the weak 
against exploitation by the strong.  The general rule is that any transaction devoid of uncertainty 
and speculation facilitates the parties’ complete and perfect knowledge of the counter-values to 
be exchanged.276   
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Ibn Rushd, a Mālikī scholar, wrote in his Bidāyat al-mujtahid that gharar in sale transactions 
causes the buyer to suffer damage as a result of a want of knowledge (jahl), which affects either 
the price or the object of purchase.  He specified several conditions that must be met for gharar 
to be averted: (1) both the price and the subject-matter must be in existence; (2) the 
characteristics of these must be known; (3) their amount must be determined; (4) the parties 
must have control over these factors so as to ensure that the transaction can take place; (5) 
and, finally, the date of future performance, if any, must be defined.277  
 
Subject-matters which are non-existent at the time a bilateral transaction takes place have been 
declared void by an overwhelming majority of traditional Muslim scholars.278  A non-existent 
(ma’dum) subject-matter epitomises the risk and speculation of a transaction based on a want of 
knowledge, and the eventual qualities and condition a subject-matter may possess.   A non-
existent subject matter in contractual relations is often equated with debt (dayn).  Yet the 
meaning of dayn is more general in that it relates to something not present, which is yet to be 
paid or completed at a future date; but which is already owned by the creditor pursuant to the 
contract.  While a dayn is not yet in the possession of the creditor, it resides in his 
consciousness (dhimmah).  Therefore, despite its incorporeal nature, dayn is described 
metaphorically in physical terms, leading some contemporary scholars to equate it with the 
English common law concept of “chose in action”, or a thing not in possession of the creditor.279  
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3.6.2  THE SALE OF DEBT (BAY‘ AL-DAYN) 
 
Consensus surrounds the opinion that the sale of a debt for another debt at a discount (bay‘ al-
dayn bi al-dayn) is not valid since it results in ribā.280 The right to payment was considered to be 
money (a ribāwi good) and thus constitutes a dayn in the dhimmah of the debtor. Money cannot 
be traded except at par value or else it violates the rules pertaining to ribā al-faḍl and gharar. An 
oft-cited Hadith supported this prohibition: “The Messenger of God forbade sale of the delayed 
obligation [al-kali’] for a delayed obligation”.281  
 
The transfer of a debt from one debtor to another (ḥawālah) at par value could be undertaken 
subject to a number of strict rules that ensure ribā al-faḍl and gharar are not violated.  Suppose 
that X (a transferee) owes a debt to Y (transferor) and Y owes a debt to Z (creditor).  By 
transferring Y’s right to payment to Z, Y is freed from his obligation and Z has a right against X.  
Different rules pertain to the schools of law including who requires consent, whether or not a 
pre-existing debt owing to the transferor from the transferee is required, and to whom the 
creditor has recourse in case the transferee is unable to pay.282 
 
The LIF also prohibits the sale of a debt at a discount to third parties, although there is 
controversy whether certain modern proprietary rights such as patents and copyrights, should 
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be considered as dependent on corporeal matter (‘ayn) or whether they should be seen as 
incorporeal rights in the dhimmah of the debtor.283  In the former case the transfer of such rights 
could be exchanged with a profit while the latter require equivalence according to the rules of 
ribā al-faḍl.  These are considered below.  
 
3.6.3  GHARAR AND THE FOUR SCHOOLS OF LAW 
 
Many prominent scholars qualified their objections to gharar transactions.  Ibn Rushd wrote that 
in case of necessity (ḍarūrah), and when the future existence of the subject-matter is certain, a 
sale contract could be valid.  For example, a sale contract involving the harvest of fruit prior to 
full ripening was permitted by the Mālikīs as long as such fruit can be harvested in continuing 
succession.  The majority opinion proscribed the sale of fruit prior to its full ripening.284  
 
Ibn Rushd skilfully pointed out that each school of law’s position with respect to a contract of 
sale for an absent thing or object (bay‘ ghā’ib) was unique and certainly not homogeneous.  In a 
bay‘ ghā’ib the vendor has title over the subject-matter, but the subject-matter is either not 
available or not present at the meeting of the parties.  Historically, the bay‘  ghā’ib served an 
important role in regional and long-distance trading in the far-flung Islamic provinces, as needed 
commodities were imported from trading partners without the buyer having inspected the goods 
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prior to their importation.285  Al-Malik and his disciples permitted the sale of an absent 
commodity so long as it was accompanied by description and was of the nature or kind of good 
whose essence did not alter prior to the buyer taking possession.  If the object conformed to the 
description, the sale became binding.  On the other hand, Al-Shāfi‘i and his disciples prohibited 
the bay‘ ghā’ib due to the buyer’s failure to inspect the goods prior to purchase.  Whether the 
unavailable object was accompanied by description or not was immaterial to their reasoning.286   
 
The Ḥanafīs deemed the transaction valid by requiring the vendor to indicate the location of the 
good and by describing the object in detail.  Known as the khiyār al-ru’yah (the option of 
inspection), it entitled the purchaser to inspect the subject-matter after the purchase whereupon 
he could decide to proceed with or rescind the sale.  Likewise, the Ḥanafīs held that the buyer 
always had a right to khiyār al-ru’yah – even when the subject-matter mirrors the seller’s 
description – and were thus more lenient with respect to bay‘  ghā’ib.287  The point of contention 
concerned the issue of whether the degree of knowledge gained through description of the sale-
object is equal to that gained by one’s sensory perception of an object at-hand.288  Thus the 
eponyms of the schools debated whether the degree of uncertainty (gharar) in a given 
transaction was permissible or not. 
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According to al-Nawawī, Shāfi‘is tolerated gharar in case of need and when gharar could only 
be averted with exceptional difficulty.289  Ibn Taymīyah argued vehemently that the sale of a 
non-existent object is unlawful only if it involves gambling and the misappropriation of the 
property of others, as there is neither a textual ruling (naṣṣ), nor a general consensus to support 
the view that such a sale is unlawful.290  His disciple, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, defended his 
mentor’s argument by asserting that no reference, either specific or general, exists in the Quran 
or the Sunna of the Prophet or his companions to the effect that the sale of something non-
existent is unlawful.  The essential feature of sale is the delivery of the item sold; if the seller is 
unable to deliver, then this is the risk and speculation – the gambling – of which the Quran 
clearly speaks.291 These scholars seem to have recognised early on that the tendency to define 
gharar in terms of non-existence of the subject-matter had become deeply entrenched, and had 
outgrown the early substance of the principle as depicted in the Quran, i.e. risk, speculation and 
uncertainty associated with gambling.  The concept of gharar had evolved by virtue of qiyās into 
a question of the existence of the subject-matter in a contract of sale. 
 
The contemporary Lebanese jurist, Maḥmaṣānī, qualifies the general requirement of existence 
of the subject-matter by making a distinction between the subject-matter as a specific piece of 
property (‘ayn) and the subject-matter in the form of labour (‘amal) or use (manfa‘ah).  The 
subject-matter as an ‘ayn must meet the requirements as discussed above; whereas subject-
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matters in the form of labour and use are necessarily non-existent at the time of contract and 
only come into being with the gradual implementation of the contract. 292 A lease contract 
(‘ijārah), for instance, in which the usufruct of an object is hired for a specific term, only 
materialises with usage over a period of time.  A contract of manufacture (istiṣnā‘ ), in which a 
specialist’s labour is employed to produce a subject-matter, is included amongst these 
exceptions.  Other kinds of transactions such as a guarantee of debts (kafālah) or agency 
(wakālah), which also involve use, are equally applicable to this distinction.293  Accordingly, a 
majority of scholars made exceptions for these types of contracts, if only on a case-by-case 
basis,294 and with reference to principles such as istiḥsān, and subsequently, ijmā‘.   
 
3.6.4  AVOIDING THE RIGIDITIES OF GHARAR 
 
In practice the exigencies of trade and commerce required the fuqahā’ to find solutions to the 
rigidity of the gharar prescription. Ḥiyal were employed to enable transactions that had 
appreciable benefits for the people.  These included cases in which the value of the commodity 
was not precisely known, as in muzabana contracts,295 or in the barter of livestock for meat, 
which on the basis of its unknown differences in counter-values would violate both the 
prohibition of ribā and gharar.  In sum, Islamic jurisprudence has yielded over time to the 
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pressures of commerce and the needs of human existence, shielding merchants and traders 
from the sin of ribā and gharar by formulating exceptions to rules.   
 
Most, if not all, commercial transactions, including those which took place in the early Islamic 
period, contain a certain element of risk or uncertainty with regard to some attribute of the 
transaction.  In the classical period jurists seem to have agreed that excessive gharar (al-gharar 
al-kathīr) was prohibited whereas minimal gharar (al-gharar al-yasīr) was not.  However, they 
continued to disagree about what constituted these categorisations.296  Several modern jurists 
sought to establish a sort of doctrine of gharar that establishes legal effects and creates a viable 
framework for the assumption of risk.  Maḥmaṣānī, for example, differentiated between 
excessive and trivial gharar with respect to legal effects.  Excessive gharar renders a contract 
null and void (bāṭil), or it may be cause for indemnity and compensation.  Slight gharar may be 
deemed to be tolerable (mubah) and, if so, would not invalidate a given transaction.297 Al-
Sanhūrī advocated that a distinction should be made between instances in which the subject-
matter of a transaction is non-existent but will come into existence with certainty, and other 
cases in which the subject-matter is also non-existent, but the probability involving its existence 
is uncertain – thus invoking gharar.  He accepted the notion of a scale of gharar in which 
excessive gharar is outlawed and slight gharar in which the transaction is valid.298   
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Both scholars clearly recognised the necessity of aleatory contracts in modern commerce and 
thus stressed the degree of gharar.  Their position diverges from the classical one by qualifying 
the prohibition on the basis of the non-existence of the subject-matter.  The following section 
addresses the second major prohibition in the law of Islamic contracts, namely, the prohibition of 
ribā.  
 
3.7   THE PROHIBITION OF INTEREST: RIBĀ  
 
The practice of forbidding interest took place as early as 1750 BCE, if not earlier.  King 
Bocchoris of the Egyptian 24th Dynasty (730-715 BCE) forbade the receipt of interest in excess 
of the principal amount owed.  And the great Egyptian jurist, al-Sanhūrī pointed out the 
significance of the moment when Egypt decreed – after a three thousand year hiatus – that 
modern Egypt should adopt the same rule in Article 232 of the Civil Code.299  However, the 
levying of interest is equally ancient and likely a more prevalent form of money-lending.  Ancient 
Greeks and Romans charged exorbitant interest with the peculiar aspect of securing debt in the 
form of the person.  If a debtor was unable to repay the loan in kind, he became the creditor’s 
slave.  In Rome, slavery for debt existed well into the fourth century CE.300   
 
At the inception of Islam money was generally hoarded, for it was regarded as unproductive in 
the sense that a money economy did not yet fully exist.  In its place Meccans are to have 
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bartered commodities in Syria with the objective of returning to Mecca laden with other more 
precious goods from settled agriculturalist societies.  Goods transported and sold in Syria were 
hides, leather goods, skins, clothing and perhaps also animals, clarified butter, and perfume, on 
occasion.301  Workers did not receive money-wages for their labour, and production was not the 
chief focus of hoarded wealth.302   
 
Goitein’s meticulous scholarship of the Geniza records shows that gold and silver were still 
traded as commodities three centuries later.  However, by then they were also widely used as 
means of payment.303  At each transaction, coins, like goods, had to be weighed and their value, 
including their fineness and state of preservation, had to be determined.  Money was generally 
handled in sealed purses of coins whose value was attached to the outer purse.  A similar 
system prevailed in Roman and Jewish societies, and, subsequently in Christian Europe.304  
 
So-called ‘merchant bankers’ (the “tājir”) in the “dār al-ṣarf” (the money exchange of Fustat) 
were highly adept at handling money.  As a rule, merchant-banker accounts indicated the real 
value or the value in weight of the dinars in consideration.  Therefore, a document indicates that 
a purse of 76 and 1/6 dinars most probably contained 80 gold pieces.305  The prohibition of ribā 
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al-faḍl (ribā by excess) – examined below – is more easily understood in light of these 
circumstances.  
 
3.7.1   THE ISLAMIC ORIGINS OF THE PROHIBITION OF RIBĀ 
 
In the Muslim tradition the prohibition of ribā is a central factor affecting all obligations and 
contracts in Islamic law due to its influence on the shape and contours of all commercial activity.  
Ribā has been simply defined to convey an unjustified enrichment in which a party receives a 
monetary advantage without giving a counter-value in return.306 Yet scarcely is there a principle 
the meaning of which has been as vehemently contested over centuries of commercial practice 
and jurisprudential thought.   
 
The Arabic root of ribā is r.b.w., which denotes increase, to grow or to augment.  It is used 
twenty times in the Quran. As a noun ribā denotes excess (ziyādah), increase, augmentation, 
expansion or growth (namā’), which for its part is used eight times in the Quran.307  A consensus 
that the general meaning of ribā is synonymous with ‘increase’ is one of the few areas where 
there is little or no controversy.  
 
The prohibition of ribā in classical Islamic law seems to have developed gradually in successive 
revelations, likely beginning with the Meccan revelation from the sūra al-rum (references the 
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defeat of the Byzantines at the hands of the Persians (613-614 CE)) which declares: “That 
which ye provide with the prospect of an increase through the property of [other] people, will 
have no increase with Allah; but that which ye provide for charity, seeking the countenance of 
God, [will increase]: it is these who will get a recompense multiplied”.308  The Meccan verses are 
replete with denunciations of the economic injustices of Meccan society such as widespread 
profiteering and commercial exploitation by a small group of wealthy patricians at the expense 
of the poor.309   
 
Tradition indicates that a debtor who could not repay the capital (money or goods) with 
accumulated interest at the time it came due was allowed an extension on the condition that the 
sum was “doubled and multiplied” – aḍ‘afan muḍā ‘afatan.  In his Muwatta’, al-Mālik Ibn Anas (d. 
179/795-6) recites this loan-ribā tradition, as follows: “Zayd ibn Aṣlam relates that the ribā of 
jāhilīyah (pre-Islamic times) was that the creditor, who had given a loan for a certain period to a 
debtor, used to demand from the other when the time for its repayment came (saying): “Will you 
return the loan, or give an increase (over the loaned capital)”?310   
 
The custom of doubling one’s debts was categorised by some authors, including the renowned 
Ḥanbalī scholar, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, as a so-called third category of ribā known as ribā al-
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jāhilīyah.311 Jāhilīyah is a time of ‘ignorance’, as the successive revelations from God to his 
Prophet Muhammad had not yet transpired in the period before the rise of Islam.  Al-Jawzīyah 
reported that Ahmad Ibn Ḥanbal confirmed that the ribā al-jāhilīyah was the ribā as to which 
there was no doubt.  For his part, al-Jawzīyah considered this “manifest ribā” and noted that 
besides this there are many unfair forms of commercial practice which are not explicitly ribā, but 
which he labelled as “concealed ribā”.  The breadth and range of the term was confirmed by the 
great expert on Hadith, Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, who said that “the term ribā can be applied to 
every forbidden commercial practice”.312 
 
Many authors have contended that the Quran testifies to an increasing awareness of the 
division between rich and poor and a diminished social morality vis-à-vis the poor and 
orphans.313  Moreover, the Quranic stress on acts of generosity seems to imply that this value 
had eroded to some extent in early Islamic society. Yet charges of excessive wealth and 
diminished moral values are the standard repertoire of monotheistic preachers and, while the 
book is revered as the word of God for all devout Muslims, it cannot be adduced as evidence of 
the social conditions in pre-Islamic Arabia.314  A well-known theme indicates that the good things 
of this world divert men’s hearts from God and expose one to the danger of sin.  Thus, the 
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burden of guilt is placed upon the well-to-do.  This notion has become inextricably linked with 
the sentiment that the wealthy and powerful are unjust and oppressive.315   
 
While the Quran, especially in the early Meccan period, contains verses which rise up and rail 
against riches and the rich, it is equally evident that there is nothing in the Quran and the Sunna 
against trading and profit-making.  In fact, the Quran has been described as the embodiment of 
the relations between man and God of a “strictly commercial nature”.  Allah is the merchant and 
the universe his reckoning, where all is counted and everything measured.  His institution is the 
Quran and He establishes a pattern of honest dealing.  Life is a business in which man gains or 
loses.316  Furthermore, a number of traditions attest to the merchant’s exalted role in the 
afterlife, such as Muhammad’s proclamation that: “the merchant who is sincere and trustworthy 
will (at Judgment Day) be among the prophets, the just and the martyrs”.317  In fact, before his 
prophetic mission, Muhammad was a successful trader in his own right.  In sum, the lack of 
historical evidence from the early origins of Islam leaves us unsure as to the socio-economic 
roots of the prohibition of ribā; evidence that, were it available, might provide contextual clues as 
to the intended meaning of ribā. 
 
Nonetheless, the practice of doubling the principal sum of a debtor in the event that the debtor 
was unable to pay is widely corroborated by numerous Muslim narrators, including the Quran. 
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Therefore, it must be accepted as historically persuasive.  The usurious practice is illuminating 
in the sense that it stands in stark contrast to the Quran’s clear message of social responsibility 
and mutuality in which the wealthy have a moral obligation to provide for the poor, the needy, 
widows, the divorced, slaves and the generally less fortunate. It is clear that the Quran’s 
revolutionary appeal consisted not only in the spirituality of its message but also in its zeal for 
altering embedded social practices that it deemed corrosive and immoral. 
 
Undoubtedly, the Quraysh’s318 zeal for exorbitant profit-making is admonished in two separate 
passages in the Quran that deal specifically with this practice.319  Quran 3:130 is thought to be 
an early Medinan passage, which would thus have been revealed after Muhammad and his 
followers’ emigration (hijra) from Mecca and the subsequent Muslim defeat at the battle of 
Uḥud.320  The verse, from the sūra āl ‘Imrān – the family of ‘Imrān – is sharper in its admonition 
against the consumption of ribā, perhaps reflective of the Muslim community’s increased 
political stature.  Muhammad commands: “You who believe, do not consume usurious interest, 
doubled and redoubled.  Be mindful of God so that you may prosper – beware of the Fire 
prepared for those who ignore [Him] – and obey God and the Prophet so that you may be given 
mercy”.321  The revelation is no longer a recommendation but a command and warning to the 
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believers to desist in usurious lending typified by doubling the principals of the debtor’s debt.  
Some Western scholars, including Schacht and Rodinson, associate this gradualism with 
Muhammad’s experience with money-lending as practised by the Medinan Jews after the hijra, 
but this assertion has not been substantiated.322  
 
The third and last sūra, sūra al-baqarah or the cow, revealed before the fifth year of the hijra 
and the exile of the last Jewish tribe of banū Qurayzah, delineates the seriousness of the 
prohibition further: “Those who devour ribā shall only rise again as one whom Satan strikes with 
his touch; this because they say, ‘selling is like usury’; but Allah has permitted selling and 
forbidden usury.  He therefore who receives a warning from his Lord and abstains shall have 
pardon for what is past and his affair is with Allah; but they who relapse into usury are the 
people of Hell, and they shall remain in it forever.  Allah abolishes usury and makes alms bring 
interest; Allah loveth no sinful unbeliever [...]”.323 The Quran is adamant that those who 
disregard the ban on ribā merit the hell fires of the afterlife; these unbelievers (kuffār) commit 
perhaps the gravest sin that one may commit – it was said to have been worse than murder, 
idolatry and incest.324 Yet this passage is also important for its depiction of sin, on the one hand, 
and righteous deeds, on the other.  The last verses speak of God’s desire that the creditor allow 
a delay in payment of the debt, should circumstances require it, or absolving the debtor from his 
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obligation altogether.  This message has had important consequences for how Islamic financial 
institutions treat late payments or payments in default.  
 
The above verses constitute the essence of the traditionalist ‘fiqhī’ (jurisprudential) interpretation 
of ribā.  Jurists viewed them as a denunciation of the rich money-lender, who receives an 
increase in the form of usurious interest without giving to the other party, a borrower who is 
likely less well-off, an equivalent return. Unearned income absent an equivalent measure of 
productive economic activity is viewed as the root of injustice and commercial exploitation.  It 
tends to enrich the moneylenders and usurers and impoverishes those who must borrow to 
meet their basic existential needs.   
 
3.7.2   THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE RIBĀ CONCEPT: MONEY, TIME AND 
COMMODITIES 
 
Available historical documents indicate that ribā as enunciated in the Quran, in the earliest 
period of Islam, was most likely understood to prohibit interest on loans, chiefly in money and 
foodstuffs.  This fact is attested by numerous documents from the Geniza indicating that not 
only were loans without interest extended on the basis of kinship or partnership but 
documentation completely failed to mention any increase for such acts despite the intricacy and 
detail of such records.325  In fact, few documents openly describe lending practices with interest, 
although the taking of loans on interest from Muslims and vice versa was regarded as legal, 
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despite Islamic law’s clear statements as to its unlawfulness.  The main point here, however, is 
that dealing in ‘interest’ was equated with the trespassing of God’s law; whether or not it was, in 
fact, the ribā of which the Quran speaks, is less important than the way in which Muslims, and 
Jews for that matter, understood the scriptural sources. 
 
A strongly influential tradition is cited from the Hadith specialist, al-Muslim, whose collection is 
regarded as amongst the most authoritative of the Hadith collections.  The Hadith extended the 
prohibition considerably to the exchange of currencies and several critical foodstuffs.  These 
became property susceptible of ribā (mal ribāwi). It declared: “Gold for gold, silver for silver, 
wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, like for like, equal for equal, 
hand to hand.  If these types differ, then sell them as you wish, if it is hand to hand”.   Versions 
of this Hadith exist in all the major ṣaḥīḥ (valid) compilations.326  The majority of jurists of the 
schools of law agreed that although the items mentioned in the Hadith are very particular, its 
meaning could be extended to other goods; however, jurists disagreed about the general 
underlying meaning on the basis of which these species were prohibited – the ‘illah of the 
prohibition.327   
 
From this Hadith and others a more technical systematisation of ribā developed in which 
unlawful gain is expressed in two forms.  The first is ribā al-faḍl.  It is “derived from the 
quantitative inequality of the counter-values in any transaction purporting to effect the exchange 
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of two or more species, and which belong to the same genus and are governed by the same 
efficient cause”.328  The second, ribā al-nasī’a   (ribā of delay), is the “deferred completion of the 
exchange of such species, or even of species which belong to different genera but are governed 
by the same ‘illah [...] whether or not the deferment is accompanied by an increase in any one of 
the exchanged counter-values”.329   
 
This Hadith – which forms the basis of this particular prohibition – applies principally to the two 
precious metals (gold and silver) and the four basic commodities (wheat, barley, dates and salt) 
mentioned in the famous tradition.  By analogy these prohibitions were extended to all species 
which are governed by the same ‘illah; or jointly belong to any one of the genera to which the six 
articles named in the Hadith are subordinated.  Saleh’s definition of genus (jins) with respect to 
the ribā prohibition comprises a class of articles in which several subordinate classes or species 
are extant.  Likewise, species may be defined as a group of articles which contain several 
common attributes or qualities, and, for their part, are subsumed under the broader category of 
genus.  Consonant with most aspects of Islamic law, the schools of law offer diverse 
interpretations of the nature and specificities of genera.330   
 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the four schools of law in Sunni Islam define the ‘illah of the 
famous commodities Hadith differently.  Shāfi‘is detect two causes – that of currency and food; 
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Mālikīs expand upon the traits of food – those foods being basic foodstuffs or essential nutrients 
and others which are able to be preserved and stored; the Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī schools see only 
goods sold by weight or by volume, which are subdivided into 3 classes: (1) measure by weight; 
(2) measure by volume (3) and highly precise measure (for gold and silver only).  In particular, 
the Ḥanafīs stressed equivalence as the aim of prohibiting ribā as justice demands that 
transactions are fair and equitable.  When the differing nature of things made the determination 
of equivalence difficult, if not impossible, a money system of dinars and dirhams was 
established for the assessment of their values.  Things differing in nature should be related to 
each other proportionately – that is, the ratio of the price of an object with respect to its own 
genus should be equivalent to the ratio of the price of another object relative to its genus.331  
Fairness and justice are the end-result.  All schools of law are unanimous that the ribā 
prohibition applies to goods that share a single subdivided class,332 e.g. by weight, by volume, 
or by precise measure. Importantly, all the various eponyms of the schools of law based their 
rulings on different Hadiths, and sometimes, like Al-Malik, sought to reconcile two Hadiths to 
express a certain principle.333 
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The lack of functionality inherent in this type of reasoning is exemplified by the Ḥanafī madhhab.  
As noted, the Ḥanafī ‘illah has two characteristics: the circumstance in which exchanged articles 
belong to the same genus and the fact that the same articles are either measured or weighed as 
a function of the exchange.  In the case that one of these two characteristics arises in the 
course of a transaction, i.e. evincing properties susceptible to the ribā prohibition, the counter-
values must be exchanged on the spot and without delay.  Gain or profit from the exchange is 
permissible only in a hand-to-hand transaction.334  If the articles to be exchanged are either both 
measurable or both weighable and belong to the same genus, i.e. both characteristics of the ‘
illah, a deferred transaction is strictly prohibited as is gain in the spot-exchange.  When one of 
the exchanged counter-values is measurable and the other is not or when one of the exchanged 
counter-values is weighable and the other is not, gain is permissible in either a spot-sale or 
deferred transaction.  Yet this reasoning leads to an unreasonable result, namely that the 
exchange of commodities such as sugar, cotton, iron and copper for a deferred payment of gold 
or silver (or more generally, the sale of weighable articles for deferred payment) would be 
deemed unlawful because gold and silver are also weighable commodities.335  The Ḥanafīs 
solved this problem by dividing weighable articles into those with a highly precise measure and 
all the rest, which reflects the necessity of this type of transaction.  This distinction between 
weighable qualities was considered to be of enough significance as to permit deferred sales 
transactions.  
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The famous traditionist Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī catalogued a detailed record of different 
categories, forms and nuances of ribā transactions in his 40-chapter-book, al-Sunan al-Kubrā, 
which dealt with loans and sales involving general commerce and agriculture.336  Likewise, al-
Mālik’s al-Muwaṭṭa’ describes in detail the contemporary forms of ribā in loans, sales and 
exchanges of commodities. Both works underline the notion that the loan of basic foodstuffs 
(ribāwi goods), other commodities or money for a certain period for an increase is ribā.337 Thus 
the development of ribā al-faḍl expands upon the meaning of ribā al-nasī’a considerably. Ribā 
al-nasī’a is generally believed to have simply referred to an increase in principal in the debt of 
the borrower unable to pay at a stipulated time.   
 
However, the content and essence of ribā al-faḍl has been a point of contention and controversy 
throughout Muslim history.  As this examination demonstrates, this form of ribā is not clearly 
identified, nor is there a broad consensus on exactly what is meant by the term.   It seems to be 
a hypothetical game of juristic hair-splitting that involves the exchange of goods, some fresh, 
others old, some refined by craftsmanship and some coarse, with little, if any, economic utility. 
Conservative modern scholars such as Haque claim that ribā al-faḍl and ribā al-nasī’a were both 
prevalent in pre-Islamic times and thus the idea that jurists and traditionists developed ribā al-
faḍl in its systematic logic at a later date is wholly contested. However, chapter four illustrates 
the arguments of many well-respected modern scholars, and muftis alike who have challenged 
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this notion of ribā; perhaps in an effort to enable the Muslim world to adapt to the exigencies of 
modern commercial life. 
 
Furthermore, modern scholars have noted that conflicting Hadiths espoused by Hadith 
collectors undermine the definitional claims made by classical jurists.  For example, Muslim, al-
Bukhārī, al-Dārimī, al-Nasā’ī, Ibn Mājah and Ibn Ḥanbal each recorded Hadiths narrated through 
chains of transmitters whose general claim is “ribā is on loans” or as al-Bukhārī emphatically 
expressed: “There is no ribā except on loans”.338  However, many of these same authors, 
including al-Bukhārī, Muslim and other canonical collections also report the equivalency Hadith 
that was examined in section 3.7.2: “Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī reported God’s Messenger as saying, 
“Gold is to be paid for by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley by barley, dates by dates, 
and salt by salt, like for like, payment being made ‘hand to hand’.  If anyone gives more or asks 
for more he has dealt in ribā.  The receiver and the giver are equally guilty”.339 Apparently, this 
obvious contradiction in meaning did not go unnoticed and each of the schools had its own 
supporting Hadith.   
 
In sum, the body of Hadith-material on this particular subject, which includes many other 
Hadiths dealing with the topics of excess and delay, indicates a marked trend toward a more 
rigid and conservative definition of ribā.340  It is also evident that a clear and unanimous 
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definition of the term did not exist, especially amongst the learned jurists. Furthermore, historical 
evidence of commercial transactions in the earliest Muslim centuries is completely missing in 
these discussions.  A more in-depth appreciation of the way in which the term was understood 
by early Islamic traders and merchants impedes a more pragmatic discussion of how the 
prohibition was put into practice.  While the Geniza documents point to a general understanding 
that all interest – no matter how small or exorbitant – constituted the forbidden ‘ribā’, knowledge 
concerning the earliest Islamic centuries, in particular the famed ‘ribā al-faḍl’, remains partial 
and unsatisfying. The following sections attempt to understand the way in which classical 
commerce was actually practiced.  
 
3.8    HISTORICAL COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 
 
The practice-oriented nature of Islamic commercial law is more easily understood as a result of 
an interesting analysis which determined that over 75 percent of the jurists from the third/ninth 
and fourth/tenth centuries either engaged in commerce or the handicrafts or originated from 
families whose members engaged in these professions.341  In fact, the eminent scholar and 
eponym of the Ḥanafī school of law, Abū Ḥanīfah, was a dealer and exporter of Khazz silk from 
Kufa to his partner in Baghdad.342  Therefore, an influential number of pious scholars who 
contributed to the formulation of God’s law had an in-depth and personal knowledge of the 
commercial requirements of the marketplace and these demands evidently found their way into 
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the law. The following discussion concerns the partnership (shirkah), which was one of the 
primary tools of commercial exchange in the classical Near East.343 
 
3.8.1  THE PARTNERSHIP (SHIRKAH) 
 
The shirkah is an ancient form of business association that has been practiced in the Near East 
since the days of Babylon as evidenced by its mention in the Code of Hammurabi, the Talmud, 
its treatment in the Corpus Iuris Civilis of Justinian and in the Gaonic responsa of the ninth and 
tenth centuries.344  Another credit institution, the qirāḍ partnership, seems to have been endemic 
to the pre-Islamic Arabian tribes in their pursuit of the trans-Arabian caravan trade.345  With the 
Islamic conquests the qirāḍ was introduced to outlying provinces of the Near East, North Africa, 
and eventually to Southern Europe where it was known as the commenda.346  It can 
unequivocally be stated that the qirāḍ is the earliest example of a commercial association that 
bears similarity to the later commenda in all its essential features.347  The qirāḍ also became 
known as the muqarāḍah, or muḍārabah, depending on the region in which the contract was 
exercised and the preferences of the schools of law.  The distinctive form of partnership known 
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as qirāḍ and muqarāḍah apparently originated in the Arabian Peninsula while the muḍārabah is 
of Iraqi provenance.348   
 
The Geniza records attest to the surprising fact that at least one-half of the international trade 
was based on a series of highly complex, informal business partnerships, which spanned the 
Near East from Morrocco to Mesopotamia, and could last a lifetime.  This fact is in keeping with 
our understanding of custom, of the proximate and trusted partners and agents, and locally 
available information which typify the ‘local knowledge’ criteria of successfully conducting 
commerce in the classical Near East.349  Thus the Mediterranean and Indian trade, the most 
important trade routes of the period, were largely based on informal relationships rooted in 
mutual trust and friendship, and lacking any formal legal instrumentation.350  Moreover, an 
‘umlah or commission was only rendered for a special service; no compensation was given for 
extraordinary expenditures of time and effort which these informal undertakings often required.  
Instead these partnerships flourished in reciprocity as the sources confirm that “he serves there 
and I serve here”, and “you are in my place there, for you know well that I am your support 
here”.351   
 
Formal partnerships tended to be of shorter duration and limited to specific undertakings, 
although many long-term business relationships seemed to have combined the two.  
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Partnerships encompassed practically every economic activity in the Geniza period due to the 
fact that they substituted for large fields of economic activity that would subsequently be housed 
in alternative contractual forms: namely, employment and loans on interest.  Partnerships ran 
the gamut from industrial pursuits such as: the running of workshops, wine production, and the 
building of homes; and commercial projects in both wholesale and retail trade; or projects 
related to the administration of the state such as tax farming (the fiscal basis of the state), and 
occupations in the royal mint or exchange, and so forth.352  Money, goods, work, or any 
combination of the three, could form the basis of a partnership and records detail a number of 
diverse constellations.  There are two general vehicles of partnership which encapsulate this 
commercial activity, one of which has been discussed.  The second, known as the shirkah (also 
sharikah), or perhaps more commonly as the khultah (literally, the mixing of the investments) 
describes contractors who offer their services in various shares and share the profit or loss in 
proportion to their investment.353 
 
The popularity and widespread usage of the qirāḍ reflect the unique character of the contract.  
An investor could harvest the advantages of a loan as the qirāḍ entailed no liability for the 
investor beyond the sum of money or quantity of merchandise extended to the agent.  In the 
event of a successful venture, the agent was to return the capital plus a share of the profits.  
Meanwhile the agent could claim complete indemnity from any liability for the capital, in the 
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event of a partial or total loss.354  Furthermore, the investor reduced the cost of trade by using 
partners and/or agents to undertake business dealings on his behalf.  Further, risk allocation 
could be better managed through trade diversification with respect to goods, location and 
time.355 
 
In the contract of qirāḍ one of the most crucial issues was in determining the legitimate cost to 
the seller of any given commodity so as to be able to determine the profit in excess of total cost.  
According to Ḥanafī law the single most important guideline in making this determination was 
the customary practices of the locale in which the transaction was to take place.356  It is a 
definitive example of how the sharia incorporated local business practices. 
 
Moreover, the enforcement of the ban on investment in the form of goods or merchandise would 
have dealt a severe blow to medieval commerce, particularly for those engaged in long-distance 
trade.  It was common that merchants had nearly all their capital invested in goods and 
merchandise, which could not always be sold advantageously at a certain locale.  A number of 
quite simple legal devices, i.e. ḥiyal, were developed to circumvent this prohibition.  The 
merchants were to have made frequent use of them so that these subsequently were 
incorporated into the legal manuals and the earliest legal formularies (shurūṭ).357  The 
assimilation of the ḥiyal in the fiqh, including contractual formularies, was so complete and 
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without reservation that their extra-judicial quality was eventually forgotten and omitted from the 
texts.358 
 
The qirāḍ was often the source of partnership between Muslims and Jews and could be formed 
by a variable number of partners and partnership stakes, while profit, loss and expenditure were 
divided in proportion to the investment.  So, for example, a Tunisian merchant had a one-sixth 
stake in a 365 dinar-partnership in which lacquer was transported from Egypt, while he 
maintained a five-sixths stake in a shipment of indigo and sal ammoniac dispatched from the 
same country.359  So adept and practical in the field of commercial exchange were the Arabs 
that their widespread use of complex credit facilities throughout the Islamic territories pre-dated 
a similar European development of credit by at least three or four centuries.360   
 
The qirāḍ partnership was the subject of lengthy discussion in the earliest Islamic legal literature 
(late eighth century CE), and the refinement and tone with which it is treated indicates its 
historical antiquity.  In addition to citing a number of Hadith relating to the Prophet and his 
companions, al-Sarakhsī justifies the permissibility of the qirāḍ contract on the grounds of 
commercial necessity: “in relation to this contract, the requirements of the law yielded in face of 
the people’s need for it”.  Furthermore, when commercial practice was stymied by the broad 
restrictions relating to analogical reasoning, Ḥanafī jurists were inclined to exercise the 
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prerogative of istiḥsān and thereby suspend the rigid application of strict analogy.361  In addition 
to enhancing the flexibility and efficiency of market players, these principles succeeded in 
adopting large swathes of commercial customary practices into the Islamic fold. 
 
Although the Quran does not mention the qirāḍ, traditions attribute it to the practice of the 
Prophet and his leading Companions.  One tradition places Muhammad as an agent in a qirāḍ 
investment with his future wife, Khadīja, and ‘Umar and ‘Uthmān, the second and third, 
respectively, of the rightly guided caliphs, are known to have participated in these ventures.362  
The sharia admitted these partnership practices on the grounds of traditional practice, the 
consensus of the community (ijmā‘), and its practical application for the well-being of the Muslim 
community. 
 
The imperatives of commercial practice were not limited to the qirāḍ.  For example, a labour 
partnership between a stall-owner and an artisan illustrates a contract of widespread 
commercial importance throughout the classical period.  In a partnership described by al-
Sarakhsī, a stall-owner allows an artisan to utilise his stall, whereupon all profits were to be split 
equally amongst the parties; the same would apply to loss in the event of misfortune.363  Such a 
partnership would be rendered void on account of the artisan’s intangible investment, at least in 
monetary terms; and the stall-owner’s provision of his stall is equally difficult to value and is thus 
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prohibited as a means of investment in a partnership.  Likewise, the terms of the contract do not 
satisfy the conditions inherent in the contracts of hire or lease (ijārah) as the terms of the 
agreement have not been specified prior to the conclusion of the contract.    
 
Al-Sarakhsī offers his insight into why this sort of arrangement was permitted: “By exercising 
juristic preference (istiḥsān), he [i.e. Shaybānī] permitted this arrangement because of its 
continuous use in the affairs of men without any disapproving voice being raised against it.  
Objecting to transactions which are in common use among the people is in itself a type of 
offence.  In order to avoid this offence, this contract is permissible.  For there is no explicit text 
nullifying it, and the people have a need for this contract […]”.364  This is a more evident 
example of the differentiation between the adoption and subsequent Islamisation of customary 
usages of clear economic relevance, on the one hand, and the ideal theory of the sharia, on the 
other.  But the adoption of customary practices is not merely a reasoned abandonment of the 
uṣūl al-fiqh in favour of a more practical and flexible approach to the law.  On the contrary, it 
depicts a pliant and willing belief-system, which in bestowing its grace and permission upon a 
set of not incompatible acts, enhances the strength and vibrancy of the Muslim community, and 
by extension, the Muslim faith. 
 
The Cairo Geniza papers are not always clear with respect to which law, Jewish or Islamic, 
governed a contract.  There is considerable circumstantial evidence, however, which indicates 
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that local custom (the so-called merchant’s law) and the contractual terms and conditions as 
agreed by the contracting parties established the guidelines regulating a contract.365  Most of the 
Geniza documents available with respect to the governing law are court records.  There are a 
number of records which deal with the termination of a partnership, known as a release.  These 
releases were statements confirming that the parties to a business association had relinquished 
their claims against one another.  Naturally, settlements were made out of court, or before 
Muslim notaries.  It is likely on account of the common usage of the Muslim qirāḍ that these 
settlements were made in the presence of Muslim notaries.366 The following section analyses 
the use of interest in classical transactions. 
 
3.8.2   THE USE OF INTEREST IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
 
It is evident that Islamic ideals reinforced already strongly entrenched beliefs concerning the 
immorality of the practice of levying and paying interest.  For instance, evidence from the Cairo 
Geniza show that lending on interest was not only shunned religiously but was of little economic 
importance throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries.  It is thought that people at the time felt 
as though the acceptance of interest, or, perhaps unusually, employment, was to denigrate 
one’s person as “the borrower is a slave to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7); a dependent 
relationship lacking dignity.367 This mentality is highlighted by the then current notion of giving 
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loans (qarḍ ḥasan) as an act of charity, which accords with the requirements of the sharia that 
loans bear no interest, and, in fact, be given as an act of charity without recompense in this life.  
Such loans were commonly advanced amongst relatives connected by common commercial 
undertakings.368 
 
In the twelfth century, the Geniza shows that the mood shifts so that fixed interest, ribā (ribbith 
in Hebrew), is evidenced in documents which openly flaunt the prohibition.  In this period it 
becomes unlikely that large amounts of money, such as 300 or even 180 dinars, which were 
lent for a period of six years, would not have been compensated without fixed interest or 
“service”.  Overall, however, scanty documentary evidence highlighting the use of interest likely 
indicates that appearances were kept up, so to speak, and thus the use of interest openly was 
still perceived as a social and religious anathema.  Indeed, it seems that the creditor’s objective 
was to arrange for an increase for himself without publicly stipulating such profit in a signed and 
notarised contract.369   
 
A telling sign of the times is evidenced in both Muslim and Jewish willingness to lend on interest 
to members of the opposing religion, whether it was for commercial or simply consumptive 
reasons.  For instance, the terrible wars of the 1020s witnessed the decimation of the Jews of 
Jerusalem who were subsequently forced to borrow from Muslim usurers to pay the poll tax.  In 
one Cairo Geniza letter signed by ten residents of the Holy City and posted to Old Cairo around 
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1040, it is written: “In the current year we took a loan of 40 dinars for the poll tax alone from the 
usurer known to you”.370 While the taint of interest has had a genuine social impact over 
centuries of religious practice, at least to the extent that it was clearly a sin according to all of 
the monotheistic religions, its usage has nonetheless waxed and waned over centuries of 
commercial practice. 
 
During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, lending at interest was a condoned 
practice.  In fact, ribā or fā’ida (interest) at relatively low rates was perceived as different from 
the usurious form condemned in the Quran.  An interest rate of 15 per cent was legally 
sanctioned.  The clergy stood squarely behind the ruling and had those people, who denied its 
validity, persecuted according to the Ottoman understanding of the sharia.371   
 
Classical commercial practices indicate that customary business practices were adopted within 
the Islamic fold when their benefits were obvious, despite the fact that some of these practices 
exceeded doctrinal limits.  The flexibility and pragmatism with which the sharia treated such 
practices provides a strong indication of jurists’ willingness to adapt and extend the law to 
commercial requirements.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The system of Islamic nominate contracts is premised upon the divine covenant.  While many of 
its rules were laid out in the holy sources, numerous areas of law were not touched upon.  The 
jurists’ task was to formulate a body of substantive law that accorded with the textual substance 
(‘illah) of the revealed texts.  This resulted in a disparate group of nominate contracts that each 
contained their own rules and particular legal effects.  The intricate rules which characterise the 
system of nominate contracts entail many restrictions upon contracting parties’ freedom to 
contract.  However, jurists made some allowances for exceptions to general principles – such as 
the contracts of istiṣnā‘  and salam – that offset some of the doctrine’s more rigid features.  
 
The textual hermeneutic from which jurists sought to formalise the law helped to generate 
complex rules concerning ribā and gharar.  The classical schools of law interpreted each 
prohibition differently for a variety of reasons.  In general, it was assumed that God had 
prohibited ribā and gharar to abolish exploitation and to mitigate injustice in contractual deal-
making.  However, the manner in which these principles should be defined has been the subject 
of debate since their juristic inception.  At any rate, it seems that the great majority of Muslims 
has understood ribā as interest from a very early date.  Gharar, on the other hand, was not as 
easily formulated.  Its effects in classical commerce were less restrictive due to the types of 
contracts available in that period.  In some areas of the doctrine, however, the concept could 
have restrained trade and commerce markedly.  However, jurists cautiously devised robust 
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exceptions to the prohibition that permitted much-needed commercial and trading activity.372   
Both prohibitions affect the structure and content of Islamic contracts by circumscribing what 
parties can contractually undertake.   
 
While the law of Islamic nominate contracts is fairly rigid and generally restricts parties’ freedom 
to contract, school doctrines ameliorate this rigidity considerably by accommodating customary 
business practices.  Customary practices were either condoned because the community 
(umma) had a definite need for them or because they had used them for so long that it made no 
sense in forbidding them.  Many of these practices were incorporated into fiqhi doctrine via the 
process of Hadith or ijmā‘, while rationalising legal principles were used to accommodate others.  
 
The historical practice of Muslim commerce bears witness to the predominance of custom in 
commercial transactions.  Classical business transactions, not unlike contemporary ones, were 
undertaken according to the needs of traders and merchants.  The ability of the sharia to 
envelop all sorts of practices – some of which clearly transgressed a conservative interpretation 
of school doctrine – testifies to the law’s historical ability to adapt to changing commercial 
imperatives.   
 
In the next chapter some of the complex legal and economic challenges affecting the modern 
Muslim world are considered as well as Islamic legal responses to these challenges.   
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PART II: THE CHALLENGES OF ARTICULATING THE LAW OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE MODERN ECONOMY AND ISLAMIC FINANCIAL IJTIHĀD 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter has two principal objectives.  First, it investigates some of the complex economic 
and legal challenges affecting the modern Muslim world.  Second, it examines the strategy, 
methods and tools used to respond to these challenges and which ultimately produce the LIF.  It 
is asserted that jurists’ legal articulation of these challenges reflects a formalistic approach to 
deriving the law that is designed to retain an allegiance to classical legal theory and tradition.  
However, the LIF is a hybrid law that diverges in both form and substance from the sharia. 
 
These objectives are addressed by examining the following topics: first, the role of money in the 
modern world and its effects upon economic activity and social interaction; second, the 
displacement of the sharia throughout the Muslim world in the modern era; third, Muslim 
intellectual trends and their relevance to the contemporary interpretation of ribā; fourth, Islamic 
economics and interest-free banking – the offshoots of these intellectual trends; fifth, the 
prevalent trends of contemporary Islamic finance; sixth, the role of transnational financial 
institutions; seventh, the commercial drive toward standardised Islamic financial contracts; and 
finally, Islamic legal strategies and methods for formulating the Law of Islamic Finance.      
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4.1  THE NATURE OF MONEY IN THE MODERN WORLD 
 
The development of Islamic finance is intimately connected to the social, economic and 
psychological role of money in the modern world.  The use of money as a means of exchange 
as well as its representation of value has undergone enormous change since the classical 
centuries of Islamic commerce.  These changes have altered the way in which people think 
about and transact in money.  They also present major challenges to classical Islamic 
conceptions of dealing in money-based transactions.  This section analyses the challenges 
associated with the modern world’s use and perception of money.  
 
Money means different things to different people.  Economists view money as purchasing power 
or the representation of the value of all items of wealth. Although lawyers recognise this 
conception, they make many differentiations in law that economists do not. 373  Thus, bank 
accounts are debt, not money; and “deposit accounts are not even debts payable on demand”, 
and so forth.374 Furthermore, money is highly self-referential.  It only comes into existence if 
people believe that something is money, use it as money and treat it as money.  Therefore, the 
attitude that people have towards money “is partly constitutive of the phenomenon”.375 
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The modern development of complex monetary systems enables the signification of value in a 
multitude of forms, including the most familiar media of exchange such as bank notes, letters of 
credit and bills of exchange.  However, the technological revolution, in particular the use of 
electronic money transfer systems, has dramatically transformed our ability to conduct 
transactions – by the addition and subtraction of intangible numerical symbols in accounting 
ledgers – in a matter of seconds, irrespective of location.   
 
Even the most highly developed monetary systems of the pre-modern era, the Roman Empire, 
never advanced beyond the use of ‘commodity money’, which took the shape of material 
coinage and was made of precious metals including gold, silver, copper and iron.376   In 
rudimentary monetary economies the value of the supply of precious metals may have been 
determined by their alternative use as an adornment; although as economies began to produce 
more goods this condition seems to have gradually disappeared.  In medieval and early modern 
Europe, as a result of a growing psychological indifference to metal money in terms of its value 
as a metal, and the introduction of banknotes as mediums of exchange, money increasingly 
came to be equated with paper money.377   
 
In traditional economies the desire for symmetry regulated the exchange of money.  A large 
token of value was demanded for large objects; in the Islamic tradition this required the 
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exchange of like for like and the imposition of intricate rules for weighing and measuring.  Recall 
that the Cairo Geniza records indicate that as late as the 13th century CE coinage was weighed 
and assayed; this reflected people’s perception that value resided in the metals themselves.  
Only as economies began to disassociate money from precious metals did such cultures realise 
that a considerable quantitative inequality could still permit an equality of power and value.  This 
step is symbolically important in that it represents an abstraction, in which one half of the 
equation no longer functions as a value in itself but is the abstract expression of the prevailing 
counter-value.378  Eventually a consciousness of money as dematerialised or imaginary was 
fostered through the dislocation of money of account and precious metal coinage.379  Although 
the ideal significance of money as a standard and expression of the value of goods has 
remained completely unchanged since the use of money first began, money’s character as a 
means to store and transport values has evolved and is still in the process of changing.380   
 
The introduction of banknotes as currency hastened the development of fractional reserve 
banking.  The reserve of gold to bills of exchange in issue was termed the “reserve ratio”.  As 
the goldsmith bankers of seventeenth century England realised that people began to view paper 
receipts as money, these could be lent out at interest rather than gold. In those instances in 
which depositors’ withdrawals outweighed reserves of coins, bankers relied on reserve 
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arrangements to make up the shortfall.381  Eventually the state’s declaration that these paper 
receipts were as valuable as money effectively made them so.382 
 
Eventually, this development led to money’s detachment from particular individuals in the 
creditor-debtor relationship.  Paper money became transferable to third parties and could 
circulate as private money within commercial networks.  This marked the very first time in which 
the extensive production of money took place outside the state’s monopoly of currency issue.  
Eventually these markers of debt adopted depersonalised terms similar to today’s bills of 
exchange; such as ‘payable to ‘x’ or the ‘bearer’’.  The bills could now be issued by banks and 
hence the possibility to finance enterprise on a large scale came into view.  The essence of 
capitalism, “the elastic creation of money by means of readily transferable debt” was born.383  
 
In sum, money’s significance has evolved from a direct and substantial function to its ideal form; 
namely, it produces its effects merely as an idea embodied in a representative symbol.384  The 
value of money does not derive from the costs of its production, or from supply and demand 
(neo-classical economic theory), or from labour value (Marxist theory).  Rather money is the 
absolute expression of abstract value; the value of things detached from the things 
themselves.385  
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In modern times the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971 represents a further step 
in the evolution of the modern world’s perception of the value of money.  As the US dollar 
became the medium of world trade in the post-war years, the agreement backed the dollar by a 
fixed convertibility into gold.  Moreover, the US dollar was further buttressed by American 
political and economic supremacy.  In effect, the US economy became the guarantor of 
international value.386  The shift to a global system of floating exchange rates ended dollar-gold 
convertibility but at the same time presaged a new phase in which the immaterial form of value 
gained meaning.  In particular, exchange rates between different currencies have been 
extremely volatile and reflect, in part, the competitive economic position and overall power of 
nation-states’ economies.  But these are hardly absolute qualities and are thus in constant flux.  
The effect is to render spaces, in this case, national economies, that underpin the determination 
of value as unstable as the determination of the value itself.387  
 
4.2  THE GLOBALISATION OF FINANCE 
 
These developments, coupled with the deregulation of the domestic financial sector, the 
removal of barriers to capital flows and enormous advances in information technology, have led 
to a rapid globalisation of finance.  In the era of the neoliberal capitalist economy finance has 
come to dominate the real economy.  Known as the financialisation of the economy, the term 
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connotes the predominance of financial activities over the production of goods and services.388  
It also describes the increasingly speculative nature of economic activity and hence the de-
linking of active production from the elastic creation of credit-money through the financial 
system. 389  
 
Approximately 95 per cent of daily financial transactions around the world had already become 
speculative in 1995.  Twenty-four years earlier, in 1971, only ten per cent of all financial 
transactions were speculative.390  In the United Kingdom, prior to the Great Recession of 2008-
2009, finance contributed to twenty-five per cent of gross domestic product.  At its peak, the US 
financial sector generated forty per cent of all corporate profits.391  The speculative nature of the 
world capitalist system raises important questions for a mode of finance which seeks to create 
value through tangible assets; in effect, Islamic finance seeks to re-establish a linkage between 
value and manufactured goods and/or services that no longer exists in the modern era.  
 
The financialisation of the economy is directly related to the system of fractional reserve 
banking. Commercial banks have the authority to create new money at almost no cost.  Further, 
the greater the amount of money they create the larger the amount of interest revenue and profit 
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to which they are beneficiaries.  Inevitably, commercial banks’ power to create money increases 
the supply of money, the level of private and public debt, and contributes to inflation.392   
 
Many major financial institutions maintain a reserve ratio of less than one-twentieth of total 
outstanding liabilities.  For example, the 2006 Annual Report of HSBC showed that the bank 
held just £3.5 billion in cash to cover approximately £168 billion in on-demand liabilities, which 
equates to approximately 2.08 per cent.393 Modern monetary reformers, including Islamic 
economists, argue that fractional reserve banking should be abandoned in favour of 100 per 
cent reserve banking; a concept that would extend credit through loans backed by 100 per cent 
reserves.394  
 
4.2.1  CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS OF MONEY  
 
The evolution of people’s perception and use of money has undermined some of the central 
tenets of classical Islamic notions of commercial trade including the detailed and highly intricate 
rationale underpinning the prohibition of ribā al-faḍl.  Recall that ribā al-faḍl calls for the 
exchange of equivalent counter-values in the case that these belong to the same genus or have 
the same underlying attribute (‘illah), i.e. can be weighed, counted, etc., depending on the 
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school of law.  Counter-values that do not belong to the same genus and which do not evince 
the same underlying attribute may be exchanged upon delay and in excess.  The modern 
world’s use of money contravenes this aspect of the ribā prohibition in almost all cases, with the 
exception of trading money for money.  Furthermore, financialisation raises important social 
questions about the mechanism by which value is measured and whether its disassociation 
from human labour and manufacture can be restored.  It is uncertain whether Islamic finance 
can help to remake these associations. 
 
Therefore, money is no longer viewed as a commodity but as a symbolically important 
representation of value.  It may not be overstated that it is in the psychological realm that 
money’s effects have had their most vivid consequences.  Of course, it is oversimplified to 
conflate money with the ideology of capitalism and free market values.  Clearly, the extent to 
which money “ushers in a world of moral confusion” varies greatly from culture to culture395 and, 
necessarily, according to a person’s proclivities and intrinsic nature.  Although the development 
of money has evinced a radical transformation of society, it cannot necessarily be linked to a 
radical transformation in a society’s worldview.  Anthropological research indicates that the 
meanings with which money is associated are highly dependent on the cultural matrix in which it 
has been incorporated.  Even the economic functions of money as a means of exchange, unit of 
account, store of value and so on are endowed with diverse symbolic meanings,396 according to 
their social and political context.   
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Furthermore, it is likely that every culture of exchange possesses an intrinsic drive toward 
optimum commoditisation – to create and exchange as many items as the existing exchange 
technology, i.e. money, will allow.397  The introduction of money can be seen as a response to 
this feature of human nature and in all societies in which it has been introduced – regardless of 
whether some adherents initially rejected its use or not – a rather uniform process of 
commoditisation has proceeded rapidly and extensively. The internal logic of exchange seems 
to have predisposed all economies to seize upon the new opportunities that expanded 
commoditisation brings with it.398 
 
4.2.2  MONEY, CAPITALISM AND MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS  
 
Capitalism’s channelling of all things into commodities, capable of being owned as private 
property and valued only insofar as they can be inserted into the productive process, as 
measured by the margin of profit, presented modern Muslims with a fundamentally different 
conception of material affairs and social transactions than the classical Muslim commercial 
tradition.  Importantly, these processes engender heightened consumption and, in turn, the 
satisfaction of individual wants and desires.399  Muslim intellectuals including notably Jamāl al-
Dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashīd Riḍā and Rafīq al-‘Aẓm voiced considerable 
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antipathy and misgivings about the capitalist system and its one-time socialist competitor.  Al-
Afghānī was preoccupied with the normative order conveyed by capitalism, rather than its 
material conditions and the concomitant processes of labour and industrial production.  In a 
similar vein al-‘Aẓm was concerned with the secularising tendencies wrought by capitalist 
processes.  He maintained that Islam, properly observed, was the only normative system which 
could ensure a moral economy based on solidarity, cooperation and the independence of the 
individual within just and equitable boundaries.400   
 
In the modern capitalist world the division of labour and the commoditisation of all things have 
engendered a plurality of economic dependencies based upon the infinite flexibility and 
divisibility of money.  Indeed, people of traditional economies were often dependent only upon 
themselves or a limited number of people, and thus the personal and committed nature of these 
economic exchanges was considerable.  Modern economic systems reflect a dramatic 
extension and specialisation of our needs – even in the fulfilment of fundamental requirements 
such as food, clothing and shelter - and can be satisfied only with the help of wide and complex 
organisations of people,401 many of whose functions are easily substitutable.  Thus, the modern 
use of money has tended to foster impersonal and inconsequential relationships in commercial 
exchange, and is therefore destructive of community and the intimacy of commercial 
relations.402  It has fostered a sense of independence and self-sufficiency for the elimination of 
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the personal element in commercial exchange directs the individual toward his own resources 
and makes one more positively aware of one’s liberty.403  Furthermore, research in social 
psychology indicates that consumerism seeps into the life frameworks of individuals and 
eventually affects their self-perception and interests, their view of the world and their interaction 
with others.404   The Muslim world has not been immune to these developments. 
 
Successive modern Muslim intellectuals have perceived modernity’s emphasis on individualism 
as a direct threat to Islam’s communitarian ethics as these posit the basis, if not the 
prerequisite, from which all economic life in Islam must originate.  The individualistic ethic is 
associated with capitalism, greed and materialism, and these values are thought to have stifled 
Muslim economic development.405  
 
Finally, in its modern form money has come to be defined, above all, in terms of credit and debt 
and in this sense is closely related to time.  As a mode of deferral, money enables contracting 
parties to delay the exchange of credit and liability in circumstances where immediate exchange 
of products is impossible.  As a means of bracketing time, money extracts transactions out of 
particular milieux of exchange characterised by ‘local knowledge’.  Thus, money allows for the 
enactment of transactions between agents widely separated in time and space.406  On the one 
hand, this has dramatically increased the web of transnational relations and flows of information, 
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no matter their culture of origin; on the other, the far-flung nature of modern commerce has 
contributed to the depersonalisation of social affairs.   
 
The wide-ranging change in the way in which money is perceived, used and treated has had a 
tremendous impact across the Muslim world.  The very difficult challenges that this change 
ushered in coincided with the near total displacement of the sharia in the modern period, which 
is the object of investigation in the next section.    
 
4.3   THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE SHARIA IN THE MODERN PERIOD  
 
By the end of the 18th century European scientific, economic and military dominance had spread 
throughout the Muslim world.407  By 1840 the Ottoman Empire had become economically 
subservient to a burgeoning European economy.408  The Ottomans and their elites gradually 
came to believe that European legal codes should replace those areas of traditional Islamic law 
that were considered most inadequate to meet the demands of modernisation.409 The Ottoman 
Empire responded by instituting a series of major reforms, known as the Tanzimat, which began 
in 1839 and lasted until 1876.  These reforms included new commercial and penal codes: for 
example, the Ottomans promulgated a Commercial Code in 1850, a penal code in 1858, a Code 
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of Commercial Procedure in 1861, and a Code of Maritime Commerce in 1863.  All of these 
were almost entirely based on French law.410  
 
For its part, Egypt enacted French-based civil and commercial codes in 1875-1876 for the 
Mixed Court system and instituted a programme of reform that promulgated penal, commercial 
and maritime codes derived from the French legal system.411  These types of legal transfers 
eventually became thoroughly indigenised to the extent that Muslim majority states have not 
shown any willingness to revert to a legal system based purely on the classical sharia with the 
exception of Afghanistan under Taliban rule.412  Indeed, one scholar asserts that by the mid-
twentieth century the sharia “had been reduced to a fragment of itself at best and, at worst, 
structurally speaking, to a nonentity”.413  
 
Despite the dominance of Western-based legal systems throughout the Middle East, the sharia 
does play a limited role in these states’ legal systems. Saudi Arabia is the country most 
influenced by the sharia in that its Basic Law is rooted in the Quran and Sunna.414  This is also 
due to the fact that it was the country least affected by European colonialism, it hosts the two 
holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, and largely subscribes to an ultra-conservative strain 
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of Sunni Islam know as Wahhabism.415  However, it too has enacted a parallel body of secular 
law, which it conveniently refers to as “regulations” so as not to offend its conservative religious 
elements; and has separate, specialist dispute resolution bodies in the commercial field.  These 
regulations, if found to conflict with the sharia, would almost certainly be overturned in a sharia 
court, thus confirming the sharia’s pride of place.416  Other Muslim-majority states such as, 
Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) cite the sharia as “a” source of their 
constitutions whereas Qatar and Egypt designate the sharia as “the” source.417  As a result, 
there is considerable uncertainty surrounding what role the sharia will play in solving a legal 
problem.  Whereas the sharia may not impact upon a commercial dispute tried in Kuwait (for 
reasons associated with the principles of its Civil Code) and the sharia “basically” plays a role in 
Saudi Arabia, other jurisdictions range in the degree of uncertainty somewhere between these 
two extremes.418  
 
In the next section the intellectual trends that accompanied the displacement of the sharia are 
examined.  In particular, the contemporary debate concerning the interpretation of ribā is 
considered, since it represents a salient feature of how the modern Muslim world has 
appropriated Western financial practices.   
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4.4    MODERN ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CONTEMPORARY RIBĀ 
 
European economic dominance led to the introduction of mostly French-inspired constitutional 
reforms, premised upon Western-derived forms of banking.  The use of interest in commercial 
banking became widespread and was unabashedly implemented across the wide spectrum of 
Muslim-majority countries.  In nearly every country of the Muslim world today the practice of 
lending at interest is not only accepted but enshrined in states’ commercial codes. It was at the 
turn of the twentieth century, under the yoke of European colonial power,419 when these realities 
seem to have triggered an old yet pent-up debate on the meaning and permissibility of ribā. 
 
Military, economic and political domination at the hands of European powers contributed to a 
widespread sense of Muslim enfeeblement and humiliation by those who felt that they were 
heirs to one of the world’s greatest civilisations.420  Simultaneously, Muslim society grappled 
with an acute sense of bewilderment as images and products from the West demonstrated 
Western technological and scientific superiority.   A greater willingness to receive secular 
Western social, cultural and moral values into traditional life was seen by many as the means by 
which Muslim civilisation could restore itself to its rightful place amongst peoples.  This multitude 
of converging influences gradually transformed the cultural and social values of the Muslim 
world.  
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An influential strain of thought responded to these challenges by returning to those sources of 
Muslim religious and social life that were perceived as the essence of the Muslim civilisation’s 
strength and vitality.  This line of thinking envisioned society organised on the basis of the 
Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet; the secular excesses of the Muslim world should be 
rejected.421  Inherent in these calls for reform was the assumption that Muslim civilisation lagged 
behind its rivals because it had strayed from the path of Islam.  Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-
97), an influential forerunner of the modern reformist movement, recognised that Europe’s 
successes were attributable to its scientific revolution, but believed that Muslim civilisation 
lagged far behind because it had become ignorant and weak due to a fundamental erosion of 
Muslim morality.  This had to be rectified before Europe’s rational sciences could be usefully 
adopted into Muslim lands.422  According to al-Afghānī, Islam and reason are not incompatible, 
but Islam must provide the moral principles that channel human reason.423  Al-Afghānī’s even 
more influential disciple, the Egyptian jurist Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), also believed that 
the symptom, the Muslim world’s weakness, was an outward manifestation of the underlying 
cause.424  The overriding sentiment amongst these thinkers was that only the unadulterated 
values, principles and morals of the sharia could restore Islamic civilisation to its rightful place 
amongst peoples.  The sharia is not only relevant but necessary for all times and places.   
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Two of the most important and revolutionary native movements to emerge from this volatile 
environment were the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn), founded by the Egyptian 
activist and reformer Ḥasan al-Bannā’ in 1928, and Jamā‘at-i Islāmī (Islamic Party), founded by 
the Pakistani scholar Abu ’alā Mawdudī in 1941.  Mawdudī, who coined the term “Islamic 
economics” around the time of India’s partition, called for the Islamic transformation of the 
existing political, legal, social and economic institutions of Muslim societies in accordance with 
the principles and rules laid down in the sharia.425  In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood voiced 
its disapproval of the interest-based financial system in Egypt and elsewhere in the Muslim 
world.  According to the Brotherhood, all interest-based activities should be prohibited and 
efforts made to develop an interest-free banking system.426   
 
Mawdudī longed for an Islam opposed to the jāhilīyah in all its shapes and forms.  Social life 
should be freed from bid‘a (innovation), which in their core are clearly Western-influenced and 
run counter to the spirit of Islam.  Mawdudī saw a widening gap between the ideal theory of 
Islam as espoused in classical Islamic doctrine and the application of Islam in daily life.  He 
identifies this gap with hypocrisy (nifaq), which has effected a separation between God on one 
hand, and man’s practical life (mu‘āmalāt), on the other.427  The depth of this feeling is not 
merely an exercise in political activism.  Rather it is a call for fundamental change in the 
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present-day Muslim world, which requires critical self-appraisal and painful adjustments to rid 
Muslim life of Western domination.428  
 
Despite these calls to purge Muslim society of its Western-influenced ills, Muslim societies have 
changed irrevocably over the course of time as a result of their ever-increasing encounters with 
Western states, and their societies’ own evolution in the world at-large.  Societies no longer 
barter for their goods and money exchange operations take place with deferment.  Furthermore, 
the availability of a wide array of goods and services from the far reaches of the earth 
overwhelm the systemic logic that governed the exchange of equivalent counter-values.  Ribā 
could no longer be associated with the extensive and highly systematised ribā of the classical 
legal literature, if it ever was.  Eventually, it acquired its sleeker, simpler definition as recognised 
by an overwhelming majority of scholars and pious Muslims in the modern world: namely, 
interest.   
 
Ribā has thus reverted to the early Hadith whose general thrust equated ribā with “a loan with 
interest”.  The neo-revivalists have been quick to address this meaning with respect to the 
ancient practice of doubling and re-doubling the principal of a debt past due.  They explain the 
Quranic verse as an example that strikes at the root and principle of usury, not as an indication 
of what is usurious ribā versus what is non-usurious ribā.  Thus one of the early advocates of 
interest-free banking, Sayyid Quṭb, radically derides “anyone who gives me one dollar in order 
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to demand a return of two dollars from me is my enemy; I cannot have any friendly feeling for 
him, nor can I bear him any affection”.429  
 
Moḥammad Uzair, a conservative author, expresses a viewpoint that is characteristic of the 
neo-revivalists’ unwillingness to enter into the debate on ribā, at least in terms of the arguments 
that modern revisionists advocate.  Uzair claims that “there is a complete consensus of all five 
schools of fiqh […] in the juristic literature, and among Islamic economists, that interest in all 
forms, of all kinds, and for all purposes is prohibited in Islam”.430  He dismisses modernists as 
Muslim ‘apologists’, a reference to modern Muslims’ efforts to justify the principles and beliefs of 
Islam to the West.  Further, the modernist notion that ribā could be differentiated along the lines 
of productive or consumptive purposes is simply bankrupt.431  Uzair is hardly alone with respect 
to his uncompromising position.  Other well-known authors approach the argument on nearly 
identical terms.432  In allowing that the debate has reached a ‘near-consensus’ amongst Muslim 
scholars and practitioners, they attempt to dismiss their opponents’ arguments without having to 
engage them in the minutiae of Islamic revelation.  Indeed, their strongest claim rests on the 
divine injunctions of the Quran against the institution of ribā, or interest as they see it.  Such 
divine commands are implemented on the basis of faith, morality and spirituality inasmuch as 
the Quran does not offer an explanation of the reasons or rationale for its prohibitions or 
condemnations.  Nor should humanity expect God do so.  The divine sanction for compliance 
                                               
429 Qutb, “Justice”  (1970), 120-22. 
430 Uzair, "Interest Free Banking” (1984), 40. 
431 Ibid., 41. 
432 Ahmed, "Interest” (1984), 19; Ahmad, "Foreword” (1983), 7. 
171 
 
with these demands is cruel punishment in the afterlife.433  In sum, the faithful must simply obey 
divinely-ordained commands and refrain from questioning the rationale behind such 
exhortations. 
 
Many respected Muslim scholars have challenged the authority and simplicity of this formulation 
and have thus sought to differentiate the meaning of ribā as interest as opposed to usury.  
These scholars include but are not limited to: the Egyptian mufti Muhammad ‘Abduh and his 
disciple Rashīd Riḍā, the great Egyptian jurist, al-Sanhūrī, the Syrian politician Doualibi, and the 
modern Pakistani scholar, Fazlur Rahman, as well as official expounders of Islamic law such as 
the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī.434  A brief illustration of 
some of their arguments is reminiscent of earlier debates concerning the proper interpretation of 
the Quran and the substantiation of these interpretations using Hadith.  
 
Ibrahīm Zakī al-Badawī, whom al-Sanhūrī entrusted with developing an interpretation of ribā for 
implementation in the new Egyptian civil code in the mid-1930s, subsumed his argument in a 
report under what he described as the “limiting theory”.  This theory derived from the 
interpretation of one of the most prominent companions of the prophet, Ibn ‘Abbās, who 
described ribā as that of the ribā al-nasī’a, e.g. the ribā al-jāhilīyah of pre-Islamic times.  Al-
Badawī’s liberal interpretation paved the way for article 227 of the Egyptian civil code, which 
allows interest, subject to a ceiling of 7 percent non-compound interest on loans.  Surprisingly, 
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twenty-five years later al-Badawī published a book that renounced his earlier interpretation.  In it 
he wrote that it was wrong to distinguish ribā as merely the multiplied ribā that Ibn ‘Abbās had 
espoused.  In his new work he elucidated what he called an “expanded theory” in which he 
repents of an unduly narrow view and attacks Al-Sanhūrī’s premise that ribā as a means is 
prohibited rather than ribā as an end.435  Al-Badawī’s division of the concept into two categories, 
limited and expanded, offers an insightful perspective into the nature of the argumentation that 
has been waged since the concept came to light.  
 
For his part, Al-Sanhūrī reinforced his more limited view of the prohibition by maintaining that 
the classical legal meaning of ribā should be understood as a prohibition of the means (ṣadd al-
dharā’i).  As a means it is not forbidden per se, rather it is designed to impede the development 
of a more fundamental ribā, that of the jāhilīyah.  Accordingly, there are various degrees of the 
ribā prohibition and some are less absolute than others.  Only in the case of dire need are the 
absolutely prohibited forms of ribā permitted.  However, in all other cases of ribā – those which 
constitute the first steps of ribā, so to speak – these are allowed in the case of need as they do 
not meet the same prohibitive standards.436   
 
Other modernists such as Doualibi and Rahman share arguments grounded in a sense of 
Islamic justice and fairness in commercial transactions.  The ribā of the Quran, they claim, 
consisted of a usurious, unjust ribā which exploited the poor and weak, while the rich amassed 
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their wealth amongst themselves.  It is quite evident that these writers acknowledge the 
necessity of an interest-based global economy and the futility of swimming against the tide.  
Hence, their arguments attempt to differentiate between loans for productive purposes and 
loans for consumption; they claim that loans at the time of Quranic revelation were mainly for 
mere survival but that modern lending practices are geared for capital formation.437 However, 
the modernist reformists have had little success in convincing the majority of Muslims that 
dealing in interest is permissible.   
 
The modern debate concerning the meaning of ribā has been waged from a number of different 
vantage points, each of which espouses a modern vision for the Muslim world. In recent 
decades Muslims’ perception of the prohibition of ribā has been strongly influenced by the rapid 
development of Islamic banking institutions on the basis of interest-free finance.  In the following 
section the development of Islamic economics and interest-free banking is considered.   
 
4.5 ISLAMIC ECONOMICS AND INTEREST-FREE BANKING 
 
The progenitor of Islamic financial intermediation was the 20th century cultural and political 
movement known as Islamic economics.  The early theorisers of Islamic economics include 
Sayyid Abu ’alā Mawdudī and Muhammad Baqr al-Ṣadr, a highly influential Iraqi Shi’a cleric.  
Both saw the influx of Western secular and material influences that threatened the role of Islam 
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in the Muslim world.438 Both sought to distinguish a Homo Islamicus from neo-classical and 
Marxist theories of economics in largely qualitative terms.439  In fact, few contributions to the 
literature have focused specifically on solving economic problems,440 let alone those dealing 
with quantitative economic problems.  
 
Islamic economics was to represent a decisive move away from the cultural foundations of the 
West and a concerted effort to rediscover Islam as a modern basis for all aspects of Muslim 
life.441  Some of the principal characteristics of the Islamic economic model include the 
prohibition of interest (ribā), the provision of zakāh (religious levy) and the role of revelation and 
the hereafter.442  It generally seeks to distinguish between two worldviews: the secular and 
materialist on the one hand and the spiritual and humanitarian on the other.443  The secular and 
materialist worldview attaches importance to human well-being while ignoring the spiritual 
realm.  It foresees material well-being in an individual’s unhindered pursuit of self interest in 
accordance with an individual’s wants and preferences.  The spiritual worldview, on the other 
hand, also seeks to ensure human well-being, but it sees an integral role for spirituality and the 
knowledge of the hereafter as a reminder of God’s final judgment. It also sees material and 
human benefits in the free pursuit of self-interest but it stresses the role of Islam to curb 
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unbridled self-interest.  Hence, the wants and preferences of the individual should be tempered 
in accordance with Islamic principles and values. While both views recognise the role of the 
market in allocating and distributing resources, Islamic economics foresees a spiritual role that 
the market alone cannot fulfil.444  
 
Therefore, Islamic economics does not differ with respect to the market’s role in allocating 
limited resources, nor does it support price controls that would distort market signals.445  
Instead, it argues that Islam provides a moral filter that will help prevent conspicuous 
consumption or any wasteful and unnecessary consumption.  There is little mention of what is 
meant by “conspicuous” or “wasteful” consumption.  Furthermore, the Islamic moral filter should 
foster market equilibrium –“optimum economy” – in which material and spiritual needs are fully 
satisfied.  Hence, the Islamic moral filter minimises the inequities or injustices that the capitalist 
system fosters via individuals’ self-interested pursuit of material wants.446   
 
Islamic economics stresses the role of good governance in helping to achieve these ends,447 but 
it is also vague with respect to what is meant by “good governance” and does not offer specifics 
in terms of the state’s role in this process.448 
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The means of fulfilling this vision reside in the creation of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) and 
the interest-free banking model.449  A wholly modern innovation, the IFI was originally conceived 
as a vehicle through which the ‘Islamic personality’ could be inculcated.  Through numerous 
acts of individual private virtue the sum of Muslims’ transactions would create the basis of an 
Islamic economy.450  Its theorisers’ highly idealised ambitions sought to distinguish it from the 
individualist characteristics and questionable moral practices of the capitalist economy. Not only 
would it remind people of their relationship with God, it would act as a guarantor of “faith, 
morals, peace of mind, the family and the society [...] to protect social and economic 
equilibrium”.451   
 
The Western legal concept of the joint-stock company was adopted to house the IFI.  The joint-
stock company has no antecedent in Islamic history, although some scholars have indicated 
that the classical sharikah, in particular its modern variant, the mushārakah partnership, 
provides a similar Islamic legal basis.452  Balala argues that legal personality may be present in 
various Islamic contracts including the waqf (charitable trusts), amanah (trusteeship) and 
sharikat al mulk (shared ownership/partnership). This is a modern argument that asserts that 
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Islamic law can harness some of its embryonic concepts for use in the modern world.453 Usmani 
makes a similar case but delimits its application to public companies whose shareholders are so 
numerous that they should not be held responsible for day-to-day affairs and debts that exceed 
the value of their proportional ownership.  Usmani accepts that the muḍārabah can be used to 
fulfil the role.454  The muḍārabah investment partnership is considered similar to a modern 
corporation in that it separates ownership from control, is not limited to a certain number of 
partners, and its shares are transferable without dissolving the partnership.455 However, the 
principal issue is not whether modern Western corporate law is compatible with the sharia but 
whether the sharia knew the concept of legal personality.456  While there is disagreement about 
this, most modern scholars have accepted the concept with certain conditions.457  
 
At any rate, early Islamic financial theorisers set out to replicate the modern financial 
intermediary and did this by creating a two-tier muḍārabah model of financial intermediation as 
a means of accepting deposits on the liabilities side of a bank’s balance sheet.  The muḍārabah 
is a profit-sharing contract in which the investor (rabb al-māl) entrusts funds to an agent or 
entrepreneur (muḍārib) to undertake an investment project in an agreed manner.  The investor 
has no right to intervene in management decisions in the muḍārabah contract as opposed to the 
mushārakah profit-sharing contract in which both parties invest in the project and may 
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participate in management decisions.  Further, any profits arising from the muḍārabah are 
distributed according to a pre-agreed profit ratio and then only after the investor has received 
his principal sum.  Parties may not stipulate a ratio or percentage of the capital as profit as this 
would guarantee a return and thus constitute an unjustified enrichment (ribā).  Any and all 
monetary losses are borne by the investor although these may not extend beyond the invested 
capital.458  The agent is liable for his time and energy. 
 
In the two-tier muḍārabah the IFI459 acts as the agent (muḍārib) in accepting funds from an 
investor/depositor (rabb al-māl).  On the assets side of its balance sheet, the bank (as an 
investor (rabb al-māl) this time) may choose to redeploy the funds with an entrepreneur 
(muḍārib).  However, it may also choose from a number of debt-based contracts such as 
murābaḥah, istiṣnā’, salam and so forth. The muḍārabah and the mushārakah represent the 
“twin pillars” of Islamic banking.460  The muḍārabah will be examined in greater detail in chapter 
eight, section 8.1. 
 
In this way, the sharia provides the legal means to help fulfil both the material and spiritual 
needs of a Muslim.  Its integral role in Islamic financial intermediation is merely a confirmation of 
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its undivided importance in a Muslim’s life.  It is a testament to the enormous prestige and 
authority that the sharia continues to command in the modern world.461 In the following section 
some general trends in the modern Islamic finance industry are considered.  
 
4.6   THE RISE OF GLOBALISED ISLAMIC FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 
 
The global expansion of Islamic finance has included some of the largest and most-respected 
blue-chip corporations.  General Electric became the first western industrial company to issue 
sukuk, valued at $500 million, as it sought to attract a new pool of investors.462  The industry has 
also spread to some of the fastest growing economies.  For example, China, which has a 
Muslim population of 80 million people, has begun to facilitate Islamic finance.  Furthermore, 
South Korea and Thailand have expressed an interest in launching a sovereign sukuk issue.463 
Amongst Western countries, and those that have only recently begun to facilitate Islamic 
financial transactions, the UK’s early steps to establish a legal and regulatory framework for 
Islamic finance has given the City of London an unrivalled competitive position.  
 
The global expansion of the Islamic financial industry is reflective of a globalising trend in which 
transnational corporations spearhead financial innovation.  Indeed, the development of sharia-
compatible investments has involved multiple jurisdictions and market participants from a wide 
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range of countries and religious, cultural and legal systems.464  A number of conventional 
multinational investment banks, including BNP Paribas, Calyon, Citibank, HSBC, JP Morgan 
Chase, RBS and Standard Chartered, together with recent newcomers such as Barclays and 
Deutsche Bank, have come to dominate the Islamic finance industry.  In fact, according to a 
survey conducted by the Banker, the balance sheets of conventional banks offering “Islamic 
windows” rose from $622 billion in 2007 to $800 billion in 2008465 - a clear indication of their 
competitive superiority relative to the industry’s estimated size of $1 trillion.  These conventional 
banks have chosen to adopt “Islamic windows” – conventional institutions that offer Islamic 
financial products and services - rather than developing dedicated Islamic subsidiaries, 
principally because “windows” leverage rather than dilute the financial strength of their 
respective institutions.  Multinational financial wealth has enabled these institutions to offer far 
more resources to the industry than the fragmented Islamic finance sector, and as a result, 
much of the innovation stems from these banks.466    
 
Multinational banks, once wholly unfamiliar with the sharia, not to mention Islamic finance, are 
now developing their own Islamic finance programmes and playing to their native financial 
strengths, including innovations such as derivatives.  In many cases no suitable Islamic product 
exists on the market, yet market forces compel these institutions to seek the development of 
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products that compete in both conventional and Islamic markets.  The resulting pressure has led 
to a range of much more sophisticated financial instruments and products.467  
 
Furthermore, the economic power of transnational corporations (TNCs) – a corporation that 
produces and/or delivers services in more than one country – may be so great that the legal 
environment itself is organised according to TNC operations.  The market power of TNCs 
directly influences the commercial customs of the relevant market, if not by enshrining 
recognised commercial customs into standard form contracts, then by persuading courts and 
legislatures to include them in court opinions and/or codify them into statutory law.468  Indeed, 
the full extent of transnational corporate power is evidenced in those markets in which the 
market leader’s standardised use of particular contracts becomes the industry norm.469  The 
origins of the most influential transnational actors determine the particular characteristics and 
nature of the law so as to reflect its native legal background and traditions.   In particular, Fazio 
argues that the United States’ dominance in the world economy as well as the proliferation of 
American TNCs throughout the world engenders an Americanisation of international commercial 
law.470  The local ramifications of TNC activity resonate globally.  Thus the growth of cross-
border production networks and interlinked trade alliances encourages the development of 
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global economic and regulatory uniformity,471 requiring the Islamic financial industry to adapt to 
TNC-designed rules and strategies.   
 
Some observers argue that IFIs have prospered in designing products which cater to the 
particular demands of local populations and their localised understandings of the sharia, 
whereas global financial services companies’ product-design objectives increasingly strive for 
homogeneity.  The conventional banking philosophy is based on the belief that everyone in the 
world has similar banking requirements and these revolve around three core products: savings, 
payments and investments.  In focusing on these foundational contracts, conventional 
institutions have striven to achieve economies of scale.  Service delivery to the largest possible 
number of people is made more efficient with the creation of a wide range of delivery channels 
and branches across the globe.472 The large majority of new market entrants, including Islamic 
financial institutions, consists of small and medium-sized that are not able to adopt this strategy.  
Instead, IFIs have focused on identifying market niches that exploit the different needs of a 
multitude of diverse ethnic groups.  This strategy is seen as a competitive advantage for small 
and medium-sized IFIs in developing brand recognition and an ability to foster better customer 
service.473 The challenge for these institutions is to achieve a balance in which authentic product 
offerings are made viable while complying with growing calls for the standardisation of the 
market, a topic examined in the next section.  
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4.6.1 COMMERCIAL PRESSURES FOR STANDARDISED ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
CONTRACTS  
 
Transnational domination of the Islamic financial industry generates pressure to standardise 
Islamic financial contracts.  Legal standardisation raises critically important religious and ethical 
questions concerning the central function of contingency in the sharia – the mere probability that 
the Muslim jurist has interpreted the sources correctly.  Contingency in the law legitimises the 
normative pluralism within and between schools of fiqh; and has led to the peaceful co-
existence of the various doctrines and normative systems.474 It is the attribute that distinguishes 
a religious law from a state-based legal system with central legal authority.  The issue of 
standardisation is closely related to the controversial debate concerning the codification of the 
sharia in the nation state.475 
 
Standardised contracts have a long history in Islamic commerce.  Developed over the course of 
centuries, shurūṭ (formularies) were designed to facilitate commercial exchange.  Individuals 
engaging in a transaction could simply agree to engage in an ijārah, salam or istiṣnā‘ and have 
a notary produce the relevant standardised contract.  However, classical shurūṭ were drafted 
according to the doctrine of the respective school of jurisprudence and could thus be arbitrated 
according to one’s specific beliefs476 and customary practices.  Modern attempts at Islamic legal 
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standardisation highlight the inherent tension between the religious and ethical essence of the 
sharia and its functionality in modern financial markets.   
 
The combination of vast multinational financial resources and the careful selection of widely 
respected sharia scholars may combine to buttress a dominant interpretation of fiqh (Islamic 
law) that reflects the interests of financial institutions.477  Sharia supervisory boards are 
composed of at least three sharia scholars whose Islamic stamp of approval legitimises Islamic 
products and services.478 AAOIFI recommends that all Islamic financial institutions form a sharia 
supervisory organ for a period of at least three years.  Sharia boards should be appointed by the 
general assembly of bank shareholders and meet periodically or on-demand to examine special 
issues.479  Major institutions employ at least one full-time sharia scholar so as to have their 
services available on an on-going basis. 
 
As the Islamic financial industry has grown in prominence sharia scholars’ fatwas have gained 
increasing recognition across the Islamic world as a result of the reputation of the scholar or the 
institution issuing them.  The profile of sharia scholars has taken on renewed social and 
religious significance after a long period in which Arab nationalism and Islamic political 
movements largely sidelined the ulema.   It has “brought the ulema back into the mainstream of 
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Muslim society”.480  Furthermore, sharia scholars’ alliances with Islamic financial practitioners 
have reinvigorated the research and theorising of financial fiqh with an intensity and drive that 
nearly every other area of the sharia has not been given.481 These alliances have arguably 
paved the way for the renewal of Islamic law more generally.   
 
Some sharia scholars have gained recognition due to the liberal interpretation which they 
espouse.  Many such fatwas have become general standards amongst Islamic financial 
institutions (IFI), amongst them fatwas which permit transactions once seen as unacceptable 
forms of trade.482  The vested interests of financial institutions and sharia scholars may 
encourage legal interpretations that are geared toward strengthening the competitiveness of 
Islamic financial transactions.  Ethical and religious considerations may not figure prominently in 
such considerations.   
 
In 2009 the top three sharia scholars occupied 26 per cent of the total number of sharia board 
positions in the GCC, according to a research report issued by Funds@Work.483  This 
concentration of expertise poses questions as to whether sharia boards are able to perform their 
auditing roles credibly.  Clearly, IFI’s own financial interests lead them to promote certain 
interpretations of fiqh and these may gradually become accepted by the Muslim populace at 
large.  Islamic financial institutions’ employment of sharia scholars is also controversial for the 
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reason that one of their primary tasks is to report to IFI shareholders, customers and the general 
public on the extent to which their employer’s activities conform to the recognised precepts of 
the sharia.484 These intrinsic conflicts of interest continue to overshadow the industry and foster 
insecurity with respect to the authenticity of Islamic financial products and services.   
 
A great diversity of regulatory approaches to the constitution and operation of sharia supervisory 
boards exist throughout the Muslim world and in non-Muslim majority jurisdictions such as the 
United Kingdom.  While diversity in regulatory structure is also common amongst conventional 
financial markets, the lack of uniform sharia standards poses particular problems for the industry 
inasmuch as the disparate practices of sharia supervisory boards fosters industry-wide 
uncertainty.  Further, the task of the regulator becomes more difficult in that uniform regulatory 
standards are difficult to achieve in an industry with such great product and operational 
diversity. 
 
Commercial law, in general, trends toward convergence, but some differences remain, 
nonetheless.485  History underscores this fact by demonstrating that market transparency, 
stability and predictability have proved to be essential principles with respect to the development 
of commercially viable and prosperous financial centres.  Indeed, historically dominant centres 
of finance and industry such as the United States, England and France have been able to 
export their commercial and financial law as a result of their incorporation of these principles.  
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Specifically, conventional financial transactions generally establish clear parameters with 
respect to (1) the relative rights and remedies of the parties (2) the terms of many financial and 
commercial risk allocations and (3) the legal documentation.486  Therefore, the convergence of 
international commercial law is designed to mitigate uncertainty and apprehensiveness with 
respect to these general principles.   
 
Legal standardisation is also a means of alleviating the apprehension legal practitioners feel 
towards states’ conflict of laws rules.  Legal practitioners seek to minimise the risks and 
associated expenses of cross-border financial transactions in the light that they may not be 
aware of certain applicable foreign laws and/or regulations; and is often a reflection of leading 
states’ ideological and political assumptions that convergence mitigates potential strife and 
encourages peaceful economic cooperation.487   
 
In specific jurisdictions legal documents are typically standardised as they are used for many 
years and have been the subject of extensive interpretive litigation.  Thus “there is great 
certainty and predictability as to how any particular provision will be interpreted and 
implemented with respect to the rights, obligations and remedies of all parties in a broad range 
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of circumstances”.488  The extensive track record of such standardised documentation has 
resulted in significant transaction cost efficiencies.489   
 
Yet to some extent the principles of stability, predictability and transparency are subjectively 
based.  They refer to an individual’s perception of the historical practices of market practitioners 
and their transactions.  The fact that most market practitioners have little or no experience with 
Islamic financial transactions is an indication of the lack of certainty and predictability that these 
transactions incur. Moreover, the perceptions of most market actors will understandably be 
based on conventional structures and financing techniques that take no cognizance of the 
sharia and differences of risk allocation inherent in Islamic financial structures.  These legal 
disadvantages underpin the commercial drive of Islamic market practitioners and Islamic 
financial institutions to develop standardised contractual vehicles for the industry.490  
Specifically, greater standardisation would benefit the industry in a number of ways by: (1) 
reducing transaction costs for firms and thereby lowering prices for consumers; (2) reducing the 
time necessary for marketing new products; (3) reducing the burden on sharia scholars of which 
there is clearly a shortage; (4) improving documentation standards and mitigating the risk of 
legal challenges; (5) by improving consumer confidence in the authenticity of Islamic financial 
products and services.491  Indeed, in the United Kingdom, surveys of potential Muslim investors 
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indicate that the scant take-up of retail Islamic financial products is a direct consequence of their 
uncertainty about the sharia-authenticity of Islamic financial products.492  
 
National courts will give legal effect to standardised terms and conditions developed under the 
auspices of trade and professional associations such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC).493  The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) – which is responsible for issuing uniform sharia accounting and auditing standards in 
view of creating more transparency in the industry494 - presents this type of collective 
standardisation effort.  AAOIFI has successfully enacted 41 sharia standards to date, many of 
which have been adopted and implemented in Islamic financial institutions across the globe.495 
Bahrain, Sudan, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have made them either mandatory 
or recommended guidelines.496  Quite substantial progress has been achieved over the past two 
decades in creating a general set of core products and services,497 which are sometimes 
referred to as plain vanilla products.  Despite these gains, however, IFIs have not consistently 
adopted AAOIFI sharia standards, with the result that Islamic finance continues to be practiced 
differently between jurisdictions and even within the same jurisdiction.498    The challenges of 
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developing institutions to standardise accounting, regulatory and sharia standards is daunting 
not merely due to the industry’s weak financial architecture but also due to the large degree of 
political consensus amongst sovereign financial authorities necessary to agree such 
standards.499 Negotiating agreed standards remains one of the primary objectives amongst 
Islamic financial architects. 
 
In Malaysia500 – a country in which centralised sharia supervisory boards are part of the financial 
infrastructure – legal standardisation has resulted in sukuk becoming cheaper than their 
conventional counterparts by 5 to 10 basis points as inefficiency has been reduced.501 However, 
most analysts believe that the industry will continue to be plagued by differences of opinion on 
the finer points of the sharia.  At present, Malaysian scholars are seen as more liberal than their 
Gulf peers.  And intra-regionally there are just as many differences of opinion.  Moreover, the 
global financial crisis has coincided with a reassessment in some more conservative quarters 
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whether the industry’s rapid expansion and innovation has led it beyond central Islamic 
precepts.  In late 2007 Sheikh Taqi Usmani – one of the industry’s most respected scholars – 
argued that many sukuk went too far in mimicking conventional, interest-bearing products, a 
topic that is analysed in chapter ten.502  In April 2009 the International Islamic Fiqh Academy 
ruled that the “organised use” of the tawarruq financial instrument was prohibited, in what many 
experts have described as a blow to Islamic banks, as these use them on an almost daily basis 
for liquidity management and lending.  Indeed, a growing number of people are unhappy with 
the direction Islamic finance has taken and this has resulted in a splintered market of smaller, 
less viable regional industries.503  
 
Transnational financial institutions’ dominance of the industry places acute pressures upon the 
industry to standardise the sharia.   However, standardisation may conflict with the contingent 
attribute that is integral to the religious dimension of the sharia.  While it is true that all 
commercial and financial law trends towards convergence, Islamic financial transactions remain 
relatively new and untested in courts.  Market uncertainty and unpredictability regarding these 
structures would be ameliorated to the extent that Islamic financial products and services are 
standardised.  In the following section the strategy for transforming the sharia into the Law of 
Islamic Finance is examined.  
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4.7 ISLAMIC FINANCIAL IJTIHĀD    
 
The central strategy for devising sharia-compatible financial contracts is undertaken by locating 
suitable commercial contracts from classical literature and adapting these to mimic conventional 
financial practices.  There has been very little departure from the practices of conventional 
finance and the types of products and services it offers.504  However, it is important to note that 
the vast majority of financial instruments – both conventional and Islamic – are not revolutionary 
new instruments but merely combinations of older generation derivatives or standard money 
market contractual vehicles.  A building block approach towards financial engineering is at the 
heart of finance; creativity is not about inventing products from scratch.  Indeed, in the 
conventional financial industry four key financial instruments may be combined in various forms 
and guises to create all other financial products.  These foundational products are the forward 
contract, the option contract, the deposit contract, and the spot contract.  A small number of 
highly exotic financial instruments are regarded as examples of “accounting innovation” or 
“ignorance innovation” and possess limited utility for end-users.  However, most utilised financial 
instruments can be broken down into one or another combination of the four mentioned 
products.505   
 
One central reason lies behind the IF industry’s conventional approximation: the industry seeks 
to be competitive with conventional finance.  Muslim consumers/investors of Islamic financial 
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products demand the same competitive returns that conventional financial institutions offer their 
clientele.  The focus of the Islamic finance industry has been on “the application of a new 
product or a technology to a specific market opportunity, such as a lifestyle”506 or addressing 
socio-economic problems such as directing capital towards small- and medium-sized 
businesses.  Islamic finance has innovated by developing products that cater to the “niche 
demands” of particular groups of customers.507   
 
The free market is the force that determines this strategy.  The low-cost ease of access through 
the internet has driven firms to innovate new financial products that meet the changing needs of 
the marketplace.  Banks, in particular, usually adopt a needs-driven approach in seeking to 
provide their clients with better solutions to their problems.  Firms which are not successful in 
creating novel structures to meet these needs generally fail.508  For example, evidence suggests 
that IFIs, which choose to offer less competitive, but perhaps more sharia-authentic contracts, 
i.e. those that are perceived to have a closer connection with classical commercial structures, 
would probably see their clientele exit for more profitable investments.509 As examined in the 
previous section, competitive financial transactions are those that have the lowest transaction 
costs.  Lower transaction costs translate into higher rents.  The origins of these costs and 
Islamic finance’s particular disadvantages vis-a-vis conventional transactions have been 
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reviewed.  Cost pressures associated with Islamic financial transactions have resulted in an 
industry-wide push to standardise Islamic financial products and services.   
 
The legal tools used to achieve these economic objectives are represented in the practice of 
Islamic financial ijtihād. Islamic financial ijtihād is a modern form of collective ijtihād510 used to 
adapt classical sharia contracts and rules to modern financial markets and regulatory 
requirements.  Legal theory provides that any form of ijtihād should be exercised sparingly and 
then only in those instances in which novel legal problems arise.  In financial practice, however, 
the term has a much broader application.  It includes those instances in which scholars choose 
from a range of past opinions (takhayyur), irrespective of the school of law to which the jurist 
belongs,511 deemed to be of benefit (maṣlaḥah) for the Muslim community. 512  Further, it 
includes an unprecedented utilisation of rationalising legal tools and ḥiyal to make transactions 
lawful that otherwise transgress classical sharia norms and procedures.  
 
Islamic financial ijtihād does not represent an effort to conceive an independent legal theory.  
Rather it is a legal practice designed to create an LIF that retains a legal, if not organic, 
connection to the legal doctrines and historical traditions of the classical sharia. In fact, it has 
never been the objective of Islamic financial theorisers to replace the classical law or its legal 
theory.  Instead, their deeply conservative strategy has tried to give effect to classical sharia 
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after a lapse in the modern era in which Islamic civilisation is perceived to have declined.513 
There is a tacit, if not explicit, understanding that the traditional edifice of the sharia is not only 
suitable for all times and places but the principal determinant in restoring the moral, financial 
and social successes of the Islamic world.514  Therefore, Islamic financial theorisers515 
intentionally associate the LIF with the “rationalising discourse” of the uṣūl al-fiqh. 516  This is an 
inference to the fact that the uṣūl al-fiqh was formulated several centuries after the genesis of 
Islamic law.  Therefore, the uṣūl al-fiqh did not play a role in formulating a large body of Islamic 
jurisprudence.  The degree to which it contributed thereafter is an open debate. The uṣūl al-fiqh, 
as examined in chapter two, embodies Islamic religious and political legitimacy.  It is a concept 
that exerts a powerful historical legacy.  Tightly bound to the holy sources, the Quran, Sunna, 
‘ijmā‘ and qiyās, it offers a pathway for discerning God’s intentions.  The historical and religious 
importance of the concept essentially means that “any conception of the law [sharia], however 
ultimately defined, must rest on and presuppose a consciously formulated legal 
methodology”.517  Despite Islamic finance’s acceptance and apparent adherence to this 
tradition, the LIF constitutes a novel and innovative law that markedly distinguishes it from the 
classical sharia.  Yet the LIF’s theorisers have not sought to formulate a distinct legal theory as 
this would disassociate the law from the historical legacy of the sharia. 
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The LIF’s divergence from the classical sharia can be ascribed, in part, to the heavy emphasis 
and frequency given to the application of rationalist legal tools in a legal and financial 
environment wholly foreign to classical commercial law.  These include maṣlaḥah, takhayyur, 
ḍarūrah, and ḥiyal.  However, it is uncertain whether these concepts are used more often or with 
greater scope than in the classical period; while evidence of their historical use is limited, 
available evidence indicates that these tools were probably used frequently according to the 
imperatives of the classical commercial environment.  Subsequent chapters demonstrate, 
however, that the radical changes of the modern world, including market competition and a 
complex process of pluralistic legal and regulatory interaction, would seem to require a heavier 
and more frequent use of these concepts than in the classical era.  
 
In modern financial markets Islamic legal tools are the means of adapting and extending the 
law. Maṣlaḥah, in particular, is an underlying conceptual tool of the LIF, but theorisers decided 
to narrow its application according to the procedures of the uṣūl al-fiqh. The standard approach 
of doing so resides in incorporating the concept in the procedure of qiyās.518  Al-Ghazālī 
provides the template for this method.  He determined that maṣlaḥah had to be defined in order 
to be used in setting aside revealed laws.  If maṣlaḥah could be determined with certainty to 
pertain to the essential elements of the law – religion, life, intellect, offspring and property – then 
a scriptural ruling could be set aside.  However, if maṣlaḥah concerned a need (haja) or 
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improvement (tahsin) with regard to the five elements (maqāṣid al-Sharia) of the law, then its 
application was unacceptable.519   
 
This limited approach to maṣlaḥah provides a marked contrast to early 14th/19th century jurists, 
such as Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (1866-1914), whose use of 
maṣlaḥah was premised on abandoning the classical Islamic tradition in favour of directly 
interpreting the textual sources, the Quran and Sunna.  Ijtihād was to be practiced as the 
principal means of reviving Islamic law.520  This essentially meant that maṣlaḥah was to form the 
basis of legislation for establishing truth and justice in society. Maṣlaḥah was viewed as an 
independent standard in its own right.  As opposed to the uṣūl’s rigid procedures and logically 
coherent methods of extracting the law from the four formal sources, modern rationalists were 
less concerned with the manner in which the law was to be found.  Instead, the jurist’s fatwa 
was to conform to the underlying ethical purpose of the law – however abstract a notion this 
may be – in order to be legally valid. Legal certainty or the ability to validly discern God’s law 
was to be achieved by mapping the legal ruling to the law’s underlying ethical purpose.521 Hence 
this conception of maṣlaḥah indicates that reformists perceived the human intellect as capable 
of discerning it as a concrete and objective criterion – a marked departure from the Ash’ari 
theological tradition.522  
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Maṣlaḥah is used to adapt the sharia so as to achieve Islamic financial structures that are 
competitive in financial markets; such structures have no classical antecedent. Yet the concept 
is applied narrowly in the procedure of qiyās in line with the tradition of al-Ghazālī.  The use of 
qiyās in this respect is capable of producing contemporary transactions from classical nominate 
contracts that do not fulfil the condition of materiality required by the uṣūl al-fiqh.523 Such is the 
case, for example, when jurists approve of the novel concepts of copyright and patents despite 
their immaterial attributes.524 In cases when qiyās is not able to meet the modern needs of the 
Muslim faithful, ḍarūrah can be invoked to circumvent a general prohibition.525   
 
Furthermore, the application of diverse minority opinions (takhayyur) is probably unusual in the 
sense that the dominant opinions of the classical madhhabs became known as established, 
positive doctrine in the geographical area represented by the school.526 Talfīq (literally, patching) 
is a related principle which draws upon takhayyur’s facility of eclectic choice, and is practised in 
the engineered products of Islamic finance.  The principle of Talfīq is of much more ancient 
origins.  Talfīq is surmised to have first been debated after taqlīd (conformity) became the juristic 
modus operandi; in other words, around the end of the 4th century A.H., after the closing of the 
“gates of ijtihād”. A widespread definition emphasises the scholar’s role in bringing “forward a 
fashion [rule of law] that no qualified legal interpreter teaches (bi-kayfīyah la yaqūl bihā 
                                               
523 Ahmed, “Product”  (2011), 48. 
524 Ibid. 
525 Ibid., 167. 
526 Hallaq, “Authority”  (2001), 121. 
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mujtahid)”; in essence a number of opinions of different schools can be taken together to form a 
novel opinion.527  
 
Takhayyur was first put to systematic use in the compilation of the Majalla, which was 
completed in 1876.528  The principle of takhayyur has expanded progressively in scope, and has 
proved to be the major expedient in the modernising legislative reforms throughout the Muslim 
world.529 Whereas the Majalla included minority opinions from the Ḥanafī school, and at least 
one well-known Ḥanbalī opinion,530 modernists extended the scope of this principle to include 
any opinion put forward from any Sunni school; or even to doctrines advocated by the early 
jurists prior to the formulation of the madhhabs; or to school doctrines which have since become 
extinct such as the Ẓāhirīs.  On some occasions modernisers have even attempted to invoke 
Shi’i opinions, although these have seldom been expressly acknowledged in regard to 
legislation promulgated in a Muslim-majority country.531  
 
Adherence to the classical tradition represents a formalistic approach to the law which adheres 
to legal theory but diverges from the ethical and religious substance of the sharia over time.  
Widely decried for its “sharia arbitrage”532 and religious formalistic attributes533 critics argue that 
                                               
527 Krawietz, "Talfiq” (2002), 7. 
528 See ibid. 
529 Anderson, “Law Reform”  (1976), 47-48. 
530 Arabi, "(Shurut)”  (1998), 31. 
531 Anderson, “Law Reform”  (1976), 51. 
532 El-Gamal is a well-known proponent of this wholly valid criticism.  See El-Gamal, “Islamic Finance”  
(2006). 
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Islamic financial ijtihād is devoted “to the creation of elaborate forms of potentially deceptive 
artifices in order to circumvent prohibitions derived under otherwise unworkable Islamic rules, 
most importantly those concerning interest on debt and forms of speculative risk”.534   This line 
of reasoning argues that scholars should adopt a rationalist approach that emphasises 
experiential context and real-life human interaction, aided by the legal tools that modernist 
reformers espouse.535  A substantive rationalist approach536 to the law would necessarily lead to 
a wholesale revision of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, notwithstanding the financially relevant 
prohibitions of ribā and gharar.537  As suggested in the introductory chapter, however, the 
majority of Muslims across the globe would not readily agree to a re-interpretation of these 
historical doctrines.  A rationalist approach to financial ijtihād is unlikely to be perceived as a 
legitimate and authoritative interpretation of the holy sources.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The modern use and perception of money has fundamentally altered the social, economic and 
legal environment of communities across the globe.  The value of money is no longer attached 
                                                                                                                                                       
533 See Hamoudi, "Social Justice” (2007).; Hamoudi, "Schizophrenia” (2006-2007). 
534 Hamoudi, "Revolution” (2007-2008), 258. 
535 Hamoudi, "Schizophrenia” (2006-2007), 607, 11. 
536 This is the term used by Opwis to describe a theoretical approach that emphasises ethical 
compatibility with a legal ruling.  See Opwis, "Maslaha” (2005).    
537 El-Gamal, "Ribā ” (2001).  Gamal argues that ribā should be seen in terms of efficiency rather than as 
a matter of exploitation by the strong of the weak and vulnerable.  For his work on re-interpreting gharar  
see El-Gamal, "Gharar” (2001). 
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to the coinage in which it is exchanged.  Rather it has come to represent the ideal signification 
of value; the embodiment of a representative value that is as much a psychological 
phenomenon as an economic one. 
 
Money’s altered role in the modern world is epitomised in the financialisation of the world 
capitalist economy.  The predominance of finance over the real economy fundamentally 
undermines the social and economic basis of Islam’s prescriptions for avoiding ribā.  Modern 
Muslim authors perceived this danger and wrote fervently of the evils that capitalism and 
secularism posed for the Muslim world.  In particular, capitalism threatened the spiritual and 
communitarian coherence of Islamic life. 
 
Nearly the entire Muslim world witnessed the displacement of the sharia in the wake of 19th 
century European economic dominance and colonial imposition.  Islamic economics is a largely 
qualitative response to Islam’s devaluated role in the Muslim world. It represents an economic 
and social trend that reasserted the moral primacy of Islam in economic life.   Islam alone could 
provide a moral filter for the economy that shunned excess, greed and immorality; the 
materialism of the West and its concomitant secularist values.  Islamic finance was viewed as a 
way of gradually implementing an Islamic economy. The sharia and its prescriptions for financial 
transactions is the natural vehicle of modern Islamic finance. In particular, the Islamic bank was 
conceived on the basis of the muḍārabah partnership contract. 
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The rapid growth and development of Islamic finance is evident in the fact that it is represented 
in over 70 jurisdictions across the globe.  Transnational financial institutions have joined the fray 
and now dominate the industry.  The industry’s push to standardise Islamic financial contracts 
and practices reflects the commercial prerogatives of lowering transaction costs associated with 
the uncertainty and unpredictability of Islamic financial structures. 
 
The central animus underlying the effort to adapt the sharia to modern financial markets and 
regulatory architectures resides in the industry’s drive to offer competitive investment returns.   
This requires the industry to find ways in which transaction costs can be reduced. Essentially, 
the strategy is to adapt classical financial structures to conventional financial products and 
services.  
 
The theorisers of Islamic finance expressly associate the LIF with the classical legal theory 
known as uṣūl al-fiqh.  This is due to the uṣūl’s authoritative and legitimising role in helping 
jurists to discover God’s law.  Islamic financial theorisers believe that the uṣūl and the traditions 
– if not the rules – of classical jurisprudence (fiqh) are applicable for all times and 
circumstances.  Islamic financial ijtihād is the strategy for creating the Law of Islamic Finance, a 
law that is clearly distinguishable from the sharia.  In part, it is distinguishable by the types of 
tools utilised and the frequency of their application.  The principal factor, however, relates to the 
LIF’s wholesale adaptation to market forces and regulatory requirements.  
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Maṣlaḥah, takhayyur and ḍarūrah are the principal legal tools used to adapt the sharia to 
modern financial markets.  Yet theorisers’ pursuit of a narrow application of maṣlaḥah in the 
procedure of qiyās represents a formalistic approach to the law that is consistent with classical 
theory.  Modern authors decry this approach.  They criticise the LIF’s formalistic attributes and 
inefficient contractual structures.  They favour a rationalist approach to the law that stresses 
religious and ethical substance.  
 
In the following chapter several important Islamic financial contracts are analysed.  The analysis 
is concerned with the way in which Islamic financial ijtihād has been applied to these structures.  
It is also concerned with some municipal legal considerations that may arise in conjunction with 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
204 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: MODERN ISLAMIC FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines several Islamic financial contracts that are the product of Islamic 
financial ijtihād.  It considers the way in which Islamic financial ijtihād is used as well as the 
municipal legal challenges that arise in conjunction with these structures.    
 
In particular, the chapter is concerned with three pivotal products used by the industry: the 
modern murābaḥah, the tawarruq and the sukuk.  Conventional securitisations are also 
examined so as to better conceptualise the structure, attributes and legal uncertainties that 
characterise sukuk securitisations. Finally, a debate concerning the authenticity of sukuk 
issuance is considered, which provides a significant example of the principal legal issues 
encountered in the exercise of Islamic financial ijtihād.  
 
5.1 THE MODERN MURᾹBAḤAH 
 
The murābaḥah, a debt-based contract used for financing, is a particularly important contract in 
the Islamic financial industry.  It comprises approximately 80% of a typical IFI’s balance 
sheet.538   The classical murābaḥah was a spot sale of a good with a clearly disclosed profit 
                                               
538 Ahmed, "Islamic Law” (2006), 88-89. DeLorenzo, "Compliance” (2006-2007), 406. 
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margin.  In that structure the initial price had to be known to the buyer as well as the profit 
margin.539  It was a rather simple and straightforward means of avoiding the prohibition of 
ribā.540 
 
The modern murābaḥah is used to finance household items, cars or business equipment and/or 
supplies.  It is often used to replicate a conventional trade financing agreement.   In this contract 
the client approaches an Islamic financial institution and requests that the IFI purchase a 
commodity on her behalf for a clearly specified cost and profit.  Second, the IFI contacts a seller 
and purchases the commodity.  The IFI takes possession and ownership of the commodity and 
thus assumes risk of loss or damage to the goods.  Third, the IFI sells the commodity to the 
client for a profit, usually on a deferred payment basis.  Finally, the sale is concluded and the 
ownership, along with the risk of the commodity, is transferred automatically to the client.   
 
The modern murābaḥah resembles the economic substance of a conventional trade finance 
agreement with documentary credits.  These provide the seller (S) with security that it will be 
paid the purchase price of a good; and they reassure the purchaser (P) that the goods exist, 
that they have been shipped, insured and sometimes quality-checked. It is undertaken as 
follows: The first step involves P, who enters into a supply agreement with a seller for purchase 
of a particular good/goods.  P then applies to his bank (IB – issuing bank) to open a credit in 
favour of S.  IB issues a letter of credit to S undertaking to pay “a sum equal to the contract 
                                               
539 Al-Zuhayli, “Transactions”  (2003), 355. 
540 Usmani, “Introduction”  (2002),  31-32, 37. 
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price or payment, acceptance or negotiation of a bill of exchange drawn for that sum”. IB is not 
concerned with the underlying contract of sale.  It merely acts on P’s instructions.  IB may 
directly issue a letter of credit but more often it arranges for notification by another bank, known 
as an advising bank (AB).  AB will be located in the country of the seller and will advise S of the 
opening of credit in his favour.  The notification given by AB constitutes the documentary 
credit.541  
 
Banks are not in the business of selling merchandise and so the Islamic financial institution will 
not own the good which the buyer wishes to purchase. Yet, the Islamic laws of contract forbids 
the sale of an item not yet owned by the seller, and has a complex set of rules regarding the 
seller’s constructive and actual possession of such goods. The solution is to compose the 
murābaḥah of two binding contracts which are to be executed independently of one another.  
Arguably, this kind of combination of classical nominate contracts to effect a single economic 
objective is the single most important method of Islamic financial engineering; without it, modern 
Islamic banking and finance would not be possible. 
 
In the first instance, the initial purchase agreement, a “binding promise” (wa‘ad), is executed.542   
Such “promises” are enforceable in both Muslim and non-Muslim majority jurisdictions. 
However, classical jurisprudence generally does not recognise the validity of a binding ‘promise 
to purchase’ as this transgresses the sharia.  Namely, a “promise to purchase” an item not yet in 
                                               
541 Goode, “Commercial Law”  (2010), 1062-65. 
542 Moghul and Ahmed, "Contractual Forms” (2003-2004), 174-175. 
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existence, whose price is unknown, and which the buyer has not yet seen, violates the very 
essence of the prohibition of gharar.543 Moreover, the inclusion of a binding promise agreement 
violates the prohibition of “two contracts in one” or “two sales in one contract”.544   
 
While most of the great eponyms of the Sunni orthodox schools of law, al-Shāfi‘i, Ibn Ḥanbal, 
and Abu Ḥanafī viewed the fulfilment of such promises as a noble quality and thus as advisable 
for the promisor to fulfil, they regarded them as neither mandatory (wājib), nor enforceable 
through the courts.545  Judge Muhammad Taqi Usmani, however, finds proof of the binding 
nature of the promise amongst the opinions of a number of jurists. This is the view, argues 
Usmani, of Samurah bin Jundub – the well known companion of the Prophet – as well as of 
‘Umar bin Abdul Aziz, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Sa’id bin al-Ashwā’, Isḥāq bin Rahwaih and Imam al-
Bukhārī, some Mālikī jurists, and even the great Shāfi‘i philosopher-jurist al-Ghazālī, who said 
that a promise was binding as long as it was stated in absolute terms.546  Other jurists and IFIs 
have accepted an opinion from the jurist Ibn Shubruma, a relatively less well-known Mālikī 
jurist.547 According to Ibn Shubruma the promise is binding when it does not result in allowing 
that which is forbidden or forbidding that which is permitted.548 In other words, the murābaḥah’s 
legal justification relies on the adoption of diverse opinions (takhayyur).    
                                               
543 Ray, “Renewal”  (1995), 51. 
544 El-Gamal, “Islamic Finance”  (2006), 99. 
545 Usmani, “Introduction”  (2002), 50. 
546 Ibid. 
547 El-Gamal, “Islamic Finance”  (2006), 66. 
548 Al-Zuhayli, “Transactions”  (2003),  361. 
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The highly-respected Islamic Fiqh Academy’s decision that a promise made in commercial or 
financial transactions is binding on the promisor confirms this modern application of takhayyur.  
Its decision stipulated that the following conditions are necessary for a valid murābaḥah: (1) the 
promise should be unilateral, i.e. performance cannot be made contingent upon the execution of 
another contract; (2) it must have led the promisee (the seller or lessor) to have incurred costs; 
(3) if the promise relates to the purchase of an item in the future, the parties must enter into an 
actual contract of sale only at that time; and (4), if the promisor (the buyer) breaks his promise, 
the promisee may seek a remedy in court for damages or specific performance.  Damages are 
confined to actual monetary loss by the promisee (IFI) and do not include the opportunity cost of 
the money in question.549    
 
The risk that the buyer may nonetheless refuse to make the purchase is reduced by requiring 
security in the form of a promissory note or third party guarantee.  Some IFIs have required 
security well in advance of the purchase and in an amount that would cover any losses that may 
arise from the buyer’s refusal to purchase.550  
 
Returning to the second step of the murābaḥah schematic, the bank’s purchase of the 
commodity from a third-party supplier for re-sale to the client does not usually live up to sharia 
rules concerning the conclusion of a valid contract of sale.  In some cases, the sale of a 
                                               
549 Uberoi et al., "Wa'ad” (n.d.). 
550 Moghul and Ahmed, "Contractual Forms” (2003-2004), 181. 
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commodity is completed before its acquisition from the supplier, often in circumstances in which 
contractual documents are signed in quick-fire succession.  In this case, the IFI assumes little or 
no risk in the ownership of the commodity as its ownership lasts, literally, seconds.  Although 
this manner of executing the murābaḥah is criticised by jurists, the practice predominates 
throughout the industry. 
  
Ownership of the good ensures that the IFI assumes risk in the commodity, including liability for 
potential damage, defects or outright loss.  Any inherent defect in the article sold transfers an 
unconditional right of rescission of the contract, an option of fault (khiyār al-‘ayb) to the buyer.551  
According to classical jurisprudence, such a stipulation cannot be waived by the buyer, as it is 
an essential component of the contract of sale.  The option of fault highlights the essence of 
certainty in the Islamic law of contracts; any exclusion of its provisions is, in itself, a nullity.552 
The prevalent industry practice excludes the option of fault and the right to rescind the sale so 
that the IFI is insulated from these commercial risks.553  For example, the Kuwaiti Finance 
House, stipulated in its contracts of sale that any defect in the object of sale, excluding 
insufficiency in the number of items shipped, is to be borne by the buyer.554   
 
Banks have attempted to circumvent ownership requirements by appointing clients (buyers) to 
purchase the commodity as agents of the bank (wakīl).  This scheme would likely have been 
                                               
551 Al-Zuhayli, “Transactions”  (2003), 200-01. 
552 Coulson, “Commercial Law”  (1984), 66. 
553 Moghul and Ahmed, “Contractual Forms” (2003-2004), 181. 
554 Ray, “Renewal”  (1995),  49. 
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forbidden by Ḥanafī, Shāfi‘i and some Mālikī jurists on account of the prohibition of creating a 
contract which is contingent upon the fulfilment of another.   Modern jurists, while expressing 
reservations concerning the practice, deem it valid on the basis of necessity (ḍarūrah) and on 
condition that the steps are carried out individually and in consecutive fashion.555   
 
Another widespread practice makes the buyer not merely responsible for defects in the 
commodity, but assigns to the buyer liability for the shipment and “the actions of the exporter”.556  
This effectively indemnifies the seller from any liability relating to the goods, indicating that the 
parties did not intend the transaction to be a contract of sale.   Like a documentary letter of 
credit the financial institution removes the risk and inconvenience of the transaction by limiting 
its participation to the documents relating to the sale.557  Despite its non-compliance with the 
sharia, this type of indemnity is a standard practice.  In fact, the commercial feasibility of 
transacting in murābaḥah structures without such clauses is precarious558 and very few, if any, 
IFIs would be willing to transact in them.559 These provisions, however, would almost certainly 
fall foul of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979; in particular, section 12 (2)(b) provides that there is 
an implied term that “the buyer will enjoy quiet possession of the goods except so far as it may 
                                               
555 Usmani, “Introduction”  (2002), 67. 
556 Ray, “Renewal”  (1995),  49. 
557 Chuah, “Morabaha” (2006-2007), 161. 
558 Ibid., 162. 
559 Bälz, “Murabaha” (2004), 126 . This also pertains to conventional trade finance.  The difference is that 
conventional trade finance does not attempt to cloak the transaction in the garb of a contract of sale.  The 
issuing bank does not assume liability for the good(s) supplied by the seller because its carefully 
circumscribed role is merely to finance a supply contract agreed by the parties. 
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be disturbed by the owner or other person entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance 
so disclosed or known”.560  Parties may not waive the implied terms to title, including rules 
providing for the buyer’s quiet possession, and others concerning the description and 
satisfactory quality of the good(s).561   
 
Furthermore, section 6 (3) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 provides that liability in non-
consumer contracts of sale “[…] can be excluded or restricted to a contract term, but only in so 
far as the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness”.562 The reasonableness test 
concerns the relative bargaining positions of the parties; whether the customer received any 
inducements to agree to the terms; whether costumers should have known of the existence and 
scope of a specific term, and other conditions.563 
 
The extent of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 is limited by section 26(1), which provides 
that: “A person may exclude or restrict liability by reference to a contract term do not apply to 
liability arising under [international supply contracts]”.564  International supply contracts are 
qualified as those that are “made by parties whose places of business (or, if they have none, 
habitual residences) are in the territories of different States”.565  Where the Unfair Contract 
                                               
560 Sale of Goods Act 1979. This is the opinion of Chuah, “Morabaha” (2006-2007), 162-163. 
561 Chuah, “Morabaha” (2006-2007), 163. 
562 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s 6, s-sub. 3. See schedule 2 for guidelines for application of 
reasonableness test.   
563 Ibid., sch 2. 
564 Ibid., s 1. See s 26(3) for a description of that contract.  
565 Ibid., s 26(3)(b). 
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Terms Act 1977 does not apply, the terms of the contract are not subject to the requirement of 
reasonableness.  Furthermore, the common law, which does not have a reasonableness test, 
will approach the validity of excluding or limiting a liability clause as a matter of construction.566  
As most murābaḥah are transacted between contracting parties located in the same state, 
however, the exclusion in section 26 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act would not apply.  In that 
event the contract would be subject to a reasonableness test.567   
 
The murābaḥah presents a vivid example of the Islamic concepts and tools used to adapt the 
classical mark-up structure to mimic conventional financing techniques.  The modern structure 
does not evince the ownership requirements of the sharia, and yet few IFIs would be willing to 
transact in them, if they were forced to assume these requirements. Furthermore, various 
indemnities associated with the transaction may fall foul of statutory law, although international 
supply contracts are excluded.  The next section examines the use of the tawarruq as a 
financing technique at the Islamic Bank of Britain. 
 
 
                                               
566 See Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827. The House of Lords held that 
“the doctrine of fundamental breach by virtue of which the termination of a contract brought it, and, with 
it, any exclusion clause to an end was not good law; that the question whether and to what extent an 
exclusion clause was to be applied to any breach of contract was a matter of construction of the 
contract and normally when the parties were bargaining on equal terms they should be free to apportion 
the risks as they thought fit, making provision for their respective risks according to the terms they 
chose to agree”. 
567 Chuah, “Morabaha” (2006-2007), 165. 
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5.2  TAWARRUQ 
 
Tawarruq is a modified version of the bay‘ al-‘inah group of sales which involve a same-item 
sale-repurchase with a third party intermediary. The tawarruq is used on an almost daily basis 
by IFIs to generate liquidity for clients’ business needs and to facilitate inter-bank lending.  The 
underlying bay‘ al-‘inah structure is designed accordingly: a “borrower” sells some property to 
the “lender” and receives its cash price in return; the “lender” then turns around and re-sells the 
same property to the “borrower” on credit and at a higher price equal to the cash price plus 
interest.  Abū Ḥanīfah ruled that the validity of a contract is determined solely by its language.  
Nonetheless, he agreed that the same-item sale-repurchase without the inclusion of a third 
party intermediary was defective according to a tradition from Zayd ibn Arqam.  Al-Shāfi‘i and 
Ẓahirī jurists deemed the contract valid for the same reason, although they also found the 
contract extremely reprehensible as it was an obvious stratagem to circumvent the prohibition of 
ribā.568  In general, proponents of the contract maintain that the validity of contracts is to be 
examined only through the external manifestation of its contractual parts.  The motive (nīyah) of 
the parties is immaterial as to the validity of the contract which they support with the following 
prophetic Hadith: The Prophet was to have said: “He who jests with the words that will make a 
binding contract of marriage, or with the words that pronounce a divorce or declare a slave free, 
shall be taken to have meant the words seriously”.569  Although the Hadith does not deal with 
commercial affairs or the circumstances in question, supporters rely on Islam’s long tradition of 
                                               
568 El-Gamal, “Islamic Finance”  (2006), 70-71. 
569 Haneef, “Trends” (2005), 47. 
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textualism and legal formalism to justify this central claim.  However, sharia scholars of the 
Islamic Bank of Britain have other legal tools at their disposal that would also help to validate 
the transaction.  
 
The Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) was established in London in 2004 as the first and only stand-
alone Islamic retail bank in the United Kingdom.  It offers both secured and unsecured business 
finance.  The IBB claims that its business finance product is structured upon the principles of 
murābaḥah but, in fact, the steps of the transaction resemble those of the repudiated tawarruq 
in modified form.  The procedure is as follows:  
(1) the client requests a facility for, say, £10,000 to be repaid over 12 months; 
(2) the client appoints the bank to act as his agent whereupon the IBB purchases £10,000 of 
a commodity (usually a metal on the London Metals Exchange) and sells this to the 
client at a profit (say £10,800 which equals an £800 profit or an 8 percent mark-up);   
(3) the client’s debt to the bank now totals £10,800 and is due, over the course of 
instalments, in 12 months (neither the client nor the bank takes delivery or possession of 
the goods and thus little risk is assumed by either party);   
(4) the bank acting on behalf of the client instructs a broker to act as the client’s agent 
(wakīl) and sell the commodity on his behalf;   
(5) by employing a broker-agent to sell the commodity to a third party buyer on behalf of the 
client the bank achieves a degree of separation from the immediate sale transaction and 
so gives the appearance that it does not take a direct role in the re-sale of the 
commodity;  
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(6) in a clear conflict of interest, the bank also acts for the broker under a separate power of 
attorney and arranges for the broker to sell the commodity at its market value, £10,000, 
resulting in the client’s receipt of £10,000 in cash.570    
 
The contract represents a rather vivid legal stratagem designed to facilitate business finance.  
By circumventing the risk of ownership, however, it gives effect to a structure that produces an 
unjustified enrichment according to the ribā doctrine.  
 
Tawarruq plays a pivotal role in meeting consumer and investor financing requirements, and it 
facilitates financial institutions’ interbank liquidity requirements. Although controversial in terms 
of its economic substance, some schools of law view its legal form as sharia-compatible.   
 
The following section examines a further example of Islamic financial engineering.  In particular, 
the sukuk securitisation structure is the central focus.  
 
5.3 SUKUK AND CONVENTIONAL SECURITISATIONS 
 
The sukuk represents a vivid example of the way in which practitioners of the Law of Islamic 
Finance have adapted conventional financial contracts to produce sharia-compatible 
alternatives.  The sukuk, although commonly known as an Islamic bond, is perhaps more 
                                               
570 IBB, "Business Finance” (2006). 
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appropriately described as an Islamic investment certificate.571  Sukuk certificates represent a 
holder’s proportionate ownership interest in an underlying asset or transaction and thus share 
characteristics of asset-backed securities and equity investment.  However, sukuk also share 
characteristics with unsecured debt securities, which makes it difficult to classify them in any of 
these categories.572   
 
Sukuk573 are a modern innovation borrowed from the conventional concept of the asset-backed 
securitisation and designed to replicate the payment profile of conventional bonds.  
Conventional bonds are mid- to long-term debt instruments in which an investor lends money for 
a defined period of time and receives a fixed or floating amount of interest income. Bonds have 
a set maturity date at which time the issuer agrees to pay the holder his principal investment.574 
Bonds bear interest and are not permissible according to the sharia. Furthermore, funds 
generated from bond issuances are not screened according to sharia criteria and thus could 
possibly be used for ḥarām purposes including alcohol, pornography or highly leveraged 
corporations.575   
                                               
571 Wilson, "Sukuk Market” (2004), 3. 
572 Richardson, "Integration” (2011), 8. 
573 The modern sukuk, sg. ṣakk (the plural form is almost always used) originated from the classical ṣakk, 
an ancient monetary instrument first described in Malik’s famous treatise, al-Muwatta.  In the first Islamic 
century the Umayyad caliphate would pay soldiers and public servants in cash and in kind.  Payment in 
kind was known as sukuk al-badā’i ‘, something akin to commodity coupons or grain permits. Ṣakk 
holders would produce their certificate upon its maturity date at the treasury and receive a fixed amount of 
commodity, usually grains.  See Haneef, “Trends” (2005), 29. 
574 Rose and Marquis, “Capital Markets”  (2008), 68. 
575 Wilson, "Sukuk Market” (2004), 5. 
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A conventional asset-backed securitisation, on the other hand, is a structure that generates 
profit from the performance of an underlying tangible asset(s), transaction(s) and/or venture(s) 
and thus meets general sharia requirements concerning the generation of wealth. The following 
sub-section examines the legal features of conventional securitisations and thus provides 
background information for a subsequent examination of the sukuk al-ijārah or lease-based 
sukuk. 
 
5.3.1  CONVENTIONAL SECURITISATIONS 
 
A securitisation enables an originator (a company, municipality or government) to raise money 
from investors on the security of receivables. It represents an increasingly important way of 
raising money from investors in open markets instead of through a traditional financial 
intermediary such as a bank.576  A securitisation converts illiquid (non-marketable) assets into 
tradable, highly liquid (marketable) securities and/or funds. Receivables are the most common 
type of assets in a securitisation.  They represent rights to payment in connection with leased 
assets, loans to buy real property, unsecured commercial loans and amounts owing on credit 
cards.577  Finance is raised by securitising the rights to a particular set of assets that generate 
predictable income streams.  Tradable securities representing the rights to assets or an interest 
in an asset are sold to generate funds.578  
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Four principal steps are involved in a securitisation; (1) the owner of receivables, known as the 
originator, sells them to a special or single-purpose vehicle (SPV).  The SPV is a legal entity 
that is either orphaned (shares are held by third parties; this is usually the case in non-trust 
countries)579 and/or owned by a charitable trustee so that it is not financially attached to the 
originator; (2) The SPV borrows money in a ‘funding loan’ to finance the purchase of the 
receivables.  The funding loan is later repaid from the proceeds of the further sale of the 
receivables; (3) the purchaser of the receivables authorises the originator to collect proceeds of 
the receivables on his behalf and to forward proceeds to the SPV; (4) the SPV grants security 
over the receivables to the purchasers of the assets.  The funding loan is secured by way of a 
fixed or floating charge over all of the assets of the SPV.580 
 
The principal economic objective of securitisations is to enable the originator to raise money 
from investors on the security of the receivables.  The grant of securities enables creditors to 
force a sale of the property and to apply the proceeds of the sale to the secured debt ahead of 
other creditors.  When a creditor’s rights have been realised through the payment of a secured 
debt, a debtor is released from his obligation.581  A number of other advantages are also 
available to originators.  For example, the originator continues to retain any surplus from the 
receivables just as would be the case as if it had granted a security interest such as a mortgage 
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581 Wood, “Security and Guarantees”  (1995), 4. 
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over them.  An actual security interest over an asset would require the creditor to retain any 
surplus not needed for repayment of the secured loan and remit this to the debtor.582  
Furthermore, under a security interest the debtor has the right to the charged collateral upon 
repayment of his debt.583  By using “title finance” structures such as sukuk the originator is able 
to retain title to the asset as opposed to having a mortgage over the asset.   
 
This may be particularly relevant to Islamic finance in that some Middle Eastern jurisdictions 
may not grant non-possessory chattel mortgages due to money-lending or usury laws.584  For 
example, mortgages on chattels are currently not possible in Saudi Arabia.585  The sharia, which 
is the official law of Saudi Arabia, does not recognise chattel mortgages in that they secure an 
investor’s principal and thus generate an unjustified return (ribā).  Similarly, the United Arab 
Emirates, one of the largest markets for Islamic finance, does not permit mortgages on 
movables.  Instead the UAE Commercial Code allows commercial businesses to pledge their 
businesses while retaining possession of the business. The title to goods in which businesses 
transact are not able to be pledged. In general, security law in the UAE is underdeveloped and 
thus prevents lenders from effectively securing transactions.586 
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In a securitisation the originator is able to transfer the risk of the non-payment of receivables to 
investors and thus can remove the assets from its balance sheet; the loan becomes a liability of 
the SPV rather than the originator.587 Therefore, originators are able to raise money without the 
loans appearing on its balance sheet and, importantly, retain any surplus profit from the sale of 
the receivables.  Furthermore, the originator (as seller) receives a cash price on the sale of the 
receivables which can be used to offset liabilities.  Hence, both assets and liabilities are 
removed from its balance sheet and more borrowing room is created.  This improves an 
originator’s financial ratios, i.e. its debt to equity ratio – known as gearing.  Thus the seller’s 
return on capital is improved in that its assets and liabilities have been removed but it still 
retains the profit.588  
 
Furthermore, the conventional SPV benefits from receiving a higher rate of interest for its sale of 
the receivables than the securities holders receive in payments comprising principal and 
interest.  The originator ultimately receives the margin of difference from a number of methods 
of profit extraction, bearing in mind that the risk that the receivables default could frustrate this 
strategy.  Finally, originators benefit from cheaper capital in that securitisations offer a cheaper 
means of raising finance than that obtained by applying directly for a loan or issuing bonds.  
Issuance is designed so that junior tranches of notes bear a greater risk of first loss, which 
enables senior tranches to be rated AAA – the highest rating given – and thereby pay a low rate 
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of interest.  Senior tranches are usually higher quality assets than most of the seller’s assets 
and these are insulated from the credit of the seller and are effectively secured.589   
 
The realisation of these objectives depends, in large part, on whether a ‘true sale’ has taken 
place between the parties.  Certain legal thresholds must be met.  First, the seller should have 
no liability for the asset except for providing warranties against defects.  Therefore the seller 
may not guarantee recoverability or have a duty to repurchase the asset, nor provide additional 
cash transfers or assets.  In general, the seller should have no moral duty to note holders to 
compensate them for shortfalls.  Liability would require a seller to clearly state the asset in its 
balance sheet and retain capital against it.  Second, buyers should maintain exclusive control 
and dominion over the asset, which entitles them to sell or pledge it without consideration of the 
seller.  Therefore, the buyer should be able to collect all profits from the asset without having to 
transfer these to the seller.  Were the seller to retain some degree of control and dominion, the 
asset may still belong to the seller and be susceptible to its creditors – although this basic 
principle of private property is somewhat diluted in the case of securitisations.  Finally, the sale 
cannot be revocable upon the insolvency of the purchaser, due either to a preferential transfer – 
such as whether the form of sale transfers assets at a price below market value - or because 
the seller is, in fact, the buyer or a part thereof.590   
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The key determinant of these criteria consists in whether the risks inherent in the assets has 
been retained by the originator or has been transferred to the issuer and through the issuer to 
the note holders.  If the risks of the assets have transferred to the SPV – in other words, a true 
sale has occurred - the originator’s creditworthiness is not taken into account as its continued 
financial health is of no further significance to the transaction.  However, in a secured lending 
structure such as a mortgage– a structure wherein the debtor has the right to receive the 
charged collateral upon payment of the secured debt as well as any surplus monies in the case 
that the creditor enforces payment and sells off the collateral - the originator is the borrower and 
its financial health plays a significant role in any rating of the transaction.591   
 
Two principal issues depend on whether a ‘true sale’ has been effected; (1) the re-
characterisation of a ‘sale’ as a security interest and (2) the concept of bankruptcy remoteness.   
 
A court of law, for the purposes of security law, may re-characterise the transaction as a 
secured loan by the SPV to the originator so that secured assets would be treated as still 
belonging to the originator rather than as a true sale of the assets to the SPV.  The effects are 
usually disastrous.  Re-characterisation effectively destroys any advantage derived from 
securitisation so that assets would be listed on the balance sheet of the originator and the 
purchaser’s loan would constitute a liability.  Moreover, the transaction would almost certainly 
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require registration or “perfection by filing” if it is not to be treated as void upon the insolvency of 
the seller.592   
 
Some states require registration of certain transactions and may re-characterise title finance 
structures as mortgages.  Were this to occur, registration buttresses the creditor against a loss 
of priority – the priority by which creditors’ claims against debtors’ assets are made valid – but 
would obviate the originator’s advantages in using a title financing structure.593  Recall that 
some Middle Eastern jurisdictions do not recognise mortgages over non-possessory chattels 
and may invalidate a transaction subject to re-characterisation.  At present there are no 
precedents in GCC jurisdictions that offer clues as to the way in which courts in these 
jurisdictions may approach a sukuk issuance with a purchase undertaking.594  
 
The principal factors in considering re-characterisation are:595 
(1) Whether the originator’s rights to repurchase receivables in substance constitute an 
equity of redemption of mortgaged property, i.e. the mortgagor’s right to get back the 
mortgaged property on repayment of the loan.  The originator may desire a right to 
                                               
592 Wood, “Title Finance”  (1995), 53. 
593 Ibid., 12. 
594 Bi, "Transactions” (2011), Q&A session; Hourani and Fahl, "Securities Law” (2001), 55. The Dubai 
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repurchase in order to end the transaction because, e.g. it is too onerous, or 
enforcement would be damaging, or it is no longer profitable.  The originator usually has 
the right to repurchase small remaining amounts at the end of the financing to mop up 
the last drops when it is no longer economic to continue. 
(2) Whether the extraction of profits by the originator amounts to a lender accounting to the 
borrower for the excess of the mortgaged property over the loan.  In a true sale, the 
purchaser keeps the residual value (profit) of the purchased property, but in a mortgaged 
property the borrower receives back the residual value on repayment of the loan.  
(3) Sham, i.e. the parties carry out the transaction in a different way than that contemplated 
by the documents, e.g. the records refer to a loan and interest, not a sale price.  The 
parties need to make sure that this does not happen.  
(4) Collections by the originator, i.e. whether the continued collection of the receivables by 
the originator negates a true sale.  
 
An English common law jurisdiction is not likely to re-characterise a securitisation for the reason 
that an appropriately documented sale of receivables, which the parties treat as a sale, “is not a 
loan by the buyer to the seller secured on the receivables requiring registration, even if the 
buyer has recourse to the seller for unpaid receivables, even if the seller has a right of 
repurchase (e.g. stub assets at end ), even if the profit is paid to the originator (e.g. a servicing 
fee), even though the seller continues to collect as agent of the purchaser, and even though the 
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economic effect is similar to a loan secured on the receivables”.596  In England form is given 
weight over economic substance.  Effectively structured transactions are not registrable unless 
the court dismisses the transaction as a sham – or views it with regard to its substance rather 
than its form - and converts it into a secured loan or mortgage.597  Although common law 
protects investors with equitable doctrines of unconscionable dealings and equitable principles, 
in general, its focus is on the legal substance of a title finance transaction.  For example, in 
Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co the Court of Appeal held that the transaction 
could not be interpreted as a sale of goods or a charge or mortgage on the goods without 
examining the agreement, and the nature of the legal relationship, as a whole.598  As long as the 
transaction is what parties claim it is, and not a guise for something else, the court is 
disinterested in whether the transaction has been structured as a sale or a loan.  Form over 
substance is firmly established with respect to many authoritative cases relating to title finance 
in English courts.599  This obviously represents a particularly amenable legal environment to 
Islamic finance and it is thus not surprising that many Islamic financial transactions are 
governed according to English law.  
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The second principle issue of ‘bankruptcy remoteness’ also depends on whether the agreement 
can be described as a ‘true sale’.  Bankruptcy remoteness from the originator is established 
when the securitisation is able to withstand the originator’s insolvency.  For this to occur the 
SPV must be made wholly independent of the originator so that the bankruptcy of the originator 
would not be tied to the assets and liabilities of the SPV. The purchaser SPV should not be 
consolidated on the balance sheet of the originator.  The separateness of the SPV is 
strengthened by applying the rules pertaining to the piercing of the veil of incorporation.  These 
include the provision of separate officers, no commingling of assets, separate records, the 
observance of corporate procedures, financial statement disclosure and so forth.  Furthermore, 
the seller’s transfer of payments to the SPV “may not be capable of being set aside as a 
preference” or undervalued on the bankruptcy of the seller.600  Were payments or other transfers 
set aside, creditors of the originator would have a claim against the receivables.  This rule 
pertains to the original sale of the assets to the SPV and subsequent (asset) substitutions by the 
originator.601 
 
5.3.2  SUKUK  
 
Recall that a conventional bond entitles a bondholder to receive regular interest payments 
during the life of the bond from the bond issuer and the principal investment upon maturity of the 
bond.  Bondholders are creditors to the bond issuer and are ranked as senior unsecured and 
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unsubordinated creditors of the issuer in the case of insolvency and thus take priority over 
shareholders – who through their purchase of equities have agreed to be paid after the senior 
creditor.602  Islamic law forbids the conventional bond structure in that it is essentially a loan and 
thus transgresses the ribā prohibition. To be sharia-compatible AAOIFI requires that an Islamic 
securitisation has to result in the undivided ownership by a security holder of shares in “tangible 
assets, usufruct and services or in the ownership of assets of particular projects or special 
investment activity”.603  Nevertheless sharia scholars endeavoured to retain the fixed income 
characteristics of a bond instrument as well as the bond-like priority of security holders over 
shareholders in the case of default, while giving the structure equity-like ownership features that 
would render it sharia-compatible.  Moreover, attaching equity-like properties to the sukuk 
structure enables it, from a sharia perspective, to be transferable whereas the sale of debt 
(dayn) – as examined in chapter three – is ḥarām amongst a majority of contemporary jurists. 604   
 
Exceptionally, in Malaysia the bay‘ al-dayn has been rendered acceptable by the Sharia 
Advisory Council of the Malaysian Securities Commission with the proviso that a transparent 
regulatory environment enables the structure to meet the maṣlaḥah objectives of the Malaysian 
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228 
 
Muslim community.605  As a result, Malaysia has developed liquid sukuk markets in which 
murābaḥah, and bay‘ bithaman ajil sukuk certificates are negotiable.606  However, Malaysian 
scholars’ permissive attitude toward the bay‘ al-dayn  is not widely accepted amongst Middle 
Eastern investors.607 
 
Therefore, outside of Malaysia sukuk generally cannot be structured on receivables as these 
represent obligations and may only be transferred at or below par value to avoid the prohibitions 
of ribā and gharar.  This effectively prevents debt-based Islamic financing structures such as the 
murābaḥah from being securitised.  Therefore, conventional receivables such as those related 
to home mortgage loans, commercial property mortgages as well as consumer receivables 
including car, boat and truck loans, credit card receivables and various types of equipment 
leases cannot be used as the underlying assets of sukuk.  Instead, an issuer of sukuk generally 
seeks to securitise non-debt based immovable assets such as office buildings and land.  Oil and 
gas properties as well as stands of timber are also possible.608   
 
Jurists have permitted some blended forms that include a combination of mushārakah, ijārah 
and murābaḥah transactions subject to the proviso that the majority of assets should include at 
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least 51 per cent tangible assets (‘ayn).609  This is substantiated on the basis of the juristic 
maxim whereby the majority determines the genus and characterisation of the total.610 The 
practice facilitates the negotiability of sukuk, which is essential to their attractiveness.  Not only 
does negotiability enable a liquid secondary market to take root, it allows these instruments to 
be rated by recognised rating agencies, listed on major securities exchanges and processed 
through major clearinghouses.611    
 
5.3.2.1   SUKUK AL-IJĀRAH 
 
The sukuk al-ijārah (lease-based sukuk) is the most popular form of sukuk in today’s capital 
markets, although AAOIFI lists fourteen other forms of permissible sukuk modelled on the 
nominate contract scheme. For example, sukuk proceeds are routinely invested in muḍārabah  
partnerships, istiṣnā‘  (hire or construction) projects as well as equity participations in the form of 
mushārakah  – which represents a co-ownership interest in assets.612  The sukuk al-ijārah has 
been constructed to mirror the ownership attributes – in this case the ownership of an asset’s 
usufruct (manfa‘ah) – which Islamic financial principles require.  Note holders are construed as 
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co-owners of a tangible asset similar to the shirkah (partnership).  The subsequent examination 
pertains to sukuk al-ijārah, although the central issues concern all forms of sukuk issuance.   
 
Each co-owner of an ijārah sukuk certificate may sell the rights to his asset without the consent 
of other co-owners at market price, thus enabling the emergence of a secondary market. In 
1988 the Fiqh Academy of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) agreed that a 
lessee would be entitled to sell his usufruct to a third party (sub-lessee) or the lessor at any 
mutually agreed rate.  Alternatively, the lessor may sell his/her property as long as the sale does 
not prejudice the lessee’s rights.  The sharia generally provides that the lessee’s ability to sub-
lease the asset requires the lessor’s permission insofar as third parties may wish to use the 
property in a different manner or for different purposes.  In general, however, the concepts of 
subleasing and its use in securitisations are familiar to classical jurisprudence so that they may 
be employed lawfully in a multitude of ways.613   
 
The schematic of the sukuk al-ijārah proceeds as follows. The originator generally sells a non-
moveable asset or assets such as an office building or land to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). 
The SPV obtains the financing for the purchase by issuing certificates evidencing a note 
holder’s pro-rata beneficial interest in the underlying assets.  The SPV purchaser then leases 
back the asset to the originator for payments equalling the principal and profit margin of the 
leased asset(s).  The SPV distributes variable rental dividends to sukuk holders from the lease 
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of the asset which are directly tied to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), usually plus a 
0.40 per cent per annum margin.614  Upon maturity of the lease, which is timed to correspond 
with the redemption date of the sukuk, the SPV or trustee sells the asset to the lessee for a 
price equal to the cost of its original acquisition. The SPV is then able to redeem the sukuk and 
sukuk holders receive their principal investments.  The payment profile is thus comparable to a 
conventional bond.  Moreover, the lessee’s (originator) obligation to pay the lease rentals and 
the final principal payment are ranked as senior unsubordinated debt – a ranking in priority 
comparable to the ranking of a conventional bond.615  Like conventional securitisations sukuk 
can be structured to enhance the credit of the offering and thus appeal to a diverse class of 
investors.  Hence, sukuk notes can have different ratings and varied exposure to prepayment or 
default.  Those with the highest rating are called senior bonds and those with more exposure 
are termed subordinate bonds.616 A sukuk issuer takes particular care to choose a jurisdiction in 
which regulatory and financial service expertise are most advantageous to the overall 
agreement.  Often traditional offshore jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands and 
Luxembourg are used for their tax beneficial purposes.617  
 
Under the sukuk al-ijārah liabilities arising from the regular use of the asset are to be carried by 
the lessee, while those associated with ownership such as insurance, maintenance and taxation 
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should be borne by the owners (sukuk holders).618 In practice, the circumscribed role of the 
SPV, including the need to maintain its bankruptcy remoteness from the originator, results in the 
creation of agency agreements between the SPV (lessor) and the lessee (originator). The 
originator, acting as the issuer’s agent, agrees to perform any major maintenance and will be 
compensated by the issuer upon maturity of the sukuk.619  When the originator is not in 
possession of sufficient funds, the purchase price of leased asset(s) at maturity is amended to 
comprise the maintenance expenses.620 
 
The principal legal issue affecting the commercial viability of sukuk securitisations concerns 
whether a ‘true sale’ has occurred.  While sukuk issuers (SPV) strive to provide sufficient 
documentation that the actual transfer of ownership has taken place (true sale), in practice the 
originator has transferred beneficial title rather than the actual legal title.  AAOIFI states that 
“ownership is possible under a sale contract, even if the title is not registered in the purchaser’s 
name, on condition that the purchaser should obtain a counter-deed or bill of sale to establish 
the actual transfer of his ownership of the asset”.621  In cases in which the beneficial transfer 
relates to immovable properties such as land parcels and buildings, the accepted practice 
allows the seller (originator) to remain the registered proprietor of the assets as long as a trust 
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declaration – in the case that a trust SPV is used – has been given to the effect that the SPV 
shall hold the assets as trustee for the buyer.  
 
The use of the securitisation trust represents an agreement in which one person transfers title to 
specific property to a trustee who is given effective legal control over the asset for the benefit of 
third person(s) known as cestuis que trust,622 and then for the originator.  The trustee issues pro 
rata investment certificates to investors who are given beneficial ownership of the asset(s). The 
relationship between trustee and beneficiary is governed by a trust deed or declaration of trust 
often executed unilaterally by the settlor.623  It is claimed that the characteristics of the trust fully 
comply with the sharia and that the concept might even derive from Islamic law.624 Yet the 
concept of beneficial ownership, in fact, may be difficult to reconcile with the sharia concept of 
ownership.   
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By assigning the property to a trustee who holds the assets in trust for the beneficial owners 
(sukuk holders), the lessor or seller maintains legal title.625  A sukuk participation certificate 
conveys beneficial ownership of a certain share to an investor. An SPV operating agreement or 
trust indenture define the attributes of ownership including the rights and obligations of each 
party.626  The reason for not transferring the registered title to an issuer is a result of 
unfavourable transfer taxes or similar cost disadvantages that attach to certain jurisdictions.627 
 
Some countries, particularly civil law jurisdictions, require parties to utilise the common law 
concept of trust for a securitisation SPV.628  However, the use of the trust in common law 
jurisdictions such as England and the United States is less favoured, probably because:629  
 
(1) The corporate form dodges cumbersome legal issues, such as the liability of the 
trustee and beneficiaries for obligations incurred by the trustee for the account of the 
trust and such as the non-recognition of the trust elsewhere.  
(2) Flexible security interests and trusts of the SPV’s shares are available.  
(3) The corporate form is less likely to invite the complexities of regulatory codes 
controlling collective investment schemes. 
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While sukuk often utilise the trust SPV most ijārah sukuk issuances attribute the risk of 
underlying assets to the lessee of the asset (originator) rather than the lessor (SPV) for the 
reason that the lessee has been legally bound to purchase the asset at an agreed exercise 
price upon a dissolution event.630  The repurchase agreement provides a guarantee either 
through issuer or manager covenants that sukuk certificates will be redeemed at face value, 
rather than market value.631  This essentially indemnifies investors from the adverse 
performance of the underlying assets.  It also enables the originator to mop up any surplus profit 
from the securitisation for a nominal price upon maturity of the sukuk, thus acquiring them for a 
fraction of their market value.  In effect, the purchase undertaking transforms the asset-backed 
securitisation into a debt owed to note holders. The guaranteed income that this provides is 
viewed as unjustified enrichment (ribā) that fails to expose investors to commercial risk.632  
   
Unlike conventional asset-backed securitisations, investors do not have recourse to the 
underlying assets in the event of default.  Default accelerates the purchase undertaking – a 
promise to purchase the assets upon maturity of the sukuk for a nominal value – which, if 
unfulfilled, would trigger an investor’s claim against the originator to be decided in a commercial 
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court.633  The originator’s contractual obligations, whether guaranteed or not, clearly indicate 
that the originator’s credit risk is of issue rather than the underlying assets.634  
 
Major ratings agencies such as Fitch Ratings and Moody’s Investor Service agree that, unlike a 
true securitisation, the commercial terms and legal structures of sukuk issuances show that 
sukuk performance is not governed by the underlying assets.  A default event does not allow 
investors any recourse to the underlying assets.635  Further, the originator’s credit risk should be 
viewed as the main determinant in that the risks associated with the asset reside with it.  Default 
would accelerate the purchase agreement, which, if unfulfilled, would result in investors 
pursuing their claim in a commercial court against the originator.  This claim would be 
immediately due and payable whereby the assets underlying the sukuk would be available to all 
senior unsecured creditors (note holders) of the originator.636   
 
Moody’s perspective of sukuk issuances – notably, rating agencies take a substance over form 
approach to the issue – divides them into two classes: (1) asset-backed sukuk, for which ratings 
are given based on the underlying assets of the sukuk; here the risks have been transferred to 
note holders; and (2) unsecured sukuk, for which ratings are given based on the originator’s or 
borrower’s credit risk.  All sukuk have underlying assets in the structure but Moody’s only 
                                               
633 Dubai World’s Nakheel sukuk contained a clause in which a purchase undertaking was triggered by a 
default event.  See Nakheel Development Limited, "Offering Circular” (2006),142. 
634 Ratings, "Fitch's Approach” (2007), 2. 
635 Howladar et al., "Ratings” (2006-2007), 27; Ratings, "Fitch's Approach” (2007), 2. 
636 Ratings, "Fitch's Approach” (2007), 2. 
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considers them to be asset-backed or asset-secured if the central elements of securitisation 
ensure that sukuk holders have beneficial title and realisable security over the assets.637  To 
date, very few rated sukuk issuances have fulfilled ‘true sale’ requirements.638  The result is that 
sukuk issuances have been given significantly lower ratings than conventional asset-backed 
structures, thus contributing to increased costs for secured financing.639  Most sukuk 
securitisations have not been rated as major ratings agencies have shown a reluctance to issue 
credit ratings on local structures.640  Asset-based sukuks’ ‘long-term rating’ does not exceed the 
‘issuer default rating’ (IDR) of the originator, assuming that no substantial preferential creditors – 
which rank ahead of sukuk note holders – are attached to the originator’s assets.  In normal 
circumstances, an originator-backed sukuk is considered to have average recovery 
prospects,641  although the paucity of historical data on defaults impedes rating agencies’ ability 
to estimate recovery rates used in pricing and rating tranched products.642 
 
The fundamental test of ownership according to the sharia is based on who must bear the risk 
of complete loss or destruction of the asset.  Yet the investment returns that the majority of 
sukuk securitisations guarantee force us to rethink modern jurists’ position with respect to the 
concepts of ownership, debt and interest in Islamic law.  Clearly the prohibition of the exchange 
                                               
637 Howladar et al., "Ratings” (2006-2007), 27. 
638 In August 2006, Kingdom Instalment Corporation of Dubai is said to have issued the first ‘true sale’ 
sukuk  securitisation.   
639 Howladar et al.,"Ratings” (2006-2007), 27. 
640 Jobst, "Securitization” (2007), 29. 
641 Ratings, "Fitch's Approach” (2007), 2. 
642 Jobst, "Securitization” (2007), 30. 
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of debt and the maxim that investment returns derive from the risk of ownership remain the 
norm in the conscience of the majority of Muslims.  However, the gradual acceptance of sukuk 
investment certificates indicates that Muslim jurists may make exceptions to these principles 
when circumstances dictate.  The following section looks at the lively polemic waged 
surrounding this issue. 
 
5.4 THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTHENTICITY 
 
In chapter four the debate concerning the validity of the binding promise was analysed; its 
compatibility with the sharia is also at issue with respect to sukuk master agreements.  
However, the most controversial feature of the sukuk securitisation structure is the unilateral 
purchase undertaking given by the originator to the SPV.  In February 2008 the sharia board of 
AAOIFI, headed by Justice Taqi Usmani, struck out at the current practice of issuing sukuk, 
which shocked the market and slowed issuance.643   
 
AAOIFI reaffirmed the following sharia issues concerning the issuance of sukuk.  First, 
negotiable sukuk must be owned by sukuk holders, with all the rights and obligations attached 
to ownership in real assets.644  This provision concerns the practice of including a re-purchase 
agreement in sukuk master agreements and thus not fulfilling true sale criteria.   
                                               
643 AAOIFI, "Sukuk Standard” (2008). See Sheikh Usmani’s statement on current sukuk practices: 
Usmani, " Applications” (2008).  
644 AAOIFI, "Sukuk Standard” (2008), 1. 
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Second, negotiable sukuk must not be based on receivables or debts, except in exceptional 
circumstances, when these were unintentionally included.645  This provision does not mention 
blended or mixed sukuk issuances but presumably these types of issuances were not intended 
under the provision.  
 
Third, sukuk managers, whether acting as muḍārib or sharik (partner), or as an agent (wakīl) are 
not permitted to offer loans to note holders, when earnings on the underlying assets fall short of 
expectations.  Instead a reserve account may be established for the purpose of covering such 
shortfalls.646 
 
Fourth, muḍāribs, shariks or wakīls may not undertake to repurchase the assets from sukuk 
holders, upon maturity or dissolution of the sukuk, for a nominal value or their original principal 
investment.  It is permissible, however, to undertake to purchase the assets at their net value, 
market value or agreed price at the time of actual purchase, i.e. when the sukuk has matured.647  
Clearly, the board sought to assuage critics concerning the prevalent practice of sukuk 
issuance, which emulated an interest-bearing debt instrument by assuring investors of their 
principal investments and shielding them from any losses in proportion to their investment 
certificates.  However, this latter provision does not apply to sukuk al-ijārah, whereby a lessee 
                                               
645 Ibid., 2. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid., 3. 
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may purchase the leased assets for a nominal value upon extinguishment of the sukuk, so long 
as the lessee is not a muḍārib or investment agent.648 
 
However, prohibiting this contractual step would remove a key commercial advantage of 
investment sukuk securitisations – namely the originator will no longer be able to profit from the 
re-purchase of the asset at a nominal value.649  Further, assets are subject to price volatility and 
market movements which could significantly alter the original value of the asset over the course 
of time so that an originator may have to pay more for the asset than it received for the original 
sale.  Nevertheless, this particular feature obviates much of the market risk that sukuk holders 
must countenance and thus leads to unjustified returns.   
 
Finally, sharia supervisory boards should assume greater responsibility for the post-contractual 
monitoring of “relevant contracts and documents related to the actual transaction” after the 
issuance of a fatwa to certify sharia-compliance at every stage of the transaction.650  This final 
statement criticised current sharia board practices that have enabled ribāwi practices to define 
the industry.  
 
These pronouncements have shocked market investors the world over.  One scholar 
commented that 80 per cent of current sukuk structures are not Islamic according to these 
                                               
648 Ibid., 3-4. 
649 Lessees (originators) may purchase the leased asset for a nominal value in the sukuk al-ijārah 
structure. 
650 AAOIFI, "Shari'a Standards” (2004-2005). 
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conditions.651   Sheikh Usmani’s re-consideration of the matter is thought to be based on his 
unwillingness to continue to condone a practice that was conceived to act as a stop-gap 
measure until the industry had attained a more secure institutional basis.652  The widespread 
prevalence of these practices throughout the industry highlights its convergence with 
conventional financial markets. Importantly, AAOIFI’s statement represents a desire to strike a 
different course and thus provides signals to Muslim investors that the Islamic financial industry 
is striving for more “authentic” means of financial intermediation. 
 
The AAOIFI resolution contributed to slowing the issuance of sukuk in 2008 and beyond due to 
investor uncertainty concerning sharia-compliance risk, although increased sovereign ijārah 
sukuk issuance may have mitigated the impact since these structures were not adversely 
affected by the pronouncement.653  In particular, the fact that the asset(s) underlying ijārah 
sukuk could continue to be purchased, pursuant to a purchase undertaking, at a nominal price is 
a decisive factor.  Moreover, AAOIFI’s standards are not the definitive statement on sukuk 
standards.654  In 2009 the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) issued capital adequacy 
standards655 for sukuk structures and in 2010 the Kingdom of Bahrain published the Bahrain 
                                               
651 Islamic Finance Resource, "Proposals” (2008).   
652 Barzilai, "Financing” (2010). 
653 Wedderburn-Day, "Sukuk” (2010), 332. See also Hijazi, "Issuance” (2009).  
654 Richardson, "Integration” (2011), 23. 
655 IFSB, "Capital Adequacy” (2009).  
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Financial Exchange Handbook656, both of which included some, if not all, of the sukuk practices 
outlawed by AAOIFI.  
 
By far the most important factor in reducing the global growth of sukuk issuance was the 2008 
global financial crisis.  By the end of 2007 the global volume of outstanding sukuk exceeded $97 
billion;657 a trend that, if it had continued, would have seen sukuk issuance exceed $200 billion 
by 2010.658 However, in 2008 global sukuk issuances decreased by a staggering 54.5 per cent 
to total $15.1 billion.659 By the end of June 2009 the total value of outstanding sukuk totalled 
$136 billion, indicating that the market was on the path to recovery.660 2010 evidenced a 
dramatic turn-around in the market with record growth in sukuk issuance.  At $51.2 billion, it 
surpassed the previous record in 2007 by 34 per cent.661 
 
As remarked, AAOIFI’s pronouncement is an attempt to chart a different course for the industry 
as a whole but it may not be a commercially viable strategy.  In the background of AAOIFI’s 
statement polarised opinions concerning the imperatives of innovation are in conflict with calls 
for transactions that are tied to Islam’s historical legacy.  The practitioners of the Law of Islamic 
Finance, i.e. sharia scholars, Islamic bankers, lawyers, and others, are part of a project of 
                                               
656 Bahrain Financial Exchange, "Insight” (2010).  
657 IOSCO, "Objectives” (2008), 9. 
658 Jobst et al., "Islamic Bond” (2008), 4. 
659 Hijazi, "Issuance” (2009), 2. 
660 IIFM, "Report” (2010). 
661 Globe, "S&P” (2010).  
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coming to terms with the legacy of Islamic law.  In a world fraught with competing interests, 
overriding necessities, and changed realities, the LIF is forged by determining which Islamic 
principles are malleable and which are non-negotiable.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The modern murābaḥah is a critical contract for facilitating short-term finance for consumer and 
business needs.  The contract illustrates several contracting methods that are used widely in the 
formulation of Islamic financial transactions.  This includes the conglomeration of nominate 
contracts, the binding promise and the application of takhayyur.  These tools and legal 
stratagems – depending on the particular practice – are pivotal to the industry’s gamut of 
financial structures.  Yet they raise sharia-compliance concerns regarding ownership.  They 
highlight the LIF’s formalistic attachment to legal form over ethical and religious substance.  
 
Some of the indemnities written into murābaḥah transactions may fall foul of UK statutory law.  
In particular, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 may prevent 
practitioners from incorporating such indemnities into their contracts, depending, again, on the 
circumstances of the particular transaction.   
 
The practice of contracting in tawarruq evinces many of the same legal tools used in the 
murābaḥah. However, this contract, unlike the murābaḥah, is widely recognised as a ḥila.  
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Nevertheless it plays an important role for the industry in that it generates financing for business 
and consumer needs, and provides a crucial instrument for facilitating inter-bank lending.  
 
The sukuk securitisation represents a clear example of the way in which the LIF has 
appropriated conventional financial structures and endowed these with Islamic characteristics.  
The sukuk is designed to achieve bond-like regular income streams and the return of investors’ 
principal while appropriating the equity-like properties of asset-backed securitisations.  
Securitisations transform non-marketable illiquid financial assets such as receivables into liquid 
financial assets with the result that originators generate financing and other economic 
advantages.  However, receivables constitute rights to payment (dayn) and are not transferable 
at a discount.  Further, bonds are interest-generating and hence not permissible.  Sukuk 
certificates are structured to circumvent these challenges by allowing sukuk holders to purchase 
beneficial ownership rights in tangible underlying assets, usufructs or services.  Furthermore, 
sukuk certificates based on tangible assets are negotiable.   
 
Securitisations must satisfy ‘true sale’ criteria if investors are to have ownership rights over the 
underlying assets.  A ‘true sale’ transfers title to tangible assets to the SPV issuer where these 
are made ‘bankruptcy remote’ from the creditors of the originator.  In the event that ‘true sale’ 
criteria are not fulfilled the securitisation may be re-characterised as a security interest with 
disastrous consequences for the transaction.  Re-characterisation undoes the economic 
benefits of a securitisation and exposes note holders to creditors’ claims against the originator’s 
assets.  In England the risk of re-characterisation by an English court is slight.  English case law 
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has established that title finance transactions will be construed according to legal form rather 
than economic substance as long as the transaction is not a sham. However, in some Middle 
Eastern jurisdictions, where sukuk issuances often originate and where assets are often 
located, the risk that a commercial court will re-characterise a sukuk remains.   
 
The sukuk al-ijārah is the most popular form of sukuk issuance.  The sukuk al-ijārah, not unlike 
other sukuk structures, depends on a purchase undertaking in the master agreement that allows 
sukuk holders to receive their principal investments in full.  However, purchase undertakings 
disqualify most sukuk issuances to date from being characterised as ‘true sales’.  This is 
confirmed by major rating agencies’ assessment that an originator’s credit rating determines the 
creditworthiness of the sukuk issuance.  
 
From a sharia perspective the concept of ownership requires owners to bear the risk of total 
loss or destruction of the underlying tangible assets.  When a ‘true sale’ has not been given 
effect, sukuk holders are shielded from the risks of ownership. This predominant practice calls 
into question whether sharia scholars have revised their perspective concerning the 
fundamental attributes of ownership and/or the prohibition of ribā.   
 
In 2008 AAOIFI issued a declaration concerning some predominant practices of sukuk 
issuance, which rattled markets and exposed a simmering debate. The episode reflects the 
challenge in forging a modern law that strikes a balance between financial innovation and 
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Islamic legal tradition.  The following chapter examines the legislative implementation of Islamic 
financial transactions in the United Kingdom. 
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PART III: THE CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE LAW OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE FACILITATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the UK government’s objective of consolidating an Islamic financial 
centre in the City of London.  The UK government has facilitated Islamic financial transactions 
by modifying tax measures and amending the conventional regulatory framework.  The chapter 
investigates the domestic and international objectives of this strategy and its methods of 
implementation. The legislative and regulatory facilitation of sovereign sukuk issuance – which 
is pivotal to establishing wholesale Islamic markets – provides an important demonstration of 
the way in which the government’s strategy is implemented in practice and what legal and 
economic challenges arise there from.  
 
The chapter is first concerned with assessing the international dimension of Islamic finance and 
its transmission to the UK.  Second, domestic markets and rationales for Islamic finance are 
analysed.  Third, the debate concerning the incorporation of sharia-inspired structures within 
English law is highlighted.  Fourth, the government’s legislative and regulatory approach to 
Islamic finance is scrutinised.  Fifth, the implementation of legislative measures, beginning in 
2003, is examined.  Sixth, the legislative facilitation of sovereign sukuk issuance is given 
consideration as is its economic relevance. Seventh, the facilitation of commercial sukuk 
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issuance is considered and, finally, the regulatory modifications for sukuk instruments are 
examined.   
 
6.1 THE TRANSMISSION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE TO THE UK  
 
Recall that Islamic financial transactions have been conducted in the UK since the early 1980s 
without any legal or regulatory accommodation.  This fact underscores the government’s policy 
of accommodating Islamic finance in response to the financial transactions that had long since 
been taking place.  This is not unusual.  Law often develops in response to commercial and 
financial developments. Nonetheless, the government’s policy to erect a tax and regulatory 
apparatus for Islamic financial transactions represents an important step in stimulating the 
growth and development of domestic and wholesale markets. 
 
The government’s primary objective in facilitating Islamic finance is to strengthen an Islamic 
financial centre in the City of London and thus maintain London’s status as Europe’s premier 
financial centre, and indeed, one of the leading financial centres in the world.662  The sharp rise 
in oil prices since 2003 has resulted in enormous liquidity surpluses, primarily in GCC states.  
Yet the capacity of the region’s financial markets has not been able to keep pace with the 
growth in liquid funds.663  London’s pre-eminent role as a leading financial centre, its strategic 
position in a global financial network, and its historical ties to Middle Eastern states have 
                                               
662 London, "Centres” (2010). 
663 Ainley et al., “Islamic Finance” (2007), 7. 
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enabled it to attract Middle Eastern capital in its bid to consolidate a leading international hub for 
Islamic finance.    
 
The development of an Islamic financial hub in the City of London highlights the centrality of 
place against a policy-oriented and academic debate largely concerned with the neutralisation 
of the nation-state by global communications, the hyper-mobility of capital, and the practices of 
transnational corporations.664   The sovereignty of nation-states is being eroded by the 
liberalisation of world trade and global capital flows.  Economic and financial globalisation has 
enabled the extension of the economy beyond the borders of the nation-state as recent financial 
crises make clear.  A number of leading economic sectors, especially international finance, are 
now swayed by investor sentiment across the globe.  Moreover, global financial markets 
operate within an increasingly global regulatory framework that is primarily attuned to the 
demands of the market, to the requirements of transnational corporations and financial 
institutions rather than the bureaucracy of the state.665 The world system is increasingly 
characterised by a highly interdependent and ambivalent relationship between the nation-state 
and transnational capital.666   
 
 
                                               
664 See Sassen, “Globalization”  (1998), XXI. See also Santos, “Legal Common Sense”  (2002), 279. 
Eatwell and Taylor, “Global Finance”  (2000), 96. Isard, “Globalization”  (2005), 65. 
665 Cotterrell, “Law's Community” (1995),  303; Santos, “Legal Common Sense”  (2002), 194. 
666 Nadkarni, "World Trade” (1999), 134. Nadkarni argues that national autonomy is being sacrificed to the 
liberalisation of world trade.  Global structures should be erected to channel the destabilising process.   
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Yet the UK government’s facilitation of Islamic finance underscores the pre-eminent role of the 
nation-state in creating a legal and regulatory framework which enables a particular mode of 
finance to thrive.  It strengthens the premise that global processes materialise in national 
territories, through national institutional arrangements via legislation and the judicial process.  
The UK experience with Islamic finance underscores the importance of the state in actively 
erecting fiscal and legal frameworks through which the global economy works and without 
whose instruments it simply could not function.667  
 
Theoretically, the complexity of this relationship would tend to result in legal heterogeneity in 
state regulation, embodying diverse political and ideological assumptions as well as different 
types of law for different areas of state intervention.  The emergence of multiple legal orders, 
constituting “relatively unrelated and highly discrepant logics”668 within a single state apparatus 
would unravel the coherence and uniformity of the state-based regulatory framework.  Multiple 
microcosms within a single state, regulated by disparate regulatory logics and styles, would be 
the likely result.669   However, the UK’s response to the emergence of Islamic finance 
undermines – to an extent – this theoretical conclusion. The UK has opted to assimilate Islamic 
finance into the regulatory system rather than create a dual regulatory system that would 
provide a more favourable and efficient regulatory structure for the industry; but which would 
                                               
667 Comaroff and Comaroff, "Millenium Capitalism” (2001), 38; O'Brien and Williams, “Economy”  (2010), 
426. 
668 Santos, “LegalCommon Sense”  (2002), 281 
669 Ibid. 
252 
 
undermine the coherence of the regulatory architecture.  Therefore, the state has subjected this 
transnational phenomenon to national forces.670   
 
6.1.1  RETAIL MARKETS 
 
The second objective of the government concerns the inclusion of a large domestic Muslim 
minority in the financial marketplace, which represents the government’s principle of equality of 
access to financial markets.  While discrimination on the grounds of religion or conscience has 
been unlawful since 2003,671 the rationale in facilitating Islamic finance is not a political or legal 
response to incidences of unlawful discrimination.  Rather, it is a pro-active, top-down and 
highly centralised series of measures rooted in a growing awareness that British Muslims have 
not been able to avail themselves of financial activities due to their Islamic beliefs. Hence, it 
sends a strong signal to the Muslim community that the government understands their religious 
needs and seeks to create an environment in which Muslims are able to practice their faith in 
conformity with their beliefs.   
 
Despite the Islamic finance industry’s international growth, UK domestic demand for Islamic 
financial products and services may be limited.  Socio-economic data reveal that Muslims are 
less economically active than the general population. Of a total of two million British Muslims, 
                                               
670 Fazio, “Harmonization”  (2007), 10. 
671 C.f. Hill and Sandberg, "Sacred” (2007); The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 
2003, SI 2003/1660. 
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1.4 million are 16 years of age and older.  This age group does not actively engage in financial 
activities.  While eight out of ten of most minority groups in the United Kingdom have accounts 
with financial institutions – compared with nine out of ten persons of the majority population - 
only two-thirds of those of Pakistani origin and just over half of those of Bangladeshi origin do.  
Research has attributed these statistics to Muslims’ beliefs in abstaining from interest-based 
financial transactions, even though British Muslim respondents often argue that interest-based 
activities are permissible with respect to loans and non-essential consumption.672  Recall that 
some modern Muslim thinkers argued that the prohibition of ribā applied solely to the essential 
commodities of daily life whereas loans with interest for purposes of production and wealth 
creation should escape the prohibition.673  
 
Research suggests that this group may be divided into three market segments: First, those for 
whom Islamic financial products are the only option of which they would avail themselves.  Only 
four per cent are considered under this “staunch demand” category.  The second category 
comprises those who might choose sharia-compliant products, if they were widely available and 
competitive.  This group is believed to constitute a further twenty-one per cent of the population.  
Finally, those who will continue to use conventional products irrespective of whether Islamic 
products are widely available constitute seventy-five per cent of the British Muslim population.674 
                                               
672 Meadows, "Access” (2000), 17.  Other, less often cited reasons for doing so relate to the classical 
differentiation between dar al-harb (abode of war) and dar al-Islam (abode of peace).  Some classical 
jurists argued that interest could be accepted from infidels in the dar al-harb, i.e. non-Muslim territories. 
673 See, for example, Rahman, "Ribā ” (1964) in s 4.3.   
674 NS&I, "Review” (2008), 3. 
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Therefore, the short-term demand for retail sharia-compatible products looks to be relatively 
low, and indeed, their acquisition has thus far been limited.675  
 
However, government consultations with industry practitioners and consultants on the 
development of Islamic financial products suggests that very significant medium to long term 
demand for such products exists in the domestic market,676 particularly if the UK were to issue a 
sovereign sukuk (Islamic bond) and thus help to establish a secondary market and other key 
economic benchmarks which would facilitate the industry.   In particular, a sukuk issuance 
would help generate a wider range of retail financial products which thus far have remained 
quite limited.677  In the short term the “exchequer effect” – the inflow of tax revenues to the 
treasury – is negligible, while the government sees long term inflows as potentially significant678 
as a result of the greater diversity and quality of Islamic products.  In sum, the government 
foresees a thriving and competitive Islamic financial industry – both retail and wholesale – as 
benefitting London as a leading financial centre and generating “further investment, jobs and tax 
revenues in the UK economy”.679  
 
                                               
675 MCB, “Consultation” (2008), 5.; Amin, "Retail” (2010). 
676 HMRC, "Assessment: Sukuk”  (2008), 5. 
677 MCB, “Consultation” (2008), 5. 
678 HMRC , "Assessment:Sukuk” (2008), 5. 
679 Ibid. 
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Financial accommodation may help to incorporate unregulated Islamic financial activities whose 
market participants are otherwise deprived of regulatory and consumer protections680 and 
whose financial activities undermine the state’s fiscal and monetary policies.  Some minority 
groups have traditionally sought financial advice, borrowing and lending within the community 
on the basis of recommendations and kinship networks.  In effect, informal credit unions have 
been established in many areas housing large minority communities.681  For example, research 
concerning ḥawālah682 money transfer systems highlights a complex web of global traders 
whose ability to transfer money to the far reaches of the globe undercuts the nation-state’s 
ability to keep tabs on its citizens’ monetary activities.683  Ḥawālah (transfer in Arabic), refers to 
informal swap arrangements that facilitate financial transfers that leave no audit trails for 
subsequent regulatory scrutiny.  Operated from unlicensed and unregistered storefronts in 
Western Europe and North America, workers use ḥawālah to transfer remittances to all manner 
of locations throughout Asia and the Middle East.684 Such informal Islamic commercial 
transactions reflect the limits of state law as these are weakened by the allegiance of subjects to 
competing legal norms.685  In co-opting informal Islamic financial practices Muslim minorities 
may feel that they should and can conform their behaviour to the requirements of state law.  The 
government stands a greater likelihood of compelling compliance amongst minority Muslim 
                                               
680 HMRC, "Assessment:Stamp Duty” (2009), 5. 
681 Meadows, "Access” (2000), 17. 
682 For an account of the classical sharia concerning ḥawālah see Ray, "Medieval” (2007). 
683 See Ballard, "Reciprocity” (2005), 321. 
684 Ibid., 320-21. 
685 Allot, “Limits” (1980), 148; Menski, “Comparative Law” (2006). 
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populations by bringing previously informal transactions under legal auspices into the regulatory 
light. 
 
6.1.2  THE INCLUSION OF THE SHARIA IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
There may be some public antipathy to the adoption of Islamic financial structures within the UK 
legal system.  In a public response to a government consultation regarding the issuance of 
sukuk in June 2008 a number of respondents “believed that it was inappropriate for the 
government to issue sukuk or to take any action which could result in the incorporation of the 
sharia law into English law”. 686 This may arise, in part, due to uncertainties surrounding the 
issue of sharia compliance. Respondents suggested that disclaimers may be required so as to 
shield the government from claims that it engaged in marketing non-sharia-compliant products.  
Respondents rightfully observed that the government’s facilitation of Islamic financial structures 
within English law forced it to adopt “valid” interpretations of sharia-compatible structures.  The 
government concedes that “it has not yet decided its preferred way to ensure the sharia 
compliance of sukuk issuance”,687 which indicates that the legal ramifications resulting from its 
policies towards the industry are not yet known. 
 
More generally, the facilitation of the sharia within English law adds oil to the fire of a raging 
debate in Europe concerning the public role of Islam and the compatibility of Islamic principles 
                                               
686 Treasury, "Sukuk Issuance: Response” (2008), 39. 
687 Ibid. 
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and values within a largely secular social environment.  In February 2008 the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, delivered a speech in which he addressed the existence of 
minority communities within the United Kingdom which subscribe to normative systems other 
than the English legal system alone.688  Dr Williams examined whether space could be allowed 
alongside the secular law of the state for the legal norms and rules of faith groups.  The most 
frequently raised objection to the recognition of supplementary jurisdiction in particular areas of 
the law, especially family law, concerns whether it may have the effect of reinforcing retrograde 
or regressive practices within ethnic minority communities.  In particular, the treatment of 
women is a particular concern.  Dr Williams acknowledged this concern by laying out a general 
framework of how faith-based legal practices could be accommodated.  He stated that were 
"any kind of plural jurisdiction ... recognised, it would presumably have to be under the rubric 
that no 'supplementary' jurisdiction could have the power to deny access to the rights granted to 
other citizens [regardless of faith affiliation], or to punish its members for claiming those 
rights”.689   He stressed the importance of working to overcome the ultimatum that ethnic 
minorities have to choose between their culture or their rights.690  The role and rule of law in a 
pluralistic society must be reconsidered.  A society that is ethnically, culturally and religiously 
diverse and in which identity is formed within different “contexts of belonging” must not be 
subject to a “universal/abstract dimension of social existence”.691 Instead the role and rule of law 
should be premised upon establishing a space for “everyone in which it is possible to affirm and 
                                               
688 See Williams, “Lecture” (2008), 262. 
689 Ibid., 268. 
690 Ibid., 270. 
691 Ibid., 271 
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defend a commitment to human dignity”.692 It may be possible to accommodate “certain carefully 
specified matters” such as Islamic finance or aspects of law that achieves this objective.693 
 
The Archbishop presciently stressed that manifold anxieties had arisen in the context of the 
discussion; an analysis that was confirmed in the vociferous response to the Archbishop’s 
erudite presentation.  The Archbishop noted that social anxiety had arisen, in part, as a result of 
sensational reporting on particular Muslim communities who wish to live according to the sharia.  
He highlighted the fact that most people perceive the sharia as repressive towards women and 
archaic and brutal in its physical punishments for crimes that no longer exist in the modern 
world.694   The Muslim scholar, Tariq Ramadan, voiced the unspoken when he wrote: “In the 
West the idea of sharia calls up all the darkest images of Islam […] It has reached the extent 
that many Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to refer to the concept for fear of frightening 
people or arousing suspicion of all their work by the mere mention of the word”.695  Moreover, 
the sharia’s fourteen hundred year history has been besmirched by global jihadists who invoke 
Islamic texts as a justification for terrorist attacks around the world, most notably in the attacks 
of 11 September 2001 and the London underground and bus attacks of 7 July 2005.  Sectarian 
killings in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan have repeated this trend and strengthened the 
perception that Islam is hostile to the democratic values of the West.  A general wariness toward 
Islam pervades the Western social consciousness, and increasingly morphs into outright 
                                               
692 Ibid., 272. 
693 Ibid, 274. 
694 Ibid, 263. 
695 Ramadan, “Western Muslims”  (2004), 31. C.f. Williams, “Lecture”, 263. 
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Islamophobic denunciations.696  It is therefore plain that the ongoing debate concerning the 
multicultural society in the United Kingdom is also a debate about the role of Islam in public life.   
 
Arguably, the world of finance has generally been viewed as a less delicate terrain in which to 
address issues of multicultural accommodation; indeed, commercial law is seen as less 
impermeable to outside influences and transplants.  The national ethos of commercial law is 
less determinant with respect to a country’s legal culture.697  This characteristic of commercial 
law is evident in its emphasis on the importance of the economic substance of transactions – 
the so-called “real” activity that can be “objectively” observed, whereas other areas of law are 
normatively conceived with respect to a society’s values and culture.  Culture apparently plays 
only a small role in this “extra-cultural” analysis.698 Globalisation assumes that commercial 
activity, in particular, converges toward cultural homogeneity and thus culture is regarded as 
superfluous.  However, business and financial activities are, to an extent, just as much a 
reflection of local and national culture as any other area of human endeavour.699   
 
                                               
696 The examples are numerous.  Consider legislation across Europe to forbid the wearing of the niqab or 
head covering that conceals the face.  France is the most prominent example.  See Loi No. 2010-1192 du 
11 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public(1). In the United States the 
Qur’an has been publicly burned and the building of mosques unduly criticised, and so forth. 
697 Santos, “Sense”  (1995), 213. 
698 Leff, "Economic Analysis”  (1974), 464. For a slightly different analysis see examples of the economic 
analysis of the law. Posner and Parisi, "Wealth” (1985); Eric A. Posner, “Law”  (2001); Richard A. Posner, 
"Law and Economics” (1997). 
699 Foster, “Comparative Commercial Law” (2007), in passim. 
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The larger objective of furthering the development of an Islamic financial hub could be very 
profitable.  The commercial benefits of continuing to lure Middle Eastern capital to the UK are 
potentially very significant and the social advantages of creating an inclusive financial system 
are many.700  Even better, relatively few legislative amendments are necessary for facilitating 
the industry and these are neither overly burdensome nor expensive.701  A series of regulatory 
impact statements regarding proposed tax amendments to facilitate the issuance of commercial 
sukuk reveal that the associated costs are negligible.702  Furthermore, despite the Great 
Recession of 2008 and the Eurozone crisis, finance remains a rather technical specialisation 
whose complexities are not easily understood and do not command the attention of the general 
populace.703  In particular, the general public is still largely unaware of the government’s role in 
facilitating Islamic finance in the UK.704   
 
The cultural and values-dominated debate concerning the inclusion of sharia in English law has 
not featured prominently in the facilitation of Islamic finance.   
The following section is concerned with the legislative and regulatory approach that the UK 
government has taken toward Islamic finance.  
                                               
700 Islamic financing was central to the Clifford Chance-assisted £1.25 billion acquisition and funding of 
the Chelsea Barracks site.  It also plays a role in the construction of commercial real estate projects such 
as the Shard – at 280 metres the tallest building in the UK. Furthermore, real estate buyers from the Arab 
world continue to invest in London properties – particularly after the Arab Spring (2011) – and Islamic 
finance is considered a suitable vehicle for doing so.  See Hammond, "Horizon” (2011). 
701 HMRC , "Assessment: Stamp Duty” (2009), 2. 
702 HMRC, "Assessment: Sukuk”, 2:5. 
703 Lanchester, “Whoops” (2010), xv. 
704 Treasury, “Development” (2008), 21. 
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6.2  THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY APPROACH TO ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
 
The UK government characterises its uniform legislative and regulatory approach to Islamic 
finance as fair and consistent, rooted in the belief that no financial system deserves special 
treatment to the detriment of others.  It states unequivocally that “all financial institutions 
authorised by the FSA and operating in the UK, or seeking to do so, are subject to the same 
standards.  This is true regardless of their country of origin, the sectors in which they wish to 
specialise, or their religious principles”.705 In essence, the government espouses a religiously 
“neutral” position predicated on the establishment of a “level playing field” for Islamic finance 
that is not distorted by tax and regulatory law originally conceived for the conventional, interest-
based system.706  As a result, since 2003 all legislative amendments to acts of parliament 
including both finance and regulatory provisions refer to “alternative financial instruments” when 
referring to general Islamic financial products and “alternative investment bonds” when referring 
to Islamic bonds; so that the religiously descriptive “Islamic investments” is replaced with the 
ideologically neutral “alternative financial instruments”.  These usages are in line with a 
universalistic approach to the law which emphasises the equal dignity of citizens and refrains 
from taking legislative positions on particular religious, cultural or value-embedded norms of 
minority populations.   
 
                                               
705 Ainley et al., “Islamic Finance” (2007), 11. 
706 Treasury, “Development” (2008), 13. 
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Indeed, the government states unequivocally that “legislation will not be tied to the Quran or the 
Islamic faith, but rather uses intrinsic features of the underlying contracts under UK law to define 
transactions to which the rules will apply”.707 However, as will be made evident, sharia principles 
and rules have been implemented using English law.  So while the state does not take 
responsibility for the religious interpretation of the transactions it facilitates, legislation 
necessarily does have a connection to the Quran and Islamic law.  Furthermore, the state has 
facilitated certain Islamic financial contracts which reflect a specific understanding of Islamic 
commercial law.  The state has not taken any direct action in determining the religious meaning 
of these structures, but it has willingly accepted others’ interpretation of what the sharia 
constitutes (one of many) in financial dealings.  Yet this does not concern the state because its 
sees its role as a facilitator of these transactions.  It is prevented by the terms that underlie its 
legitimacy and existence from dictating the preferences or wants of its citizens.   
 
The following section examines how this approach guides the legislative implementation of 
Islamic financial transactions. The treatment of tax issues in this thesis is limited to the most 
important principles necessary to facilitate Islamic financial transactions.  A complete analysis of 
tax issues will not be pursued in this thesis. 
 
 
                                               
707 Treasury, "Alternative” (2007), 6. 
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6.3 THE LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
 
The government highlights several critical barriers to industry development in which it aims to 
focus its attention: namely, (1) taxation and regulation; (2) standardisation; (3) industry 
awareness; and (4) the development of industry-related skills.708  In practice, the government’s 
focus has principally centred on amending tax measures so as to accommodate Islamic 
financial structures within the UK’s complex tax regime.  It has enacted very few regulatory 
measures as such an approach would indicate differential regulatory treatment.  Moreover, its 
efforts toward legal standardisation are relatively minimal insofar as the government does not 
see its role in determining valid sharia structures.  Finally, the government has expended some 
effort in establishing industry awareness and related training programmes.709   
 
In terms of taxation and regulation, the government, quite crucially, has adopted the principle 
that treatment should follow the economic substance of transactions rather than the legal 
form.710  This is particularly important since it enables Islamic financial products to be 
implemented competitively within the conventional tax regime.  If Islamic financial transactions 
were taxed according to their legal structure in such a regime, they would receive less 
favourable tax treatment as a result of their multi-tiered architectures.  The economic substance 
                                               
708 Treasury, “Development” (2008), 15. 
709 Secretariat, “Background” (2011). 
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approach results in Islamic financial products being treated on the same basis as equivalent 
interest-bearing financial products; ordinary tax rules should apply where possible; and rules 
that foster undesirable or unpredictable results should be amended.711  
 
For tax purposes, Islamic financial products are categorised in two types of returns; namely, 
alternative finance returns and profit share returns.  Both types are treated equivalently for 
corporation tax purposes in that they describe “amounts paid or received” that are, in substance, 
equivalent to interest.712   
 
In light of these objectives the government, in conjunction with industry and through the joint HM 
Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs Tax Technical Group, initially set out to deal with 
alternative property financing, known in the industry as Islamic home mortgage purchase plans 
(HPPs).  To this effect, stamp duty land tax (SDLT) was amended for alternative finance 
arrangements in the Finance Act 2003.713 Stamp duty land tax is a real estate transfer tax that 
falls due on real estate purchases at varying rates.  After the March 2010 Budget a maximum 
rate of 5 per cent can be levied.714  A purchaser of real estate pays SDLT on the entire purchase 
price of the property.  No further payment of SDLT is required with repayment of the loan.715  
Popular nominate contracts used in real estate financing such as the murābaḥah and the 
                                               
711 Ibid. 
712 HMRC, "Stamp Duty” (2008), 22. 
713 Finance Act 2003, ss 72-73. 
714 DirectGov, “Budget” (2011). 
715 Amin, "Policy” (2010).   
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diminishing mushārakah  each entail the transfer of property in at least two instances: once 
when the IFI purchases the asset and again, when the IFI sells the asset to the client buyer.  In 
each transaction SDLT would be payable twice, making such transactions considerably more 
expensive.   
 
The law was amended so that contracting parties’ acquisition of a chargeable interest or 
property acquisition would not be taxed multiple times.716  By removing this obstacle Islamic 
financial institutions were able to offer the murābaḥah or the tawarruq. These contracts, whose 
returns equate in economic substance with a loan, would be taxed as if they were loans.717   
 
SDLT provisions were extended in 2005 to equity sharing arrangements such as the 
muḍārabah.  Alternative finance returns resulting from the transaction were treated as interest 
payable on a loan.718 Thus Islamic financial institutions could introduce deposit arrangements 
based on the muḍārabah contract that had previously treated muḍārabah profits as dividends.719   
 
Recall that the muḍārabah is an investment partnership which, if successful, generates a profit 
from the investment.  The Income and Corporations Taxes Act 1988 (ICTA), had long prevented 
                                               
716 Finance Act 2003, sec 72, 73. 
717 Treasury, “Development” (2008), 16. 
718 Finance Act 2005, pt 2, ch 5. 
719 Treasury, “Development” (2008), 16. However, the muḍārabah-like contract IFIs offer on the deposit-
taking, liabilities side of their balance sheet differs considerably from the classical principles of the 
contract. 
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companies from disguising equity finance in the form of debt so as “to obtain tax relief for 
payments that are economically equivalent to dividends to risk bearing shareholders.720  ICTA 
1988 s 209 (2)(e)(iii) defines a distribution as:  
(e) any interest or other distribution out of assets of the company in respect of securities 
of the company (except so much, if any, of any such distribution as represents the 
principal thereby secured and except so much of any distribution as falls within 
paragraph (d) above), where the securities are— 
(iii) securities under which the consideration given by the company for the use of the 
principal secured is to any extent dependent on the results of the company’s business or 
any part of it;  
 
Under section 209 (2)(e)(iii) any profits generated from the transaction would be treated as a 
distribution and subjected to corporation taxes. The profit share would not be tax deductible by 
the IFI,721 which would make these transactions uncompetitive.   The government solved this 
problem by amending Finance Act 2005, section 54, which excluded the muḍārabah from 1988 
s. 209 (2)(e)(iii):722   
Profit share return is not to be treated by virtue of section 209(2)(e)(iii) of ICTA as being 
a distribution for the purposes of the Corporation Tax Acts. 
 
Therefore, for the purposes of Finance Act 2005, the muḍārabah is treated as a loan 
relationship.723  Of course, the theoretical muḍārabah should not be transacted as a loan 
relationship as this implies a fixed interest return. Yet if the contract is to be practiced as set out 
                                               
720 ICTA, s 209 (2)(e)(iii). Amin, "Policy" (2010). 
721 Ibid. 
722 Finance Act 2005. 
723 Deringer, "Alternative” (2008).  
267 
 
in classical texts its profits should be treated as dividends and taxed accordingly.  Otherwise, 
conventional equity investments would not benefit from the same exclusions. The fact is, 
however, that the industry does not practice the muḍārabah in conformity with the sharia, and 
hence Finance Act 2005 has carved out an alternative loan relationship,724 that treats its 
dividends as interest. Chapter eight examines the regulatory rationales for treating it in this 
manner.    
 
Further relief was carved out for shared ownership products such as the diminishing 
mushārakah (a form of progressively diminishing shared ownership in which the borrower 
gradually acquires the lender’s share in the asset), by giving it SDLT relief.  Moreover, the 
existing ijārah wa iqtinā’ (lease based mortgage) received relief, effective in Scotland.  Finally in 
2005, sharia-compliant child trust funds were regulated so that providers could enter the market 
competitively.725   
 
The Finance Act 2006 enabled the introduction of the wakālah or profit share agency whereby 
an investor appoints an agent to manage an invested sum of money and is entitled to a return 
that is equated, in substance, as interest.726  Further modifications in 2006 included the 
introduction of legislation enabling the use of ijārah wa iqtinā’ in asset finance; HM Revenues & 
Customs allowed the use of diminishing mushārakah as a standard loan; SDLT relief was 
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extended to companies, trusts, charities and partnerships seeking Islamic products (it was 
previously was only available to individuals); and secondary legislation empowered the FSA to 
regulate Islamic Home Purchase Plans (HPPs).727  Alternative property finance relief is only 
available where the “first transaction” is one in which any of the reliefs under schedule 7, paras 
1-13 of the Finance Act 2003 apply, e.g. group, reconstruction and acquisition reliefs.  This 
requirement ensures that only one relief can be claimed in an effort to stem tax avoidance.728 
 
6.4  IFIS AND LIQUIDITY RISKS  
 
Section 6.4 is concerned with wholesale money markets.  In particular, it examines the way in 
which sovereign sukuk issuance would help to alleviate Islamic finance’s liquidity risks.   
 
The London Stock Exchange has emerged as a global centre for the issuance of sukuk.  By 
2010 the exchange had listed 34 sukuk issues with a value just under $19.9 billion, more than 
any other global exchange.729  However, the government would like to develop the market 
further inasmuch as it sees the potential benefits of sukuk issuance flowing to the City of 
London and to the wider community.  In particular, sovereign sukuk issuance would enhance 
                                               
727 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2006, SI 
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. HMRC, “Stamp Duty” (2008), 7. 
728 Natalie Schoon, “Islamic Banking”  (2009), 157. 
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the City of London’s ability to attract further commercial sukuk structuring activity and, more 
generally, business activity related to the Islamic financial industry.  
 
In addition, the government launched a feasibility study on the issuance of sovereign sukuk in 
April 2007 to examine the benefits and costs of whether the UK government should become an 
issuer of wholesale sterling Islamic financial instruments, and to consider the legal implications 
of doing so.730   It is believed that a UK sovereign sukuk issuance could potentially facilitate the 
development of a greater range of sharia-compliant retail financial products such as Islamic 
individual savings accounts (ISAs), other savings accounts and capital guaranteed investment 
products.  This has the potential of including those in financial markets who would otherwise 
refrain from investing in the conventional financial system.731   
 
Market participants are concerned about liquidity risks as several sharia prohibitions, such as 
the prohibition of trading in debts (bay‘ al-dayn), restricts banks’ ability to generate liquidity 
rapidly.732  Most conventional institutions repackage and sell off their loans and thus retain 
relatively accessible deposits of liquidity.  This process – the negotiability of claims – enables 
parties to trade loans and other contingent claims.  Negotiability is not only the defining 
characteristic of a capital market, it dramatically enhances the power of financial technology.733  
                                               
730 See Treasury, "Sukuk Issuance: Consultation” (2007). 
731 Ibid., 8. For the general reasons behind sovereign bond issuances, see Fry, “Government Debt”  
(1997). 
732 Abdullah, “Liquidity” (2010), 13. 
733 Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst, "Innovations” (2005), 7. 
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Islamic law’s prohibition of the sale of debts means that this financial innovation is largely 
outside its reach.  The resulting dearth of Islamic financial instruments has prevented Islamic 
banks from quickly raising funds from money markets.   
 
The underdevelopment of cross-border Islamic inter-bank money markets or Lender of Last 
Resort (LLR) facilities to which IFIs could turn for short-term loans that do not engage in 
interest-based financing compounds this problem.734  The inter-bank market is a wholesale 
market in which banks lend surplus funds or borrow from each other when their reserves are 
low.  Loans are normally for very short periods (from overnight to fourteen days) although some 
institutions lend for three, six and one year terms.735 The current inadequacy of cross-border 
Islamic liquidity markets negatively affects IFIs’ ability to manage their liquidity and risk 
management requirements.736  Instead Islamic Interbank lending arrangements generally 
originate from bespoke financing rather than capital market structures, although some central 
banks including those of Malaysia, the UAE and Indonesia have established Islamic interbank 
platforms.737  For example, in February 2002 the governments of Bahrain, the United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait established the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC) in an 
effort to establish an active and geographically expansive Islamic interbank market.  Each 
                                               
734 Chapra and Khan, "Regulation” (2000), 32. 
735 In London the rate of interest paid on interbank loans is known the London InterBank Offer Rate or 
LIBOR.  LIBOR is an important reference for banks since it indicates the cost of raising immediate surplus 
funds.  See Howells and Bain, “Financial Markets”  (2007), 129-30. 
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country’s twenty-five per cent equity stake is designed to help financial institutions address 
liquidity mismatches through the issuance of short and medium term liquid investments. 738 
Further, the central bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia, operates a commodity 
murābaḥah programme based in large part on the bay‘ al-‘inah contract.  However, the bay‘ al-
‘inah is repudiated by most schools of law, which highlights the challenge in creating globally 
accepted and standardised products that have an appreciable effect on markets outside of 
Malaysia.739 
 
These problems have resulted in cumbersome settlement and operational procedures as well 
and a limited supply of short-term money market instruments.740  A number of institutions offer 
overnight murābaḥah structures on an accommodation basis, but there is no Islamic institutional 
arrangement equivalent to the conventional inter-bank market.741 Another difficulty in creating a 
sharia-compliant overnight product consists in developing the right risk/yield profile.  A number 
of products have been launched but subsequently withdrawn despite a huge demand for the 
facility.742  Thus the potential market for overnight products is large and will likely prove to be a 
watershed in the development of the industry. 
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Moreover, the dependence on bilateral arrangements for the deployment of interbank liquidity 
has empowered the institutions able to accommodate such instruments.  The small cadre of 
institutions which dominate overnight lending has slowed the development of standardised 
products and systems that otherwise remain ad hoc and variable across regions.  Despite the 
fact that the Islamic financial industry needs a centralised interbank liquidity programme, the 
difficulty resides in locating sufficient numbers of founder participants who are willing to invest in 
and support its development – a task which has not been easy.743   
 
As a result, the commodity murābaḥah is the preferred structure for interbank lending across 
most jurisdictions.744 Known in practitioner circles as the “murābaḥah syndrome”, the allocation 
of liquidity has been dominated by the murābaḥah. Reviews of audited financial statements 
reveal that more than 65 per cent – 80 per cent according to many estimates – of banks’ 
balance sheets is allocated to this type of investment.745  Yet a number of fixed costs associated 
with transacting in murābaḥah make short-term investment in these instruments expensive.  UK 
Market observers argue that a ‘bill-like’ sukuk – a sukuk with a shorter maturity – would lower 
transaction costs so that Islamic banks could address their liquidity and reserve requirements 
more cost-effectively.746  Most issuances offer maturities of three, five and ten years and thus do 
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not solve IFIs’ requirements for alternative money market-like instruments with considerably 
shorter maturities.747  
 
6.5  SOVEREIGN SUKUK ISSUANCE 
 
In the UK no institutionalised interbank lending arrangements are available for IFIs that do not 
involve interest. The issuance of short-dated sovereign sukuk similar to Treasury bills would 
help alleviate short-term liquidity pressures.748  The characteristic mismatch between the long 
term maturities of originated loans (via partnership or other investment contracts), and short 
term financing derived from retail bank deposits, which are available on demand, has limited 
IFIs long-term investments. The result is a situation characterised by either a surplus of cash in 
need of investment or a shortage of cash to meet liabilities.749 Long-term investments are 
generally less liquid, but more profitable; whereas short-term investments are less profitable, but 
more liquid.  Banks have generally shied away from making investments in partnerships, in part, 
due to short-term liquidity concerns, but primarily due to an aversion to commercial risk in 
preference for less risky modes of short- and medium-term structures such as ijārah and 
murābaḥah.750  Islamic banks would gain an essential tool in managing their extension of 
credit.751 
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UK sovereign issuance may also encourage other Western sovereign and corporate issuers to 
access Islamic financial markets due to the framework it would establish.  A UK issuance may 
act as a risk-free benchmark to facilitate the pricing of other issues in the Islamic financial 
market.  Indeed, a liquid benchmark reference may provide a pricing reference for other sukuk 
issuances, and thereby avoid the need for benchmarking against an interest-based product, as 
is the case with the frequent use of LIBOR.  Importantly, it would increase secondary market 
liquidity in the sukuk market752 with important results for the types of financial instruments 
Islamic financial institutions must necessarily offer so as to remain commercially viable.  Finally, 
sovereign sukuk issuance may provide a catalyst for the development of Islamic pensions and 
insurance (takaful) due to the degree of certainty with respect to a bank’s cash flows that 
issuance may provide. 
 
Moreover, sovereign sukuk issuance would assist Islamic financial institutions in meeting their 
capital reserve requirements by generating liquid structures which are tradable in secondary 
markets.  Thus issuance would also help to strengthen the balance sheet of UK Islamic financial 
institutions by providing AAA-rated sterling denominated assets for investment, which qualify as 
a claim on a central government according to Basel II.753   
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Basel II leads banks to use instruments with a nil or low regulatory capital, which highly rated 
liquid investments such as ‘bill-like’ sukuk would offer as opposed to less highly rated (riskier), 
less liquid murābaḥah.754  Hence, the ability to invest reserve requirements in government sukuk 
would provide IFIs with a much needed liquidity instrument and simultaneously reduce capital 
costs.      
 
Islamic investors would also benefit from the diversification of investment opportunities that a 
sovereign sukuk issuance affords. The UK government’s consultations and legislative 
implementations are designed to create a legal path toward plain vanilla sukuk al ijārah755 
offerings whereas other structures could be introduced over time. Past sukuk issuances have 
been relatively limited in structural diversity.  Murābaḥah sukuk have generally been issued in 
Malaysia while GCC states have preferred mushārakah sukuk.  The expansion of sukuk 
issuance beyond these regional centres would improve the asset risk exposure of investors.  
Furthermore, the lion’s share of sukuk issuances are denominated in US dollars or in local 
currencies, so an issuance in sterling would diversify the existing currency spectrum and 
provide opportunities for implicit foreign exchange hedges enabling financial institutions to 
manage exchange rate risk more efficiently.756  
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In June 2008 the government issued a report entitled, “Government Sterling Sukuk Issuance: A 
Response to the Consultation” which described several negative factors affecting the decision to 
issue sovereign sukuk.757 A number of points were made, including concerns whether issuance 
could be more costly than conventional issuance, either as a result of up-front structuring costs, 
or because investors could charge a premium to invest in sukuk.  Demand for AAA-rated 
sterling denominated sukuk issuance is completely untested and may prove to be limited as a 
result of currency preferences and/or the relatively low yield investors could extract from such 
investments.  Furthermore, the potential for differential pricing between ‘bond-like’ sukuk and 
gilts is likely due to the lower liquidity in ‘bond-like’ sukuk secondary markets.   Sukuk holders 
tend to buy and hold their investment certificate, thus minimising their liquid enhancing 
quality.758  And the issuance of bond-like sukuk rather than ‘bill-like’ sukuk (with considerably 
shorter maturities) creates a price risk due to the importance placed on liquidity of longer-dated 
instruments.759  The success of a sukuk issuance is usually measured by the pricing and 
distribution achieved.  Issuances priced at substantially higher levels than conventional 
equivalents of similar credit quality are generally unattractive to investors.760  
 
Moreover, some respondents argued that ‘bond-like’ sukuk issuance could fragment sovereign 
debt issuance to the detriment of the gilt market and lead to overall increased costs.  
Interestingly, a large number of respondents felt that Middle Eastern investors would not be 
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interested in ‘bond-like’ sukuk, as Islamic banks in the region have relatively high funding costs 
which may make UK sovereign issuance priced at, or close to, gilts, less attractive.  However, 
existing gilt investors, as well as UK-based Islamic banks and overseas central banks, were 
thought likely to take an interest in a ‘bond-like’ issuance.761 In addition to pricing risks, 
respondents noted that the sharia risk associated with the structuring of sukuk issuance could 
potentially affect whether sukuk issuance is acceptable to a broad range of investors due to the 
lack of standardisation in the market.  Moreover, the emerging standardisation of sharia-
compliant products raises questions as to whether a sukuk issuance, once deemed sharia-
compliant, may subsequently be found to fall outside of the standard,762 a critical issue that 
resurfaces across the range of Islamic financial contracts.  
 
Liquidity risks associated with a lack of institutional inter-bank lending arrangements present 
unique challenges to the industry that sovereign sukuk issuance may help to ameliorate.  
Section 6.5 examines UK legislative and regulatory measures designed to facilitate commercial 
sukuk issuance. 
 
6.6  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMERCIAL SUKUK 
 
In 2007 the government’s policy of developing the Islamic financial industry was extended to 
commercial sukuk issuance.  The target market for commercial sukuk is directed towards high 
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net worth individuals, largely from the Muslim world, and corporate investors.  The government 
felt that some interest could be generated amongst sovereign wealth funds and Western 
investors as these entities may require relatively secure investments as part of their portfolio 
management.763  Furthermore, because Islamic financial institutions are unable to raise finance 
via traditional securities markets, the ability to issue sukuk in the UK would assure them of 
much-needed wholesale funding.  Reports indicate that up to 26.2 per cent of global issuance is 
undertaken by Islamic financial institutions.764  Therefore, the Treasury and HMRC set out to 
establish a transparent tax structure for commercial sukuk structures in the 2007 Finance Act 
which would provide tax certainty for all interested parties.   
 
Before 2007, sukuk received a more onerous tax treatment than conventional debt securities.  
Sukuk were taxed according to the underlying legal form of the transaction which had to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.  The ad hoc nature of these arrangements placed issuers 
and thus investors at a competitive disadvantage relative to conventional equivalents.  The 
complete absence of commercial sukuk issuance restricted the funding available to Islamic 
financial institutions and accordingly affected Muslim consumers and businesses from 
accessing sukuk funds.765  Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of sukuk 
threatened the UK’s objective of creating a leading Islamic financial centre. 
 
                                               
763 HMRC, “Stamp Duty” (2008), 14. 
764 FSA & Treasury, "Consultation (Sukuk)” (2008), 22. 
765 Treasury, "Alternative” (2007), 4. 
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The government announced a specific tax regime for sukuk in the 2007 Budget.  In Finance Act 
2007 section 53 retrogressively introduces an alternative finance investment bond in sections 48 
(A) and 48 (B) of Finance Act 2005.766  Section 48 introduces a number of conditions to be 
satisfied for an investment product to be treated as an “alternative finance investment bond” and 
any ‘interest-like’ payments made or received from the bonds are treated as an alternative 
finance return.  Section 48(A)(1)(d)(ii) requires the bond-issuer:767  
(ii) to make a repayment of the capital (“the redemption payment”) to the bond-
holder during or at the end of the bond-term (whether or not in installments), and 
(iii) to pay to the bond-holder other payments on one or more occasions during or at 
the end of the bond term (“additional payments”) 
In s 48(A)(d)(ii) the Act requires some sort of purchase undertaking in the agreement, with the 
attendant implications for true sale criteria, but there is no requirement that assets are 
repurchased at par value.  
 
Section 48A(2)(h) provides that:  
(h) the amount of the redemption payment may (but need not) be subject to 
reduction in the event of a fall in the value of the bond assets or in the rate of 
income generated by them 
 
Furthermore, with reference to (iii) section 48A(2)(f) provides that additional payments may be:  
 
(i) fixed at the beginning of the bond term, 
(ii) determined wholly or partly by reference to the value of or income generated by 
the bond assets, or 
                                               
766 Finance Act 2007, s 53. 
767 Ibid. 
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(iii) determined in some other way. 
 
Therefore, the legislation takes into account the asset-based nature of sukuk and allows income 
to be generated from bond assets, although this can be complemented by other sources. 
 
A further set of conditions demonstrates the government’s tax treatment of sukuk as a debt 
instrument.  Section 48(B)(2) provides that:768  
(a) a bond-holder shall not be treated as having a legal or beneficial interest in the 
bond assets, 
(b) the bond-issuer shall not be treated as a trustee of the bond assets, 
(c) profits and gains accruing to the bond-issuer in connection with the bond assets 
are profits and gains of the bond-issuer and not of the bond-holder (and do not 
arise to the bond-issuer in a fiduciary or representative capacity), 
(d) payments made by the bond-issuer by way of redemption payment or additional 
payment are not made in a fiduciary or representative capacity, and 
(e) a bond-holder shall not be entitled to relief for capital expenditure in connection 
with bond assets. 
 
As will be readily apparent from the earlier examination of sukuk in chapter five, the tax 
treatment of alternative finance investment bonds (AFIBs) necessarily differs markedly from 
their contractual principles.  In (a) the bond holder is not treated as having a legal or beneficial 
interest in the underlying assets; in (b) the bond issuer (usually an SPV) is not to be treated as a 
trustee; and in (c) profits are not to be attributed to bond holders, which would otherwise 
indicate their proportionate legal ownership of the assets (thus requiring taxation).  In (d) any 
payments made to bond holders are not done in a fiduciary capacity, thus preventing an 
                                               
768 Ibid., s 48B(2). 
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ownership scenario from arising; and in (e) bond holders, as non-owners of the asset(s) are not 
entitled to capital expenditure relief.    
 
From the originator’s perspective, sukuk are treated as a loan or debt-relationship and tax rules 
for corporate debt apply.  Despite the sukuk’s equity-like features – or underlying assets – the 
government treats it as an interest-generating debt instrument.769  For purposes of corporation 
tax, sukuk are taxed according to the rules on loan relationships; for income tax purposes, 
sukuk returns are treated as if they were interest; and for purposes of capital gains tax, sukuk 
are taxed as qualifying corporate bonds and are exempt from tax if they meet equivalent 
conditions.770  This potentially makes sukuk tax-deductible and issuers (not note holders) are 
taxed as if they beneficially owned the assets, which entitles issuers to any capital allowances 
or tax depreciations for which the assets qualify.771  With these measures AFIBs were given tax 
certainty with respect to income and corporation taxes, capital allowances, inheritance tax and 
capital gains.772  However, stamp duty land tax (SDLT) was not covered in the legislation so that 
tax inequalities remained. 
 
Moreover, because sukuk often involve the creation of a trust and are thus treated as a 
collective investment scheme (CIS) under FSMA 2000,773 the legislation excludes AFIBs from 
                                               
769 Amin, "Tax Law” (2008), 3. 
770 Treasury, “Sukuk Issuance: Response” (2008), 35. 
771 Amin, "Tax Law” (2008), . 
772 Treasury, “Alternative” (2007),  10. 
773 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, pt XVII. 
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tax provisions relevant to trusts or collective investment schemes.774  In particular, Finance Act 
2005 section 48(B)(5) “ensures that alternative finance investment bonds are not treated as a 
unit trust scheme either for the purposes of the Income and Corporation Tax Act 1988/s469 or 
the Income Tax Act 2007/s1007 or the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992”.  Nor are they 
treated as an offshore fund.  Further, with respect to companies, they are not classified as a 
““relevant holding” in a unit trust or offshore fund for loan relationships purposes”.775  
 
The government issued a consultation document with the objective of resolving SDLT issues 
relating to commercial sukuk issuance in June 2008.776  Recall that sukuk structures, in general, 
are often backed by underlying interests in property or land – tangible assets that are 
compatible with an Islamic view of the creation of wealth and value.  Conventional bonds do not 
convey ownership interests to bond holders; bond holders merely have a right to the payment of 
interest and repayment of principal.  Because SDLT is levied on the acquisition of a “chargeable 
interest”, a plain vanilla ijārah sukuk would possibly be exposed to the tax in at least three 
instances.  First, the acquisition of an asset by the SPV from the originator would require SDLT 
to be payable by the purchaser at a rate of four per cent on an asset valued at more than 
£500,000.  Second, the re-purchase of the asset at the end of the sukuk’s maturity would again 
invoke SDLT at the same rate.  Sukuk holders might be liable to SDLT as owners of the 
                                               
774 Finance Act 2007, s 53 in Finance Act 2005, s 48b(5)(a)(b)(d). Treasury, “Sukuk Issuance: Response” 
(2008), 36. 
775 Ibid. 
776 HMRC , “Stamp Duty” (2008). 
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beneficial interest of an underlying asset.777  Together, these additional SDLT charges would 
make the issuance of commercial sukuk unfeasible.  
 
The Finance Act 2009 created a legislative framework that extended relief to: (1) the transfer of 
the asset from the originator to the sukuk issuer or SPV; (2) the repurchase by the originator 
from the sukuk issuer; and (3) to the issue and resale of sukuk in secondary markets.778  A 
series of conditions must be satisfied with respect to each specific stage of relief.  In particular, 
stage one requires that the sukuk issuers in England and Wales “enter a legal charge over the 
asset in favour of HMRC”779 for the duration in which the asset is held by the issuer.  The charge 
should be equivalent in value to the SDLT on the market value of the underlying asset at the 
time of the transaction.780   The charge gives HMRC an interest in a charged property so that “in 
the event of avoidance or default HMRC are able to collect any SDLT and related interest and 
penalties that become due”.781  In 2010 HMRC amended Finance Act 2003 to ensure that SDLT 
relief was available for ijārah sukuk issuance as was originally intended in Finance Act 2009.782   
 
However, competitive disadvantages still remain in the area of value-added tax as sukuk 
investors may be subject to a VAT charge of 17.5 per cent on any rental payments received 
                                               
777 Ibid., 12. 
778 Finance Act 2009, sch 61; pt III, s 6-9.; HMRC, "Stamp Duty: Response” (2009), 11. 
779 Finance Act 2009, sch 61; pt III, s 6(a).  
780 HMRC, “Stamp Duty: Response” (2009), 11. 
781 Finance Act 2009, sch 61; pt III, s 5(6). 
782 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2010, SI 2010/86, 
s 3. HMRC, “Stamp Duty Regulations” (2010).  
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from the SPV and on their purchase of sukuk.783  The government is working with industry 
practitioners to resolve these additional liabilities.  However, the government may be 
constrained by its European Union obligations, in particular the Sixth VAT Directive, which 
clarifies the operation of the VAT system throughout the European Union.784  The Directive was 
first promulgated in 1977.785  However, the Directive has since been updated to allow 
exemptions to certain transactions.  Different rates of VAT are permissible as long as these are 
not less than 15 per cent.786 
 
The government’s legislative agenda for AFIBs is remarkable in terms of the extent to which the 
government seeks to accommodate the Islamic financial industry.  Some of the ways in which 
the government has facilitated Islamic financial structures underscores the seriousness of the 
agenda.  Further, legally mandated consultations with the public, from which much of the above 
information derives, highlight the willingness of the government to approach the regulation of the 
industry in a highly flexible and adaptive manner.  For instance, several early requirements were 
dropped in response to industry practitioners’ concern that such requirements would render the 
                                               
783 Treasury, “Sukuk Issuance: Response” (2008), 38. Different VAT rates apply to different goods and 
services.  These must be assessed on a case by case basis. 
784 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax 
[2006] OJ L347/1. Ahmad, “Theory and Practice”  (2010), 261. 
785Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 13/6/1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of Member States relating 
to turnover taxes – common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment [1977] OJ L 145. 
786 Council Directive 2010/88/EU of 7 December 2010 amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common 
system of value added tax, with regard to the duration of the obligation to respect a minimum standard 
rate [2010] OJ L326/1, art 1.   
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industry uncompetitive.787 In general, the scale of tax modifications necessary to eliminate 
disadvantageous tax treatment, and to classify Islamic financial structures according to novel 
regulatory categorisations, underscores pivotal differences existing between the legal structures 
of the Islamic and conventional financial structures.  Government documents also illustrate the 
near reflexive approach in forcing Islamic financial institutions to adapt to the conventional tax 
and regulatory system, which is not designed for Islamic structures; indeed, the government is 
clearly convinced that a uniform approach to all financial markets provides the most efficient and 
effective mode of financial services regulation.  Section 6.6 examines this topic in greater depth 
by focusing on the government’s efforts in establishing a regulatory framework for sukuk 
securitisations. 
 
6.7   CREATING A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SUKUK 
 
Government regulatory policy toward AFIBs is designed to introduce legislative changes to align 
the regulatory treatment of sukuk with conventional bonds.  The government decided to proceed 
with a policy of including AFIBs as a specified investment under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities Order (RAO)) on the same basis as debt instruments 
and a unique regulatory definition for an AFIB was created for the purpose.  This distinctive 
definition was set out in Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 Regulated Activities (Order 
                                               
787 In particular, see HMRC , "Assessment: Sukuk” (2008). And HMRC, “Stamp Duty: Response” (2009), 
11. 
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2001).788 The regulatory definition is notable for the exceptional requirements regarding AFIB 
issuances.  AFIBs are subject to a reasonable commercial rate of return clause, which stipulates 
that the amount of additional payments must not exceed an amount deemed to be a reasonable 
return on a loan of capital.789  Specifically, it is designed to help prevent equity-like instruments 
from benefitting from these regulatory permissions, thus preventing regulatory arbitrage, which 
would disadvantage conventional equity investments.  Although a strict limit on the level of 
interest is not stipulated, the measure clearly reinforces the government’s determination to align 
the regulatory treatment of sukuk with conventional debt instruments. Of course, there is no 
such requirement for conventional bonds.   
 
Under FSMA 2000 the classification of Islamic financial instruments such as sukuk has given 
rise to various complications.  As is the case with all Islamic financial instruments, a sukuk’s 
economic characteristics, although similar to conventional products, entail legal structures and 
risk characteristics that are markedly different from their conventional counterparts.790  For 
example, consider the steps required in the ijārah sukuk that differentiate its structure from a 
conventional bond.  While a conventional bond is a simple debt instrument, a sukuk 
securitisation involves the sale and re-purchase of tangible assets via a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV).  Issues related to ownership in the underlying assets create legal risks for investors.  As 
a result of these considerations, Islamic securities may not be captured under the existing 
                                               
788 See SI 2001/544, paras 77-78. FSA and Treasury, "Consultation (Sukuk)” (2008), 14. 
789 Ibid., 15. 
790 Ibid. 
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regulatory framework.  Moreover, the challenge is exacerbated by the fact that within the Islamic 
securities industry, the nominate contracts used in sukuk may each have differing risk, legal and 
economic characteristics.  Thus the contracts of mushārakah, muḍārabah and murābaḥah are 
generic terms that describe particular types of transactions but do not describe the products 
themselves.  As a result, the same generic contract or conglomeration of contracts may entail 
fundamentally different financial products in terms of their risk profiles and economic 
substance.791  Hence the government strategy of reviewing the economic substance of 
alternative financial investments reflects the only feasible approach in developing Islamic 
finance, although it is a policy designed to function within the existing financial system. 
 
Some Islamic securities appear to fall within the definition of a collective investment scheme 
(CIS) as defined by the FSMA 2000.792  The CIS is the only product specifically regulated under 
FSMA 2000, so the regulatory regime is considerably more stringent (equity investments are 
considerably riskier investments than debt-based instruments and thus attract higher regulatory 
intervention).  Section 235 of the FSMA 2000 describes a CIS as “any arrangement with respect 
to property of any description […] the purpose or effect of which is to enable persons taking part 
in the arrangements […] to participate in or receive profits of income arising from the acquisition, 
holding, management or disposal of the property”.793 It is also provided that such schemes must 
                                               
791 IOSCO, "Objectives” (2008), 48. 
792 FSMA 2000, s 235. 
793 Ibid. 
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not be arranged so that participants have day-to-day control over the management of the 
property.  At least one or both of the following characteristics must also apply:  
(1) Arrangements must pool participants’ contributions as well as profits or income;  
(2) The property is managed on behalf of, or in whole by, the operator of the scheme.794   
 
The consequences of treating sukuk as a CIS arrangement would result in marginally higher on-
going costs relative to bond issuers.795  Moreover, CISs are subject to a wider range of controls 
and may require authorisation.  Authorisation would limit the range of eligible assets for 
investment as well as gearing and marketing capabilities.796  Therefore, sukuk issuers would be 
disadvantaged compared to issuers of conventional bonds were they regulated in accordance 
with CIS rules.   
 
Notably, the government stipulated that AFIBs should be subject to a mandatory listing 
requirement on a recognised stock exchange.  This requirement again attempts to stem 
regulatory arbitrage by creating a high level of transparency and oversight of AFIBs.  The 
government is concerned that various investments will exploit the legislative loophole and be 
excluded from the Collective Investment Scheme.  The government cites consumer protections 
for retail investors, in particular, but the loss of tax revenues must feature prominently in the 
decision.  It is not considered to be unduly burdensome as public listing is a pre-requisite of 
                                               
794 FSA & Treasury, "Consultation (Sukuk)” (2008), 15. 
795 Ibid., 26. 
796 Ibid., 15. 
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preferential tax treatment.797  However, conventional bond issuance is not subject to any such 
requirement.  The policy underscores the difficulty in placing sukuk within the uniform regulatory 
framework.   
 
In November 2008 the government announced that sovereign issuance of sukuk would not offer 
“value for money”.798  The decision coincided with a global financial crisis of historic proportions 
which reinforced the importance of UK sovereign gilt issuance, whereas a sovereign sukuk 
issuance is an as-of-yet untested product with an uncertain investor base.  The government was 
clearly concerned about the long-term costs of debt issuance as the weak economy forced it to 
raise its borrowing projections.799 Nevertheless, the government proceeded with implementing 
regulatory changes on the basis of the above-discussed industry consultations.  The issuance of 
sovereign sukuk has been postponed indefinitely.800 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The UK government’s principal objective in facilitating Islamic financial transactions is to 
consolidate an Islamic financial hub in the City of London. The UK experience with Islamic 
finance highlights the process of economic globalisation, which relies on nation-states to erect 
                                               
797 Ibid., 23. 
798 Reuters, "Gilt” (2008). 
799 Ibid. 
800 At a Norton Rose event Sarah McCarthy Fry MP, Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, made this 
announcement.  See Norton Rose, "Event” (2010). 
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legal and regulatory frameworks through which global processes are channelled and 
orchestrated.  It also provides indications of how nation-states respond to global capital flows 
and their erosion of economic sovereignty.   
 
The UK government also wishes to secure social benefits from facilitating Islamic finance.  By 
offering a sharia-compliant mode of finance it hopes to offer all British Muslims an inclusive 
financial marketplace, although early indications point to a lacklustre interest in such products.  
Financial inclusion may also bring informal Islamic financial transactions, such as ḥawālah 
money transfer systems, under the auspices of state regulation.    
 
The UK government’s facilitation of Islamic finance within UK law has coincided with a wider 
debate as to the degree to which faith-based norms and legal systems should be 
accommodated without prejudicing the rights of all citizens.  In particular, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, addressed this topic in his famous 2008 speech.  Yet the low 
public profile of Islamic finance has allowed the UK government to facilitate Islamic financial 
transactions with little public opposition.  
 
The government’s legislative and regulatory approach toward Islamic finance is designed to 
facilitate a level playing field that enables Muslims to practice finance in accordance with their 
faith.  It does not show favouritism towards Islamic finance or any other mode of finance, nor 
does it directly associate “alternative finance investments” with the Quran or the Islamic faith.  
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The government’s method is principally focused on amending the complex UK tax regime for 
Islamic financial transactions while undertaking relatively few regulatory modifications.  The 
state’s strategy is focused on removing tax and regulatory impediments to the competitive 
practice of Islamic finance.  The strategy is neutral with respect to the religious and ethical 
attributes that Islamic finance espouses.  Yet the state’s legislative implementation of Islamic 
finance necessarily adopts certain interpretations of the sharia that may pose sharia-compliance 
risks.   
 
A UK sovereign sukuk issuance would represent a large step forward in facilitating the 
development of Islamic finance in the UK.  Sovereign sukuk issuance would strengthen the City 
of London’s bid to attract further commercial sukuk structuring and business activity related to 
the Islamic financial industry.  It would offer the industry new liquidity management tools that 
could potentially facilitate the development of a greater range of sharia-compliant retail financial 
products. 
 
The industry generally suffers from a shortage of liquid instruments that would allay its asset-
liability mismatch between long term partnership investments and on-demand deposit accounts.  
It has responded to this challenge by investing in more liquid, but less profitable, debt-based 
contracts such as the murābaḥah, istiṣnā‘  and salam.  The industry’s liquidity shortage is 
compounded by the underdevelopment of an inter-bank lending market or a lender of last resort. 
Sovereign issuance may help to foster a liquid secondary market in short-dated sukuk 
certificates that would enable IFIs to meet their liquidity and capital adequacy requirements. 
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Furthermore, it would establish an industry benchmark and thus foster corporate sukuk 
issuance.   
 
The government has implemented a number of legislative measures that facilitate commercial 
sukuk within the conventional financial system. Such measures, embodied in successive 
Finance Acts, are directed at levelling the playing field concerning the way sukuk are taxed. 
Notably, the sukuk are treated as debt securities for the purpose of taxes. 
 
Finally, the government has enacted various regulatory measures and created a regulatory 
definition for sukuk as a way of regulating these as debt instruments or bonds.   These 
measures are also designed to distinguish sukuk from collective investment schemes (CISs) 
and their higher rate of taxation.  Several regulatory requirements apply to sukuk that are not 
applicable to conventional bonds as a way of ensuring that sukuk issuances are not gaming the 
system.  
 
The following chapter deals with UK financial services law more generally, as well as the role of 
regional and international regulatory standards.  The chapter focuses on the legal pluralistic 
impact that these tiers of regulation exert over Islamic financial institutions.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION AND THE LAW OF 
ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the nature and role of regulation as a preliminary to the analysis of UK 
regulation of IFIs in chapter eight.  In particular, it focuses on the UK’s approach toward financial 
services regulation and the impact that EU and international regulatory standards have on the 
country’s financial markets.  Examples of the impact of international regulatory standards’ on 
Islamic finance are considered.  
 
The following topics are analysed in turn: the theory of regulation; the liberal values that underlie 
the UK’s institutional framework; the role of financial services regulation and the methods of 
regulating financial markets; the Financial Services Authority and its responsibilities as universal 
regulator in the UK; competition and the conglomeration of financial services markets; 
standardisation of international regulatory law including EU standardisation and global 
regulatory initiatives such as the Basel process; and finally, the mechanics of Basel II capital 
adequacy requirements and its specific impact upon Islamic financial institutions.  
 
Communities, regions, states and international actors throughout the world each share a 
different understanding of what regulation means and in what manner it should be applied.  In a 
democratic society, regulation is based on an intrinsic social agreement that legitimises and 
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gives authority to those instances charged with ordering human affairs in a certain way.  
According to the republican ideal, democratic regulation is endowed with moral and legal 
authority through the popular vote of elected officials.  Legislatures and governmental 
apparatuses exist and carry out their responsibilities on the basis of people’s consent via the 
popular vote of their elected representatives.  Entrenched constitutions provide the basis for 
securing citizens from an erosion of their personal sovereignty by establishing a balance of 
powers between parliaments, executives and judiciaries.801  Parliaments are charged with 
enacting regulations that carry the power and authority of law and do so, on the basis of the 
legitimacy bestowed upon them.  Regulation implies coercive limits to peoples’ liberties.  Yet it 
depends for its legitimacy and effectiveness on whether society views it as necessary and 
morally right; in other words, on whether society believes that it fosters the social good.  
 
The following analyses the nature of regulation and the liberal values and principles that 
underlie Western political and economic institutions.  It focuses on the United Kingdom, 
specifically, although the ideas are general enough to be applicable in differing degrees to most, 
if not all, democratic states.  The ideas examined underlie the institutional basis of the UK 
financial architecture.   Islamic finance is affected by these arrangements and may be negatively 
affected when the values and ethics it espouses conflict with those of the majority population.  
 
 
                                               
801 Braithwaite and Drahos, “Regulation”  (2000), 604. 
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7.1   REGULATION, SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
 
Regulation can be understood in myriad ways, but it broadly connotes the power to implement 
collective aspirations through the use of law, by providing opportunities and information which 
people often lack.  It can take the form of a specific set of commands, such as when regulation 
involves the promulgation of a binding set of rules to be applied by a governmental agency 
responsible for a certain purpose. Or it may be seen as a pervasive influence of the state 
designed to influence social and economic behaviour.  This type of regulation includes 
command-based regimes, but also includes other methods of influence including economic 
incentives, e.g. taxes and subsidies; the supply of information; deployment of resources; 
franchises; contractual powers; and so forth.802   
 
Two broad trends characterise the different ideological perspectives concerning the appropriate 
role of regulation.  The first argues that regulation should be constructed so as to ensure an 
individual’s autonomy or freedom.  Opportunities for self-determination and self-governance are 
the highest goals of this perspective.  This viewpoint is often antagonistic towards government 
intervention in the economy on the basis that an individual’s liberty is undermined.  Accordingly, 
people should not countenance unjustifiable constraints on the free development of their 
individual beliefs and preferences.803  In fact, the government should safeguard and even 
                                               
802 Baldwin and Cave, “Regulation”  (1999), 2. 
803 Sunstein, “Revolution”  (1990), 40-46. A very interesting depiction of these values is powerfully 
conveyed in Rand, “Atlas”  (2007). Rand’s philosophy, based on individualism and the rational mind, was 
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promote different conceptions of the good life as long as these do no harm to others.  This 
viewpoint argues that it is implausible that the government knows better than its citizens what is 
good for them.  Moreover, liberty establishes the freedom to fail and to learn from failure; this 
represents an important principle in the process of human development. The state’s respect for 
autonomous choice – the belief an individual’s highest purpose in human life is to discover for 
oneself the idea of the Good - is the linchpin of freedom.804   
 
The second perspective views autonomy and freedom through the prism of the community or 
collectivity.  Because people’s values and decisions are shaped by society, liberty is only 
realisable if it is nurtured by society.805 Autonomy resides in decisions reached collectively that 
decide the course or type of society governments should pursue.  Collective self-determination 
is concerned with establishing and giving effect to the values and identity of the community 
rather than the individual preferences of its citizens.  An individual’s wants must be supported by 
reasons that appeal to the values of the community,806 and should not be given priority over 
social goods.807  Examples of this sort of law-making are environmental law and anti-
discrimination law.808   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
known as objectivism.  Many modern economists and politicians have been influenced by Rand’s 
philosophy, including Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve. 
804 Sunstein, “Revolution”  (1990), 36. 
805 Feldman, “Liberties”  (2002), 7. 
806 Sunstein, “Revolution”  (1990), 35. 
807 Feldman, “Liberties”  (2002), 7. 
808 Sunstein, “Revolution”  (1990), 35. 
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Arguably, the legal system should be designed to reflect a combination of the above.  First and 
foremost, it must defend autonomy in the processes of preference formation.  Yet liberty cannot 
be said to be immediately expressed through individual preferences or wants, since preferences 
are endogenous to available information, legal rules, social pressures and consumption 
patterns.  Instead, autonomy reflects a “full and vivid awareness of available opportunities” on 
the basis of all relevant information and without illegitimate constraints placed upon individuals 
and their preference formation.809  Liberty only obtains when rights “obligate other members of 
society to make available the resource which each person needs to give effect to his or her 
choices”.810  Therefore, this perspective requires a bridge to be formed between liberty and 
different values of equality and social justice.  Values of equality and social justice demand that 
the government improve the life standards of the worst-off groups in society.  This may require 
redistributive taxation systems and welfare programmes, the provision of public services and 
facilities, and the regulation of the markets – all of which impinge upon the autonomy of 
members of society.811 Society must not always respect private preferences, or even sub-group 
preferences, because such interests may not always be beneficial for society as a whole.  An 
example concerns the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis and the derivatives practices that helped 
foster a global economic recession.  Should the individual wants and preferences of investment 
bankers be safeguarded when society’s welfare is negatively impacted as a result?  
 
                                               
809 Ibid., 40. 
810 Feldman, “Liberties”  (2002), 12. 
811 Ibid., 13. 
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Society has an interest in determining which private interests can be accommodated without 
undermining social welfare.  Therefore, private interests are sometimes overridden by collective 
aspirations or considered judgments, often embodied in the democratic process of deliberation 
in which shared goals best reflect society’s hopes and existential needs.  Regulation can be 
justified even if some individuals are made worse off as a result.812  
 
The proposal heard amongst some fervent proponents of Islamic finance to erect a dual system 
of Islamic financial regulation provides a useful example.  Islamic finance may enable devout 
Muslims to engage in the financial marketplace and thus fulfil their financial ambitions without 
hindrance from the state.  However, a dual regulatory system would also have consequences 
for the entire financial system. It might lead to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, or claims of 
unequal and discriminatory financial practices. For example, financiers may exploit loopholes 
designed to facilitate Islamic finance to the disadvantage of conventional finance, leading to an 
unlevel playing field.    
 
From a legal perspective, theories of regulation begin with an exposition of the law of property 
and the law of contract, which establish the basis for state intervention in capitalistic economies.  
The law of property originated in Roman law as “a person’s all-embracing legal power over a 
tangible object”.813  The notion of private property changed property’s social function entirely 
and fuelled the transition from feudalism to capitalism.  The means of production became an 
                                               
812 Sunstein, “Revolution”  (1990), 46.  
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object of private appropriation;814 each producer gained the power to exclude others from 
resources necessary for the productive process, and from the fruits of that labour. The law of 
private property establishes these interests, and the law of contract secures the processes 
required for resources to be allocated to their most valuable use.  Contracts provide the 
institutional support by which agreements are able to be carried out.  Therefore, the aggregate 
of private interests gives rise to social welfare; individuals are empowered to exploit and enjoy 
society’s resources.815   
 
The notion of social welfare takes on a subjective meaning within the context of public law.  It 
not only reflects a society’s views concerning private property and the allocation of resources, 
but the political, historical, cultural, even religious traditions that have given rise to this ordering.  
Criminal law is established to safeguard this welfare.  It is employed to maintain order and 
defend the person, property, and liberty against aggression.  Institutional arrangements are 
catered for in constitutional law, which establishes rights for the exercise of these powers, and 
“for the formulation, adjudication, and enforcement of private rights”.816   
 
Now that the general concept of regulation has been discussed the examination of values in the 
UK economy is the present focus. 
 
                                               
814 Santos, "Modes” (1985), 91. 
815 Ogus, “Regulation”  (2004), 23-26. 
816 Ibid., 26. 
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7.2    LIBERAL VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 
 
International political regimes, such as the Basel process, the ‘Washington Consensus’ or the 
Bretton Woods agreements, represent instances of political authority which embody “principles 
about fact, causation, and rectitude, as well as political rights and obligations that are regarded 
as legitimate”.817  The creation and continued modification of these regimes underscore the 
internationalisation of political authority, but their factual existence does not explain the effects 
they have on economic transactions.  The inventory of such regimes says little about their 
“generative grammar” - the principles which underlie their order and meaning.818  To understand 
the determinants of economic transactions the deeper roots and meanings of such regimes 
must be examined.  
 
The UK government’s facilitation and regulatory approach to Islamic finance is premised on the 
principle of equality, which holds that “like cases should be treated alike and different cases 
differently”.819   Equality belongs to the set of values which engender a modern politics of 
universalism, emphasising the equal dignity of all citizens, and substantively geared toward the 
equalisation of rights, entitlements and obligations.820  In the UK and the EU legal intervention 
has not been aimed at defining a substantive equality which, in practice, is accepted as 
impossible.  Rather it is directed at minimising the inequality of opportunity in education, 
                                               
817 Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism” (1982), 380. 
818 Ibid. See also Ruggie, "Continuity” (1983). 
819 Feldman, “Liberties”  (2002), 133. 
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housing, employment and the acquisition of goods and services.821   The government strives for 
the creation of a society without “first-class” and “second-class” citizens; it seeks to create a 
procedural form of non-discrimination, blind to the differences of its citizens, whether they are 
Christian, Muslim, Jewish, atheist, female, male, homosexual or heterosexual, and so on.  
However, implicit in this policy is the assumption that its principles are based on neutral, 
difference-blind principles when, in fact, it is the political expression of a certain social 
understanding;822 it is dependent on a moral judgment concerning the unacceptability of 
inequality with respect to these types of criteria.823   
 
In other words, states cannot help but give partial establishment to the norms and values of a 
culture and this culture, usually reflects the majority population.824 These “define the meaning 
and identity of the individual, and the patterns of “appropriate” economic, political and cultural 
activity engaged in by those individuals”.825  Here institution is defined “as a broad patterning of 
social structure and activity around general rules”, although uncertainty surrounds the nature of 
such rules.   Institutions embody the purposes and legitimacy of states, organisations, 
professions, and interest groups while demarcating the boundaries of activity appropriate to 
each.826  The institutionalisation of a society’s values is the process whereby a given set of units 
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and patterns of activity come to be normatively and cognitively held in place, and in practice, 
taken for granted as lawful, although these may be customs and cultural knowledge.  Viewing 
societal institutions in this manner exposes the myth that the capitalist environment of actors 
including states, regulatory bodies and conventional financial institutions are a priori, neutral 
elements of modern social processes.  Instead societal institutions should be seen as socially 
constructed and highly problematic.  Their actions reflect an enactment of broad institutional 
patterns rather than autonomous, intrinsic choice, motivation and purpose; a finding very much 
opposed to an autopoietic view of the law or social systems, in general.827   
 
Therefore, despite the multicultural makeup of the UK, the majority population’s values and 
norms are deeply embedded within the institutions of the state.  In particular, when the economy 
of the United Kingdom is examined - as well as other states’ economies to varying degrees – a 
distinctive form of liberalism has emerged since Margaret Thatcher’s terms of office as Prime 
Minister from 1979 until 1990.  This liberalism holds that there are no better mechanisms, as 
general political institutions, to determine equal treatment than the two main institutions of our 
modernity: a free market to decide what goods shall be produced and how they shall be 
distributed; and representative democracy to determine what conduct shall be prohibited or 
regulated so that other conduct can be made possible and convenient.828  The prototypical neo-
liberal believes that each of these institutions provides a more egalitarian settlement than any 
                                               
827 See Luhmann, “Aufklaerung”  (1970); Luhmann, “Aufklaerung 3”  (1991); Teubner, “Law”  (1993); 
Luhmann, “Systems”  (1995). 
828 Dworkin, "Liberalism” (1978), 130. 
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other general ordering of society.829  If the market is made to function efficiently, it will determine 
a price for each product that reflects the cost in resources of material, labour and capital that 
might have been used to produce a different good for someone else; this is known as the 
“opportunity cost”.  A citizen’s distribution of goods and services becomes a function of the 
personal preferences of others and his own; and the sum of these personal preferences 
establishes the true cost to the community of meeting his or her own preferences for goods and 
services.  The egalitarian distribution – that is, a perfectly free market – requires that “the cost of 
satisfying one person’s preferences should as far as possible be equal to the cost of satisfying 
another’s”.830  In other words, a free market does not impose value judgments concerning a 
citizen’s preferences – at least within the spectrum of public policy; it does not attempt to decide 
for others what is good in life.   
 
In contract, religions necessarily attempt to impose certain moral visions and principles upon 
their adherents and the wider environment with which they come into contact.  For instance, the 
sharia proscribes certain goods and services and requires parties to engage in types of 
transactions that reflect specific moral understandings of material affairs.  Therefore, tension 
                                               
829 An example of these values in action is illustrated in the conservative government’s decision, led by 
David Cameron, to sharply reduce state spending as a percentage of GDP.  The government believes 
that the private sector will benefit from increased confidence in the economy, as a result. 
830 Dworkin, "Liberalism” (1978), 130-32. 
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necessarily arises between these ideological and moral visions, since the permissibility of 
certain behaviours is sometimes viewed in opposing ways.831   
 
Since the Second World War a form of economic liberalism, coupled with multilateral 
arrangements, established a balance between free markets and national constraints designed 
to ensure domestic economic stability.  Following liberalisation of the markets after the jarring oil 
shock of the 1970s, the ideology of neo-liberalism came to dominate the economic policies of 
the United States and the United Kingdom.  These states, in particular, sought to deregulate 
markets, promote free trade and foster the creation of free and efficient markets.  Furthermore, 
globalisation and its effects on countries’ competitive advantage accelerated the process.  
Policy-makers responded to these pressures, and the vicissitudes of the market economy, by 
enabling more flexible market processes.832   
 
Neo-liberalism represents a concerted effort to minimise the role of the state.  A radical 
interpretation of the ideology sees the state as a provider of security from internal and external 
threats and nothing more.  Citizens of a state should enjoy the right to non-intervention in their 
lives but not the right to goods.  The state should take no responsibility for ensuring that people 
are able to exercise their liberties.833 Harking back to classical economic theory, neo-liberalism 
proposes that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
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freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade”.834  But beyond creating and preserving an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices, the state should not intervene in the market.  Market 
interventions distort market signals, i.e. prices, interest rates, etc., as these are the result of 
powerful interest groups whose self-serving interests interfere with the natural course of 
trade.835  Hence, market forces are valued as an “ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to 
all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs”.836  The regular use of 
descriptive guides such as “level playing field” and the policy of “neutrality” are key operating 
concepts in the neoliberal economic landscape as these principles reflect a devoted belief in an 
unfettered market.  Indeed, the hegemony of neo-liberalism is so pervasive that its incorporation 
into people’s common sense manner of living, thinking and understanding the world almost 
goes unnoticed.837   
 
The most important question for this analysis is whether Islamic finance can function on its own 
terms within the neoliberal economy, for neoliberal values and Islamic values concerning the 
economy may not always be compatible.  The next section examines the regulation of financial 
markets, in general.  
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7.3   THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
The challenges of implementing Islamic finance in the UK economy become evident by 
examining the economic imperatives of financial services regulation.  Most important is the fact 
that regulation is designed to shore up confidence or trust in the financial system and thus 
mitigate systemic risk.  In this important respect, the regulation of Islamic financial institutions 
proceeds from the same substantive economic premise.838  The following discussion is focused, 
in particular, on the regulation of banks in the financial system. 
 
7.3.1   THE OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 
 
Financial services regulation is principally concerned with maintaining financial system stability 
in light of banks’ important role as financial intermediaries and linchpins of the payments 
system.  In particular, deposit-taking institutions act as lenders.  Through loan origination they 
transform risks into different maturities.  Banks usually create long-term, illiquid assets, which 
are financed by accepting short-term deposits.  This results in an asset-liability mismatch in 
retail deposit-taking institutions; it differs from the securities business, for example, which 
accepts investments that are not guaranteed, so that market risk is effectively transferred to the 
investor.  Furthermore, banks operate as agents within a network of other institutions as 
facilitators or clearing houses of market transactions based on a variety of mediums of 
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exchange.  The failure of one single agent in the payments system poses dangers for the entire 
system.839   
 
Other pertinent reasons include the need to maintain consumer confidence; and a consumer 
demand for regulation that offers the investor a degree of assurance and overall lower 
transaction costs.  Generally, the case for the regulation of retail financial services is stronger 
than the case for regulating the wholesale market.  This is due to greater information asymmetry 
in retail transactions than in wholesale ones.  Moreover, retail markets are easier to regulate 
than wholesale services in the sense that wholesale business tends to ‘disappear’ to less 
constraining regulatory environments.840  
 
Therefore, three core regulatory objectives are pursued in devising financial regulation: (1) 
sustaining systemic stability; (2) maintaining the safety and soundness of financial institutions; 
and (3) the protection of the consumer.841  These objectives give rise to two general types of 
regulation: prudential regulation, which focuses on the solvency, safety and soundness of 
financial institutions; and conduct of business regulation, which largely focuses on how financial 
firms conduct business with their customers.   
 
                                               
839 Koendgen, "Regulation” (2002), 29. 
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Regulators have several instruments at their disposal to fulfil their regulatory objectives.  These 
are generally classified according to the level of market intervention.  Accordingly, low 
intervention is associated with the regulation of information.  It forces suppliers to disclose 
details concerning the quality of their goods and services; further, it can be carried out in the 
form of private regulation, which imposes obligations but can only be enforced by those for 
whom the benefits of regulation have been devised.  Economic incentives may also induce 
information disclosure by market participants.  Second, a medium-level degree of intervention is 
often referred to as command-and-control, in which standards are supported by criminal 
sanctions on non-compliant businesses.  Third and finally, the highest degree of intervention 
characterises the instrument of prior approval, which prohibits an enterprise from undertaking an 
activity without a license or express permission to do so from a government agency.842  The 
Financial Services Authority, the financial services regulator in the United Kingdom, employs a 
combination of all three methods in regulating Islamic financial institutions.  We will review how 
it does this in the following chapter. 
 
The greater part of statutory regulation in the financial field relates to consumer protection.  
Conduct of business regulation’s remit is to safeguard consumers in their dealings with financial 
institutions.  This includes mandatory information disclosures, ensuring the honesty and integrity 
of firms and their employees, standardising the level of competence of firms providing financial 
services and products, ensuring fair business practices, and maintaining fair, transparent and 
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honest marketing practices.843  The risks of consumers’ adverse selections are mitigated by 
capital requirements which ensure that financial institutions have at least some minimal 
provision of resources available to honour their commitments to consumers. Moreover, capital 
requirements are intended to mitigate moral hazard by requiring owners of a financial institution 
to have a stake in ensuring that the firm conforms to conduct of business rules and does not 
engage in fraud – if merely to avoid fines and/or loss of equity value.844 
 
Problems of customer protection within the financial services field tend to be more severe than 
in other professions.845  Money is at risk, and the opportunity for fraud and principal-agent 
conflicts of interest requires a strong regulatory regime, particularly in the area of retail banking 
as opposed to the wholesale market.846  In general, the confidentiality or secrecy typically 
associated with financial services transactions contributes to a greater likelihood of fraud.847  
This is an acute problem in Islamic financial intermediation, particularly with respect to principal-
agent conflicts in various forms of partnership investments. 
 
Many factors shape consumer behavior, but the known existence of asymmetric information can 
reduce consumer demand for goods and services.  Consumers know that good and bad 
products and firms exist on the market, but they lack credible information to distinguish them at 
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the point of purchase.  For example, Muslim consumers of financial products take a particular 
interest in the sharia-compliance of the investment products they wish to purchase.  A growing 
body of evidence supports this conclusion, and further suggests that particular groups of Muslim 
consumers are not convinced that some Islamic financial product offerings have achieved this 
standard. Hence, the issue of confidence and trust in these specialised products plays a 
significant role in how the industry will fare.  Generally, the price that buyers of products will pay 
reflects the average quality of products in the market, ranging between good and bad. Sellers of 
high quality products, who know that their products are good, may refuse to sell their products at 
a lower value.  Sellers of low quality products, on the other hand, will be satisfied to accept a 
price reflecting an average value since they are aware that their products are of poor quality.848   
For their part, some consumers may respond to poor quality products by decreasing spending 
or exiting the market altogether.  In the most extreme scenario the market may break down 
completely.  Known in economic theory as the adverse selection problem, the case exemplifies 
the importance of transparency and disclosure in markets.  Consumers may decide to forgo 
purchases of high-quality products simply because of their aversion to the high risk and high 
cost of purchasing a poor product.  Thus an additional role of conduct of business regulation 
consists in setting minimum standards to prevent or remove low-quality producers from the 
market.  In fact, good-quality businesses tend to support these standards so that poor-quality 
producers are not in the position to tarnish their reputation and economic performance.849  Our 
subsequent analysis of the UK government’s position with respect to the sharia-compliance of 
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Islamic financial offerings raises questions whether the UK’s conduct of business regulation 
procedures are adequately designed to shield investors from low-quality products. 
 
Prudential regulation is designed to ensure a stable financial system.  A stable financial system 
is necessary to provide a favourable environment for efficient resource allocation and the 
promotion of economic growth.  Prudential regulation is directed against systemic risks.  It is 
designed to address banks’ special position in the financial system – their role in providing 
liquidity and their management of the payments system.850  Bank lending has the function of 
augmenting or constraining the money supply, as the recent “credit crunch” and current 
economic situation illustrate.  In this important sense, banks act as extensions of the 
government’s monetary policy.851  A major function of banks as financial intermediaries consists 
in their role as delegated monitors in a world of asymmetric information between those seeking 
funds and those who supply them.  In some cases, information cannot easily be obtained by 
outsiders.  Its production may require a significant outlay in funds or an extensive and 
continuous relationship with a firm.  Important savings can be achieved in these circumstances 
by delegating certain functions to financial intermediaries.  The financial intermediary’s costs are 
reduced by avoiding duplication of these functions; these consist of gathering relevant 
information prior to securing a funding decision and monitoring borrowers’ actions once they 
have committed to their investment projects.852  
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Therefore, banks occupy a pivotal role at the centre of the financial payments network.  A large, 
systemically important bank’s failure may result in a domino effect or contagion across the 
financial sector as a whole.  The failure of one insolvent bank can cause depositors of other 
banks – though they might be solvent – to withdraw their deposits.  Thus it is possible to cause a 
solvent institution to become insolvent because the vast majority of bank assets are not easily 
marketable or liquid.   On the one hand this scenario is indicative of the importance of consumer 
confidence in the market, and on the other it reflects the pivotal role of market players’ 
perception of the viability of specific financial institutions in a bear market (an extended period of 
time over the course of which the stock market has declined significantly).  The degree of 
confidence, or lack of it, permeates nearly every institution to some extent.   
 
A recent example provides a terrifying depiction of the reality of this market characteristic.  Bear 
Stearns, the global investment bank, had nearly $18 billion in cash reserves.  It was brought to 
near ruin in a “run” that was not the result of a criminal indictment or some mammoth quarterly 
loss, but of rumour and innuendo – a dramatic and erosive loss of confidence in the institution’s 
liquidity.853    It required the unusual assistance of the US Treasury Department to fashion a deal 
in which Citigroup acquired Bear Stearns for a paltry $2 per share – an enormous loss of equity 
in one of the world’s largest investment banks.   
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A lesson from the Bear Stearns’ incident is that banks’ marketable assets may dramatically 
decline in value due to panic.  If a bank run does occur, banks are forced to dispose of assets, 
which cannot be sold off at par value as potential buyers impose high risk premiums on the 
purchase price.854   Commonly referred to as asset liquidity risk, this scenario represents “the 
risk that an entity will be unable to unwind a position in a particular financial instrument at or 
near its market value because of a lack of depth or disruption in the market for that 
instrument”.855   
 
Two factors underpin this dynamic: First, a critical problem lies in conventional banks’ 
solicitation of debt contracts for liquid deposits.  These liquid deposits finance the acquisition of 
illiquid assets of uncertain value while the redemption value of the deposit is independent of the 
performance of the bank or the value of its assets.  Second, the value of a bank’s assets cannot 
be traded with confidence within a secondary market or to another financial institution.  The 
value of such assets on a going-concern basis is linked to insider information within the bank 
that is based on a borrower’s payment history and long-term relationship with the bank.  Thus 
an asymmetric information problem exists where outsiders are unsure of banks’ underlying 
assets.  A liquidation or break-up of the bank would cause the banks’ assets to be valued 
significantly lower than on a going-concern basis, hence Bear Stearn’s $2 share price.  
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Moreover, the failure or even significant losses of one bank may then cause outsiders to wholly 
revise their view of the value of other banks’ assets.856   
 
A substantial spill-over effect may ensue on the ‘real’ economy.  Further, the aggregate 
capabilities of bank employees may be lost if banks are liquidated, resulting in fewer specialists 
able to distinguish between good and bad assets.  The result is a sharp decrease in the amount 
of lending, and severe recession in the overall economy.857  This theoretical description of the 
loss of confidence in a financial institution and its subsequent consequences provides a 
remarkably accurate portrayal of the steps leading to the global financial crisis of 2008 – the 
most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression.  In practice, these considerations are 
also applicable to Islamic financial institutions.  However, the LIF prevents IFIs from engaging in 
some financial activities such as derivatives trading that contributed to the financial crisis of 
2008.858  Yet IFIs are susceptible to a set of different risks, including sharia-compliance risks, 
and these have the potential to undermine consumer confidence.  This topic is analysed in 
sections 8.1 and 8.4.  
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7.4  THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (FSA) 
 
The previous section examined conventional regulatory objectives and instruments for 
regulating financial markets.  The United Kingdom and its particular system of financial services 
regulation is the present focus which, as observed, is underpinned by liberal economic values. 
 
The abolition of the FSA, as well as the agreement in November 2010 amongst G20 states to 
conclude a new Basel III Accord, highlight the dynamic nature of financial services markets and 
regulatory activity.  This thesis, however, is strictly limited to regulatory developments that have 
been implemented prior to November 2010.  
 
7.4.1  THE ABOLITION OF THE FSA 
 
With the election of a conservative government in May 2010, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne, announced the abolition of the FSA.  Osborne blamed the FSA for not 
foreseeing the credit crisis, including the weakness of banks such as Northern Rock.  He 
claimed that the “FSA became a narrow regulator, almost entirely focused on rules-based 
regulation”.859  The new regulator should increase consumer protections by establishing a new 
Consumer Protection and Markets Authority whose remit is to police all financial institutions and 
the manner by which financial institutions treat their customers.  Prudential regulation will be 
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centred in a new Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), concerned with the safety and 
soundness of the financial system.860  The PRA will be housed within the authority of the Bank 
of England, thus effectively re-establishing the Bank as the principal regulatory authority.861  
Further, a new financial policy committee will be established as a means of shoring up the 
regulatory system’s perceived weaknesses to the financial crisis.  The agency will seek to 
prevent credit and asset bubbles from developing and take a holistic approach to financial 
system stability.862 On issues in which the regulatory bodies have joint responsibility, the PRA’s 
decision will have greater weight.863  Furthermore, Osborne established a commission to look 
into whether banks should be forced to separate their investment banking and retail banking 
operations, a form of narrow banking that has also been dubbed the “Volcker Rule”, as it has 
been strongly suggested by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker in the United 
States.864  The results of the commission’s report may trigger further regulatory and legislative 
restructuring in the near future.865   
 
The future restructuring of the FSA and other changes will affect Islamic finance’s future in the 
UK economy.  However, changes in direction are likely to impact on large-scale decisions such 
as whether to issue a sovereign sukuk.  The new government has voiced its support and 
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optimism for the further development of Islamic finance,866 but has not yet revealed how this will 
be translated into practice.  
 
7.4.2  THE STRUCTURE AND REGULATORY APPROACH OF THE FSA 
 
The supervision of financial firms is defined as the complementary process of monitoring and 
reviewing compliance by financial institutions with regulatory provisions or with other more 
general standards of prudent and proper behaviour in any particular market.  Until recently there 
was no legal direction in the United Kingdom as the system relied upon self-regulation and 
administrative discretion.867  The Banking Act 1979 was the first comprehensive piece of 
legislation governing the banking sector.  In particular, the act established that the acceptance 
of deposits was subject to specific authorisation by the Bank of England.868  The City of London 
reorganised and changed its methods of doing business in the early 1980s due to mounting 
competition in the global trading system from rival financial centres such as New York and 
Tokyo.  The City had relied until then upon, “a cosy, comfortable, gentlemen’s club”869 style of 
regulation, with occasional interventions from the Bank of England and the Department of Trade 
and Industry.  It was a light touch, practitioner-based system of regulation which employed a 
variety of non-legal methods to discipline and gain compliance with acceptable financial 
standards; a club-type arrangement in which membership of the financial sector was very 
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exclusive.870  Each of the city’s professional associations, including the major clearing houses 
and the stock exchange, were allowed to employ their own methods of discipline against those 
who transgressed written or unwritten rules.  Some of these methods effectively barred banking 
professionals from further professional practice.871  
 
Eventually, the sheer increase in the number of financial market participants and the increasing 
complexity of international capital markets made the system ineffective.  Yet the history of its 
evolution may shed light on the dynamic constellation of regulatory forces currently impacting 
upon Islamic finance.   A more recent trend has seen the imposition of laws or legally 
recognised rules at the national level, together with agreed standards at the international level. 
Moreover, formal legal and institutional structures have been devised within which regulatory 
and supervisory systems operate.  
 
In 1998 the Bank of England Act 1998 restructured the UK’s financial architecture significantly, 
so that monetary policy became the Bank’s chief operational responsibility and supervisory 
responsibility shifted from the Bank to the Financial Services Authority (FSA).872  The Monetary 
Policy Committee of the Bank is charged with formulating monetary policy as stipulated by the 
1998 Act.873  Moreover, in the run-up to the formal establishment of the FSA, a memorandum of 
understanding between the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury was agreed, which 
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highlights the distinct roles of each organisation.874  Under paragraph two of the memorandum, 
the Bank of England is charged with three broad responsibilities.  First, the Bank should ensure 
overall stability of the financial system including stability of the monetary system, financial 
infrastructure and the payments system.  The Bank should see its role in safeguarding the 
system as a whole, which may include undertaking financial operations in exceptional economic 
circumstances according to paragraphs 11 to 13 of the memorandum.  In particular, the 
promotion of the United Kingdom’s international competitiveness should be achieved through 
intensive monitoring of the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial sector.875  For its part, the 
Treasury is generally responsible for acting as an intermediary in the legislative process.876   
 
The FSA gained formal authority over all financial sectors as part of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act (FSMA) as of 1 December 2001.  It is composed of nine predecessor regulators 
including: the Building Societies Commission; the Friendly Societies Commission; the Insurance 
Directorate of the Department of Trade and Investment; the Investment Management 
Regulatory Organisation; the Personal Investment Authority; the Registry of Friendly Societies; 
the Securities and Futures Authority; the Securities and Investments Board; and the Supervision 
and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England.877  Therefore, the FSA became the single 
regulator with direct supervision of regulated activities stipulated by the act, including deposit-
taking, and insurance and investment transactions.  The incorporation of predecessor regulators 
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into the FSA represents one of the most significant examples of institutional integration 
undertaken anywhere in the world.  The FSMA was designed to augment this institutional 
integration with detailed and substantive reform.878   
 
The Authority is organised around its regulatory functions, although it generally operates 
according to a rules-based system in which principles of regulation are imposed and 
supplemented with detailed rules with which firms must comply in fulfilment of those 
principles.879  Yet despite a mammoth body of statutory provision and detailed rules, the British 
style of supervision is said to be rather informal and quite personalised in that the British prefer 
“a flexible and differentiated risk-based approach to setting standards and to supervision”.880  
This cooperative manner of supervision requires closer proximity to business practice and would 
thus seem to offer the best practice in terms of detecting and mitigating financial risks.  It may, 
however, pose risks in terms of firms which take advantage of the process’s informality and thus 
pursue regulatory arbitrage opportunities.  Arguably, the flexible and differentiated approach to 
the regulatory environment equipped British policy-makers and regulators to take a relatively 
early decision to consolidate the development of Islamic finance.  By comparison, a number of 
other countries including France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and South Korea have only 
recently taken the decision to make the necessary legislative and regulatory changes to enable 
Islamic financial transactions. 
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The FSMA created the statutory framework for the new regulatory and supervisory regime.  It 
provided for the creation of a dual authorisation and permission regime; the introduction of a 
new definition of regulated activities; enhanced restrictions on financial promotions; the 
establishment of an enlarged approved persons regime; the creation of the offence of market 
abuse; and conferral on the FSA of general authority to issue rules and guidance concerning the 
imposition of day-to-day regulatory requirements on financial institutions and individuals.  
Moreover, the act granted enhanced enforcement powers including the establishment of an 
integrated ombudsman, a financial services compensation scheme and a financial services and 
markets tribunal.  The act contains minimal regulatory provision but establishes the basis for the 
FSA handbook of rules and guidance in sections delineating rule-making and guidance powers, 
specifically sections 138 through 158.  Therefore, FSMA 2000 confers the necessary authority 
and appropriate powers on the FSA to establish necessary offences and enforce regulatory 
provisions.881 
 
With respect to policies detailing the key regulatory functions of authorisation and permission – 
the so-called “command and control” level of regulatory intervention, which each UK-based 
Islamic financial institution in operation has been granted - the FSMA established a system of 
statutory control based on three central provisions: the general prohibition; the permission 
requirement; and the restriction on financial promotion.  According to part II, section 19, no 
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person may carry on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom unless he is an authorised 
person or an exempt person.  This particular rule applies to the role of sharia scholars in an 
Islamic financial institution; this point is analysed further in chapter eight.  Under schedule 2, 
regulated activities may include: dealing in and arranging investments; deposit taking; 
safekeeping and administration of assets; investment advice; managing investments; creating 
collective investment schemes; and using computer-based technology to provide investment 
instructions.  The requirement for permission establishes that authorised persons carrying out a 
regulated activity in the UK otherwise than in accordance with permissions granted to him by 
part IV of the act – permission to carry on regulated activities – or any other provision of this act, 
is to have contravened a requirement imposed on him by the act.  The contravention does not 
necessarily make a person guilty of an offence, nor does it make any transaction void or 
unenforceable.  However, the contravention may substantiate a lawsuit by the person who has 
suffered a loss as a result of the contravention.882  Any person who contravenes the general 
prohibition of the act is guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction on indictment, to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum, or both.883  Finally, restrictions on financial promotion restrict any person from 
communicating an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity in the course of 
business subject to several conditions and exemptions.884  The act establishes a high level of 
intervention in the market; it delineates the necessary offences; and confers on the FSA all 
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appropriate powers and authority to enforce the act’s provisions.  All Islamic financial institutions 
are subject to these central regulatory provisions. 
 
Therefore Islamic financial institutions are subject to an intensive regime of financial regulation 
designed to safeguard consumers and the banking system.  The following section examines the 
highly complex financial environment in which IFIs compete. 
 
7.5 THE GLOBALISATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES   
 
Thus far we have analysed the nature and function of financial services regulation with 
reference to Islamic finance’s place within the UK regulatory environment.  Our analysis 
highlighted the liberal values that underlie financial services regulation.  No regulatory 
architecture is value-neutral.  Rather, as noted above, regulatory architectures embody the 
values and ideological conceptions of the majority culture.  In this section we examine the 
complex international regulatory environment in which Islamic financial institutions compete.  
Globalising trends in the financial services industry have created a complex and interconnected 
financial services environment that is subject to standardising pressures. Increasingly, the 
financial services industry is dominated by major globe-straddling financial institutions whose 
commercial interests predominate in international standard-setting bodies. 
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7.5.1   THE CONGLOMERATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
All financial institutions, including Islamic financial institutions, are subject to the increasing 
complexity and growth of international financial markets.  These are characterised by larger 
processes of globalisation, deregulation and integration, which have fundamentally altered the 
dynamic of international capital markets.  Financial innovation has resulted from this mix of 
forces due to a variety of attributable causes: First, sharp shifts in the pattern of net flows in 
international savings and investment (as reflected in the distribution of current-account 
imbalances); Second, a changing regulatory environment especially with regard to deregulating 
structural rigidities and barriers to competition in national markets, and a new focus on capital 
adequacy standards of financial institutions; Finally, the widespread application of new 
communications and computer technology and an explosive surge in competition in international 
financial markets.885  Innovation may be attributable to a dramatic increase and dispersion of 
wealth amongst private individuals, which has fuelled a multitude of new investment vehicles 
comprising investments of high net worth individuals on an informal, mostly unregulated 
basis.886 
 
Financial intermediation has changed significantly in the past twenty years.  Banks are 
increasingly securitising parts of their loan book, in particular, their stock of mortgages.  Their 
traditional role as financial intermediaries has shifted from taking and holding borrowers’ loans 
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on their own books to acting as facilitators of their clients’ financial requirements on capital 
markets.  Market operations generally involve trading in derivative markets to achieve an 
optimal balance of risk and return.  This, however, has spurned a dynamic expansion in market 
trading activities, particularly by banks in large, industrialised countries, which no longer see 
their primary role or optimal competitive position as one of pure financial intermediation.   
 
Furthermore, a limited range of investment funds and derivatives that were traded in 
standardised exchanges has given way to creative financial instruments that enable investors to 
spread risk of all kinds on a much larger scale and in more complex ways.  Today an almost 
unlimited variety of bespoke, over-the-counter transactions (derivatives) such as collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs), synthetic CDOs, and the like are held by banks in off-balance sheet 
vehicles.  These vehicles enable investors to spread their risk to a much wider range of risk 
bearers.  Some observers have argued that these structures tend to strengthen the economic 
system’s soundness;887 but they clearly obstruct regulators’ ability to perceive systemic risks as 
they materialise.888  Should serious risks arise, the network of these diffuse arrangements may 
well have an impact across the globe.  A contemporary example is seen in the so-called sub-
prime mortgage crisis, which began in August 2007 in the US housing market and has slowly 
spread to the world’s major economies and regional trading centres.  Sub-prime mortgages had 
been diced, parcelled and sold off in a multitude of derivative products.  A number of very large 
financial institutions, whose financial stability is pivotal for the entire financial system, acquired 
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and traded heavily in such investments.  Regulators and policy makers alike claim to have been 
unable to discern the systemic risks of such activities until the housing bubble burst and 
regulatory prevention was too late.   
 
Moreover, the globalisation of financial markets has led to a trend where major banks are 
represented in financial centres across the globe.889  In fact, the globalisation of financial activity 
was mostly bank-led through the use of branches or consortia rather than wholly owned 
subsidiaries.  This process of overseas expansion has gradually extended to all forms of 
business structure as well as the cross-border provision of services in banking and other 
financial services.890    
 
These developments have several consequences with wide-ranging significance.  First, 
traditional divisions between commercial and investment banks hardly exist any longer.  
Second, banking and insurance institutions now perform many of the same services, although 
the division remains clearer than between banks.891  Extended group or conglomerate structures 
have been created that unify services from multiple areas of activity.  The development has 
created an “almost seamless collection of essentially interchangeable or substitutable savings 
and investment media”.892 Its implications are such that banks’ range of allowable activities has 
been broadened in the absence of restrictive regulatory barriers.  Today, the use of corporate 
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conglomerate structures has become one of the most dominant business models in the 
industrial and commercial sectors of many leading financial markets.893   
 
Financial conglomeration is a clear strategy for banks to compete both between themselves and 
with other financial sectors in providing the full range of retail financial services.  The major 
British clearing banks, which include Barclays, Lloyds, Midland and National Westminster, have 
all become financial conglomerates in both the wholesale and retail markets.  Clearing banks 
now offer all major financial services with the exception of wholesale general insurance.894  
 
Indeed, the entire structure of the UK financial system has shifted decisively in the direction of 
universal banking or the financial conglomerate corporate model.  In the UK banks began to 
engage in securities trading in the mid-1980s and have since become involved in insurance 
manufacture.  Even non-financial companies such as Marks and Spencer - a national retail 
store – has offered unit trusts or mutual funds, personal equity plans, and consumer loans since 
1988.  Virgin Atlantic was authorised in the mid-1990s to market its own personal pension, life 
asSūrance and personal equity plans.895  Third, the legal and operational structure of banks has 
become much more complicated. For example, in universal banks or financial conglomerates 
there are no limits in cross-holdings of shares.  Consequently, large numbers of diversified 
financial conglomerates are created since commercial banks, investment banks and insurance 
                                               
893 Ibid. 
894 Llewellyn, “Universal” (1996),  180-84. 
895 Ibid., 162. 
328 
 
companies are permitted to own shares in each other (rules limit ownership in non-financial 
companies due to banks’ capital adequacy requirements).896  Fourth, the increased use of 
derivatives and off-balance-sheet positions has made the use of occasional or monthly balance 
sheets unreliable as a guide to a bank’s soundness.  As a result of these developments, 
external regulation of conventional financial institutions has become “both less effective and less 
feasible”.897 The UK’s creation of a universal regulatory authority, the FSA, represents a direct 
response to these commercial developments.  Yet the trend is indicative of a global pattern in 
which a large number of states are opting for more unified regulatory agencies.898   
 
The increasing complexity of modern financial markets makes the development of a thriving 
Islamic financial system exponentially more difficult.  In particular, the Islamic financial industry 
faces the added difficulty of balancing its heritage of ancient Islamic modes of finance with the 
incessant need to innovate in a wholly different era of financial sophistication.  For example, IFIs 
have generally been prohibited from participating in debt-based derivatives contracts or the sale 
of debts.899  This results in the absence of a secondary market for debt instruments and greatly 
hinders the development of Islamic banking by preventing easy access to liquidity.900   
Secondly, Islamic banks may be prevented from performing their role as a financial intermediary 
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without the ability to securitise their receivables.  If an Islamic bank were to help a large client 
acquire a ship or other large investment as part of its sales-based credit extension, Islamic 
banks have not been able to re-package such acquisitions into smaller portions and sell these 
off to the market.  The process of re-packaging large credit extensions enables banks to provide 
large amounts of credit without unduly straining their own capital resources.  In so doing 
financial institutions are able to more easily extend credit to small and medium-sized borrowers 
who are proportionately disadvantaged.901  The recent sukuk innovation has the potential to 
alleviate this impediment to some extent by allowing IFIs to securitise their tangible assets and 
thus to remove these from their balance sheets.  However, receivables, which are usually 
financial and debt-based in substance, are generally not able to be securitised.902  
 
The state has accommodated trends in competitive, market-driven financial institutions.  
Regulatory responses to competitive pressures have stressed the importance of new 
developments in formation, trading and delivery technology, and the evolving business 
strategies of financial institutions.  The shift towards financial conglomeration is not the outcome 
of regulatory measures specifically designed to bring it about.903  Yet there are clear instances in 
which regulatory requirements have dictated the extent of some bank activities and thereby 
directly influenced the structure and extent of banking activities.  For example, securities trading 
and insurance manufacture must be conducted through subsidiaries with dedicated capital, 
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which establishes a “fence” between different types of risk.  It is questionable, however, whether 
the compartmentalisation of risks is a real safeguard to bank solvency or simply a cosmetic 
feature since banks – extremely conscious of their reputations and market confidence – would 
not readily allow a subsidiary to fail.  Secondly, regulators may encourage the creation of a 
conglomerate structure so as to guard against actual or perceived conflicts of interest, which 
may be of crucial importance to the peculiarities of Islamic financial institutions as our 
subsequent discussion will shed light on.  Thirdly, corporate compartmentalisation enables 
functional regulation as opposed to institutional regulation to operate more effectively.904  While 
the effects of regulation on the structure and nature of financial institutions may, in fact, be 
profound, the general trend indicates that regulation happens in response to market crises, 
inefficiencies and/or commercial requirements. 
 
7.6   THE STANDARDISATION OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY LAW 
 
Nation-state regulatory frameworks are increasingly subject to regional and international 
standard setting initiatives designed to minimise the inefficiencies and distortions of global 
financial markets.  These initiatives are conceived and designed by the leading global powers 
whose conception of the market economy is rooted in their national commercial interests.  
Globally agreed standards and regulatory initiatives exert strong standardising pressures on 
Islamic financial institutions to adapt their financial processes according to the conventional 
mould.   
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7.6.1   EUROPEAN UNION REGULATORY STANDARDISATION 
 
The European Union has acted as a principal engine in the global standardisation process by 
formally binding EU member states to legislation under EU treaties.  Since 2000, EU member 
states have implemented the Banking Consolidation Directive with slight modifications to 
account for national conditions.  EU Capital Requirement Directives represent a move to codify 
and give effect to agreements reached at the global level; in this case the Basel II Accord 
received European-wide compliance.905  The EU’s adoption of Basel I and II blurs the boundary 
between regional and global banking regulation so that the tendency toward global financial 
market integration is evident.906 In accordance with the Second Council Directive of the 
European Union of 15 December 1989, the United Kingdom implemented the EU Capital 
Accord within the framework of the FSMA 2000.907  The FSA establishes an Individual Capital 
Guidance (ICG) scheme for all banks operating in the UK and makes recommendations based 
on Basel II requirements.908 
 
                                               
905 Council Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating 
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EU financial directives encapsulate the Union’s overriding objective of creating a single, 
borderless market.  The underlying strategy has sought to remove structural barriers, liberalise 
capital movements and agree common minimum standards for prudential regulation.909  The 
single market has been a market-generated project.  In particular, top tier financial firms sought 
to disband disproportionate obstacles and costs in expanding cross-border business.910  Early 
on, participants discovered that the practice of mutual regulatory recognition left a double-
regulatory burden for the foreign entity attempting to establish itself in the host country.911  The 
EU has effectively solved this problem by “passporting” EU member state-authorised institutions 
so that they may offer financial products and services throughout the European Union without 
the need for separate authorisation in each member country.912  Financial groups, which are not 
credit institutions, do not benefit from the passporting system.  Rather, investment companies 
are able to offers their products and services on the basis of Council Directive 93/22/EEC.913 
Furthermore, the passporting provision of the directive establishes that the banking activities 
undertaken by a foreign bank in a host country are not limited by that state’s banking model.  In 
fact, the Banking Consolidation Directive is based on the German universal bank model – now a 
British model of banking as well - in which a whole host of non-traditional banking activities such 
as securities trading, mergers and acquisitions, and portfolio management are conducted.914 As 
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a result, FSA-authorised Islamic financial institutions are able to offer Islamic financial products 
and services to the relatively untapped market of approximately 20 million European Muslims.  
The Bank of London and the Middle East is the first UK-based Islamic bank to have exploited 
this opportunity,915 but others have been slow in doing so.  
  
The European Union’s position at the forefront of a globalising trend toward regulatory 
standardisation has been fuelled by the creation of the Euro.  The Euro has provided a powerful 
impetus because it has eliminated exchange rate risk for a vast number of transactions, 
particularly in cross-border retail business.  Furthermore, full enjoyment of the potential benefits 
of currency union depends on efficient financial institutions, deep and liquid capital markets, and 
sound, reliable and cheap infrastructure.916  However, the recent crisis affecting highly-indebted 
Eurozone countries also exposes a critical lack of common European governance and decision-
making authority.  The crisis has led some states to act unilaterally in ways prejudicial to the 
long-term stability of the Eurozone.917  Nonetheless, the crisis has strengthened market 
pressures for the development of common economic institutions.  As a result, further measures 
directed toward regulatory and supervisory standardisation within Euro-zone countries are very 
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strong.  These forces will lead to a more coherent institutional framework and eventually impact 
all financial services institutions operating within EU member states.918  
 
7.6.2   GLOBAL REGULATORY INITIATIVES 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) process is indicative of the trend towards 
standardised international regulation.  It has been described as the herald of international 
regulatory cooperation across the globe by a non-state administrative actor which seeks to form 
a response to the dramatic globalisation of the economy.919  Basel’s chief objective, to 
strengthen the “resilience of the banking sector”,920 is sought by creating international regulatory 
standards that can be applied to all banks operating internationally or on a cross-border basis.  
These standards embody certain common minimum rules to which banks operating 
internationally must comply.  In practice and despite the informal Basel process whose rulings 
are non-binding, the Basel Committee managed to compel its members to fully implement the 
                                               
918 The alternative is for the Eurozone to fail as a monetary union.  Efforts toward regulatory and 
supervisory standardisation have accelerated in the past year with the establishment of a European 
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power to adopt emergency decisions in periods of crisis (such as prohibiting short selling); and authority 
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1988 Basel Accord.921  The 2004 Basel II Accord represented a continued effort to improve and 
strengthen international banking standards.  It too was negotiated by the G10 industrial 
countries on the basis of recommendations from supervisory authorities, market practitioners 
and academics.  However, the founding countries of the Basel Committee did not include any of 
the countries in which Islamic finance is prevalent, and none of these countries were included in 
either Accord’s negotiations.922   
 
The Basel process has left a lasting imprint on the international financial system as evidenced 
by the intention of at least 100 countries to implement the Basel II agreement at varying dates.  
It is widely acknowledged for its contribution to the widespread use of risk-based capital outlays 
both as a measure of banks’ soundness and as a trigger for regulatory intervention.923  The 
accord has become a signpost of a country’s commitment to sound and competitive financial 
markets, albeit with adjustments to local conditions.  Members are said to value the non-binding 
informality of Basel agreements in that these provide flexibility in local implementation – thus 
enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the agreements.  Further, members cannot be 
threatened with judicial action in the case of non-compliance.  Instead the organisation’s extra-
legal status employs a type of international “soft” law that induces members to comply by 
“naming and shaming” or extracting reputational costs associated with non-compliance.924   
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A pertinent example of the international reach of the Accord can be seen in the Gulf Co-
operation Council’s focus on many of the most important matters being discussed by the Basel 
Committee.  GCC states have implemented Basel proposals extensively, particularly those 
concerning capital adequacy, large exposures, derivatives and markets risks, accounting 
standards and loan provisioning.  Moreover, the states have worked towards the potential 
integration of payments systems, which would create solid regional linkages in an important 
area of the world.  This development marks a significant adoption and implementation of the 
Basel Committee’s regulatory and supervisory recommendations on a global basis.925   
 
It also represents a clear instance of what Santos terms “inter-legality”.  Inter-legality connotes 
the growing interaction of many different tiers of legal and normative systems – unofficial, local, 
national, regional, and international - which sometimes conflict and create interference.926  In the 
above instance, the GCC states’ national legal orders – which are almost all comprised of a 
mixture of civil law and elements of the sharia – are affected by regional standardisation 
initiatives in the process of implementing international standards (Basel II).   The process of 
inter-legality testifies to the deep level of global interconnectedness that globalisation 
encourages.  Its impact upon the Law of Islamic Finance may be to exert homogenising 
pressures upon localised Islamic financial structures - Municipal Laws of Islamic Finance - so 
that the industry maintains competitiveness. 
 
                                               
925 Walker, “Regulation”  (2001), 63. 
926 Santos, “Sense”  (1995), 385. 
337 
 
The global recognition of Basel is underpinned by the disciplining forces of the free market as 
well as the leading positions of Western financial institutions in the global economy.  Gulf banks 
are highly dependent on global capital markets as investment outlets, though – unusually - not 
as sources of capital.  Indeed, more than 70 per cent of their holdings are invested in North 
American and European markets.  These same financial institutions rely on Western banks for 
their financial expertise and international networks, including their facilitation of short-term 
liquidity management. Therefore, the necessity to comply with Basel standards confers 
regulatory legitimacy upon institutions so that they are able to effectively operate in the global 
economy. 927  
 
In Malaysia – the largest Islamic financial market in assets - Islamic banks adopted the Capital 
Adequacy Framework for Islamic Banks (CAFIB), issued by the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) in 2006.  The CAFIB is equivalent to the standardised approach introduced by 
Basel II, which we examine in more detail below.928   
 
In the following sub-section Basel capital adequacy requirements are analysed with a view to 
how they affect financial institutions. 
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7.6.3   THE MECHANICS OF BASEL II  
 
Basel II was agreed in 2004 and relies on three complementary elements or pillars.  Firstly, 
pillar I establishes minimum capital requirements based on the application of risk weights to a 
bank’s assets.  In addition to requiring capital reserves for market risk, operational risks are now 
capital-charged, and emphasis has been placed on the measurement of credit risk.929  Adequate 
capitalisation is viewed as a first line of defence in protecting a bank from insolvency and 
thereby insulating the financial system from contagion.  Further, mandating minimum capital 
adequacy requirements is a means to reduce competitive inequality due to differential regulatory 
treatment amongst international banks.  While increased capital adequacy reserves reduce 
profits by forcing banks to retain more of their capital, they are also believed to increase the 
safety and soundness of financial institutions.930  Most banks have been shown to reduce the 
scale of investment to incorporate larger capital buffers.  In turbulent economic periods banks 
tend to hold capital above the minimum capital requirements.  Yet despite increased reserves in 
bad times, bank failure is not necessarily lower relative to periods of market upswing.  Not 
surprisingly, with the exception of very small banks, banks have been shown to fail less in 
economic upswings, suggesting that capital reserve requirements play “a powerful disciplinary 
role in containing excessive risk-taking during economic upswings”.931  
 
                                               
929 Schoon, “Islamic Banking”  (2009), 167. 
930 Smith, “Islamic Banking” (2005),   178. 
931 Haibin Zhu, "Capital Regulation and Banks' Financial Decisions” (2007), 18-20. 
339 
 
Secondly, pillar II mandates supervisory reviews, including an assessment of a bank’s internal 
systems and controls, and risk management procedures.  This assessment may result in an 
adjustment of pillar I capital levels.  Finally, pillar III calls for more stringent market discipline 
including detailed rules on disclosure and transparency.932   
 
The Accord has retained the basic requirement of banks to hold total capital equivalent to 8 
percent of risk-weighted assets.  Its chief innovation consists in allowing banks’ own internal 
systems to assess risks as part of the input to capital calculation.  A detailed set of minimum 
requirements provides a framework to ensure the integrity of internal risk assessments.  
Supervisors are left to judge a bank’s readiness to apply its own internal systems as part of the 
regulatory process.  Furthermore, a number of options exist for banks and supervisors in how 
they deliver the capital requirement for credit and operational risk.   Banks may choose the most 
appropriate approach for their particular operations and financial market infrastructure.  These 
approaches consist of: the standardised approach, which is viewed as appropriate for banks 
lacking sophisticated risk models; or one of two approaches based on the application of internal 
ratings known as the foundation or advanced internal ratings-based approaches (IRB).  This 
flexible set of strategies does not deviate from the establishment of minimum capital 
requirements for internationally active banks, while national authorities may adopt arrangements 
that set higher levels of minimum capital or other supplementary capital measures.933   
 
                                               
932 Davies and Green, “Regulation” (2008), 43. 
933 Ibid., 44-45. 
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This is the approach taken by the UK in its recent push to strengthen the liquidity standards of 
FSA-authorised financial institutions in the aftermath of near financial meltdown.  The regime 
requires firms to increase their liquidity buffers with highly liquid, high-quality government debt 
instruments such as gilts, highly rated bonds from countries of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the United States.  Further, increased buffers may 
consist of reserves held with the Bank of England or with the central banks of the countries 
listed above.934  These added requirements present an additional challenge to Islamic financial 
institutions as bonds and central bank reserve facilities are interest-bearing.   
 
Basel differentiates capital into two categories: tier 1 and tier 2 with requirements based on their 
relative size and relation to assets.  Assets receive different risk-weighting treatment according 
to a standardised risk-grid that assigns greater weight for a bank’s business with the private 
sector as opposed to central governments and for non-OECD states versus those of the 
OECD.935  Risk weighting according to the type of counterparty is designed to differentiate 
between low and high-quality borrowers.  Regulatory capital is determined by aggregating all 
risk-weighted assets and multiplying these by 8 per cent.936  The scheme potentially restricts 
Islamic banks from investing in asset classes such as government bonds which appear 
prominently in banks’ balance sheets, particularly in more volatile markets in developing 
countries.  Observers have also noted that IFI’s preferred mode of trade financing, the 
                                               
934 FSA, "Liquidity” (2008), 54. 
935 Smith, “Islamic Banking” (2005), 179. 
936 Schoon, “Islamic Banking”  (2009),   168. 
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murābaḥah, may be less competitive since these contracts are geared towards private industry 
and thus attract a higher capital charge.  According to the Basel framework, these instruments 
would require a risk-weighting of 100 per cent or more, resulting in a relatively higher risk 
weighting for non-OECD private sector assets.937 Furthermore, non-financial tangible assets 
such as copper, houses and automobiles – the preferred assets of murābaḥah trades – 
generally require banks to retain more capital reserves.938  Ijārah-based structures such as 
those used in UK home mortgage plans are subject to a 50 per cent higher capital risk weighting 
than a conventional home mortgage, in accordance with Basel II’s provisions for mortgage loans 
on residential properties.939  The prevalence of murābaḥah- and ijārah-based contracts in IFIs’ 
balance sheets exposes them to a competitive vulnerability that conventional institutions do not 
face.  
 
Furthermore, Basel II differentiates significant equity positions from debt-based financing so that 
the preferred modes of Islamic financial intermediation, the muḍārabah and mushārakah profit- 
and loss-sharing contracts, would be characterised as equity positions in the banking book.  
Equities are more heavily penalised with respect to regulatory capital allotments, since these 
contracts entitle the holder to a share in the underlying asset which could result in losses.  Basel 
II stipulates that PLS modes of investment should carry a risk weight of 400 per cent, a relatively 
                                               
937 Smith, “Islamic Banking” (2005), 179. 
938 Bakr, "Basel II” (2008), 26. 
939 Noibi, "Regulation” (2010), 185. 
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high liquidity buffer.  Liquidity costs associated with the capital are passed on to the client,940 
which, in general, makes these modes of investment much less attractive to investors.  Our 
subsequent analysis of the peculiarities of Islamic financial intermediation in chapter eight seeks 
to provide answers as to whether this uniform regulatory treatment is justified with respect to 
Islamic finance’s unique mode of intermediation. 
 
Basel II introduces counterparty grading (or a risk-sensitive capital regime) so as to distinguish 
between low and high-quality borrowers.  This disadvantages small financial institutions, which 
are forced to maintain higher capital charges in good times to reduce the level of bank lending.  
Smaller banks tend to be riskier; they are not able to diversify their asset portfolios to the same 
extent as large institutions.  A larger capital buffer relative to their assets effectively mitigates 
the build-up of excessive risk-taking.  Large banks enjoy a 50 per cent reduction in capital 
charges unlike the flat-rate required by the Basel I Accord.  On the other hand, small banks 
must stump up 50-60 per cent more capital under the risk-weighted capital regime.941   
 
Stand-alone Islamic financial institutions tend to be very small relative to their conventional 
counterparts.942  Some observers have remarked that Basel II fosters the consolidation of banks 
in their efforts to achieve economies of scale.  In fact, regulators in several countries, including 
Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia and Sudan have either required institutions to strengthen their 
                                               
940 Schoon, “Islamic Banking”  (2009), 182. 
941  Zhu, "Regulation” (2007), 20-21. 
942 Chapra and Khan, “Regulation” (2000), 57. 
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capital reserves or merge to help buttress banks against counterparty risks.943  However, this 
tendency is lamented in that consolidated “giants” may harbour systemic threats as these may 
become “too big to fail” without unleashing systemic ripples.  Moreover, big conventional banks 
operating Islamic windows will enjoy a large advantage over smaller, indigenous Islamic 
banks944 and thus be able to dictate the terms of the industry. 
 
In sum, however, the risk-weight capital regime is credited with restoring market efficiency “by 
linking capital requirements with asset quality”.  The flat-rate model did not impose sufficient 
capital charges on high-risk loans while effectively penalising high-quality investments as these 
were charged at the same rate as low-quality assets.945  Nevertheless, the Islamic financial 
industry has sought differential treatment on the basis that the types of transactions it practices 
are less risky. Therefore, in 2002 the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), a financial 
standard-setting organisation based in Kuala Lumpur, was established to promulgate prudential 
standards for the supervision of Islamic banks.  In 2005 the IFSB released two prudential 
standards; one on capital adequacy and the other on corporate governance.946   
 
The strategy of creating international Islamic organisations, including the IFSB, AAOIFI and the 
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), to mediate between established international 
bodies such as the Basel Committee and the International Accounting Board (IAB) has been 
                                               
943 Ibid; Shakil, "Basel II” (2005), 162. 
944 Shakil, "Basel II” (2005), 162. 
945 Zhu, "Regulation” (2007), 21. 
946 Archer and Karim, "Challenge” (2007), 3. 
344 
 
adroitly described as a “third way”.  The objective of these institutions strives to carve out 
distinctive standards for Islamic finance while conceding that the industry must integrate into the 
global economy for it to continue to develop.947  Hence the organisations’ charters centre on the 
promulgation of distinctive prudential standards and improved governance and transparency 
within the Islamic financial industry. These institutions are not unlike the non-national Basel 
Committee in that they are transnational organisations whose standard-setting efforts are 
promulgated on a non-binding, informal basis. 
 
Other market forces with galvanising regulatory effect in international capital markets include 
credit rating agencies, which perform a vetting service for investors.  Almost all significant 
corporate or sovereign borrowers are issued a rating by one of the two major agencies, 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.  These agencies also rate debt instruments including 
derivatives.  Ratings are utilised by regulators to assess the quality of portfolios held by financial 
institutions, and to determine the amount of capital reserves needed.  The Basel II Accord has 
generated heightened importance for these ratings, particularly in the more sophisticated 
versions.948  In 2002 the Islamic financial industry responded to this development with the 
creation of the International Islamic Ratings Agency (IIRA).  However, the industry’s relations 
with the major ratings agencies have been contentious.  Islamic market practitioners complain of 
having to “meet conventional standards or suffer the consequences”.949  There is concern that 
                                               
947 Smith, “Islamic Banking” (2005), 172. 
948 Davies and Green, “Regulation”  (2008), 67-68. 
949 Smith, “Islamic Banking” (2005), 182. 
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ratings agencies do not adequately take into account Islamic finance’s unique mode of financial 
intermediation.  
 
7.6.4   BASEL III CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY REFORMS 
 
Basel III is likely to have a very significant impact upon Islamic financial institutions.950  Its 
implementation will considerably increase the quality of banks' capital and significantly raise the 
required level of their capital.  In particular, the agreement calls for core tier 1 capital to increase 
from Basel II’s requirement of 2 per cent to 7 per cent.951  A new capital conservation buffer 
comprises 2.5 per cent of the increase.  The buffer will be composed of common equity – after 
the application of deductions like deferred taxes – and will force banks whose capital ratio dips 
below the buffer to restrict payouts on dividends, share buybacks and bonuses.952  The 
agreement raises the total tier 1 capital ratio to 6 per cent from its current level of 4 per cent.  
Core tier 1 capital is composed of top quality capital such as retained earnings or common 
equity.953 
 
Particularly troublesome for Islamic financial institutions is the intention to implement the world’s 
first set of common liquidity requirements under the agreement.  These would ensure that banks 
                                               
950 Philipp Härle et al., "Basel III” (2010), 5. 
951 Caruana, "Basel III” (2010), annex. 
952 Reuters, "Factbox” (2010). 
953 Caruana, "Basel III” (2010), annex. 
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have sufficient liquidity so that they would be able to withstand very severe short-term financial 
shocks.954  The goal of the new standards is to encourage financial institutions to maintain a 
prudent short-term liquidity profile.  Liquid assets would be comprised mostly of sovereign debt 
but may also include high-quality corporate debt.  Sovereign and corporate debt instruments are 
interest-based assets, so IFIs will need to make alternative arrangements for fulfilling rigorous 
liquidity standards.   
 
Higher capital and liquidity requirements are believed to increase the cost of lending incurred by 
banks without accounting for lending restrictions such as credit rationing.  For example, each 
percentage point increase in the capital ratio increases the cost of credit by 13 basis points.  
The additional costs of meeting new liquidity standards amount to a 25 basis point increase in 
lending spreads – assuming risk weighted assets remain stable.  However, lower regulatory 
capital is required as a direct result of banks’ holding of low-risk assets, thus resulting in a 
lending spread of 14 basis points.955  Some of the costs are likely to be met by increased 
productivity.  Despite these added costs and considerable uncertainty as to the magnitude of 
the effect, evidence suggests that higher capital and liquidity requirements may significantly 
minimise the likelihood of banking crises.956   Some observers argue, however, that increased 
capital requirements encourage heightened competitive pressures, i.e. banks are forced to carry 
the same amount of tier 1 capital and thus the rents they offer embody similar cost structures.  
                                               
954 BIS, "Reform Package” (2010), annex. 
955  BCBS, "Assessment” (2010), 10. 
956 Ibid., 9. 
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As a result, banks may be encouraged to take greater risks on more profitable parts of their 
portfolios.957 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The theory of regulation centres on different ideological perspectives concerning the content 
and meaning of liberty. Some argue that liberty cannot exist without augmenting it with 
economic and social rights that make the fulfilment of one’s choices possible.  Without these 
rights citizens would not have the capacity to understand the meaning of liberty.  Others see 
liberty in the absolute autonomy of the individual, unfettered by the state, and wholly free to 
pursue their own interests and preferences.  In practice, democratic countries compromise 
between these positions by limiting autonomy to the extent that social and economic justice is 
available to everyone to varying degrees.  Regulation involves a trade-off between the 
objectives of social welfare and the autonomy of the individual. In public law the meaning of 
social welfare is subjective and depends on a country’s history, society, culture and religious 
values. 
 
In the United Kingdom, liberal values underscore its parliamentary democracy and free market 
economy, the twin institutions of the modern liberal economy.  A prototypical liberal economy 
does not dictate the preferences or wants of its citizens – although society certainly does 
                                               
957 Larosiere, "Basel” (2010), 13. 
348 
 
influence an individual’s preferences in a number of complex ways.  Since the 1980s, however, 
the UK has fostered a neoliberal economic model that pursues free trade, deregulation and free 
markets.  The neo-liberal creed holds that individuals should be empowered to make their own 
choices; social welfare represents the aggregate of individual welfare.  Islamic finance may 
struggle to be relevant within this economic framework.  In particular, the question arises 
whether Islamic finance can adhere to the ethical and religious values of the sharia within that 
system. 
 
The principal objective of financial services regulation is to ensure the stability of the economy 
and to foster the efficient allocation of resources.  Conduct of business regulation is designed to 
protect consumers from financial practices that take advantage of their lack of information and 
financial sophistication. Financial institutions, whether they are conventional or Islamic, occupy 
a pivotal role in the economy and hence are subject to extensive government intervention.  In 
the UK, financial institutions are regulated by the Financial Services Authority, the universal 
regulatory authority.   The UK’s historical approach to regulation has been non-interventionist 
with substantial autonomy delegated to financial institutions.  This approach was characterised 
by a combination of self-regulation and professional oversight within networks of professional 
associations and business elites. The FSA, a modern regulatory agency formed from nine 
predecessor authorities in 2000, applies a rules-based approach meant to satisfy regulatory 
principles according to the specific circumstances of individual financial institutions.   
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Since the 1980s, deregulation, international free trade and free national markets, amongst other 
reasons, have fostered an explosive surge in financial innovation and financial market 
complexity. As a result financial intermediation has undergone fundamental changes.  Banks’ 
traditional role as financial intermediaries has shifted from taking and holding borrowers’ loans 
on their own books to acting as facilitators of their clients’ financial requirements on capital 
markets.  Market trading activities have expanded exponentially and banks, particularly in large 
developed countries, no longer see their role as traditional financial intermediaries.   Derivatives 
trading that mostly took place in regulated exchanges has given way to a wide variety of over-
the-counter, bespoke financial instruments such as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), 
which enable practitioners to spread risk bundles to a much larger number of participants on a 
global basis. Large financial institutions, which are now globally active, have conglomerated 
their provision of financial products and services so that retail, investment and insurance 
functions are provided under one roof.  The complexity of the financial environment poses 
challenges to all financial institutions.  Islamic financial institutions are particularly affected by 
the innovative environment that sometimes conflicts with Islamic principles.    
 
The European Union has been at the forefront of an international effort to standardise regulation 
across the EU and thus to shore up the imperfections and inequalities of the common financial 
markets.  EU financial directives embody regulatory standards that must be adopted by all EU 
member states. The EU’s Capital Requirements Directive codifies and gives effect to the Basel 
II Accord.  The EU’s adoption of Basel I and II blurs the boundary between regional and global 
banking regulation.  The United Kingdom implemented the EU Capital Accord within the 
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Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  Therefore, Islamic financial institutions based in the 
UK must comply with the Directive. 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is responsible for creating international 
regulatory standards that embody certain minimum rules to which all banks operating 
internationally must comply.  Despite the non-binding character of Basel standards, most states 
are compelled to adopt its standards.   The 2004 Basel II Accord represents a continuing effort 
to strengthen international banking standards.  Standards were negotiated and recommended 
by the G10 leading industrial countries.  Negotiations did not include a single country in which 
Islamic finance comprises a significant market share, implying that such standards represent the 
commercial interests and economic model of leading states.  
 
Basel II capital adequacy requirements establish minimum capital requirements based on the 
application of risk weights to a bank’s assets.  Capital adequacy requirements are designed to 
protect banking systems from bank runs and other systemic vulnerabilities.  Adequate 
capitalisation is viewed as a first line of defence in protecting a bank from insolvency and 
thereby insulating the financial system from contagion.  However, increased capital adequacy 
reserves reduce profits by forcing banks to withhold more of their capital.  Islamic financial 
transactions require relatively high risk-weightings as a result of the commercial risks associated 
with commodities trading, the types of non-OECD private-sector counterparts they do business 
with, and the equity partnerships that Islamic finance favours.  Small financial institutions – 
stand-alone IFIs are generally small – are disadvantaged to the extent that they must retain a 
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greater proportion of capital relative to their assets than large financial institutions do.  The 
Basel III Accord, recently agreed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, proposes 
increased capital requirements and the world’s first set of common liquidity requirements.  Both 
requirements will seriously impact the Islamic financial model.  The next chapter deals with the 
FSA’s regulation of Islamic financial institutions. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE REGULATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter analyses the regulation of Islamic financial institutions in the UK and the 
challenges that financial services regulation presents for Islamic financial intermediation.  It is 
shown that the FSA’s strategy for regulating Islamic banks is guided by a conventional rationale.  
Namely, the substantive economic risks of Islamic banks and their processes of financial 
intermediation are the central focus of regulation.  The qualitative risks associated with IFI’s 
sharia law-making capacity are not the state’s concern.  It is asserted that this strategy exposes 
Muslim consumers to “religious risks” that might result in destabilising financial outcomes. 
 
This chapter is first concerned with the theoretical model of Islamic financial intermediation.   
Second, an analysis of this model in practice is undertaken. Third, the sharia audit process is 
reviewed and, finally, the FSA’s approach to sharia supervisory committees concludes the 
analysis.   
 
8.1 THE NATURE OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
 
Regulators must understand a financial institution’s risks in order to regulate effectively.  Islamic 
financial institutions and the products they offer comprise a unique cocktail of risks that 
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distinguish the industry from its conventional peer.  These risks arise as a result of the modern 
Islamic contracts utilised in Islamic financial products as well as the legal, governance and 
liquidity infrastructure of Islamic financial institutions.958  Both IFIs and regulators are concerned 
with designing effective risk management systems that recognise and effectively manage the 
specific risks in Islamic financial products.  In particular, financial institutions must concern 
themselves with risk measurement and disclosure as a means of fulfilling the new Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel II) and the implementation of new liquidity standards. 959 Basel II and the recent 
strengthening of liquidity systems and controls require an appropriate capital buffer depending 
on the level of these risk measurements. 
 
It is helpful to examine an Islamic financial institution’s balance sheet so as to conceptualise the 
unique nature of Islamic financial intermediation (See table 1 below).  On the liabilities side, IFIs 
accept deposits on the basis of the muḍārabah.  Deposits/investments are usually offered in 
current, savings, investment and special investment accounts.  Savings and investment 
accounts are available on a restricted and unrestricted basis.  Unrestricted accounts entitle 
banks to invest depositors’ investments according to their own discretion; they do not permit 
depositors to issue instructions with respect to the object, time period or jurisdiction of the 
investment.  Restricted accounts designate a specific portfolio of investments that are pre-
agreed between the depositor and the bank.960  As muḍārib (agent) the bank accepts the 
                                               
958 Sundararajan, "Risk” (2007), 41. 
959 See FSA, "Strengthening Liquidity Standards” (2008). 
960 Ali, "Islamic Banking” (2011), 7-8. 
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deposit from the customer (rabb al-māl) on the basis that it will retain a pre-specified percentage 
share of the profits – if the venture is profitable – from its investment of the money with an 
entrepreneur.  In the event of failure the muḍārib does not share in any loss attributable to the 
investment other than his loss of time and effort in locating and contracting an appropriate 
investment.  Further, the muḍārib is not allowed to offer any collateral to the rabb al-māl.  As 
soon as the contract has been concluded the bank (this time as rabb al-māl) is not allowed to 
monitor the entrepreneur or enforce additional actions by legal devices. 961 Deposits can be 
made in a multitude of pre-agreed maturities, which range from one month upwards and may be 
withdrawn either immediately or upon advance notice.  Distributions between the bank and 
depositors are allocated – according to a pre-determined ratio – usually with 80 per cent 
channelled to investors and 20 per cent to depositors.962 
Table 1: Generalized Balance Sheet of an Islamic Bank 
                       ASSETS                        LIABILITIES 
Cash balances Demand deposits (amāna) 
Financing assets (Murābaḥah, salam, 
ijārah, istiṣnā‘ ) 
Investment accounts (muḍārabah ) 
Investment assets (muḍārabah , 
Mushārakah ) 
Special investment accounts 
(muḍārabah , Mushārakah ) 
Fee-based services (ju‘ālah, kafālah, 
and so forth) 
Reserves 
Non-banking assets (property) Equity capital 
Source: Author’s Own 
                                               
961 Lewis and Algaoud, Islamic Banking  (2001),  77. 
962 El-Hawary et al., “Regulating” (2004), 12. 
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Theoretically, these deposits would not constitute a liability for the bank; rather they would take 
the form of an equity investment.  According to the model, an IFI’s portfolio of well-diversified 
assets on the assets side, and equity investment-like profit- and loss-sharing structures on the 
other, would create a more efficient and stable mode of financial intermediation.  The model is 
often referred to as a “pass-through” method of financial mediation on the basis that IFIs do not 
carry risk on their banking books associated with investors’ deposits, as all risks are carried by 
depositors/investors, save for misconduct or negligence.963  
 
In practice, the actual utilisation of funds by IFIs deviates starkly from the theoretical model.  
Islamic banks investment of depositor’s/investor’s funds should undertake to screen potential 
investment projects on behalf of investors/depositors and thus engage in partnership (sharikah).  
Yet, the typical balance sheet of an IFI shows a clear preference on the assets side for less 
risky trade-finance assets of considerably shorter maturities such as murābaḥah, istiṣnā‘, Ijārah 
and salam (See figure 1).964  Trade-based instruments backed by assets and leasing (ijārah) 
products dominate the assets portfolio of IFIs.  Together these can constitute 80 per cent and 
upwards of total assets with the remainder devoted to profit- and loss-sharing investments.965  
The use of short-term trade financing structures backed by real assets minimises the risks of 
                                               
963 Greuning and Iqbal, "Banking” (2007), 19. 
964 Ibid., 17. 
965 El-Hawary et al., “Regulating” (2004), 18. 
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verification, moral hazard and adverse selection.966  Further, vulnerability to liquidity problems 
on the liabilities side of the balance sheet encourages the use of short-term liquid contracts.967   
 
Figure 1 depicts asset compositions from a sample of 30 Islamic banks in 2008 located in 
countries of Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  The murābaḥah is by far the dominant mode 
of financing used by Islamic banks in all MENA countries, accounting for more than 90 per cent 
in some countries.  In others, it figures less than 50 per cent.  The average proportion of 
murābaḥah financing across the MENA region is 75 per cent.  The ijārah contract is the second 
most utilised structure in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Qatar.  Istiṣnā‘  is the third most popular 
structure.  Only in Saudi Arabia was the muḍārabah the second largest mode of financing.968  
Therefore, from an economic point of view, Islamic finance closely resembles conventional 
financial practices, since its preferred investments are less risky and offer financial institutions 
greater means of control and hedging opportunities.969 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
966 Lewis and Algaoud, Islamic Banking  (2001), 72. 
967 El-Hawary et al., “Regulating” (2004), 18. 
968 Ali, "Islamic Banking” (2011), 18. 
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Figure 2: Percentage Composition of Islamic Financial Structures Across a Range of Islamic 
Banks in MENA Countries in 2008 
 
Source Ali, “Islamic Banking” (2011), 18. 
 
However, the high concentration of asset-backed trade financing structures limits IFIs’ capacity 
to achieve maximum profitability from their portfolios by narrowing investment options to short-
term and less profitable investments.  Further, asset-backed instruments expose IFIs to 
heightened levels of credit, operational, market and exchange rate risks, which pose important 
questions for regulatory authorities.  Recall that these types of investments are considered very 
risky from a capital adequacy perspective. 
 
From a regulatory perspective, PLS modes of finance may increase the overall level of risk on 
the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet.  In particular, the degree of operational risk is a crucial 
consideration for regulatory authorities.  The management of PLS modes of financing requires 
investment activities that are not normally undertaken by conventional banks.  These include the 
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determination of profit-and-loss sharing ratios from assorted investments as well as the ongoing 
auditing of investment projects to ensure that projects are properly managed and appropriately 
valuated.  As mentioned earlier, IFIs have no legal recourse to control the investment activities 
of agents/entrepreneurs.  According to muḍārabah, agents are entitled to direct the investment 
activities to the best of their ability.  Furthermore, unlike trade-financing transactions, PLS 
modes cannot be hedged with collateral or other guarantees to reduce counterparty credit risk 
since the sharia prohibits these.970 
 
Known as the principal-agent problem in conventional finance, the separation of management 
and ownership entails moral hazard, because managers may not possess the right incentives to 
maximise profits as owners would have them do.  The principal-agent problem arises because 
of the asymmetric information between the manager and the owner; the owners/stockholders of 
a firm do not possess complete information about the manager’s activities and the monitoring 
process is costly in terms of time and money.971  Therefore, the fact that the equity contract is a 
less attractive contract in conventional finance offers a clear indication of why PLS modes of 
financing in Islamic finance are also underutilised.   
 
On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, PLS modes of financing pose fiduciary risks in the 
case of misconduct or negligence on the part of the muḍārib.  In the case of misconduct or 
negligence a profit-sharing and investment account (PSIA) would lose its equity features and 
                                               
970 Sundararajan and Errico, "Institutions” (2002), 5-6. 
971 Mishkin, “Economics”  (2004), 181-82. 
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become a liability of the bank, giving rise to prudential concerns.972  AAOIFI defines fiduciary 
risk as the act of becoming legally liable for a breach of the investment contract either for non-
compliance with sharia rules or for mismanagement of investors’ funds.973  In the case that an 
IFI were found to be liable for breach of its fiduciary responsibilities toward depositors it could 
lead to both direct and indirect losses.  Indirect losses resulting from damage to its reputation 
would lead to a decrease in the price of its listed shares.  A loss of confidence in the financial 
institution could lead to a bank run, exposing share holders and investment account holders 
(IAH) to substantial economic losses.974  
 
Furthermore, the sharia requires account holders to bear the risk of loss in the case that the 
bank’s investment loses money.  This primary feature, coupled with the information asymmetry 
via unrestricted account holders, engenders significant moral hazard since banks’ incentives are 
directed toward risk-taking and maintaining low levels of capital.975  In general, the muḍārabah 
offers a bank’s management significant freedom in fund management decisions.  Yet there is a 
total lack of transparency with respect to management’s investment choices; with regard to 
management’s ability to alter profit shares as a reward due to the muḍārib; in the allocation of 
liquidity costs between shareholders and investment account holders; and, finally, in the 
                                               
972 Bhambra, "Implications” (2007), 207. 
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management’s choice whether losses should be absorbed by internal reserves or whether these 
costs should be passed on to investment account holders and/or shareholders.976 
 
Moreover, banks, in order to offer investment yields competitive with conventional financial 
institutions, establish profit reserves so as to “smooth” any potential losses from 
depositors/investors deposits; thus, in effect, negating market risk on the part of the investor.977  
In fact, profit-and-loss sharing investments, which theoretically do not guarantee the value of the 
deposit, in practice almost never pass on a loss to depositors.978  Therefore, IFIs’ own capital is 
exposed to investment losses on the assets managed for investors.979  IFIs may forgo all or part 
of their share of the profits to be able make these transfers.  Known as displaced commercial 
risk (DCR) this practice varies between countries as some regulators require IFIs to carry 
virtually all of the risk.980 The regulatory consequences of DCR leave regulatory authorities 
uncertain about the consistency of a key product and, indeed, with respect to the Islamic 
banking model.981   
 
In addition to accepting deposits on the basis of profit- and loss-sharing contracts, Islamic 
financial institutions differentiate themselves from conventional institutions by combining 
                                               
976 Montanaro, “Islamic Banking” (2010), 116. 
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different functions of banking under a single roof.  Brokerage, investment banking, and 
commercial banking form the activities of IFIs, similar to that of the universal bank model.982  
However, universal banks offering conventional products separate fund management and 
investment operations from commercial banking operations according to function.  Further, 
universal banks erect firewalls to separate investment and commercial financial activities legally, 
financially and managerially.983  In practice conventional banks’ segregation of banking functions 
may not protect institutions from systemic shocks such as that of the 2008 financial crisis, but it 
does minimise inherent conflicts of interest and provide a buffer between banking activities.  IFIs 
conduct the same activities without any such separation which may lead to greater instances of 
conflict of interest or insider dealing within firms.984   
 
Furthermore, current Islamic financial practice pools funds mobilised on the basis of muḍārabah 
with equity holders’ capital; thus barriers between different types of accounts are “treated as one 
large bucket”.985  According to the theoretical model, a clear separation of risks and 
performance associated with individual investment projects clarifies the rights and 
responsibilities of all involved stakeholders.  In practice, the proceeds of all investments, 
including demand deposits, are divided amongst shareholders and investment account holders 
relative to their share of the capital.  An investment account holder’s return equals the total 
revenue minus the percentage due to the muḍārib or bank’s shareholders.  Therefore, 
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shareholders and investment account holders must bear the credit and market risks in 
proportion to their investment.  Yet, only the shareholders must countenance operating risks 
associated with illegal and negligible behaviour by the bank’s management.986  From a 
regulatory perspective, the fact that different stakeholders carry different risks and thus require 
different safeguards, may strengthen the argument that uniform regulatory treatment is 
insufficient or overly restrictive.987 
 
While most Islamic banks report these funds on-balance sheet, many banks have placed them 
off-balance sheet.  Those banks that report investment accounts off-balance sheet clearly 
regard these as fiduciary investments, since risk is borne by the investor.  On a global basis 
regulatory authorities have required different accounting treatments of investment accounts that 
render financial comparability extremely difficult, if not impossible.  Moreover, the variability of 
this accounting treatment directly impacts capital adequacy requirements, liquidity or treasury 
management, as well as fiduciary issues with respect to the evaluation of funds transfers 
between investment account holders’ funds and those of equity holders or the bank’s own 
funds.988  In the UK, financial institutions’ annual report and financial statements are undertaken 
according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as adopted by the European 
Union and implemented in the UK Companies Act 2006.989  Therefore, the certainty and 
consistency of accounting treatment in the UK removes the disadvantages of incomparability 
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and greatly facilitates the regulator’s task.  Questions remain, however, regarding the 
appropriateness of conventional accounting treatments of Islamic financial products in 
jurisdictions in which accounting standards vary.  Guidelines determining ratios for capital 
adequacy, other reserves and provisions as well as overall liquidity may be more meaningfully 
expressed under AAOIFI accounting standards than IFRS.990  
 
The next section examines the way in which the Financial Services Authority addresses the 
unique risks associated with Islamic finance. 
 
8.2  THE FSA REGULATORY APPROACH TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
In the United Kingdom the FSA is confronted with the challenge of determining the appropriate 
definition of products offered by IFIs.  The economic substance and outcome of Islamic financial 
transactions are generally similar to conventional products while the legal structure varies quite 
significantly, and, in turn, contains different risks.  In particular, the FSMA 2000’s RAO may not 
apply to Islamic financial products and services.  This is critical, since the regulatory definition of 
products determines to whom financial products can be marketed.  If a financial product falls 
outside the regulatory framework, restrictions may arise concerning potential investors.  These 
considerations should prompt firms to consider whether the products they wish to market “can 
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be accommodated within the Regulated Activities Order”.991  These considerations underscore 
the constraints that the established regulatory framework poses to an industry which seeks to 
alter economic outcomes.  If alternative financial transactions are not able to be categorised 
according to conventional standards, IFIs are restricted from bringing these to market. 
 
Furthermore, section 5 (2) of the FSMA 2000 RAO defines a deposit as a sum of money paid on 
terms “under which it will be repaid, with or without interest or premium, and either on demand 
or at a time or in circumstances agreed by or on behalf of the person making the payment and 
the person receiving it”.992 Therefore, UK statutory law requires “capital certainty” for all bank 
deposits.  Unless a bank is insolvent, it is required to return a depositor’s principal plus any 
interest earned, if applicable.  In the case of investment products - other than deposits - in which 
the return of the principal is not assured, financial institutions are subject to more extensive 
regulatory requirements as well as more extensive obligations under the FSA’s Treating 
Customers Fairly (TCF) initiative, which provides enhanced consumer protections for retail 
customers.993  Furthermore, deposits and retail investments of up to £50,000 are guaranteed in 
the UK by the FSA’s financial services compensation scheme,994 as required by the Deposit 
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Guarantee Scheme (DGS) directive.995  The directive was implemented in part XV of FSMA 
2000, which covers all regulated activities.996 
 
The UK deposit guarantee scheme runs up against the sharia prohibition of gharar. 
Furthermore, the scheme invests its funds in interest-bearing accounts and is not structured to 
segregate Islamic funds from conventional banks’ interest-bearing funds.  Some states have 
found solutions to these problems.  Turkey has taken pains to engineer a solution by 
establishing a sharia-compatible deposit takaful in which Islamic funds are pooled. Malaysia has 
also launched a deposit insurance scheme that segregates Islamic deposits.997  This particular 
problem has yet to be addressed in the United Kingdom.   
 
The implication for Islamic financial institutions is that they are not permitted to offer profit- and 
loss-sharing accounts on the liabilities side of their balance sheets in the United Kingdom.  Of 
course, this does not prohibit IFIs from offering PLS modes on the asset side.  On the liabilities 
side, IFIs may offer an account in which a customer’s money is invested into a pool from which 
returns are paid and the capital is guaranteed.  In the case of loss, the bank is required, in 
accordance with the law, to provide funds from its own resources to ensure that customers are 
repaid in full.  Customers are given the right to elect whether they wish to receive full repayment 
in the case that losses arise and are advised that they will be acting contrary to the sharia, if 
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they choose to accept full repayment.998  Thus, the FSA effectively does not allow PLS modes 
as deposit-taking instruments.  In doing so a whole host of principal-agent risks, including 
consumer protection issues, are avoided on the liabilities side of an IFI’s balance sheet.  
Further, income recognition policy and the funding structure of ventures, i.e. IFI’s profit 
distribution between investment account holders and shareholders, do not need to be regulated.  
As long as returns on investment account holder funds and shareholder funds are properly 
disclosed, market discipline should ensure that appropriate distributions are made.  If the IFI, 
acting as an agent, appropriates too large a share of the profit, its competitors will seek to 
attract its investors/depositors.999  Finally, the FSA’s prohibition of PLS modes avoids 
contentious problems related to corporate governance. In particular, investment account holders 
rightly do not have an interest in shareholder- type rights as long as they are assured of their 
principal investment.  However, the issue continues to bedevil jurisdictions in which investment 
account holders’ equity-like holdings are not allowed participation in the governance of the 
financial institution.1000  
 
In April 2008 the IBB introduced a deposit-taking investment account known as wakālah in 
response to the particular requirements of British Muslim consumers.  A wakālah is a traditional 
Islamic contract, the equivalent of agency.  The wakālah investment account enables 
depositors/investors funds to be managed individually on a profit- and loss-sharing basis; funds 
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are not pooled with the monies of other investors and the bank offers customers an expected 
rate of return.  If, for any reason there are doubts that the expected rate of return will not be 
achieved, the deposit plus any accrued monies are returned to the customer.1001  The wakālah 
offers Muslim investors a compromise in the modern economy.  Depositors are able to 
deposit/invest their monies with the assurance that their principal investments will be 
safeguarded.  Moreover, they can take satisfaction in employing a traditional Islamic structure to 
facilitate their requirements without directly contravening the sharia.  Contracts resembling the 
wakālah such as wadī‘ah yad ḍamānah (guaranteed safekeeping) or al-qard (loan) are used as 
guaranteed principal contracts throughout the industry.1002  
 
Yet the concept of profit- and loss-sharing as a means of fund mobilisation – which is the 
cornerstone of Islamic financial intermediation - is prevented from being fully realised in the UK 
and in many other jurisdictions.  The result is that FSA-authorised IFIs accept deposits in an 
almost identical manner as conventional banks do.  In the event the state’s uniform regulatory 
approach impacts the type of financial intermediation that Islamic finance envisages by 
preventing it from occurring.  The socio-economic values and benefits associated with PLS 
modes are not realised.  On the other hand, however, it is not entirely certain that Muslim 
depositors/investors truly desire a true profit- and loss-sharing mode of finance.  It would be 
erroneous to assume that a Muslim consumer’s desire for religiously authentic products could 
supplant their need for the stability and predictability of modern financial practices or for returns 
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that approximate conventional earnings.  While it has been documented that the religious 
element of Islamic financial products represents the most important factor in British Muslims’ 
uptake of such products, in practice the higher cost of Islamic financial products such as Islamic 
home mortgages has prevented a vigorous uptake of such investments.1003 
 
Other factors besides financial services law are involved in determining the extent to which the 
LIF is practiced.  After all, investment banks may still offer investors PLS modes of investment; 
these types of investments, however, do not ensure investors’ principal amounts.  To date no 
empirical research suggests that Muslim investors’ religious and cultural motives for their uptake 
of Islamic financial products are decisive, so that these same consumers would forgo high and 
stable returns as offered by conventional banks.1004  In effect, Islamic banks’ decisions to 
engineer and employ certain types of Islamic financial contracts, some of them tailor-made, are 
based on ensuring a competitive return for their customers.  In sum, Muslim consumer/investor 
decisions are not intrinsically different than conventional preferences1005 and this is a very 
significant factor shaping the modern Law of Islamic Finance. 
 
The authorised mode of Islamic banking in the UK highlights the fact that the secular state 
allows individuals’ discretion in whether they choose to employ or adhere to the LIF.  
Underscoring this fact, conventional institutions operating so-called “Islamic windows” in the UK 
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are not subject to any separate authorisation requirements other than the permissions and 
authorisations already obtained as a conventional financial institution.  Only if such institutions 
were to establish subsidiaries or other separate legal entities, would these require separate 
authorisation to conduct business.1006  The religious characteristics of Islamic windows’ financial 
offerings are of no direct concern to the state.   
 
This state of affairs evokes the fine balance of an intricately carved social understanding, not 
wholly dissimilar to that found in other Western countries.  The balance affords little room for 
religion in the public sphere, even though the Church of England occupies a historical and 
symbolic role as the religion of the state.  Instead, the practice of one’s religion is deemed a 
private matter, appropriately undertaken in the privacy of one’s own home.  Yet this social frame 
of mind is not in any way exclusive of the consciousness and lifestyle of British Muslims.  For 
example, an integral feature of the social function of Islamic banks concerns the annual 
calculation and payment of zakāh (almsgiving) payments.  Zakāh is etymologically linked to 
zaka (to be pure), and suggests the idea of growth to underscore the fact that the giving of one’s 
resources represents both a spiritual cleansing of oneself as well as one’s property.  It is 
commonly understood as a tax on property rather than income, and is payable only on certain 
kinds of property, namely those which represent growth or are devoted to growth, actually or 
virtually.  Hence, it is also a means of income redistribution.1007  The IBB does not undertake 
this social task on the part of its shareholders; rather it suggests that its own shareholders 
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should calculate their own private contributions and donate these to their preferred charity.1008   
Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs) should, according to theory, calculate zakāh obligations on a 
per share basis as this role figures prominently in IFI’s conception of their greater social 
good.1009  Therefore, it would be short-sighted and somewhat prejudicial to believe that the 
social understanding of religion’s role in society is limited to the majority population. By 
implication, it is implicitly agreed that a uniform system of regulation offers the most effective, 
equitable and legitimate means of meeting everyone’s financial requirements and investment 
decisions. The following section concerns a unique feature of Islamic finance, namely, the 
sharia audit process. 
      
8.3  THE SHARIA AUDIT PROCESS 
 
The Sharia audit process is an integral part of the corporate governance of IFIs.  The SSB is the 
primary organ responsible for ensuring the integrity and credibility of the IFI by issuing fatwas 
and auditing the sharia compliance in all aspects of the products, operations and activities of the 
financial institution.1010 This includes both the ex ante and ex post aspects of all IF transactions, 
which indicates that both the legal composition of contracts and the way in which an Islamic 
financial product is transacted, must be reviewed for their sharia compliance.1011 Furthermore, 
the audit process involves the review of investment policies, the disposal of non-sharia-
                                               
1008 IBB, "Report” (2009), 9. 
1009 Schoon, “Islamic Banking”  (2009), 139.  
1010 IFSB, “Guiding Principles” (2006), para 47. 
1011 Ibid., para 48 (i). 
371 
 
compliant income, the monitoring of charitable activities as well as the calculation and payment 
of zakāh.1012 An SSB should certify in an annual report that an IFI has complied with the sharia 
in the all of the tasks outlined above.1013 
 
In practice, the internal sharia audit systems of IFIs differ according to provisions stipulated in 
firms’ articles of association or, in some jurisdictions, according to national regulatory 
requirements.  Yet, according to a survey of 13 IFIs, all firms were responsible for their own ex 
ante monitoring of sharia compliance.  Only infrequently, did national or international regulators 
stipulate SSB-rules that detailed specific competencies, decision-making authority and the 
composition of such bodies.1014  Regulators who do oversee IFIs’ internal sharia auditing 
processes delegate responsibility for the design and functioning of such systems to IFIs, which 
allows secular regulators the freedom to regulate these processes indirectly.1015   
 
For example, the articles of association of the Islamic Bank of Britain describe its sharia-related 
supervision accordingly: “It is intended that the business affairs of the company shall be 
conducted in accordance with Sharia’a.  Activities of the Company will at all times be supervised 
by the Sharia’a supervisory committee.  The Directors of the Company are obliged to ensure 
that the business of the Company is at all times Sharia’a compliant”.1016  This minimal disclosure 
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does not clarify SSB procedures for ensuring these objectives; nor does it offer transparency in 
how the SSB arrives at fatwas that sanction the products and services it offers, despite the 
IFSB’s recommendations that IFIs do so.1017   
 
Sharia scholars should perform regular audits of new products or transactions and issue fatwas, 
if they are satisfied that the product meets sharia guidelines.1018  Straightforward products such 
as murābaḥah, ijārah and wakālah usually involve minimal oversight due to their relatively 
standardised forms.  However, more innovative and complex products such as sukuk, wa‘ad-
based instruments (derivatives-based hedging instruments) and hybrid sharia structures require 
direct and prolonged involvement in the development process.1019  According to the industry, 
many complex products are channelled through a long development process only to be rejected 
as ḥarām, or forbidden.1020   
 
Despite these safeguards, IFIs’ sharia audit systems raise serious concerns whether a 
conventional regulator is equipped to deal with them effectively. In particular, conflicts of interest 
often surround the appointment of members of the sharia board.  The AAOIFI standard for this 
stipulates that members should be appointed by the Board of Trustees for a four year term1021 
so that SSB members are not subject to any undue influence by the executive management, 
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which should not have the authority to appoint or to dismiss them.1022 While the application of 
this standard varies from country to country, according to one survey conducted by the 
International Institute in Islamic Thought, almost 80 per cent of sharia board member 
appointments were made directly by management.  Another survey conducted by Hasan Yusuf 
Dawud in 1996 found that only 39 per cent of appointments were made by shareholders.1023  
Returning to the example of the Islamic Bank of Britain, SSB members there are appointed and 
suspended directly by directors, so sharia scholars are, in effect, dependent on the firm’s 
management for their continued employment.1024  They thus have an economic stake in the firm.   
 
In practice conflicts of interest may be mitigated to some extent by sharia scholars’ ethical 
standards and the high cost that would be inflicted upon their reputation and career prospects in 
the case that their services were deemed to have denigrated the sharia.1025  However, the risk 
raises important questions about whether SSBs are in a position to credibly perform their duties 
to the best of their ability and religious conscience. In assuming the role of vetting Islamic 
financial products and services for their sharia compatibility, the SSB assumes responsibility for 
the religious interests of the Muslim consumer/investor.   
 
Another survey conducted by the International Institute of Islamic Thought brought an equally 
vexing problem to attention.  The survey sought to uncover the methods by which sharia 
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scholars came to know of a sharia-relevant problem or issue which required their expertise.  A 
range of responses were submitted.  SSBs that had established permanent offices in IFIs and 
whose duty it was to vet all products and related documentation totalled 10.8 per cent of all 
respondents.  SSBs which conducted periodical meetings to address issues brought forth by the 
management totalled a staggering 48.5 per cent.  Only 6.2 per cent of respondents addressed 
sharia issues by way of regular audit.  Finally, 27.3 per cent described having employed 
alternative methodologies to undertake sharia-related tasks.1026 The implication of this survey, if 
it is to be taken as a general trend, is disturbing.  The disproportionate percentage of SSB 
respondents who come to address issues of sharia-relevance via their firm’s management 
reveals a strong level of dependence upon the availability, amount and quality of information 
supplied by the management.  While there are a number of reasons why a firm’s management 
could fail to disclose sharia-relevant information to its SSB, the circumstances demonstrate the 
pitfalls of moral hazard that threaten the credibility of the internal audit system. 
 
A related issue concerns the qualifications and skills of sharia supervisory board members and 
hence the quality and consistency of judgment employed in making sharia-related decisions.  
Sharia scholars are expected to be knowledgeable in Islamic law as well as financial and 
accounting practices.  Yet, in practice, very few scholars, on a global basis, are considered to 
possess expertise in all these disciplines.1027  Moreover, no formalised system of accreditation 
or professional association has been established so as to provide regulators with the knowledge 
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and confidence that sharia scholars are competent and capable of fulfilling their auditing and 
advisory roles, despite IFSB recommendations.1028  While Malaysia has taken steps to remedy 
this problem by creating a national sharia advisory council, other countries such as the UK have 
been very reluctant to do so for reasons that have been examined.1029  However, the rather low 
percentage of sharia scholars who are able to combine knowledge of the sharia with financial 
theory is gradually improving with the introduction of many educational programmes in Islamic 
finance as well as positive law and conventional finance.1030  In addition, many IFIs have 
established in-house sharia training programmes in which young scholars are paired up with 
senior scholars on a mentoring basis.1031  The recruitment and training of additional staff with 
sharia knowledge and financial expertise will contribute significantly to the quality of sharia 
supervision and will help to dispel conflict of interest issues associated with multiple SSB 
memberships. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of consistency of sharia legal opinions across IFIs and jurisdictions 
continues to bedevil the industry, as noted in chapter four concerning the issue of sharia 
standardisation.  Besides limiting the growth prospects of the industry, however, lack of 
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consistency undermines consumer confidence in the types of products that have been allowed 
and in the industry as a whole.1032   
 
Another issue concerns the disclosure of all information relating to an IFI’s sharia supervisory 
process.  In general, investors are faced with an absence of information relating to the activities 
of the SSB. Ideally, an IFI would disclose the duties, competence, composition and decision 
making of the SSB, including the publication of all fatwas.1033 In practice, the irregular conduct of 
the internal sharia audit and the non-existent provision of information concerning the SSB’s 
decision making disadvantages the consumer from making optimal investment decisions.  
Finally, the fatwa concerning the financial product provides no indication of the legal reasoning 
employed to approve a product.  This lack of disclosure discourages confidence in the industry 
and prevents a larger role for market discipline from taking root. 
 
Once a product has been approved and formally launched, “sharia supervision may take the 
form of ongoing monitoring through periodic audits.  Such audits may be undertaken by means 
of site visits, document reviews, or consultation with management at regular intervals”.1034 In 
practice, however, the ex post verification of transactions has received much less attention from 
SSBs. In fact, most IFIs do not undertake the ex post verification of transactions for their sharia-
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compliance.1035 Recall that this issue was recently highlighted (see section 5.4) in the 2008 
AAOIFI statement concerning the failure of IFIs to properly monitor the transaction of IF 
products and services.   
 
In the next section the FSA’s approach to regulating sharia supervisory boards is considered. 
 
8.4  THE RISKS OF SHARIA NON-COMPLIANCE  
 
Recall from chapter six that the government utilises neutral language in implementing Islamic 
financial transactions in the UK.  This approach reflects the government’s unease in 
transgressing the social understanding regarding the particular role of religion in the UK.  In line 
with this approach the government takes no responsibility for problems of choice of evaluative 
criteria such as whether an Islamic financial product or service complies with the sharia as it 
states that this would be “inappropriate” as a “secular” regulator.1036  Individual financial 
institutions are wholly responsible for determining the sharia compliance of the products and 
services they offer.  In accordance with AAOIFI standards, most Islamic financial institutions opt 
to form an SSB comprising three sharia scholars trained in classical Islamic commercial law, 
although others have chosen to use sharia consultancy services or have merely hired a single 
sharia scholar.  The state does not stipulate any requirement regarding sharia compliance or 
enforcement with respect to the myriad functions of Islamic financial intermediation.  The 
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Financial Services Authority (FSA) states that “it would not be appropriate, even if it were 
possible, for the FSA to judge between different interpretations of sharia law”.1037  Hence the 
FSA believes that neutrality can be achieved by avoiding any subjectivity or “bias” and by 
focusing on concrete data which can be understood in absolute terms and free of context.  
Moreover, a neutral position can be claimed between and vis-à-vis faith-based arguments.1038   
 
However, the accommodation of the unique role of sharia scholars within IFIs is acknowledged 
by the FSA as having potential implications for the solvency of Islamic financial institutions. In 
particular, the market’s response to a breach of sharia rules could dispel confidence in IFIs, as 
compromised assets would automatically be seen as liabilities and a bank’s solvency could be 
thrown into question.1039  As IFIs become more systemically important and more closely 
connected with conventional banks, this risk increases,1040 particularly for wholesale institutions.  
 
While such a scenario has not yet taken place in the UK, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
British Muslims’ low take-up of retail Islamic financial products is related to their highly sceptical 
opinion concerning the sharia-authenticity of Islamic financial products.1041   Furthermore, 
overseas investments from Gulf state investors are probably even more dependent upon the 
industry gaining the trust and confidence of investors in the sharia authenticity of their products.  
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The British investment bank, Kleinwort Benson, in its first stab at creating an Islamic unit trust in 
1986, was not very successful, in part as a result of not employing a sharia supervisory board or 
even a single sharia advisor to monitor the fund. It had not established the necessary credibility 
with Gulf investors.1042  Yet the FSA’s approach to regulating IFIs places all its emphasis upon 
evaluating and mitigating the financial risk that institutions may present, and largely ignores the 
“religious risk” associated with the development of the industry. 
  
The FSA has acknowledged the unique role of sharia supervisory boards in Islamic financial 
institutions since these entities are responsible for approving and legitimating the “Islamic” 
products and services that originate from such institutions.  Yet the state is essentially 
hamstrung from developing criteria and procedures to address the qualitative nature of the 
boards other than those employed to examine the corporate governance of conventional 
financial institutions.  The FSA’s emphasis centres on the role of the SSB in each authorised 
firm; particularly, the SSB’s impact on the direction or operation of the firm.  This is partly 
undertaken by reviewing the terms and conditions of sharia scholars’ contracts.1043 The FSA 
must determine whether sharia scholars are assigned an executive role or whether they merely 
provide advisory services to the institution.  According to the FSA Approved Persons rules,1044 
the suitability of anyone acting as a director is assessed according to “fit and proper” criteria.  
For example, these criteria relate to the competence and capability of the candidate, so a 
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prospective director would be expected to have relevant experience and education.  If a sharia 
scholar’s role does resemble that of an executive director, multiple memberships of different 
financial institutions’ SSBs would be problematic due to significant conflicts of interest.  We have 
seen on an international basis that the practice of sharia scholars sitting on multiple supervisory 
boards is a common, if not regular, occurrence.  However, FSA-authorised IFIs to date have 
shown that sharia scholars occupy advisory roles so that their responsibilities do not interfere in 
the management of the firm.1045  However, this finding is unconvincing. The SSB’s objective, to 
ensure the “sharia compliance in all an entity’s products and transactions”,1046 plays a pivotal 
role in the organisation; indeed, the SSB’s existence legitimises the Islamic label and constitutes 
an important motivation in Muslim consumers’ demand for Islamic financial products and 
services. It seems unlikely that those individuals who decide whether a product can be brought 
to market under the Islamic brand do not have an impact on the management of the firm.   
 
The FSA attempts to justify its inattention to the religious risks associated with sharia 
supervisory committees by requiring that Islamic financial institutions “pay due regard to the 
interests of its customers and treat them fairly”.1047 The FSA’s Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) 
programme lays emphasis on the provision of clear information, suitable advice and an 
acceptable level service”.1048  However, these requirements do not oblige the FSA or the IFI to 
provide information on whether particular products are sharia-compliant.  The FSA does require 
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1048 Ibid. 
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IFIs to provide an explanation of Islamic financial products and their associated risks,1049 but this 
information concerns the economic risks of products; it takes no notice of any qualitative 
attributes.  For example, the government has made an effort to distribute fact-sheets on Islamic 
home mortgage purchase plans (known as HPPs) which provide a “step-by-step guide to each 
product and the associated risks and benefits”.1050 This information is not sufficient to determine 
whether such products comply with Islamic law.  
 
Finally, issues concerning financial malfeasance and false advertising need to be considered.  
In particular, the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 20081051 reinforces other 
consumer protection acts including the Trade Descriptions Act 19681052 and the Fraud Act 
2006.1053  In general, this legislation makes illegal “misleading actions” based upon false 
information as to the nature or main characteristics of the product or service; and actions which 
cause or are “likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would 
not have taken otherwise”.1054  Yet an offence can only be established under the regulations if it 
can be proven that the service provider knowingly or recklessly engaged in a misleading 
action.1055  Hence, as there is neither an agreed standard on what constitutes sharia compliance 
                                               
1049 Ibid., 25. 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 “Consumer Protection”, SI 2008/1277. 
1052 Trade Descriptions Act 1968. 
1053 Fraud Act 2006. 
1054 “Consumer Protection”, pt 2, s 5(2)(b). 
1055 MCB, “Consultation” (2008), 11-12. 
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nor enforcement other than the non-binding standard-setting efforts of international 
organisations such as AAOIFI, claims of false advertising are generally non-justiciable.   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Islamic financial intermediation is based on a profit-and loss-sharing model in which profits are 
shared in agreed ratios and any losses are passed on to the investor/depositor pursuant to the 
muḍārabah contract.  Theoretically, under the two-tier muḍārabah model, IFIs are not liable for 
any losses except their time and effort in managing the investment on behalf of depositors.  In 
practice, Islamic banks prefer debt-based contracts such as Murābaḥah, istiṣnā‘ and salam that 
produce short-term profits and are relatively liquid. These types of financing structures 
constitute approximately 80 per cent of a typical IFI’s balance sheet.   
 
Profit- and loss-sharing modes of finance are associated with a number of additional risks that 
conventional retail banks usually do not countenance. These risks are associated with the moral 
hazard occasioned by the muḍārib’s investment activities and the limited oversight available to 
the Islamic bank in accordance with the law pertaining to the muḍārabah contract.  Other 
principal-agent risks associated with the terms and conditions of the muḍārabah are asymmetric 
risk, fiduciary risk, adverse selection, and displaced commercial risk.   Furthermore, investors 
are exposed to the uncertainty of different accounting treatments of investment accounts that 
make financial comparability across jurisdictions extremely difficult.  In the UK, IFRS standards 
are required of IFIs, so this is less of a concern.    
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The UK domestic industry has faced several regulatory difficulties as a result of the hybrid legal 
structure associated with Islamic financial contracts.  These include questions of how to 
categorise Islamic financial contracts according to the FSMA 2000 Regulated Activities Order.  
Another serious challenge involves the statutory definition of a deposit and its capital guarantee 
requirement.  This law effectively prevents Islamic banks from using the muḍārabah on the 
liabilities side of the balance sheet.  The result is that the PLS model – the cornerstone of 
Islamic finance – is not a feasible model in the UK.    However, there is reason to believe that 
British Muslims, and indeed most Muslim investors around the world, have not shown a definite 
preference for profit-and loss-sharing modes of finance.  Arguably, Muslim consumers/investors 
have internalised the conveniences of modern finance and consumer lifestyles, and enjoy the 
certainty and predictability that capital-guaranteed investment accounts afford.   
 
The sharia audit process of SSBs differs according to IFIs’ articles of association.  In practice, 
very few national regulators take part in the composition, procedures or any other aspect of SSB 
functions. Most IFIs have adopted AAOIFI standards concerning the sharia audit process, which 
includes regular audits, site visits, document reviews and advisory work concerning the 
development of products. 
 
Several problems affect the integrity of SSB governance and thus undermine confidence in the 
industry.  These problems relate to sharia scholars’ independence, confidentiality, and 
competence in their positions as sharia advisors to financial institutions.  Issues also concern 
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SSB’s consistency across jurisdictions and information disclosure policies. Surveys of SSB 
practices from a large number of IFIs indicate that these problems are widespread and deep-
seated.  
 
The FSA’s regulatory approach toward Islamic finance is designed to facilitate a level playing 
field that enables Muslims to practice finance in accordance with their faith.  The FSA does not 
show favouritism towards Islamic finance or any other mode of finance.  Nor does it believe that 
it would be appropriate to intervene in the religious functions of Islamic financial institutions.  
Therefore, the authority does not interfere with any aspect of the sharia law-making capacity of 
sharia supervisory committees – which most Islamic financial institutions house – other than to 
enforce the Approved Persons regime of the FSMA 2000.  Accordingly, the FSA has 
categorised sharia scholars as non-executive persons, which provides that they are not involved 
in the management of the financial institution.  This assessment takes no cognisance of the 
religious risks associated with sharia non-compliance.  Conventional regulatory authorities are 
ill-equipped to deal with IFIs’ religious functions by virtue of the appropriate role of the state in 
religious matters in the United Kingdom.  
 
The following chapter is the last substantive research chapter of the thesis.  It examines the final 
piece in the complex web of law that constitutes the UK Law of Islamic Finance; namely, the 
enforcement of Islamic financial transactions in English courts. 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE ENFORCEMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is concerned with the enforcement of Islamic financial transactions in English 
courts and with the implications of enforcement for the industry.  In particular, the chapter 
demonstrates the legal challenges that prevent Islamic financial transactions from being 
enforced according to the sharia.  Moreover, arbitration as an alternative means of dispute 
resolution for Islamic financial transactions is considered.  Finally, the chapter illustrates the 
pluralistic legal interaction that the enforcement of Islamic financial transactions brings about 
and the difficulties that it presents.   
 
This topic is addressed by analyzing first several recent cases in the English courts.  In the 
second half of the chapter the role of arbitration is the focus; in particular, its feasibility in cross-
border commercial transactions and its compatibility with attitudes in the Middle East are 
considered.  Finally, specific cases in which arbitral awards have been adjudicated in English 
courts are examined. 
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9.1 ISLAMIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN ENGLISH COURTS 
 
Parties to international commercial and financial transactions often adopt English law as the 
governing law of their contract due to its “well-known and well-developed jurisprudence [...] 
which is not open to doubt or disputation on the basis of religious or philosophical principle”.1056  
In particular, freedom of contract in English law has proved pivotal to English law’s international 
success.  It represents a laissez faire approach that views the “courts’ role as that of enforcing 
parties’ bargains” so long as they do not transgress acceptable norms of behaviour.1057  
Freedom of contract in English law has helped to create some of the most efficient and flexible 
financial markets in the world; as well as a regime for security interests “which is unrivalled for 
its informality and its willingness to allow the parties to define their own rights and remedies and 
to organise their relationships in whatever way they consider best suited to their needs”.1058 
Furthermore, The English courts have a strong reputation for impartiality and competence, and 
the English legal profession has a high reputation for their specialist international commercial 
expertise. Both domestic and international traders have come to associate English law with the 
stability and predictability that is necessary for international commerce to flourish.1059 
 
Only a handful of published court decisions involving Islamic financial transactions have been 
reported worldwide.  Malaysia is one jurisdiction in which some published case law exists.  
                                               
1056 Shamil Bank v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd  [2004] EWCA Civ 19 [54]. 
1057 Goode, “Millenium”  (1998), 31. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 Ibid. 
387 
 
Many Middle Eastern jurisdictions, however, do not report their case law and private law firms 
are not disposed to report cases in which they have acted as counsel. Bälz indicates that plain 
vanilla financial transactions have generally become non-litigious; and that financial institutions 
are wary of creating innovative structures that expose them to lawsuits.1060  In fact, most 
financial transactions are settled out of court. All of these factors may have contributed to a 
scarcity of case law. 
 
9.1.1  THE SYMPHONY GEMS CASE 
 
Islamic Investment Co Ltd v Symphony Gems NV1061 (Symphony Gems case) is reportedly the 
first Islamic financial transaction decided in a Western court.1062  The case involved a 
murābaḥah financing agreement made between the parties “in accordance with the Islamic 
Shariah” that was nonetheless governed by and construed according to English law.1063  
Further, the importance of the case resides in its illustration of the way in which English courts 
uphold parties’ contractual agreements where these are not constrained by the rules of 
mandatory legal provisions or public policy.  The case also demonstrates the mixed nature of 
the Law of Islamic Finance.  Specifically, it shows the interaction of the sharia, English law and 
                                               
1060 Bälz, “Murabaha” (2004), 118-19. 
1061 [2002] Transcript. 
1062 Moghul and Ahmed, “Contractual Forms” (2003-2004), 155. 
1063 Symphony Gems (n 1063) (A). 
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the law of the Bahamas, together with internationally recognised commercial principles when 
these are enforced in an English court of law.   
 
The Islamic Investment Company ((IIC) the claimant) and Symphony Gems ((SG) the first 
defendant; the second and third defendants served as guarantors) made an agreement 
involving a “revolving sale and purchase facility”.  The seller (IIC) granted the purchaser (SG) 
the facility.  The seller agreed to purchase rough diamonds from a supplier and immediately sell 
these to SG on deferred payment terms pursuant to purchase agreements.   Two purchase 
agreements were made, each to equal $7,500,000 in rough diamonds.  According to the 
purchase agreements, IIC transferred $15 million to the account of Precious Ltd, based in Hong 
Kong and was to receive $7,917,450 in payment for each advance.  However, IIC did not 
receive payment and sought to retrieve these monies, accrued interest and damages, minus 
$7.5 million recovered pursuant to a bank guarantee.1064 
 
The case turned on the defence’s claim that the outstanding balance required delivery of the 
rough diamonds to the purchaser, i.e. whether the sale price is due in the absence of delivery. 
Tomlinson J took note of the fact that the defendants did not raise the issue of absence of 
delivery to the claimants prior to the proceedings, a fact that assisted the Tomlinson J in 
reaching his conclusion.1065 A purchase agreement “means an agreement made between the 
Purchaser and the Seller for the purchase of Supplies by the Seller from the relevant Supplier 
                                               
1064 Ibid. 
1065 Ibid. 
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and for the sale of those Supplies by the Seller to the Purchaser [...]”.1066 Pursuant to clause 4.3, 
those purchase agreements required the purchaser “to enter into arrangements with the 
supplier to the effect that the seller will purchase the supplies from the supplier”, or else the 
agreement would be automatically terminated.1067  On this basis, Tomlinson J concluded that 
“all of the arrangements concerning the acquisition of goods by the seller from the supplier fall 
to be made by the purchaser, for the very good reason that this is a financing agreement 
facilitating or apparently facilitating the purchase of supplies by the purchaser”.1068  Furthermore, 
“if therefore there has been no delivery of goods from the supplier to the seller and thus from the 
seller to the purchaser, that can only be because the purchaser has not made the necessary 
arrangements”.1069 
 
Further, clause 4.4 provides that “the instalments are payable whether or not the seller is in 
breach of any of its obligations under the relevant purchase agreement” and this would certainly 
include a failure to deliver.1070   Payment was to be made unconditional of any event.  Nowhere 
in the agreements was a delivery date specified nor were any procedures provided for the 
logistics of such arrangements.  Hence, Tomlinson J ruled that the delivery of goods was “not a 
                                               
1066 Ibid., cl 3. 
1067 Ibid., cl 4.3. 
1068 Ibid., cl 4.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.6. 
1069 Ibid. 
1070 Ibid., cl 4.4. 
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prerequisite to recovery by the sellers of the relevant instalments of the sale price from the 
purchaser”. 1071  
 
In Symphony Gems the legal issue concerning the Islamic legal definition of a murābaḥah 
contract1072 was not a concern of the court, because the issues on which the court was to 
decide were strictly matters of English law.  Clause 25 of the agreement clearly stated: “This 
Agreement and each Purchase Agreement shall be governed by, and shall be construed in 
accordance with, English law.”1073 Morrison J concluded that he “must simply construe it 
according to its terms as an English law contract.”1074 
 
The defence also claimed that the contract was illegal, a claim dependant on the court’s 
construction of the contract being found unlawful in the place of performance.  The defence 
claimed that the contract envisaged performance in Saudi Arabia.  In that case the sharia would 
be applicable to the transaction and its terms and conditions would likely be void.  Tomlinson J 
did not find that the contract called for performance in Saudi Arabia and therefore ruled that the 
principle of illegality was irrelevant.1075 
 
                                               
1071 Ibid. 
1072 Evidence provided by Dr Yahya Al-Samaan, partner of the law firm Salah Al-Hejailan in Saudi Arabia 
and Dr Martin Lau, then Lecturer in South Asian law at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
indicated that the transaction did not meet the requirements of the classical murābaḥah. 
1073 Ibid., cl 25. 
1074 Ibid. 
1075 Ibid., . 
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The next argument relied upon by the defence was an ultra vires argument.  Ultra vires is a 19th 
century doctrine that limited a company’s legal capacity to the objects stated in its memorandum 
of association.  Any action which transgressed those limits was in principle void.1076  With 
respect to this particular contract the defendant claimed that the “contract is outwith the objects 
stated in the Claimant’s Memorandum of Association, which includes the limitation to carry out 
in a manner which is consistent with Islamic laws, rules, principles and traditions the following 
objects”.1077  Referring to the expert testimony provided by Dr Yahya Al-Samaan, Tomlinson J 
agreed that the essential characteristics of the murābaḥah had not been met in this transaction.  
Yet the application of the ultra vires doctrine depended on the law of the Bahamas, the 
jurisdiction in which IIC was incorporated, because the capacity of corporate entities is 
determined by the place of incorporation rather than the governing law of the contract.  
Tomlinson J ruled that Bahamian law it did not prevent the IIC from acting outwith its objects, so 
ultra vires could not be relied upon by the defence. 
 
In Symphomy Gems Tomlinson J’s judgment for the claimant highlights an English tradition of 
freeing the hands of commercial parties and thus upholding the bedrock doctrine of party 
autonomy.  The court’s primary concern was in upholding a properly agreed contract and thus 
safeguarding commercial interests. This represents a historical continuity of English courts 
upholding reasonable business practices where these are not otherwise constrained by the 
                                               
1076 Davies, “Company Law”  (2008), 153. 
1077 Symphony Gems (n 1063).   
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rules of mandatory legal provisions or public policy.  As a result, the business community is 
granted wide discretion to agree the terms of contracts.1078   
 
The following section addresses a very influential case in which the question of whether the 
sharia can be chosen as the governing law of the contract was debated. 
 
9.1.2  THE BEXIMCO CASE AND THE ROME CONVENTION 
 
Shamil Bank v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd (the Beximco Case) was an appeal from the High 
Court, in which Morrison J found in favour of the respondent, Shamil Bank of Bahrain, and made 
an award of US $49.7 million.  Appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted on a single point “in 
relation to the construction and effect of the form of the governing law clause contained in the 
financing agreements”.1079  The clause in question reads: “Subject to the principles of the 
Glorious Sharia’a, this Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the 
laws of England”.1080    
 
The Court of Appeal’s ruling illustrates two key principles. First, the Rome Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations1081 – an EU treaty whose provisions, in general, 
                                               
1078 Bälz, “Murabaha” (2004), 126. 
1079 Beximco (n 1058) [1]. 
1080 Ibid. 
1081 European Convention 80/934/ECC on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 
Convention) [1980] OJ L266/1. 
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established the law governing contractual relations in the UK at the time in which the case was 
heard – made clear that a contract could only be governed by the law of a country so that a 
contract which sought to incorporate a non-state law or body of principles such as the lex 
mercatoria or the sharia would not be recognised as the applicable law of a contract.1082   
 
Second, the judgment demonstrates the relevant application of the English doctrine of 
incorporation, in which parties may incorporate specific ‘black letter’ terms of a foreign law or 
general legal principles or non-state law into an English contract but which can only serve as a 
source of law from which the governing law may draw.  ‘Incorporation’ is a shorthand method of 
including a limited set of terms so as to avoid laying out the articles of a foreign law in full.  The 
court would construe an English contract, “reading into it as if they were written into it the words” 
of the foreign law.1083  In such a case where there existed ambiguity or doubt as to the effect of 
such rules, the court would rely upon the testimony of experts in foreign law.1084  However, the 
courts are not bound to the expert evidence on foreign law inasmuch as they are “interpreting 
the terms of an English contract and not applying foreign law,” as established under the 
authority of Stafford Allen & Sons Ltd v Pacific Steam Navigation Co.1085  
 
                                               
1082 Ibid., [48]; Collins, “Conflicts of Laws”  (2006), 1568. A subsequent EU Regulation on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, known as Rome I, now supersedes the Rome Convention in all EU 
member states.  See Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.  
1083 Collins, “Conflicts of Laws”  (2006), 1571. 
1084 Halpern v Halpern [2007] EWCA Civ 291 [ 31]. 
1085 [1956] 2 All ER 716. Collins,“Conflicts of Laws” (2006), 1572. 
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The background of the case centred on the Beximco Group’s efforts to seek working capital 
from the respondent, Shamil Bank – an IFI – whereby monies were advanced via two 
“morabaha financing agreements”.1086  A principal murābaḥah financing agreement was entered 
into between the first defendant, the second defendants and the bank, under which the bank 
agreed to purchase, with the second defendant acting as its agent, certain goods to be sold to 
the first defendant.1087  Pursuant to the initial 1995 murābaḥah agreement, Shamil Bank 
advanced the second defendant US$15 million.  In 1996 a second murābaḥah agreement was 
agreed and another US$15 million was advanced for the purchase of specified goods.  By 
December 1999 the defendants had defaulted on the agreements.    
 
Subsequent negotiations led the bank and the first and second defendants to enter into two 
Exchange in Satisfaction and User Agreements (ESUA) modelled on an ijārah contract, with the 
third, fourth and fifth defendants acting as guarantors.  The ESUAs provided that the bank 
would discharge the amounts outstanding under the 1995 and 1996 Morabaha agreements in 
exchange for unencumbered title to certain assets.  The defendants were entitled to use those 
assets in the normal course of their business “in consideration for payment by instalments of a 
user fee” as well as other “payments of accrued compensation”.1088  Subsequently, termination 
and default events occurred and Shamil initiated proceedings in the English court.1089  
 
                                               
1086 Beximco (n 1058) [12]. 
1087 Ibid., 14. 
1088 Ibid., [19]-[20]. 
1089 Ibid., [20]-[21]. 
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The appellants did not dispute the fact that there can be only one governing law in respect of 
the agreements, nor that the proper law of these agreements was English law.  Article 1.1 of the 
Rome Convention requires the parties to choose the law of a country to govern their 
contract.1090  It stipulates that “the rules of this Convention shall apply to contractual obligation in 
any situation involving a choice between the laws of different countries”.1091 On the face of it 
Article 1.1 is not “applicable to a choice between the law of a country and a non-national system 
of law, such as the lex mercatoria, or “general principles of law”, or as in this case, the law of 
Sharia”.  Article 3.1 of the Rome Convention, which provides that “a contract shall be governed 
by the law chosen by the parties” and with reference to choice of a “foreign law” in conjunction 
with Article 3.3, “make it clear that the Convention as a whole only contemplates and sanctions 
the choice of the law of a country”.1092   
 
Yet the appellants contended that the financing agreements were only enforceable in the event 
that both the sharia and English law were complied with.1093 The principles of the sharia should 
be given relevance.1094 Further, it was argued that the construction of the governing law 
“produces a result no different from the incorporation by reference of a codified system of rules, 
                                               
1090 Rome Convention [1980]. Article 3.1 of the Rome Convention was implemented in the UK under 
article 3, paragraph 1 of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 and applied to all contracts made after 1 
April 1991. See Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
1091 Rome Convention [1980], art 1.1. 
1092 Beximco (n 1058) [48]. For analysis of this case see Bälz, "Rome Convention”, 45; Chuah, 
“Morabaha” (2006-2007), 168; DeLorenzo and McMillen, "Law” (2007), 162; Junius, "Islamic Finance” 
(2007), 537.  
1093 Beximco  (n 1058) [27], [42]; [2003] EWHC 2118 [15]. 
1094 Beximco  (n 1058) [42]. 
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such as the Hague Rules or the Warsaw Convention into a contract governed by English law 
[...]”.1095  For example, the Court of Appeal in Nea Agrex SA v Baltic Shipping Co Ltd1096 rejected 
a lower court’s conclusion that a “paramount clause provision was to be treated as ineffective to 
incorporate the Hague Rules into a charterparty”.1097  In that case the Court of Appeal held that 
the court should strive to give meaning to an incorporated clause if at all possible, rather than 
rendering it meaningless.1098  Hence the defence argued specifically that the rules relating to 
interest and the nature of the murābaḥah and ijārah agreements should be read into the 
agreement in accordance with the “principles of the Glorious Sharia” governing clause.1099 
 
However, the court ruled that the doctrine of incorporation can only function where the parties 
have identified the terms of their contract in “specific ‘black letter’ provisions of a foreign law”, 
international code, or set of other rules such as the Hague rules, which are amenable to 
incorporation as “terms” of the relevant contract.  The doctrine enables parties to an English 
contract to agree a contract which is construed in accordance with the relevant articles of a 
foreign law or non-state law.  The effect of such would not make a non-state or foreign law the 
governing law of the contract, rather the specific articles of such a law would be incorporated as 
contractual terms into an English contract.1100   
                                               
1095 Ibid., [43]. 
1096 Nea Agrex SA v Baltic Shipping Co Ltd, [1974 N. No. 2011] - [1976] Q.B. 933. 
1097 Beximco  (n 1058) [43]. 
1098 Nea Agrex (n 1098), 935. 
1099 Beximco  (n 1058) [49]. 
1100 Collins, “Conflicts of Laws”  (2006), 1571. 
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Unlike Nea Agrex, in the present case “the general reference to the principles of the sharia [...] 
affords no reference to, or identification of, those aspects of sharia law which are intended to be 
incorporated into the contract, let alone the terms in which they are framed”.1101  Thus the court 
agreed with the general consensus amongst experts that the reference to the sharia does not 
afford the court with a direct reference to specific terms or other legal rules intended to be 
incorporated into the contract.1102  This prevented the court – even if the court was able to do so 
– from determining the dispute according to such religious principles.1103  However, if specific 
provisions of the sharia had been included in the parties’ agreements with respect to ribā and 
the contractual essentials of the murābaḥah and ijārah, the “defendants would have been likely 
to succeed”.1104   
 
The UK government’s decision to opt-into the Rome I Regulation – note that Rome I is a 
regulation and is thus directly effective in English law – has allowed the successor to the Rome 
Convention to be applied to contracts concluded after 17 December 2009.1105  Like the Rome 
Convention, the principle of party autonomy in relation to parties’ choice of law is “substantively 
the same” as in Rome I.1106  Like the convention the regulation does not foresee parties’ choice 
                                               
1101 Beximco (n 1058) [52]. 
1102 Ibid., [55]. 
1103 Chuah, “Morabaha” (2006-2007), 151; Beximco  (n 1058) [40]. 
1104 Ibid., [55]. 
1105 News, "Rome I” (2008). 
1106 Justice, "Rome I” (2008), para 45. 
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of a non-state body of law as the choice of law despite an early draft resolution which might 
have permitted parties to choose public international law.1107  The final session of regulation 
does offer parties the means to “incorporate” non-state law or international standards by 
reference into their contract,1108 for recital 13 of the Preamble to Rome I provides that the 
regulation “does not preclude parties from incorporating by reference into their contract a non-
state body of law or an international convention”.1109 However, this leaves unresolved the 
problems of convincing an English court, in the light of the Beximco decision, that the sharia is a 
“body of law” which can be incorporated.1110 
 
Some observers have perceived this as a slight to Islamic jurisprudence and a relegation to 
second-class status.1111  Some Muslims have taken offence at Morrison J’s comments in 
Beximco to the effect that the sharia was unfit to govern modern commercial or banking 
transactions on the basis that its provisions are difficult to specify or ascertain.  They view this 
as a ‘capitis deminutio’, a diminution of the sharia and contextualise the court’s findings in the 
light of early arbitration awards such as Sheikh Abu Dhabi v. Petroleum Ltd,1112 Ruler of Qatar v. 
International Marine Oil Company Ltd,1113 and the well known 1958 Aramco v. Government of 
                                               
1107 Wood, “Conflict of Laws”  (2007), 62. 
1108 Rome I [2008], para 13. 
1109 Ibid. 
1110 Following discussions with NHD Foster. 
1111 Chuah, “Morabaha” (2006-2007), 168. 
1112 [1953] 47 AJIL 156. 
1113 [1953] 20 Int LR 534. 
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Saudi Arabia1114 award.  In each of these cases, British judges held that the sharia could not 
“reasonably be said to exist”, or it “contains no precise rule” concerning a particular contract, so 
that Islamic law could not “reasonably” be used as the governing law.1115  Furthermore, they 
assert that many legal systems entail similar difficulties, and that the law of the land in Saudi 
Arabia is the sharia. Moreover, the sharia is an internationally recognised body of law.  The 
International Court of Justice recognises the sharia as belonging to the general principles of law 
recognised by civilised states.1116  Why then should the problem of ascertaining the law arise, 
when, in fact, it is applied in international commercial arbitrations?1117 
 
An important consequence of the Beximco case concerns the religious risks which arise from 
non-compliance with the sharia.  Potter LJ remarked that neither party “was under any illusion” 
as to the true nature of the transactions which provided long-term working capital and that both 
parties “were content to dress the loan transactions up as morabaha sales (or ijārah leases), 
whilst taking no interest in whether the proper formalities of such a sale or lease were actually 
complied with”.1118  Accordingly, Potter LJ felt that the dispute should be approached in 
accordance with the actual substance of the agreement rather than construing the wording in a 
manner which would be irreconcilable with the authors’ intentions.1119 Furthermore, the effect of 
                                               
1114 [1958] 27 Int LR 117. 
1115 Fadlallah, "Arbitration” (2009), 307-08. 
1116 Ballantyne, "Shari'a” (2010), 11. 
1117 Examples of arbitration in which parties have chosen the sharia as the substantive law of their 
agreement are considered in the following section. 
1118 Beximco (n 1058) [47]. 
1119 Ibid. 
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the Beximco judgment in City law firms has been to reduce the sharia aspect of deals to a 
matter of compliance and not law.1120  These considerations may unsettle the market since the 
court indirectly determined that the types of murābaḥah and ijārah transactions performed in the 
case at hand did not comply with a strict interpretation of the sharia.  As a result, the court 
intimated that a genuine link between the subject matter and the financing must be made for 
these contracts to fulfil their Islamic criteria.  Hence, the Court of Appeal has indirectly defined 
the “authentic” version of these transactions as sale-based transactions.  In doing so, issues of 
liability and mandatory policy as discussed above could limit the flexibility and use of these 
types of instruments.1121   
 
Beximco also illustrates the importance of the industry’s standardisation efforts. Specifically, the 
sharia will not be applied in an English court of law unless it can be convinced that an 
authoritative interpretation of the sharia can be determined.  AAOIFI standardisation efforts are 
an important step in this process and yet the willingness of financial institutions and affected 
countries to implement these rules has been ad hoc and minimal.  The lack of convergence 
around such standards or of another set of authoritative standards prevents parties from making 
a more general contractual reference to ‘the agreed standards of Islamic commercial law;’ but it 
may enable parties to incorporate specific AAOIFI rules as long as these are clearly indicated. 
Second, the judgment must necessarily refocus the industry’s attention on the important work of 
sharia supervisory boards’ audit and assessment of IFI’s products and transactions.  English 
                                               
1120 This information was communicated to me in person by NHD Foster. 
1121 Chuah, “Morabaha” (2006-2007), 149. 
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courts have made it very clear that they will not play the role of SSBs in determining the sharia 
compliance of financial transactions.  Hence, the judgment is a very important marker for IFIs in 
terms of their legal expectations.  The burden of ascertaining the Islamicity of products lies in 
the preparation of contracts and internal sharia audit systems and controls.1122  
 
9.1.3  THE INVESTMENT DAR CASE1123 
 
The Investment Dar Company KSCC (incorporated in Kuwait – TID) and Blom Developments 
Bank SAL (Blom) entered into a wakālah (agency) agreement pursuant to which Blom made 
several deposits.  Blom’s prinicipal investments as well as an anticipated profit return were 
guaranteed, equivalent to a loan-bearing investment.1124 TID’s SSB approved the sharia 
compliance of the agreement in October 2007.1125  
 
Blom claimed sums allegedly due under the agreement and applied for summary judgment.  
Summary judgment, a legal device to expeditiously dispose of a case without a trial, is used 
                                               
1122 Junius, "Islamic Finance” (2007), 542. Some arguments have been advanced that Uddin v Choudhury 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1205 has overturned the persuasive precedent set by the Court of Appeal in Beximco. 
However, from this author’s standpoint, Uddin v Choudhury, a matrimonial dispute, is not relevant to the 
Beximco decision.  This is supported by the absence of any mention of Rome I or the Beximco judgment. 
An unpersuasive argument was made in Bowen, “English Courts” (2010). 
1123 The Investment Dar Company KSCC v Blom Developments Bank SAL [2009] EWHC 3545(Ch) [12]. 
1124 Ibid., [2]. 
1125 Ibid., [10]. See also Cunningham, "Sharia Boards” (2010). 
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when there is no dispute concerning the material facts of the case, and a party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Blom claimed in contract and trust. 
  
TID’s memorandum of association requires that all transactions are sharia-compliant.1126 
Nonetheless, TID argued that the agreement was not sharia-compliant, was therefore ultra vires 
its memo and void under Kuwaiti law. A court’s ruling that a contract had been undertaken ultra 
vires its articles of association would be deemed void despite any recitals, contractual 
representations and promises not to challenge the sharia-compliance of the agreement, which 
was provided in the master wakālah agreement.1127   
 
At the summary judgment hearing, Master Bragge found that this was triable issue but found for 
Blom with respect to its trust claim.1128  
  
However, Purle J ruled that the trust claim ‘was sufficiently arguable […] that there is no trust 
claim’, and so decided it was a triable issue.1129  Furthermore, Purle J agreed with Master 
Bragge, that the ultra vires claim was also a triable issue.1130 
                                               
1126 Ibid., [3], [4]. 
1127 Norton Rose, "Implications” (2010).   
1128 Ibid., [18]. 
1129 Ibid., [19]-[20]. 
1130 Ibid., [20]. 
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The Investment Dar caused much consternation in Islamic financial markets as a result of the 
sharia compliance risks the case highlights.1131 Yet the case has no precedential value; it is 
merely an appeal from summary judgment.  Furthermore, there is nothing out of the ordinary 
about the court’s decision.  It was simply that the ultra vires issue was triable.   The case has 
not been to trial and the issue has not been argued, so we do not know what the result would 
have been (e.g. there might not have been a problem under Kuwaiti law).  Furthermore, ultra 
vires is a well-known issue and the possibility of its occurrence is a matter of standard due 
diligence.  Finally, the case is disquieting in that an IFI should have produced such an 
argument, but it remains highly unusual.  
 
The following section examines alternative methods of dispute resolution available to Islamic 
financial transactions. 
 
9.2 ARBITRATION AND ISLAMIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
 
Arbitration allows contracting parties to an Islamic financial transaction the possibility of 
choosing a non-state body of law or other legal principles as the applicable law of their contract.   
Theoretically, contracts in which the sharia, the lex mercatoria or the general principles of law 
are the express choice of the parties will be given effect in most jurisdictions around the world.  
As long as parties have agreed that such rules apply or in circumstances in which the parties 
                                               
1131 CityUK, "Islamic Finance" (2011). 
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have remained silent concerning the governing law, the choice of a non-state law will not affect 
the validity or enforceability of the arbitral award.1132   
 
However, in practice, the utility of arbitration in most Arab jurisdictions is limited to some extent 
by the uncertainty of whether foreign arbitral awards will be enforced.  Furthermore, banks and 
financial institutions have shown an antipathy towards arbitration for a number of reasons 
examined below.   
 
9.2.1  THE PROS AND CONS OF ARBITRATION 
 
Arbitration is a process in which parties who are in dispute have agreed, either in their contract 
or after a dispute has arisen, to submit their dispute to an experienced person who they believe 
will exercise good judgment and impartiality in resolving their conflict.  This person or persons 
decide the dispute according to the procedures or law of a private tribunal known as the lex 
arbitri.  The substantive matters of the dispute may be governed by an entirely different law, or 
the lex arbitri may also be chosen as the law in this instance.  However, most international 
arbitrations are carried out in a neutral country – a country in which the parties are not habitually 
resident – and the law which governs the enforcement of the award is almost always different 
from the law chosen to regulate the arbitration proceedings.  The arbitrator’s decision is both 
final and binding on the parties because the parties have agreed to bind themselves to the 
                                               
1132 Redfern et al., “Arbitration” (2009), 221. 
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tribunal’s decision.1133  In effect, the choice to arbitrate is to rescind one’s “right of recourse to 
the courts of law in respect of any such dispute”.1134 Arbitration is made internationally 
enforceable through the New York Convention and the national laws that implement such 
agreements.  The key characteristics of arbitration, the neutrality and competence of the arbitral 
forum, necessarily require broad international recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to 
make the system workable.   
 
The relevance of arbitration to solving commercial disputes is shown by the fact that 
“international arbitration has become the principal method of resolving disputes between states, 
individuals, and corporations in almost every aspect of international trade, commerce and 
investment”.1135  In such disputes huge amounts of money are often at stake. In fact, instances 
in which large sums are at stake are more likely to be referred to arbitration.1136  It has been 
commonly used to decide commercial disputes in a much more flexible manner than court 
proceedings; and has been noted for its capacity to limit the damage or embarrassment of 
contracting parties in a manner conducive to future constructive business relations.1137  
Moreover, a major survey found that corporate counsel preferred arbitration over transnational 
litigation because it offers a “private and independent system, largely free from external 
                                               
1133 Ibid., 1-9. 
1134 Ibid., 17. 
1135 Ibid., 1. 
1136 PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary, "Arbitration” (2008), 3. 
1137 Blackett, "Courts" (2009), 12. 
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interference”,1138 a reference to the danger of settling commercial disputes when one party is a 
state.   
 
Furthermore, Middle Eastern cultures display a preference for a mediation-like form of dispute 
resolution.  Their communitarian makeup instills individuals with a strong sense of respect to 
those persons who are senior to themselves, and a duty to protect those who they perceive as 
more vulnerable.  People attempt to save face and take care not to inflict shame on others.  A 
clear preference for informal methods of dispute resolution is viewed as a means of 
safeguarding peace and harmony within the professional or social group.1139 
 
Islam supports the resolution of disputes by mediation.  Arbitration and mediation, known as 
sulh in the sharia, are not necessarily distinguished from one another.  Both provide a means of 
resolving disputes that are more amicable to all parties involved.1140 Early Muslim traders often 
resorted to mediators in settling commercial disputes.  The mediator was recognised for his 
prestigious social status, deep knowledge, impartiality and honesty in finding solutions to 
disputes, which disputants felt morally bound to honour.1141     
 
                                               
1138 PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary, "Arbitration” (2008), 9. 
1139 Antaki, "ADR” (2009), 113-14.   
1140 See Khatchadourian, "Arbitration” (2010), 12. 
1141 Ibid. 
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Yet banks and financial institutions have traditionally shunned arbitration in favour of litigation   
for the following reasons:1142  
(1)  financial disputes typically involve straightforward payment claims and do not 
involve complex legal questions or fact finding, with the latter more suited for 
arbitration;  
(2)  arbitration does not provide for the possibility of default judgments or summary 
judgments, and as a result arbitration is not as efficient and cost effective as 
court proceedings;  
(3)  disputes about the tribunal’s jurisdiction may lead to unnecessary delays;  
(4)  arbitrators tend to render more equitable decisions than judges;  
(5)  the flexibility of the arbitral process creates legal uncertainty;  
(6)  banks appreciate control of decisions by higher courts on appeal;  
(7)  arbitration can permit unnecessarily extensive document production (particularly 
compared with civil law courts);  
(8)  arbitration is problematic in multi-party disputes;  
(9) arbitral confidentiality means that proceedings cause less embarrassment to the 
debtor; and  
(10)  awards have limited precedential value.  
 
Moreover, arbitration can be more expensive as the arbitrator must be paid, the venue hired 
and, in some cases, the fees of an arbitration centre must be borne.  However, the relative 
merits and disadvantages of arbitration versus litigation depend upon the type of transaction, 
the counterparty and the location of the assets.1143  Furthermore, all courts should not be 
considered equal; litigation in one country might be more favourable than in another. For 
example, arbitration is favoured in transactions with counterparties in emerging markets.1144 
                                               
1142 Sheppard, "Arbitration” (2009). 
1143 Ibid. 
1144 Ibid. 
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Finally, all arbitral processes should not always be considered more costly or less efficient than 
litigation.1145    
 
9.2.2 THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS 
 
Arbitration agreements are generally recognised and enforced in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.1146  The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention)1147 so that arbitral 
judgments involving cross-border disputes are recognised and enforced in the UK.  Article (2), 
section (1) provides that “each contracting state shall recognize an agreement in writing under 
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or 
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or 
not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration”.1148  Moreover, the treaty 
binds signatory states to recognise awards made outside their national borders unless the 
government has specifically opted to recognise only certain national jurisdictions.1149 The 
convention has been incorporated in the UK Arbitration Act 1996.  Section 101 provides that:1150   
                                               
1145 Ibid. 
1146 These are the jurisdictions that are subject to the UK Arbitration Act 1996.  
1147 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [1958]. 
1148 New York Convention [1958]. 
1149 Ibid. 
1150 Arbitration Act 1996, s 101. 
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(1) A New York Convention award shall be recognised as binding on the persons as 
between whom it was made, and may accordingly be relied on by those persons by way 
of defence, set-off or otherwise in any legal proceedings in England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland.  
(2) A New York Convention award may, by leave of the court, be enforced in the same 
manner as a judgment or order of the court to the same effect.   
 
As of 23 April 2010 144 states out of a total of 192 UN member states, had adopted the 
convention.1151  
 
The UK Arbitration Act 1996 comprises almost all English arbitration law.1152  Unlike conflict of 
laws principles which stipulate that only a state law can be used as the governing law of a 
contract, section 46 provides that:1153 
  
1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute: (a) in accordance with the law chosen by 
the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute; or (b) if the parties so agree, in 
accordance with such other considerations as are agreed by them or determined by the 
tribunal. 
                                               
1151 “New York Convention” [1958]. 
1152 Arbitration Act 1996; c.f. Blackett, "Courts" (2009), 12. 
1153 Arbitration Act 1996, s 46(1)(a),(b). 
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Thus parties possess the legal right to settle a dispute according to the sharia or other non-state 
law or body of rules.  Moreover, section 46 (1)(b) provides the parties and tribunal with greater 
latitude in deciding which set of rules they wish to employ.   
 
Arbitration in the area of consumer banking is limited in the European Union by the terms of the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive.1154  The directive proscribes pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts that have not been individually negotiated and are 
thus deemed unfair, i.e. those instances in which a significant imbalance between the rights and 
obligations of the contracting parties disadvantage the consumer.1155 Any dispute that arises in 
conjunction with such clauses cannot be the subject of arbitration.1156   
 
As financial institutions have increased transactions with developing countries the role of 
arbitration has become more important.  This is a result of their uncertainty as to whether 
English law judgments or New York law judgements will be given effect in these jurisdictions.  
For example, financial institutions often include arbitration clauses in international loan 
transactions with counterparties based in the Middle East and Asia, South America, Russia and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Such contracts are structured to provide 
financial institutions with flexibility in the way in which potential disputes are resolved.  In 
                                               
1154 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L95/29, 
art 3(3). See UK statutory instrument: The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 
1999/2083, para 4(2)(a). 
1155 EC, "Summary” (1993).  
1156 Bantekas, "Arbitrability” (2009), 312. 
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London this is done by referring disputes to English courts with an option, exercisable by the 
bank in the event a dispute arises, to initiate arbitral proceedings instead.  In England this option 
has been sanctioned in Law Debenture Trust Corp plc v. Elektrim Finance BV.1157   
 
Cross-border Islamic financial transactions stand to benefit from the New York Convention and 
its rules of enforcement for arbitral awards. Leading issuers of sukuk, including Bahrain, 
Malaysia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are signatories to the treaty.1158  Key 
industries in the Middle East such as shipping, energy, oil and gas, and insurance have shown 
themselves most likely to take advantage of international arbitration.1159  Yet significant 
uncertainty attaches to the enforcement of arbitral awards in Middle Eastern courts.  
Theoretically, signatories to the New York Convention should enforce arbitral awards without re-
examination of the award.1160  Yet, in practice, enforcement has proved to be uncertain.  
 
For example, in Saudi Arabia the enforcement of arbitral awards involving financial transactions 
is highly uncertain due to the sharia and its prohibitions of ribā and gharar.  In general, none of 
the sharia courts in Saudi Arabia would even entertain a dispute involving a prohibited financial 
activity, let alone approve an arbitral award that involved the payment of interest.1161 
Furthermore, any arbitral award governed by a law other than the sharia or Saudi law would be 
                                               
1157 Sheppard, "Arbitration” (2009). See [2005] EWHC 1412(Ch). 
1158 Jarrar, "Awards” (2009), 12. 
1159 PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary, "Arbitration” (2008), 9. 
1160 Linklaters, "Developments” (2011).   
1161 Baamir, “Shari'a”  (2010), 154-58. 
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reviewed for its sharia compatibility.  Awards found to contradict with the sharia are subject to 
excluding the prohibited activity from the award or re-submitting the dispute to a different 
authority.1162 
 
In the UAE, however, two recent foreign arbitral awards were enforced without re-examination 
of the merits of the award, which may lead to greater confidence in the UAE amongst the 
international business community.1163  This optimism is qualified by the fact that legal systems in 
the Middle East do not base decisions on precedent and the possibility exists that another court 
may reach a different decision in any subsequent action, thus compounding the uncertainty of 
enforceability.1164  
 
In the next section the way in which Islamic financial arbitral awards have been enforced in 
English courts is examined. 
 
9.3 THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN ENGLISH COURTS 
 
Sanghi Polyesters Ltd v The International Investor KCSC1165 offers an example of how arbitral 
awards involving Islamic financial transactions will be enforced in English courts.  In general, the 
                                               
1162 Ibid., 162. 
1163 Linklaters, "Developments” (2011).   
1164 Ratings, "Fitch's Approach” (2007), 3. 
1165 [2000] All ER (D) 93. 
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case demonstrates that the right to appeal arbitral awards will be very limited.  The case 
concerned a financing agreement based on an Islamic istiṣnā‘  contract (purchase or hire 
agreement) in which The International Investor KCSC (TII) furnished Sanghi Polyesters Ltd 
(SPL) with US $5 million to produce and export polyester yarn.  SPL failed to pay sums due 
under the contract and subsequently failed to perform under various extension agreements 
created to assist SPL.  Thereafter, TII began arbitration proceedings according to the 
agreements’ arbitration clause which provided: “This dispute shall be governed by the Laws of 
England except to the extent it may conflict with Islamic sharia, which shall prevail”.1166 The 
arbitrator awarded TII the principal and profit it had claimed but disallowed some additional 
damages of approximately $600,000.1167   
 
The arbitration was held under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
based in London.  The parties had chosen the Arbitration Act 1996 as the law of the forum.  
Section 69 of the act permits parties “to appeal against a question of law arising out of the 
Award in certain circumstances but only if the parties have not “otherwise agreed”.1168  The 
court found that the parties, in deciding to submit their dispute to arbitration, had waived their 
right to appeal in accordance with article 24 of the ICC (the lex arbitri).  Hence, they had clearly 
“otherwise agreed” and Mackie J dismissed this argument.  
 
                                               
1166 Ibid., transcript.  
1167 Ibid. 
1168 Arbitration Act 1996, s 69. 
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According to section 69(3) the following issues would enable a party to appeal an arbitral 
award:1169  
a) that the determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of 
the parties; 
b) that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine;  
c) that on the basis of the findings of fact in the award (i) the decision of the tribunal on the 
question is obviously wrong, or (ii) the question is one of general public importance and 
the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt;  
d) that, despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just 
and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question.  
 
The court summarily dismissed SPL’s applications which sought to make effect of s 69(3) on the 
basis of procedural errors committed by the arbitrator and thus confirmed the high threshold 
necessary for gaining leave to appeal. 
 
Another case, Halpern v Halpern,1170 provides insight into the complex conflict of law 
considerations judges must make in resolving arbitral disputes which parties seek to enforce 
under English law.  While the case addresses a number of contractual issues, including duress, 
just one subject of the appeal will be examined below; namely, whether Jewish law can be the 
applicable law of a contract.  In this light Halpern is important in terms of the way in which the 
                                               
1169 Ibid., s 69, sub-s 3. 
1170 [2007] EWCA Civ 291. 
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court interpreted section 46(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996.  As noted above, section 46 (1)(b) 
allows the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute, if the parties so agree, in accordance with ‘such 
other considerations’ as are agreed by them.  Since the court ruled that the seat of arbitration 
was in England, it decided that ‘such other considerations’ would permit the tribunal to apply the 
parties’ choice of Jewish law or non-national law to govern a certain part of the contract1171 
“under which matters of interpretation can be assisted by rules or a law different from the 
applicable law of the contract”.1172  Because the dispute involved an arbitration, which applied 
Jewish law, the application of Jewish law was material to the contract.   
 
The claimants in this appeal sought the enforcement of an arbitral compromise which had taken 
place before a Zurich-based Beth Din composed of three Rabbis.  The arbitration had sought to 
resolve issues concerned with the status of an inheritance dispute.   All the parties were devout 
orthodox Jews and had agreed to submit their inheritance disputes to arbitration.  The 
compromise took the form of a written agreement which did not expressly state which law was 
to govern the contract.1173  The defence challenged the validity of the compromise on the basis 
that under Jewish law the compromise would be unlawful.  The defence “pleaded that Jewish 
law (halakha) was intended to be the lex causa as well as the lex curia, and would regulate 
procedure;” the result of which would render the compromise agreement void.1174   
 
                                               
1171 Redfern et al., “Arbitration” (2009), 227. 
1172 Halpern (n 1172) [35]. 
1173 Levy, "Duress” (2006), 936. 
1174 Halpern (n 1172) [14] subpara vii. 
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In the event that a law has not been chosen to govern the agreement section 46(3) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 provides that the court must have reference to the conflict of laws rules 
which it considers applicable”.1175 Furthermore, article 4 of the Rome Convention provides 
that:1176  
 
To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance 
with Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is 
most closely connected.  Nevertheless, a severable part of the contract which has a 
closer connection with another country may by way of exception be governed by the law 
of that other country.  
 
The circumstances of the case involved English law, Swiss Law and Jewish law – the laws of 
countries as well as a non-state law.  The absence of the parties’ choice or consent as to the 
substantive law of the compromise agreement made the consideration of Jewish law as the 
applicable law of the agreement, redundant.  Furthermore, Beximco established that Article 1(1) 
of the Rome Convention “makes it clear that the reference to the parties’ choice of “the law” to 
govern a contract is a reference to the law of a country.  It does not sanction the choice or 
application of a non-national system of law”.1177 The court affirmed the supremacy of national 
legal systems in citing the well known case of Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance 
                                               
1175 Arbitration Act 1996, s 46, sub-s 3. 
1176 Halpern (n 1172) [27]. 
1177 Ibid., [21]. 
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Co.1178  In that judgment Lord Diplock said that “contracts are incapable of existing in a legal 
vacuum.  They are mere pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless they were made by 
reference to some system of private law which defines the obligations assumed by the parties to 
the contract by their use of particular forms of words and prescribes the remedies enforceable in 
a court of justice for failure to perform any of those obligations”.1179   
 
In applying the Rome Convention, the court concluded that the contract had been reached 
under the auspices of a Beth Din in Switzerland; and the parties resided in England and brought 
their claim to an English court.  Further, the parties to the compromise did not propose the 
application of Swiss law to the agreement.  Therefore, the court found that England and hence 
English law represented the “closest connection” to the circumstances of the case. 
 
In effect, the Court of Appeal resolved the matter by taking cognisance of the fact that the 
dispute was initially an arbitral dispute and therefore required the court to apply the Arbitration 
Act 1996.  In particular, the court’s reference to section 46(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act convinced 
the court that “such other considerations” could make the provision of Jewish law material.  The 
finding reaffirms the judgment in Musawi v RE International Ltd1180 that paragraph 46(1)(b) 
entitled the parties to an arbitration to employ Shia sharia law as the substantive law of the 
                                               
1178 [1984] AC 50. 
1179 Ibid., 66.   
1180 [2007] All ER (D) 222(Dec). 
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dispute.1181  The court in Halpern said that the “solution under which matters of interpretation 
can be assisted by rules or a law different from the applicable law of the contract, but matters 
affecting the contract as a whole must be dealt with by the applicable law is […] consistent with 
the Convention”.1182  Apparently, the court sees its approach to this matter as one of 
determining the extent to which the applicable law would enable the provision of Jewish law to 
influence a part of the contract.1183   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The Symphony Gems case underscores the complex interplay of multiple legal systems and 
norms that becomes apparent in the process of enforcing Islamic financial transactions.  
Furthermore, the case provides an illustrative example of how the murābaḥah is used by the 
Islamic financial industry as a trade financing contract and what legal risks arise from its 
particular terms and conditions.  Finally, the case illustrates the types of arguments that have 
resurfaced in Islamic financial disputes, including claims of sharia non-compliance and ultra 
vires transactions. 
 
The Beximco case represents a persuasive judgment by an English court that prevents parties 
from choosing the sharia as the governing law of their contract.  According to the Rome 
                                               
1181 Ibid., [46](1)(b). 
1182 Halpern (n 1172) [35]. 
1183 Ibid., [36]. 
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Convention, to which the UK is a signatory, and its subsequent replacement (Rome I), a non-
state law may not be chosen by the parties to govern their contract.  However, Beximco 
illustrated that the sharia could then be incorporated into the contract pursuant to English law’s 
doctrine of incorporation in accordance with Rome I, recital 13 of the Preamble.  In Beximco, 
however, the Court of Appeal ruled that the inclusion of the sharia in the governing law clause 
was indeterminate and did not meet the black letter law requirements of that doctrine. The 
decision has caused consternation amongst many Muslims who argue that the sharia should be 
allowed to govern Islamic financial transactions. 
 
A theoretical alternative for allowing parties to choose the sharia as the governing law of their 
contract concerns the practice of arbitration.  However, for a number of reasons, banks and 
other financial institutions have traditionally shunned arbitration in favour of litigation.  This 
practice may be changing as financial institutions increase the number of transactions with 
emerging markets and choose to include arbitration clauses in their agreements.  Furthermore, 
arbitration accords with the preferences and attitudes of Middle Eastern cultures and so may be 
a viable alternative for Islamic financial disputes. 
 
Arbitral awards are enforceable in England, Wales and Northern Ireland pursuant to the 
Arbitration Act 1996.  Cross-border transactions that have assets located in the Middle East or 
involve corporations incorporated in Middle Eastern jurisdictions face uncertainty whether local 
commercial courts will enforce arbitral awards.  For example, commercial courts in Saudi Arabia 
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will often re-examine foreign arbitral awards on their merits and compatibility with the sharia, 
despite being signatories to the New York Convention. 
 
Several cases illustrate the way in which arbitral awards will be enforced in the United Kingdom.  
In those decisions English courts had recourse to the Arbitration Act and its provisions for 
determining whether arbitral awards should be given the force of English law.    
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The concluding discussion examines three interrelated themes highlighted by the thesis. These 
are: the challenges of creating sharia-authentic financial structures; the imperative of reconciling 
value systems by levelling the playing field; and the importance of standardisation as a means 
of establishing a coherent, certain and transparent legal framework for a global LIF.  
 
These themes are examined in turn, followed by a number of proposals for resolving the 
complex challenges that each presents to the development of a global legal framework for the 
Islamic finance industry.   
 
10.1 RESOLVING THE AUTHENTICITY ISSUE 
 
The central legal issue raised by this thesis’ examination of the transformation of the sharia in 
modern financial markets concerns the problem of devising sharia-authentic legal structures, i.e. 
modern structures which evince an “authentic” connection with classical Islamic commercial law. 
The transformation of the sharia via its modern articulation and implementation in modern 
financial markets has created a multiplicity of hybrid MLIFs that together interact to comprise the 
global LIF.  The global LIF’s municipal variants (MLIFs) arise from the law’s implementation in 
municipal legal systems, which vary in terms of their legal and regulatory framework.  However, 
the hybridity and municipal diversity of the developing legal system ultimately undermine the 
law’s claim to sharia-authenticity, since these attributes underscore the LIF’s innovative 
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composition rather than classical authenticity, and also fall short of offering legally coherent, 
certain and transparent financial structures; the necessary elements for financial markets to 
flourish.  
 
The religious risks that result from this sharia authenticity problem undermine confidence in the 
industry and its financial offerings. The following proposals address different thematic elements 
of the thesis, yet all provide incremental solutions to the problem of sharia authenticity. 
Ultimately, these proposals seek to facilitate clarity, transparency and a more cohesive 
framework for the facilitation of MLIFs and their interaction with the globally relevant LIF.  
 
The first theme concerns the thesis’s contribution to revising perceptions of Islamic commercial 
law, the basis from which the modern industry derives its inspiration.  
 
10.1.1  REEVALUATING THE ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LEGACY 
 
Research findings indicate that the sharia, especially its commercial rules, is a pragmatic and 
flexible legal system that is amenable to adaptation, and reserves an important role for 
customary practices (‘urf). It is thus plausible that the legal solutions adopted by jurists through 
their application of Islamic financial ijtihād have a genuine legal basis in the classical tradition 
(fiqh), and may resemble the ways in which jurists made historical commercial transactions 
legitimate (ḥalāl). This is a more important insight than has generally been acknowledged. 
Unfortunately, in today’s highly politicised Muslim world many Muslims and outsiders alike view 
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the sharia as a fairly rigid legal system, not particularly amenable to legal adaptation, not to 
mention modern financial practices. The findings from this thesis speak otherwise, however, and 
it is hoped that this insight will make a contribution to altering this perception.  
 
However, it is clear that a change of perception alone is not sufficient to convince devout 
consumers, for they will remain sceptical about IF products, so long as their substantive effect 
resembles that of conventional products. Authenticity then becomes a byword for the desire to 
create an original economic system that does not take its cues from conventional financial 
values, which seem to have led markets into the abyss.  Therefore, solutions to the challenges 
and problems raised by this central issue must address ways in which the Islamic tradition can 
be more effectively accommodated so as to develop on its own terms. This topic is examined in 
the following section.   
 
10.2  RECONCILING VALUE SYSTEMS  
 
The thesis showed that the UK financial services environment does not, in principle, prevent the 
Islamic finance industry from developing alternative financial markets. Yet the values of the 
global economy, in particular those that underlie the current institutional framework of liberal 
economies such as the UK, are dominant.  In facilitating the stateless LIF in a municipal legal 
architecture, the LIF necessarily interacts with, adapts to, and sometimes conflicts with the 
dominant values of the global economy. Despite this subordination some areas of legal conflict 
have been reconciled that begin to bridge the gap between value systems. Consider, for 
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example, the government’s abolition of double stamp duty in 2003, which ushered in a range of 
new Islamic financial activity. Yet more deep-seated structural imbalances remain that require 
modification for a truly alternative financial system to grow.  What is perhaps surprising is that 
many of these reform ideas emanate from conventional financial circles as ways to rebalance 
the global economy. Indeed, many of the principles behind such proposals could be considered 
“Islamic”. 
 
For example, consider the UK government’s facilitation of mudāraba partnership and profit- and 
loss- investment partnerships. The profit share arising from these transactions, if treated as 
equity-based investments, would normally not be tax deductible by the IFI for the reason that 
dividends are subject to disadvantageous tax treatment – taxes are payable – whereas interest 
is generally tax-deductible.1184 The government approached this problem by amending Finance 
Act 2005, which enabled mudāraba dividends to be treated as interest paid on loans (and hence 
given tax-deductibility). However, the example clearly illustrates the current financial 
architecture’s underlying incentives, which prioritise a debt-based, highly leveraged economy to 
the disadvantage of equity-based investment. An incremental solution to this inequity would 
establish a tax neutral framework by de-incentivising leverage and associated tax-based 
regulatory arbitrage. A neutral tax framework would create incentives to invest in equity, which 
is compatible with Islamic principles.  
 
                                               
1184 Haldane, “Control Rights” (2011), 7. 
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Another way of reconciling value systems would be to review the merit of according the lowest 
risk-weighting to sovereign debt and other debt-based investments for capital adequacy and 
liquidity requirements.1185 Although debt is usually seen as a safer investment than equity, the 
lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis indicate that this is not always the case, and that 
undue reliance upon it may have negative consequences.1186 As for sovereign debt, its safety 
has been put into question in recent months by the problems experienced by some of the most 
highly-rated developed economies including the United States,1187 the United Kingdom1188 and 
France.1189  
 
IFIs cannot avail themselves of interest-bearing debt and so cannot take advantage of the low-
risk weighting of these instruments for capital adequacy or liquidity purposes.  This presents an 
acute challenge for the alternative asset-backed industry.  
 
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which has issued capital adequacy standards for 
IFIs,1190 should be given greater recognition in global efforts to restructure the financial reserves 
                                               
1185 Analytics, “New Framework” (2011), 9. 
1186 Sovereign debt figures heavily in states’ current capital regimes, a factor which has exacerbated the 
Eurozone crisis.  Reliance on these assets for the determination of liquidity ratios is even more 
problematic. See Analytics (n 1185) 9. 
1187 US Sovereign debt was downgraded by S. & P. for the first time in 2011. See Appelbaum and Dash, 
"S.& P. Downgrades" (2011).   
1188 The UK sovereign debt rating is under pressure. See BBC, “Warning on UK Debt" (2009). 
1189 In addition to France, the sovereign debt rating of eight other states was downgraded. See Schneider 
and Cody, "Standard & Poor’s Cuts" (2012).   
1190 IFSB, “Capital Adequacy” (2005). 
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and liquidity ratios of financial institutions via the Basel process. The extent to which IFSB 
standards should be accommodated or made applicable with respect to IFIs must be based on 
a wholesale reconsideration of the risks arising from particular transactions.  
 
Furthermore, in the UK the PRA should invest considerable effort in helping the industry to 
devise an effective interbank lending framework that is not based on interest. Basel III’s 
increased liquidity ratio requirements highlight the enormous challenges that IFIs must surmount 
to remain competitive market players. Helping IFIs to create an established liquidity framework 
would ease liquidity challenges to a considerable extent and potentially make room for the 
development of more authentic products and services. 
 
Finally, the government should consider developing a sharia-compliant deposit guarantee 
scheme, possibly modelled on the takāful insurance model. By making alternative arrangements 
for assisting depositors in the event of monetary loss, the government can assure Muslim 
consumers that their investments will be compatible with the teachings of Islam from start to 
finish.  
 
Another important way of enhancing sharia authenticity involves the global effort to standardise 
the LIF, a topic which is addressed in the following section.  
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10.3  STANDARDISATION OF THE LIF 
 
One of the most important ways of addressing the sharia-authenticity problem of the developing 
LIF concerns the manner in which sharia-inspired transactions are interpreted by courts. For 
example, English courts have shown a historical reluctance to allow the sharia to be chosen by 
parties as the governing law of their contracts. This reluctance was illustrated most recently in 
Beximco which, as the most authoritative case concerning the governing law issue, confirmed 
that the sharia cannot be chosen as the proper law of a contract. Financial markets and legal 
practitioners responded positively, since the judgment clarifies the way in which English courts 
will deal with this type of issue. Therefore, Beximco establishes legal certainty and places the 
moral burden of structuring sharia-compatible contracts on the contracting parties themselves.  
 
Yet the lessons of Beximco do not satisfy devout Muslim consumers’ desire for sharia-authentic 
contracts since a municipal legal system, namely English law, continues to govern their 
interpretation. The recognition that the sharia cannot be the governing law remains a source of 
religious insecurity and sharia legal confusion, in the sense that consumers must recognise the 
difference between the governing law and the sharia aspects of the transaction. Arguably, 
Beximco paves the way for a higher level of religious risks in IFIs, since the judgment allows just 
about any transaction to be labelled ‘sharia-compliant’ as long as the parties have agreed 
amongst themselves that this is indeed the case. The result is that sharia-compatibility has 
become a simple marketing issue, not a legal concern. Captive consumers do not have judicial 
recourse in the event that they belatedly discover their investment products are non-compliant, 
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because there is no single definition of what is meant by labelling a transaction sharia-
compliant. A Muslim investor is expected to know what is sharia-compatible and what is not or 
at least be willing to rely on an SSB’s fatwa.  
 
A partial solution to this problem is to encourage the industry to incorporate specific provisions, 
such as AAOIFI sharia standards, into IF contracts. So long as such provisions are sufficiently 
specific, they operate “as a set of contractual terms agreed upon between the parties”.1191 
English courts will refer to incorporated standards in their interpretation of English law contracts 
so that the legal substance of contracting parties’ objectives is achieved.1192 The determinacy of 
such standards allows easier judicial interpretation and they do not overstep the appropriate role 
of religion in UK public life. Furthermore, the interpretation and resolution of disputes on the 
basis of SSB-accredited sharia standards would strengthen the authenticity claims of the Islamic 
financial industry.  
 
Despite this proposal’s merits as well as other legal solutions such as arbitration, which allows 
parties to settle disputes governed by non-state legal systems, a major consequence of 
Beximco is that the LIF will continue to be conceived outside of municipal legal systems. But this 
trend need not be an impediment to the industry or its efforts to standardise the LIF; in fact, as 
                                               
1191
 Referring to 32-087 and 32-086 Dicey & Morris, cited in Beximco (n 1058) [50] and Nea Agrex (n 
1096) 
1192 Nea Agrex (n 1096). The court ruled that a paramount clause provision could incorporate the Hague 
rules into a charterparty.  
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long as a general level of legal standardisation can be achieved, it may be beneficial, since the 
non-national status of the law may lend it more religious legitimacy. 
 
Another important area of standardisation concerns the ways in which the FSA and its 
successor, the PRA, can encourage IFIs to adopt sharia standards in their market-making 
practices. The current ad hoc approach taken by IFIs in utilising these standards is 
counterproductive and creates legal uncertainty. The regulatory authority can facilitate 
standardisation by revising its process of supervision of the sharia law-making functions of 
SSBs. While the FSA/PRA cannot intervene directly in the sharia law-making process, this does 
not prevent it from supervising the process as a whole. Direct supervision of SSB governance 
would force IFIs to comply with sharia governance and audit rules to which each has chosen to 
subscribe.  
 
A further measure would begin to address the wide range of problems concerning the 
credentials, conflicts of interest and judgment of sharia scholars. This involves the 
establishment of self-regulatory associations to vet, licence and provide training opportunities to 
scholars in a formal, standardised and transparent process. National regulators can play an 
important role in encouraging the formation of sharia scholar self-regulatory associations and 
thus help to strengthen consumer protections.  
 
Finally, the UK government should take the opportunity seriously to reconsider the economic, 
legal and political merits of issuing a sovereign sukuk. As highlighted in the thesis, sovereign 
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issuance would provide a benchmark for subsequent issuances and would generate new growth 
and development in the UK-based industry. It would also provide a legal template for sukuk 
issuance that would encourage the standardisation of the LIF.  
 
All of the above proposals would help to standardise Islamic financial transactions, strengthen 
sharia authenticity claims and assist in reconciling competing value systems. Nevertheless, 
these proposals, even if carried out to the fullest extent, are not likely to be greeted by 
everyone, since Islamic law has a long history of religious contingency. Contingency, the reader 
will recall, is the quality of a religious law that enables a multiplicity of valid and binding 
interpretations to exist side-by-side. Standardisation, despite its clear advantages in the 
mundane world, is a secular feature of law that reflects the authority of mankind to determine 
the structure and rules of society. Some Muslims may find this morally repugnant, since it may 
not accord with the most basic sharia principle; namely, that God is the lawgiver.1193 Despite this 
cautionary note, however, almost all Islamic finance practitioners realise that standardisation is 
the most important means of developing a coherent legal and regulatory framework for the 
Islamic finance industry. It is by far the most important modern tool to help Islamic finance 
practitioners overcome the complex challenges of articulating and implementing the LIF. 
 
 
 
                                               
1193
 There is a lively debate concerning this issue. For example, see Hamoudi, “Death” (2010); Mayer, 
“Methodology” (1990); and Peters, “Jurist’s Law” (2002). 
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10.4  FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This project has shown the challenges associated with the UK MLIF.  Much work remains to be 
done to understand the development of MLIFs in other jurisdictions where Islamic finance has 
been facilitated.  Comparative work with other jurisdictions would clarify the way in which the LIF 
is developing, whether trends are ascertainable, and what differences or idiosyncrasies exist 
between jurisdictions.  Jurisdictions that have created dual legal and regulatory frameworks to 
facilitate the industry – such as Malaysia and Bahrain – should be given special attention as 
they may offer a model that can be fruitfully juxtaposed with the UK’s integrationist model.  In 
general, comparative analyses, which are almost absent in the current literature, offer important 
insights into the ways in which the global LIF is conceived and taking shape across the globe.  
 
Comparative research provides a framework for more conceptual work regarding the 
development of the LIF.  Further work in this area may attract greater scholarly attention to the 
LIF as a globally relevant law, perhaps akin to an Islamic lex mercatoria.1194  Such a marked 
shift in how the law of the industry is perceived would place greater weight on understanding its 
generation, its legal processes and developing hierarchies. It may help in visualising a law that 
transcends the state/non-state distinction that, by itself, is of limited use.1195  
                                               
1194 A set of legal norms, procedures and institutions generated by and for global commerce that exist 
independently of the state. Foster critically analyses the concept of the lex mercatoria in Foster, 
“Foundation Myth” (2005), which is a useful starting point for this analysis. 
1195 Michaels, "Lex Mercatoria" (2007), 468. 
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At the micro-level, continuing analysis of the sukuk, the legal forms used, and the municipal 
legal challenges that arise, will play a crucial role for the further growth and development of the 
industry. As more issuances take place, secondary markets develop and disputes involving 
sukuk are resolved in commercial courts, much work will need to be done to clarify the 
industry’s practices and thus help chart the course for the Islamic financial industry.  
 
10.5 FINAL REMARKS 
 
The pluralistic legal and economic challenges that have fundamentally transformed the sharia in 
modern financial markets continue to raise hurdles to its development. This thesis showed ways 
in which these factors have irreparably altered the sharia via a process of legal hybridisation; a 
process, which, paradoxically, has made the classical legal tradition relevant once again. Yet 
the sharia’s transformation into a LIF comprised of multiple MLIFs requires a concerted effort to 
authenticate the law, so that Muslim consumers are able to connect with the LIF’s religious 
origins.  
 
The thesis has shown sharia authenticity to be the most important element in the process of 
building a modern, certain and transparent LIF.  This thesis’s focus on the development of a UK 
MLIF offers many important insights into the problems, challenges and successes of developing 
an MLIF.  The lessons of this case study can be usefully applied in further research so as to 
chart the most effective and sharia authentic way of developing MLIFs across the globe.  
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